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This dissertation is concerned with a systematic organization of the epistemological dimension 
of human knowledge in terms of viewpoints and methods. In particular, it will be explored to 
what extent the well-known organizing principle of integrative levels that presents a 
developmental hierarchy of complexity and integration can be applied for a basic classification 
of viewpoints or epistemic outlooks.  
In the last decades of research in the field of knowledge organization, there has been an 
increasing interest in the context factor regarding the production, mediation, and consumption 
of knowledge as it is symbolically mediated and recorded in documents. This is often indicated 
by a pragmatic turn emphasizing the epistemic activities that are involved in knowledge 
exchange or information interaction and which need to be considered in its cognitive, cultural, 
and historical contexts. Such an epistemic pluralism calls for a multi-perspective knowledge 
organization that makes explicit the underlying frames of reference of the principal actors of 
information systems including authors as producers, information professionals as mediators, 
and users as consumers of documents.  
The present study approaches such frames of reference or epistemic contexts at two 
analytical dimensions. The first dimension is related to knowledge organization in context 
referring to the fact that knowledge organization systems like classifications, thesauri, and 
formal ontologies are by no means neutral representations of reality but culturally and 
historically embedded human artifacts that serve a given purpose. This part is concerned with 
the context of knowledge mediation and will be illustrated by an exemplary case study 
concerned with a cross-cultural comparison of the ancient Chinese library classification known 
as the Seven Epitomes. The second dimension is related to context in knowledge organization 
referring to the context representation in document indexing that goes beyond the traditional 
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subject representation in that it takes the authorial perspectives of documents into account, 
such as underlying viewpoints and applied methods. This part is concerned with the context of 
knowledge production and will be illustrated by an exemplary case study concerned with the 
representation of authorial perspectives in the interdisciplinary knowledge organization system 
Integrative Levels Classification.  
The central thesis pursued in this investigation is that both dimensions require adequate 
tools for context analysis in order to compare and evaluate divergent or even conflicting frames 
of reference according to context-transcending standards and criteria. This task demands a 
theoretical and methodological foundation that avoids the limitation of a radical contextualism 
and its inherent threat of a fragmentation of knowledge due to the alleged incommensurability 
of epistemic contexts. Based on Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action, 
particularly, his formal pragmatics and rational reconstruction of symbolically mediated 
utterances, it will be argued that epistemic pluralism does not necessarily imply epistemic 
relativism and that a systematic organization of the epistemological dimension of human 
knowledge can benefit from already existing models of cognitive development as 
reconstructed in research fields like psychology, social sciences, and humanities.  
The proposed cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge organization is intended 
to contribute to a multi-perspective knowledge organization in that it offers both analytical 
tools for cross-cultural comparisons of knowledge organization systems, as well as principles of 
organization for context representation that may help to improve the expressiveness of existing 




Diese Dissertation beschäftigt sich mit einer systematischen Organisation der epistemo-
logischen Dimension des menschlichen Wissens in Bezug auf Perspektiven und Methoden. 
Insbesondere wird untersucht inwieweit das bekannte Organisationsprinzip der integrativen 
Ebenen, das eine Hierarchie zunehmender Komplexität und Integration beschreibt, geeignet ist 
für eine grundlegende Klassifikation von Perspektiven bzw. epistemischen Bezugsrahmen. 
In den letzten Jahrzehnten der Forschung im Bereich der Wissensorganisation stieg das 
Interesse am Kontextfaktor bezogen auf die Produktion, Vermittlung und Nutzung von Wissen 
wie es symbolisch vermittelt und in Dokumenten aufbewahrt wird. Dies zeigt sich oft an einer 
pragmatischen Wende mit der Betonung von epistemischen Aktivitäten, die beim Wissens- 
bzw. Informationsaustausch involviert sind und in ihren kognitiven, kulturellen und historischen 
Kontexten betrachten werden müssen. Ein solcher epistemischer Pluralismus erfordert eine 
multi-perspektivische Wissensorganisation, welche die zugrundeliegenden Bezugsrahmen der 
Hauptakteure von Informationssystemen explizit macht wie insbesondere von Autorinnen und 
Autoren, von Information Professionals und von Nutzenden. 
Die vorliegende Studie untersucht solche Bezugsrahmen bzw. epistemischen Kontexte 
bezogen auf zwei analytische Dimensionen. Die erste Dimension, Wissensorganisation im 
Kontext, bezieht sich auf die Tatsache, dass Wissensorganisationssysteme wie Klassifikationen, 
Thesauri oder formale Ontologien keine neutralen Repräsentationen der Wirklichkeit 
darstellen, sondern kulturell und historisch eingebettete menschliche Artefakte sind, die einem 
bestimmten Zweck dienen. Dieser Teil beschäftigt sich mit dem Kontext der Wissens-
vermittlung und wird veranschaulicht anhand einer kulturvergleichenden Fallstudie zur antiken 
chinesischen Bibliotheksklassifikation namens Seven Epitomes. Die zweite Dimension, Kontext 
in der Wissensorganisation, bezieht sich auf die Kontextdarstellung bei der Erschließung von 
Dokumenten, die über eine traditionelle Sacherschließung hinaus geht, indem die 
epistemischen Bezugsrahmen von Autorinnen und Autoren berücksichtigt werden wie etwa 
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zugrundeliegende theoretische und methodische Ansätze. Dieser Teil beschäftigt sich mit dem 
Kontext der Wissensproduktion und wird veranschaulicht anhand einer Fallstudie zum inter-
disziplinären Wissensorganisationssystem namens Integrative Levels Classification. 
Die zentrale These dieser Dissertation geht davon aus, dass eine angemessene 
Kontextanalyse für beide Dimensionen in der Lage sein sollte unterschiedliche oder gar 
konfligierende Bezugsrahmen anhand von kontextübergreifenden Standards und Kriterien ver-
gleichen und bewerten zu können. Diese Aufgabe erfordert theoretische und methodologische 
Grundlagen, welche die Beschränkungen eines radikalen Kontextualismus vermeiden, 
insbesondere die ihm innewohnende Gefahr einer Fragmentierung des Wissens aufgrund der 
angeblichen Inkommensurabilität epistemischer Kontexte. Basierend auf Jürgen Habermas‘ 
Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, insbesondere seiner Formalpragmatik und rationalen 
Rekonstruktion symbolisch vermittelter Äußerungen, wird argumentiert, dass ein 
epistemischer Pluralismus nicht zwangsläufig zu einem epistemischen Relativismus führen 
muss und dass eine systematische Organisation der epistemologischen Dimension des 
menschlichen Wissens von bereits existierenden Modellen zur kognitiven Entwicklung 
profitieren kann, die in Forschungsbereichen wie Psychologie, Sozialwissenschaften und Kultur-
wissenschaften rekonstruiert werden.  
Der vorgestellte Ansatz versteht sich als ein Beitrag zur multi-perspektivischen Wissens-
organisation, der sowohl neue analytische Werkzeuge für kulturvergleichende Betrachtungen 
von Wissensorganisationssystemen bereitstellt, als auch neue Organisationsprinzipien vorstellt 
für eine Kontexterschließung, die dazu beitragen kann die Ausdrucksstärke bereits vorhandener 
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“Only a systematic history of rationality would keep us from 
falling into sheer relativism or naively positing our own 
standards as absolute.” 
Jürgen Habermas  














1.1 The Blind Men and the Elephant 
There is an old and well-known story about some blind men who encounter an elephant. It 
presents a parable about the multi-perspective nature of human knowledge and thus about 
one of the most important challenges regarding the organization of knowledge. Each of the 
blind men approaches a different part of the unknown creature and gives a completely 
different description of the very same object under investigation. One of them examines the 
trunk and describes it as a rope, someone else scrutinizes a leg and describes it as a tree, and a 
third one inspects an ear and describes it as a wing, and so on. Consequently, the blind men 
dispute about who is right and who is wrong, ignoring the fact that they are all partly right by 
emphasizing a specific aspect but also partly wrong by overgeneralizing their own vantage 
point. The moral of this story, commonly referred to as The Blind Men and the Elephant, seems 
to be obvious: A big-picture view is possible as soon as the investigators are able to transcend 
their own limited perspective, the proverbial blindness, by integrating and interrelating the 
perspectives of the others.  
However, the traditional interpretation of this parable seems to be restricted to the 
ontological dimension of human knowledge at the expense of the epistemological dimension. 
On one hand, the ontological dimension is concerned with the nature of being or the basic 
structures of reality and related to phenomena someone is looking at. On the other hand, the 
epistemological dimension refers to the way in which processes of knowing are constituted or 
influenced by a frame of reference or the lens someone is looking through. If the elephant 
represented reality as such and the blind men represented different approaches to investigate 
reality, then an ontological understanding would interpret these multiple perspectives as 
related to different aspects of being. For example, scientific disciplines like quantum physics, 
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neurochemistry, or sociobiology describe different aspects of the same reality according to 
their level of analysis. Therefore, a main challenge of ontology-oriented approaches to 
knowledge organization (KO) is to identify organizing principles that allow to interrelate these 
different aspects of reality within a comprehensive framework (Dahlberg 1978; Poli 1996).  
In KO research, one of the most influential principles of organization is presented by the 
idea of integrative levels, a term invented by biochemist and sinologist Joseph Needham 
(1937), sometimes referred to as levels of reality or levels of being (CRG 1969; Dahlberg 1974; 
Dousa 2009; Szostak, Gnoli, and López-Huertas 2016; Kleineberg 2017). Douglas J. Foskett 
(1961, 139) expresses the idea as follows: 
The theory of integrative levels is that the world of things evolves from the simple 
towards the complex by an accumulation of properties, and that, at a succession of 
levels, these aggregations reach new degrees of complexity and become new wholes, 
with individual and unique identities. 
In other words, integrative levels present a developmental sequence in which entities at each 
new level integrate the characteristic properties and structures of the entities at the older 
levels, while exhibiting some emergent qualities and, therefore, more complexity than their 
predecessors. A typical example of such a hierarchy of complexity and integration is given by 
the sequence atoms—molecules—cells—organisms (Feibleman 1954, 62). The strength of the 
idea of integrative levels is considered to be its synthesizing force enabling a non-reductionist 
organization of the plethora of known phenomena based on logically coherent order relations 
and a general scope of coverage (Foskett 1978; Szostak, Gnoli, and López-Huertas 2016; 
Kleineberg 2017). Even before the invention of the term, the idea of integrative levels has been 
applied to classifications of sciences, for example, by Auguste Comte or Herbert Spencer. Since 
then this organizing principle is explicitly or implicitly used for knowledge organization systems 
(KOSs) including universal or general classifications for libraries (Dousa 2009; Gnoli 2017a). 
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Such ontology-oriented approaches, however, are often based on the problematic 
assumption that the known object can be considered independently from the subject or 
epistemic community knowing them. After an interpretive turn in the philosophy and sociology 
of knowledge such an assumption would be hard to defend since the known and the knower 
appear to be inextricably interwoven (Mai 1999; Brier 2000; Hjørland 2002; Frohmann 2004; 
Svenonius 2004). This is where the role of epistemic contexts comes into play since the 
knowing subject is always already embodied as a material organism and embedded in a social 
and cultural environment at a given point in time. Consequently, the known object is not 
simply a neutral and objective representation of reality but to some extent constructed in 
relation to a context-situated frame of reference, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (2010) 
language game, Hans-Georg Gadamer’s (2013) historical horizon, Thomas S. Kuhn’s (1970) 
paradigm, and Michel Foucault’s (2004) episteme, to name only a few prominent ones.  
Therefore, a more contemporary interpretation of the parable The Blind Men and the 
Elephant needs also to include the epistemological dimension that is concerned with the 
preconditions and constraints of the process of knowing. This means that even if all blind men 
(and a more contemporary version should certainly include blind women and blind children as 
well) investigated the same part of the elephant, they would probably dispute again due to 
their different frames of reference (Kleineberg 2013a). An epistemological understanding 
would interpret these multiple perspectives as different ways of thinking or forms of knowing 
that constitute an epistemic pluralism. Nevertheless, even according to this interpretation, the 
moral of the story might be the same: A big-picture view is possible as soon as the investigators 
are able to transcend their own limited perspective, the proverbial blindness, by including and 
interrelating the perspectives of the others. 
While epistemic pluralism is widely accepted in KO discourse, prevailing epistemology-
oriented approaches to knowledge organization tend to deny the possibility of such a big-
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picture view (Talja, Keso, and Pietiläinen 1999; Jacob 2000; Mai 2004; Olson 2009). Based on 
the premise that human knowledge is always context-dependent, the conclusion is often 
drawn that epistemic contexts cannot be transcended or compared to each other since the 
standards of rationality itself are supposed to be different for every context or frame of 
reference. Consequently, epistemic pluralism would be in danger to end up in epistemic 
relativism and the blind people would be doomed to remain prisoners of their own blindness. 
Departing from the same premise of the unavoidably context-dependent nature of 
human knowledge, the guiding research question addressed by the present study is this: How 
can the multiplicity of perspectives inherent in epistemic pluralism be organized in a 
comprehensive and systematic way without falling prey to epistemic relativism? In analogy to 
the organization of the ontological dimension, it will be asked to what extent the principle of 
integrative levels can be applied for an organization of the epistemological dimension in terms 
of Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
 
1.2 Outline of the Dissertation 
The present study is divided into seven chapters including an introduction, two case studies, 
and a conclusion. Additionally, there is an appendix containing samples of conceptions and 
models of Integrative Levels of Knowing collected from a large body of literature. 
This introduction chapter illustrates the main challenge of a multi-perspective 
knowledge organization, shows the direction for a possible solution, and outlines the structure 
of the dissertation. The starting point is the assumption that since human knowledge is always 
context-dependent the underlying epistemic contexts should be made explicit. It will be argued 
that the resulting epistemic pluralism should be organized in a systematic way to avoid a 
fragmentation of knowledge. The challenge of such a systematization, however, is to identify 
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principles of organization that do not dependent on a single context but can be applied to 
epistemic contexts in general. 
Chapter Two, Knowledge Organization and Epistemic Pluralism, opens the horizon for 
the general problem constellation by reviewing recent theories of knowledge organization and 
their underlying epistemologies from a library and information science perspective. While 
predominant theories of knowledge from pragmatism to historicism to various kinds of 
constructivism agree about the context-dependent nature of human knowledge and the 
importance to acknowledge different frames of reference (Jacob 2000; Svenonius 2000; Mai 
2011; Smiraglia and Lee 2012b; Hjørland 2013b; López-Huertas 2013), there is much less 
theorizing about how to cope with the challenge of a fragmentation of knowledge. It will be 
shown that prevailing context-aware approaches to knowledge organization, exemplified by 
the methodologies of polyrepresentation analysis (Ingwersen and Järvelin 2005; Larsen, 
Ingwersen, and Kekäläinen 2006), domain analysis (Hjørland and Albrechtsen 1995; Mai 2005), 
and genealogical discourse analysis (Frohmann 1994; Olson 2002; Smiraglia, Lee, and Olson 
2011; Fox 2015) tend to be in danger that epistemic pluralism leads to epistemic relativism. 
This is to say that the mere existence of multiple perspectives already implies that these 
perspectives are incommensurable to each other since there is neither a neutral “view from 
nowhere” (Nagel 1986, 1) nor a common measure against which the validity of knowledge 
claims could be evaluated across contexts. This problem has often been articulated as the 
famous thesis of incommensurability (Kuhn 1970; Feyerabend 1975). Taking seriously, this 
would eventually lead to a fragmentation and disorder of epistemic contexts. For the field of 
knowledge organization, this could mean that the various domain-specific documentary 
languages remain idiosyncratic and untranslatable to each other. For the same reason, the 
representation of context information in document indexing could lack an adequate analytical 
framework and principles for an organization of epistemic contexts in general. In analogy to 
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Henry E. Bliss’s (1933, 301) “subject-index illusion” stating that an indexing of the subject 
matter of documents without an underlying systematic organization of knowledge subjects in 
general remains pointless, this problem might be called the context-index illusion. 
Chapter Three, Organizing the Epistemological Dimension, proposes an alternative non-
relativistic approach to epistemic pluralism and introduces the organizing principle of 
Integrative Levels of Knowing. In semiotic terms, the analysis of epistemic contexts refers to the 
pragmatic dimension in linguistics concerned with the relation between a symbolic expression 
and its use by communicative actors. As a theoretical and methodological foundation, Jürgen 
Habermas’s (1984; 1987) Theory of Communicative Action will be adopted in which a 
distinction is made between empirical pragmatics investigating context-specific utterances 
(e.g., sociolinguistics) and universal or formal pragmatics that seeks to reconstruct general 
patterns and conditions of language use that apply to all possible contexts in terms of 
communicative competence. Based on his formal pragmatics, Habermas’s (1979, 2003a) 
methodology of hermeneutic reconstructionism analyzes the author’s implicit know-how or 
intuitive rule consciousness of language in terms of the generative structures or frames of 
reference according to which a symbolic expression has been brought forth. According to 
Habermas, communicative competence is the result of learning processes following a rationally 
reconstructable pattern. Such learning processes are studied by cognitive-developmental 
approaches in psychology and, for Habermas, are best described in the tradition of Jean 
Piaget’s genetic or developmental structuralism emphasizing the underlying logic of 
development. In the present study, such a developmental pattern is termed Integrative Levels 
of Knowing since it exhibits the same formal properties attributed to the traditional organizing 
principle of integrative levels coined by Joseph Needham (1937) and James Feibleman (1954). 
First, there are qualitatively distinct levels of phenomena. Second, there is an invariant 
sequence of the development of these levels. And third, there are hierarchical integrations in 
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the way that phenomena at newer and higher levels include the characteristic properties and 
structures of older lower-level phenomena. A typical example for integrative levels of the 
epistemological dimension of human knowledge is given by the cognitive-developmental 
sequence: sensorimotor—preoperational—concrete-operational—formal-operational (Piaget 
1977, 456–63). Habermas (1990) argues that such cognitive-developmental stages or 
Integrative Levels of Knowing refer to presumably universal learning capacities and offer a 
comparative tool for mutual contradicting frames of reference. In a first step, the empirical 
diversity of epistemic perspectives can be reduced to variation in the contents, in contrast to 
the universal forms. And in a second step, the remaining differences between forms of knowing 
can be explained as differences in the stage or level of cognitive development. As a heuristic 
device, Ken Wilber’s (2000) AQAL framework (abbreviation for All Quadrants, All Levels) based 
on formal-pragmatic distinctions and the organizing principle of integrative levels will be 
introduced in order to provide a point of reference for a discussion of various approaches of 
both individual development and collective development. 
Chapter Four, The Cognitive-Developmental Approach to Knowledge Organization, 
presents an overview of major research traditions of human development providing 
conceptions of Integrative Levels of Knowing, namely, the cognitive-developmental theory 
rooted in genetic structuralism (e.g., Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Robert L. Selman), the 
psychosocial theory rooted in analytic ego psychology (e.g., Erik H. Erikson, Jane Loevinger, 
Susanne R. Cook-Greuter), the cognitive social-historical theory rooted in the cultural-historical 
school of Russian psychology (e.g., Lev S. Vygotsky, Alexander R. Luria, Alexei N. Leontiev), and 
the dynamic systems theory or relational developmental systems theory (e.g., Kurt W. Fischer, 
Willis F. Overton, Richard M. Lerner). To address common criticisms and to avoid potential 
misconceptions, the idea of Integrative Levels of Knowing requires important qualifications. 
Therefore, analytical distinctions are discussed between structural, functional, and age-related 
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aspects; between developmental-dynamical and developmental-logical aspects; between 
descriptive, explanatory, and normative aspects; as well as between domain-general and 
domain-specific aspects. Derived from the described cognitive-developmental research 
traditions, some of the most elaborate models of Integrative Levels of Knowing will be 
presented as reconstructions of domain-specific lines of human thinking and knowing for both 
individual development (e.g., logico-mathematical reasoning, moral consciousness, aesthetic 
experience) and collective development (e.g., worldview, science, religion, art). The chapter 
will close with a brief outline of how these models of Integrative Levels of Knowing have 
already been applied to the analysis of authorial perspectives of documents. 
Chapter Five, Case Study I: The Ancient Chinese Library Classification Seven Epitomes, 
applies the proposed cognitive-developmental approach to a particular knowledge 
organization system under consideration of its epistemic context in order to provide a point of 
departure for a comparative cross-cultural analysis. The example of the Seven Epitomes, which 
presents in many ways a significant contrast to modern library classifications like the Dewey 
Decimal Classification, is chosen for several reasons. First, the classification system of Seven 
Epitomes is well documented in a recent research project (Lee 2010b; 2012a; 2016; Lee and 
Lan 2011). Second, it presents an obvious cultural distance, namely, between China and the 
West. And third, it presents an obvious historical distance between ancient and modern times. 
This distinction between a cultural distance (synchronic dimension) and a historical distance 
(diachronic dimension), not discussed by Hur-Li Lee’s (2016) socio-epistemological approach, 
appears to be indispensable for a comparison of KOSs within different epistemic contexts 
because otherwise it would remain obscure to what extent significant structural differences in 
the frames of reference originate from a genuine cultural difference or from historical 
developments that may occur transculturally. In contrast to strong cultural-relativistic 
approaches, it will be demonstrated how a comparative cross-cultural analysis can be 
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grounded on hermeneutic reconstructionism based on the rational reconstruction of the 
development of classificatory cognition, which seems to follow, at least in some respect, an 
invariant sequence across cultures. 
Chapter Six, Case Study II: The Interdisciplinary Integrative Levels Classification, applies 
the cognitive-developmental approach to context representation in a particular knowledge 
organization system. The example of the Integrative Levels Classification (ILC) is chosen 
because it is an ongoing research project that presents one of the most ambitious attempts to 
express multiple viewpoints or authorial perspectives within a knowledge organization system 
that is intended to serve interdisciplinary purposes (Szostak 2015; Szostak, Gnoli, and López-
Huertas 2016; Gnoli 2020a). Additionally, the phenomenon-based facet-analytical approach of 
the ILC already uses the organizing principle of integrative levels for its basic schema. At the 
current phase, its application is limited to the ontological dimension of phenomena or subject 
matters of document but offers a promising point of departure for a complementary 
application to the epistemological dimension of perspectives or context features of documents 
in terms of Integrative Levels of Knowing. In contrast to ad hoc solutions to context 
representation based on mere listings of terms that largely lack a systematic organization, it 
will be shown that the proposed cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge organization 
based on formal-pragmatic distinctions offers two novel organizing principles, namely, the 
Integral Methodological Pluralism for a classification of methods or methodologies, as well as 
the Integrative Levels of Knowing for a classification of viewpoints or epistemic outlooks. This 
case study will provide some suggestions for their implementation in the Integrative Levels 
Classification. 
Finally, the conclusion chapter summarizes the findings of this study and establishes a 
third alternative solution to the challenge of epistemic pluralism besides an epistemic 
absolutism naively claiming universal validity of its own standards and an epistemic relativism 
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abandoning the attempt to organize multiple perspectives in a systematic way. After discussing 
the limitations of the proposed cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge organization, 
this dissertation will close with a brief outline of new questions for future research. 
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2 KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION AND EPISTEMIC PLURALISM 
 
2.1 Theoretical Foundations of Knowledge Organization 
2.1.1 Knowledge Organization in Library and Information Science  
There are many ways in which human knowledge can be organized systematically. A library 
arranges books on shelves. A university distinguishes faculties and fields of research. An 
individual mind categorizes perceptions of the environment. A natural language classifies things 
from everyday life. In the most general sense, the organization of knowledge is as old as 
knowledge itself and can be found in one form or another in all cultures and at all times 
(Dahlberg 1974; Bowker and Star 2000).  
This section provides an overview of knowledge organization as a field of research in order 
to locate the point of departure of the present study. As initial orientation, Birger Hjørland 
(2008b) distinguishes a narrower and a broader meaning of the term knowledge organization. 
In the broader sense, it means the social and cognitive organization of knowledge. While the 
social organization is concerned with the division of mental labor in a given society according to 
systems of professions or public media, the intellectual or cognitive organization deals with the 
uncovering of structures of reality, as presented by organization systems like the periodic table 
of chemical elements or biological taxonomies of life forms. From this perspective, knowledge 
organization is a highly interdisciplinary field in which single sciences, metaphysics, and the 
sociology of knowledge play a central role. In the narrower sense, knowledge organization is a 
subdiscipline of library and information science (LIS) mainly concerned with the construction of 
knowledge organization systems (e.g., subject headings, classifications, thesauri, formal 
ontologies) and their application as documentary languages for the description of information 
resources. The main purpose of KOSs is to offer users of information systems an orienting guide 
and a mean for information retrieval in the form of a controlled vocabulary for document 
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indexing, particularly, in relation to document collections held by memory institutions, such as 
libraries, museums, galleries, and archives. Hjørland (2008b) concludes that knowledge 
organization in the narrower sense cannot be fruitfully developed without considering 
knowledge organization in the broader sense. 
In line with this conclusion, the present study adopts a LIS perspective on knowledge 
organization with a focus on the epistemological dimension but not without taking further 
knowledge-related fields of research into account, most importantly, the cognitive sciences 
including psychology, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, neuroscience, and philosophy. Such an 
interdisciplinary character of KO research is also emphasized by other LIS authors. For example, 
Ingetraut Dahlberg (2014a; 2014b) argues for an emancipation of the field of knowledge 
organization from librarianship and documentation towards a kind of science of science or 
metascience. Likewise, Robert J. Glushko (2013, 1) seeks to establish a genuine “discipline of 
organizing” in which organization systems from library and information science are related to 
organization systems from other research fields like cognitive science, systems analysis, or 
computer science.  
Library and information science is basically the study of information systems and the 
processes of collecting, organizing, indexing, searching, and retrieving documents or information 
resources, which is why the most important subdisciplines of LIS are considered to be knowledge 
organization and information retrieval (Anderson 1996; Saumure and Shiri 2008; Pattuelli 2010; 
Stock and Stock 2013). While information retrieval (IR) is mainly concerned with optimal 
computer-assisted strategies for searching and assessing documents or their representations, 
knowledge organization is primarily about assigning index terms or metadata to information 
resources based on controlled vocabularies in order to support tasks of information retrieval 
(Broughton et al. 2005).  
13 
The field of knowledge organization is often called “information organization” (Svenonius 
2000, 1; Taylor and Joudrey 2018, 1), whereas information retrieval is sometimes referred to as 
“knowledge retrieval” (Kemp 1988, 1; Martin and Eklund 2000, 18; Zins 2006, 458). Obviously, 
there seems to be a lack of terminological consensus regarding the basic units of organization or 
retrieval. Technical terms like information resource, knowledge organization system, or 
metadata are all related to the same process of document indexing but without sufficient 
discrimination of core concepts like information, knowledge, or data.  
A popular reference model for a conceptual clarification is presented by the so-called 
knowledge pyramid or DIKW hierarchy that presents levels of increasing complexity from data to 
information (processed data) to knowledge (meaningful information) to wisdom (applied 
knowledge). But as noted by Jennifer Rowley (2007) and Martin Frické (2009), there has been 
limited theoretical discussion of this model that seems to be based on problematic positivistic 
assumptions. In particular, it suggests that data—from Latin datum “the given”—at the most 
fundamental level can be considered to be neutral and objective, whereas the context factor 
comes into play not before the levels of processing, meaning attribution, and application. In the 
philosophy of science, such a positivistic assumption is criticized as the “myth of the given,” a 
phrase coined by Winfrid Sellars (1956, 267) to emphasize that even data are generated in and 
influences by a given epistemic context and thus need to be considered in an interpretive way 
(cp. Rorty 1979; Habermas 2003b; Hjørland 2004).  
A more context-aware attempt to disambiguate core concepts of knowledge organization 
is provided by Michael K. Buckland’s (1991b) typology of information concepts that relates 
tangible and intangible aspects to entities and processes (see Table 2.1). 
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Table 2.1 Four aspects of information. 








Data processing, document processing, knowledge engineering 
Source: Buckland (1991b, 6: Table 1.1). 
One advantage of this typology is that it is based on two clear-cut distinctions that are in line 
with common language use and definitions provided by standard dictionaries. For example, 
Buckland (1991a) refers to the Oxford English Dictionary in order to define information-as-
process as the act of informing or the communication of knowledge, information-as-knowledge 
as the knowledge communicated with reference to particular facts or subjects or events, 
information-as-thing as objects like data or documents, and information processing as machine-
based symbol manipulation. Another advantage is that data and knowledge are considered to 
be complementary aspects of information rather than different hierarchical levels. This allows to 
consider any kind of information to be situational in the sense that the informativeness of an 
object, document, datum, or event depends on the contextual conditions that also involve 
subjective judgement and social consensus.  
According to Buckland (1991a), information systems can deal directly with information 
only in the sense of information-as-thing in tangible form (e.g., sign, signal, data, text, film). 
Following this line of argument, Arlene Taylor and Daniel Joudrey (2018, 6) prefer the term 
information organization for the research field since only information as recorded knowledge 
“can be placed into a scheme of organization from which it can be retrieved.” In opposition, 
Hjørland (2012b) argues that the term “knowledge organization” appears to be more 
appropriate since the field is primarily concerned with subjects, concepts, and semantic relations 
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between concepts, that is, information-as-knowledge in intangible form (e.g., ideas, units of 
thought, language games). 
As the subtitle of the present dissertation already suggests, the term knowledge 
organization will be preferred in this study based on two main reasons. The first reason is that 
there is already a well-established use of terminology beginning with library scientist Henry E. 
Bliss (1929; 1933) and the phrase “the organization of knowledge” in two titles of his books, 
which is explicitly adopted for the name of the International Society of Knowledge Organization 
(ISKO) and the corresponding scientific journal Knowledge Organization (Dahlberg 2014b; 
Kleineberg 2015). The second and more important reason is that the present study assumes that 
any information-as-thing cannot be adequately understood without considering the context of 
meaning production that is related to the pre-understanding of communicative actors involved 
in knowledge exchange or information interaction and thus to the intangible aspects of both 
information-as-knowledge and information-as-process. In this regard, Buckland (1991a) 
emphasizes that disciplines like cognitive psychology and studies of interpersonal 
communication and persuasion play a major role and that it could be more important how beliefs 
change (information-as-process) than which beliefs change (information-as-knowledge).  
In an elaboration of Buckland’s typology of information concepts, Søren Brier (1996, 334) 
reformulates this important aspect of information-as-process simply as “Cognition” denoting the 
meaningful interpretation of signs. Since the proposed cognitive-developmental approach is 
concerned with an organization of epistemic contexts or frames of reference, it will focus 
primarily on the intangible processes of knowing and learning or becoming informed 
(information-as-process), in sharp contrast to the mere mechanistic symbol manipulation of 
machines (information processing). This distinction is also stressed by Brier (2000, 434): 
I use the term knowing because it is the process of creating viable knowledge from 
combining experiences in a way that is beyond classical logic and that seems to set human 
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knowledge apart from computers. Our cognitive processes still seem to have features 
beyond any algorithmic model or mechanism. 
In order to avoid an objectivistic understanding of information as a product that can be stored in 
finished form, the notion of knowing refers to the cognitive processes of human actors that take 
place in given contexts and include, among other things, declarative knowledge or knowing that 
and procedural knowledge or knowing how (Biggs 1992). Since the latter form of knowing is 
often only intuitive and implicit, an adequate understanding of information interaction needs 
also to consider what Brier (2000, 435) calls the “inner life,” which requires a phenomenological 
description of perceptions and emotions. In a similar way, John Budd (2001, 249) argues for a 
phenomenological approach to LIS research that takes the “cognitive elements of experience” 
into account. In this respect, the term “cognition”—from Latin cognitio- derived from cognoscere 
“to get to know” or “recognize”—also refers to the process character of human knowing and will 
be explored in more detail in Chapter Four. 
The principal actors involved in information systems like a library or a resource discovery 
system are authors as producers of documents, information professionals as intermediaries (e.g., 
classificationists, thesauri constructors, indexers, system designers), and users as consumers, 
corresponding to the phases of knowledge production, knowledge intermediating, and 
knowledge consumption (Hjørland 2003). Unsurprisingly, different theoretical and 
methodological approaches to knowledge organization tend to emphasize different aspects of 




Table 2.2 Basic approaches to knowledge organization. 




Since 19th century: 
No evident theoretical approach. It probably 
represents a rationalization of library work.  
Examples: DDC, UDC, LCC. 
Concretely, documents are the units 
organized, but the term “knowledge” 
implies a more abstract ambition to 






Analytico-synthetic methodology based on logical 
principles: Breaking down each subject into basic 
concepts and combining the relevant units and 
concepts to describe the subject matter.  
Examples: PMEST formula, BC2. 
“Ideas”. This approach removes itself 
somewhat from the empirical basis of 
documents and introduces logical 
principles for KO which are mainly 





Free-text retrieval: The assumption that texts contain 
all necessary information needed to retrieve them. 
Generally skeptical of all forms of human 
interpretation, indexing, and classification. 
Examples: Cranfield experiments, TREC. 
Concretely, words, co-word relations, 
and word-document relations are the 





Primarily based on using bibliographical references 
to organize networks of papers, mainly by 
bibliographic coupling and co-citation analysis. 
Example: Bibliometric maps. 





Systems designed on the basis of user studies and 
cognitive studies. Relevance is not evaluated by 
subject experts but by users. 
Example: Pejtersen’s “The Bookhouse” study. 




Knowledge organizing systems and processes are 
understood from a study of the domain that is being 
organized, mainly by studying the actors in the 
domain (sociologically) and the theoretical 
assumptions put forward by these actors 
(epistemologically). 
Examples: Ørom’s study of the domain of art, 
Abraham’s study of the domain of music. 
“Knowledge” is replaced with 
“knowledge claims” (documented 
knowledge claims) or works. (What is 
organized are not eternal truths, but 
works with claims which are 
substantiated from one or another 
epistemological perspective). 
Source: Based on Broughton et al. (2005, 141) and Hjørland (2008b). 
For the present study, the question of interest is in which way these different KO approaches are 
able to deal with the context factor and the various perspectives of the actors participating in 
information interaction. Therefore, a short discussion of these basic approaches is intended to 
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show to which already existing ones the proposed cognitive-developmental approach may 
contribute most fruitfully. 
Since the establishment of library science in the 19th century, the approach of 
enumerative classification, culminating in universal systems like the influential Dewey Decimal 
Classification (DDC), Universal Decimal Classification (UDC), and Library of Congress 
Classification (LCC), appears to be more oriented on practical requirements of library work than 
on theory-building in the field of knowledge organization. Even though often unreflected, the 
prevailing theory of knowledge related to the enumerated classification approach is based on a 
scientific realism reflecting the contemporary view before the interpretive turn in the philosophy 
of science (Mai 2011). For example, representatives like Charles A. Cutter, Ernest C. Richardson, 
and Henry E. Bliss more or less agree that library classification should be oriented on scientific 
classification which, in turn, is supposed to reflect the natural order of reality as neutral and 
objective as possible (Hjørland 2008b). This is what Jens-Erik Mai (2011, 711) calls a realistic view 
based on a “modern monistic ontology,” in contrast to a postmodern or “late-modern pluralistic 
epistemological foundation.” Apparently, context-specific aspects or the multiple perspectives 
of authors, indexers, and users play, if at all, only a minor role and are not approached in a 
systematic way. 
Mathematician and classification theorist Shiyali R. Ranganathan (1989) argues that 
enumerative classification schemes have a superficial foundation and are not able to anticipate 
the discovery of new knowledge since the universe of current knowledge presents actually a 
dynamical continuum with ever-growing branches. Instead, he proposes a new approach of 
faceted classification based on the so-called analytico-synthetic technique consisting of two 
main steps. In the first step, the analysis, the subject matter of a document will be broken down 
into basic concepts according to a given set of aspects or facets like Raganathan’s PMEST formula 
(Personality, Matter, Energy, Space, and Time) within his Colon Classification (CC), whereas in the 
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second step, the synthesis, these different basic concepts will be combined in a classification 
notation according to a predefined citation order. The strength of such a faceted classification is 
seen in the stable structure of facets that allows to express different and even unforeseen 
aspects of knowledge in a highly flexible way. This might include a broad range of context 
information about documents, for example, the theories and methods applied by the authors 
(Szostak 2004; Dahlberg 2008; Gnoli 2008a; Szostak, Gnoli, and López-Huertas 2016). But as 
criticized by Hjørland (2013a), the weakness of the facet-analytical approach is its problematic 
assumption that basic concepts do not change their meaning in different contexts, as if they 
were pure logical and a priori semantic units.  
The approach of information retrieval is commonly distinguished from knowledge 
organization activities but Vanda Broughton et al. (2005), as well as Hjørland (2008b), consider 
techniques of information retrieval, at least to some extent, as a genuine KO approach due to 
the fact that they share the same goal to enable users to find relevant information resources. 
The basic units of organization in information retrieval are words and their relations to other 
words or documents (e.g., term frequency or co-occurrence). Although often highly effective for 
search strategies in large-scale text collections, it should be noted that words are primarily 
considered as mere strings of characters regardless of their meaning and the context in which 
they are used. More recent IR approaches seek to include these dimensions as well, for example, 
by using semantic-web technologies like formal ontologies (Rajasurya et al. 2012), by modeling 
the cognitive space of actors in information interaction (Ingwersen and Järvelin 2005), or by 
acknowledging insights from the philosophy of language (Blair 2003; Petras 2006). Indeed, the 
appearance of powerful search engines like Google and Bing based on IR algorithms may call into 
question the value of knowledge organization systems in the digital age. But as argued by Ullah 
et al. (2017), bibliographic classifications like the traditional DDC, UDC, and LCC, as well as more 
modern ones created genuinely for digital environments like the digital library of the Association 
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of Computing Machinery (ACM) or the cooperative catalog WorldCat of the Online Computer 
Library Center (OCLC) can still play a significant role for information retrieval, in particular, by 
providing conceptual relations of classes for the development of formal ontologies. 
Furthermore, Hjørland (2012a) argues that KOSs like classifications and formal ontologies should 
function as evaluation systems for the relevance of IR search results. For example, the retrieval 
of medical documents would benefit from a classification that is based on scientific criteria, such 
as a hierarchy of research methods according to their degree of evidence-based practice.  
The approach of bibliometrics is mainly concerned with citation patterns between 
documents, often in a purely quantitative way regardless of the degree of thematic relevance or 
the reason for citation (e.g., best-practices, negative examples, counterarguments, outdated 
views, self-citation). Even though bibliometric or, more generally, informetric mappings are able 
to visualize social relations and the impact of publication activities within and across discourse 
communities, and thus certain pragmatic aspects of scholarly communication (Smiraglia 2014), 
the approach of bibliometrics largely disregards the context factor. 
Compared to the aforementioned KO traditions, the approach of user studies, often 
referred to as cognitive studies, appears to be much more context-aware since the relevance of 
information resources and the design of information systems is related to specific users or user 
groups with their particular information needs and information behavior. However, this 
approach is criticized for preferring the user’s perspective over the perspective of subject 
experts, for relying on the individual or average user, and for presuming a universal model of the 
human mind regardless of social or cultural influences (Hjørland 2013c). 
The emphasis on the collective aspect of epistemic communities characterizes the 
approach of domain analysis which studies the actors in a given knowledge domain from a 
sociological perspective, as well as from an epistemological perspective concerned with the 
theoretical assumptions put forward by these actors (Hjørland and Albrechtsen 1995). More 
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than any other KO approach domain analysis emphasizes the importance to investigate different 
epistemic contexts or frames of references (e.g., epistemologies, paradigms, language games, 
collective views) and to reflect their implications for relevance criteria, information needs, and 
the organization of knowledge. According to Broughton et al. (2005), the domain-analytical 
approach belongs to the same broader theoretical family as semiotic, critical-hermeneutic, or 
discourse-analytical approaches to knowledge organization. 
While all the presented basic approaches to knowledge organization are still important 
today, a chronological perspective on theory-building seems to reveal a trend towards an 
increasing context-awareness regarding information systems and processes. For the present 
study, the most recent approaches of user studies and domain analysis appear to be the most 
fruitful points of departure for an analysis of the context factor in knowledge organization.  
The historical trend of an increasing context-awareness seems to be also reflected by the 
history of broader paradigms or metatheories in LIS research, which in turn is influenced by more 
general scientific and philosophical developments (Šamurin 1977; Mai 1999; Ørom 2000; 
Hjørland 2000; Brier 2008). Since theories of knowledge organization are explicitly or implicitly 
based on theories of knowledge or epistemologies it appears to be necessary to have a closer 
look at various epistemological positions that can be found in KO research. In order to reduce 
complexity, Hjørland (2013b) offers a useful typology of four fundamental theories of knowledge 
(see Table 2.3). 
 
22 
Table 2.3 Simplified relevance criteria in four epistemological schools. 
Empiricism Rationalism Historicism Pragmatism/activity theory 
Relevant:  
Observations, sense data. 
Induction from collections 




Pure thinking, logic, 
mathematical 
models, computer 












Information about goals and 
values and consequences both 
involving the researcher and 







nature, not books”). Data 
about the observer’s 
assumptions and 
preunderstanding. 
Low priority is given 
to empirical data 
because such data 
must be organized in 
accordance with 
principles which 
cannot come from 
experience. 
Low priority is given to 
decontextualized data of 
which the meanings 
cannot be interpreted. 
Intersubjectively 
controlled data are 
often seen as trivia. 
Low priority (or outright 
suspicion) is given to claimed 
value-free or neutral 
information. For example, 
feminist epistemology is 
suspicious about the neutrality 
of information produced in a 
male-dominated society. 
Source: Hjørland (2013b, 174: Table 1). 
The classical epistemological schools of empiricism and rationalism or their combination in the 
form of logical positivism or logical empiricism, according to Hjørland (2013b), are still much alive 
in contemporary KO research but reveal some serious shortcomings. Most importantly, they 
ignore the fact that knowledge is a social and historical product created to serve certain interests 
and purposes. Recent theories of knowledge in the philosophy of science are dominated by more 
context-aware approaches such as historicism emphasizing that frames of reference can change 
over time and pragmatism stressing the functional purpose and practical effect of knowledge in 
given situations. 
From a historical perspective, Anders Ørom (2000, 23) subdivides the post-war time of 
library and information science into at least three main periods, namely, “the physical paradigm, 
the cognitive view and most recently a tendency towards viewing information institutions and 
information processes in a social and historical context.” The so-called physical paradigm 
presents a realistic view of science and a nomothetic type of research that considers scientific 
knowledge as universal and neutral, not influenced by social and cognitive processes (Ørom 
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2000). During the 1970s, a cognitive turn has taken place criticizing this objectivistic 
understanding as being reductionistic, while emphasizing the importance of cognitive structures 
or knowledge structures involved in information processes. As argued by Peter Ingwersen (1992, 
21), the early cognitivism based on rationalistic assumptions and guided by the metaphor of the 
computer conceiving human beings as information processing devices, should be carefully 
distinguished from a more elaborate cognitive view that refers explicitly to the process of 
meaning attribution in human cognition: 
In contrast to cognitivism, the cognitive view attempts to model information processing 
in terms of “categories and concepts” at the level of mainly conscious mental states, 
implying the property of meaning – not simply as symbol manipulation. As an obvious 
consequence, machines are not capable of understanding meaning, concept 
manipulation, thinking, cognition, creativity, etc. except when told or supported by 
humans. 
For Ingwersen (1994b, 102), the cognitive view is much more interested in the pre-understanding 
of actors and thus related to hermeneutics, which can be associated with Hjørland’s 
epistemology of historicism. According to Ingwersen (1994a), all participating cognitive 
structures are of potential relevance as a context factor and should be taken into account. The 
resulting cognitive variety is termed by Ingwersen (1994b, 101) “polyrepresentation” and 
includes cognitive structures embedded in textual information objects (authors), system designs 
(mediators), and information needs (users).  
In contrast to the methodological individualism favored by the cognitive view focusing on 
mentalistic or intrapsychological aspects, Birger Hjørland’s and Hanne Albrechtsen’s (1995) 
socio-cognitive approach of domain analysis is related to the epistemology of pragmatism or 
activity theory and prefers a methodological collectivism:  
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The domain-analytic paradigm in information science (IS) states that the best way to 
understand information in IS is to study the knowledge-domains as thought or discourse 
communities, which are parts of society's division of labor. 
In short, the most relevant KO approaches for the present investigation are cognitive studies 
oriented on the individual dimension of cognitive actors and domain-analytical studies oriented 
on the collective dimension of epistemic communities since both take epistemic pluralism most 
seriously and provide the most elaborate tools for an analysis of epistemic contexts. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be no consensus to what extent individually and socially oriented 
approaches can be interrelated, as an overview of fundamental metatheories in LIS shows (see 
Table 2.4).  
Table 2.4 Metatheoretical positions in information science. 





















history and social 
relationships 
Knowledge is social in 
origin; the individual 
lives in a world that is 
physically, socially and 
subjectively constructed; 
mutual constitution of 
the individuals’ 
knowledge structures 
and the socio-cultural 
environment 
Production of 






categorise the world and 































Source: Talja, Tuominen, and Savolainen (2005, 82: Table I). 
25 
Sanna Talja and colleagues (2005) offer a typology of theories of knowledge that focuses on the 
origin of knowledge. Table 2.4 presents a polarized continuum from purely individually oriented 
to purely socially oriented approaches that can be found in LIS research. Although one may call 
into question the assignment of some representatives, for example, Jean Piaget’s assignment to 
a purely individually oriented cognitive constructivism that is not supported by his sociological 
writings (Piaget 1995; see also Chapman 1988; Lourenço and Machado 1996; Kleineberg 2012), 
these ideal-typical metatheoretical positions offer an initial orientation. Obviously, the more 
balanced metatheories can be found in the middle of the spectrum since they seek to take both 
individual and social aspects into account. On one hand, the right-hand column of cognitive 
constructivism, represented exemplarily by Ingwersen’s cognitive view, acknowledges social 
influences on individual knowledge structures. On the other hand, social constructivism, 
represented exemplarily by Hjørland’s and Albrechtsen’s domain analysis, concedes that 
individual knowledge structures and the socio-cultural environment are mutually constituted. 
Nevertheless, the important methodological difference is stressed again by Hjørland (2002, 258–
59): 
In this way socio-cognitive views in many respects turn the cognitive view upside down. 
They are interested in individual cognition, but approach this from the social context, not 
from the isolated mind or brain. They are not working inside-out, but outside-in. 
In order to avoid any kind of a one-sided approach, Ingwersen’s and Järvelin’s (2005, 31 
[emphasis in original]) so-called holistic cognitive view proposes a more balanced two-sided 
approach: “This combined bottom-up and top-down view of cognition is named the principle of 
complementary social and cognitive influence.” This principle is also adopted by the present 
study. Despite their differences, cognitive constructivism and social constructivism should be 
carefully distinguished from constructionism that is explicitly adopted, for example, by Talja et 
al. (2005) and presents one of the prevailing approaches in LIS discourse today. According to this 
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view, there is no need at all to take recourse to individual knowledge structures or cognitive 
activities since knowledge is considered to be determined solely by social conversations within 
discourse communities.  
The methodological implications of these different metatheoretical positions regarding an 
organization of the epistemological dimension will be discussed in Chapter Three. But first, it 
should be considered what they have in common, namely, an emphasis on the context-
dependent nature of human knowledge.  
 
2.1.2 The Pragmatic Turn 
As outlined above, in the last few decades of LIS and KO research significant developments have 
taken place emphasizing the context factor in the analysis of information systems and processes. 
This general shift has been labeled differently and will be referred to in this study in semiotic 
terms as the pragmatic turn. Since the communication of knowledge is always symbolically 
mediated and KOSs as documentary languages present conceptual ordering systems, linguistics 
as the study of language and semiotics as the study of signs play a central role for an adequate 
understanding of information interaction in context. According to William J. Hutchins (1975), the 
study of documentary languages can even be considered to be part of the general study of 
communication and sign systems. In his linguistic approach, he refers to Charles S. Peirce’ 
semiotics and Ferdinand de Saussure's semiology to distinguish three important aspects for the 
study of sign systems: the formal aspect, the semantic aspect, and the functional or pragmatic 
aspect. These are related to the linguistic or semiotic branches known as syntax or syntactics, 
semantics, and pragmatics.  
As outlined by Alon Friedman and Martin Thellefsen (2011), syntactics is concerned with 
grammatical structures and the rules describing well-formed sentences in purely formal terms, 
semantics studies the meaning of linguistic expressions as the relation between signs and their 
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referents, and pragmatics deals with the context in which language is used. Friedman and 
Thellefsen (2011, 660) conclude that pragmatic relations between signs and sign users are of 
utmost importance for knowledge organization because “they implicate much more context 
information, and as such, necessitate a more extensive context analysis of concepts.” 
Accordingly, the diagnosed pragmatic turn in knowledge organization means a shift in emphasis 
from semantics to pragmatics. The latter includes the sign users' pre-understanding of signs or 
concepts, which is relative to the social context of interpretive communities. Therefore, Torkild 
Thellefsen and Martin Thellefsen (2004, 179) describe this shift in knowledge organization as a 
move from the idea of a universal documentary language to a socio-pragmatic view that relates 
KOSs to particular discourse communities or knowledge domains: 
The knowledge domain is well defined by a kind of meaningfulness, which organizes 
knowledge in relation to a particular object field or a certain perspective. Thus, knowledge 
is dependent upon a viewpoint that creates contextual frames and defines the meaning 
potential in a given communication. 
Other KO authors point in the same direction. For example, Søren Brier (1996, 334) notes that 
today “the central problems of LIS are socio-pragmatic linguistic,” Jack Andersen and Frank 
Christensen (2001, 2) underline that “indexing theory contains a considerable pragmatic 
dimension,” confirmed by Maria Biagetti’s (2006, 243) statement that the “indexing process is 
really linked to the Pragmatic point of view of semiotics.” 
Werner Bies (1992, 207) is one of the first theorists calling explicitly for a “pragmatische 
Wende” (pragmatic turn) in indexing theory from traditional semantics with a narrowed focus 
on declarative knowledge of facts and subject matters to largely neglected pragmatics with an 
interest in procedural knowledge of methods, paradigms, problem-solving, and strategies. 
Pragmatic approaches in linguistics, such as speech act theory, text linguistics, and discourse 
analysis consider symbolic utterances as actions taking place in given situations. Therefore, the 
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meaning of linguistic expressions depends on the context-specific use of language and the 
presuppositions of communication between senders and receivers that include, according to 
Bies, socio-economic aspects (e.g., role, status, economic situation), socio-cultural and cognitive-
intellectual aspects (e.g., text and world knowledge, education, experiences, knowledge of social 
rules, assumptions about other communicators), psycho-biographical aspects (e.g., motivation, 
intention, personal disposition, bodily constitution), and linguistic-communicative aspects (e.g., 
communicative competence, rule knowledge of language games). Furthermore, Bies (1992) 
emphasizes that pragmatic relations between signs and sign users include both senders (e.g. 
speakers, authors) and receivers (e.g., listeners, readers) and that indexing theory should both 
of them take into account.  
This distinction is important because users of signs should not be equated with users of 
information systems. In KO discourse, these different user concepts tend to be conflated when 
pragmatic aspects are solely related to users of information system while neglecting other sign 
users like authors and indexers. For example, Hjørland’s (1997, 78) activity-theoretical approach 
to knowledge organization presents a kind of “pragmatic indexing” that orients itself first and 
foremost on the purpose of index terms in relation to particular information needs or epistemic 
interests of user groups of information systems. With reference to Dagobert Soergel, he 
distinguishes between content-oriented indexing describing the subject matter as a mere 
function of the attributes of the document and need-oriented or user-oriented indexing treating 
the subject matter as a relation between the properties of the document and a real or 
anticipated user need in terms of an instrumental mean-goal relation. For the latter, Hjørland 
(2017b, 59) recently prefers the term “policy-based indexing” since it is related to the purpose 
or given policy of an information system rather than empirical data about users or their requests. 
 Similar distinctions are made by Raya Fidel (1994) between document-oriented indexing 
and request-oriented indexing in which the indexing language is formed by a list of anticipated 
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user requests, or by Jens-Erik Mai (2005) between document-centered indexing and domain-
centered indexing. Following this understanding, only user/request/policy-oriented or domain-
centered approaches are related to pragmatic aspects. Accordingly, Hjørland (1997, 70) criticizes, 
for example, Derek Langridge’s conception of subject matter for not making reference “to the 
user context, to the pragmatic viewpoint of subject analysis.”  
But as noted by Hutchins (1975, 111), the “pragmatic influences upon the indexer are by 
no means the same as those affecting the originator of the text.” For the purpose of analysis, 
one should carefully distinguish between different types of languages involved in information 
systems and processes including at least the document language by the author, the documentary 
or indexing language by the indexer, and the request or query language by the user. All of them 
play an important role in indexing theory and, like any language, all of them can be analyzed 
according to their formal, semantic, and pragmatic aspects. Therefore, the pragmatic dimension 
of document indexing is by no means limited to the user’s context but also includes the author’s 




Figure 2.1 Semantic and pragmatic aspects of different languages in information systems. 
This means that the pragmatic turn in indexing theory cannot simply be characterized as a 
shifting focus from the document to the user context (i.e., from the left part to the right part in 
Figure 2.1) but should be considered as a more general move from semantics analyzing the 
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meaning of linguistic expressions as mere sentences to pragmatics analyzing the use of language 
in context (i.e., from the upper part to the lower part in Figure 2.1). In other words, the pragmatic 
turn should not be restricted to the pragmatic aspects of the query language (context of 
consumption), as stressed by user-oriented or domain-centered approaches, but should also 
include pragmatic aspects of the indexing language (context of mediation) and the document 
language (context of production). 
Therefore, the opposition between content-oriented and user-oriented approaches to 
document indexing appears to be somewhat misleading because from the right premise that 
text interpretation requires a context analysis of language use, the false conclusion is drawn that 
the only relevant context is the domain of the user as searcher and reader of documents. This 
narrowed perspective corresponds to Mai’s (2005, 604) reliance on Umberto Eco’s “pragmatic 
aspect of reading” that he summarizes as follows: 
In this understanding of texts and their interpretation, a text does not have meaning in 
and by itself. The meaning of the text is created by the reader as the text is read and used. 
[...] When reading a text, a reader will construct an understanding of the text and that 
understanding is tied to the reader’s social context. 
What seems to be overlooked in this approach is what one might call the pragmatic aspect of 
writing that refers to the author’s social context and the way the author makes use of language. 
As rightly suggested by Mai (2005), a pure document-centered analysis focusing on the explicit 
content is insufficient to take implicit context features into account. But this does not mean that 
a domain-centered analysis should rely exclusively on the reader’s context at the expense of the 
author’s context. This would mean to replace one reductionism (document-centrism) with 
another (user-centrism). Instead, the important insight from hermeneutics should be 
acknowledged that both the author and the reader can be situated in different contexts, 
domains, or horizons and that the process of understanding and interpretation is about what 
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Hans-Georg Gadamer (2013, 415) calls a “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmelzung). This 
means a mediation between the reader’s pre-understanding and the concepts and ideas of the 
author that can be assimilated by means of a hermeneutic circle. Even if an interpretation that 
was correct in itself appears to be a foolish ideal, Gadamer (2013, 415) rejects the assumption 
that the reader alone determines the meaning of a text: “Being bound by a situation does not 
mean that the claim to correctness that every interpretation must make is dissolved into the 
subjective or occasional.”  
As noted by Wolfgang and Mechthild Stock (2013, 50–61), the hermeneutic task for the 
indexer (i.e., a reader of document language and query language but also an author of indexing 
language) would be to fuse her or his own horizon with both the horizon of the original author 
of the document and the horizon of the searcher or user of the document (i.e., a reader of 
document language and indexing language but also an author of query language). Therefore, a 
pragmatically informed document indexing should not be limited to the context of users of 
information systems but should take all sign user’s contexts into account including the indexer’s 
context and the author’s context.  
This point is also underlined by Andersen’s and Christensen’s (2001) analysis of the 
pragmatic dimension in indexing theory with reference to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s philosophy of 
language and his notion of language game as a rule-based social practice. They make a distinction 
between the author’s or document’s language game, the indexer’s language game, and the 
user’s language game because the underlying contexts of communication are not necessarily the 
same. From a methodological point of view, Andersen’s and Christensen’s (2001, 19) argue that 
the author’s language game, which they call the “parent language game,” and thus the social 




Figure 2.2 Elaborated indexing model and process (based on Andersen and Christensen 2001, 20). 
While the traditional indexing process contains two main steps, the interpretation or conceptual 
analysis of a document’s subject matter and the translation of the analyzed subject matter into 
a controlled vocabulary or indexing language, Andersen’s and Christensen’s (2001, 20) add a new 
first step comprising the analysis of the relation between a document and its original social 
context: 
In an indexing theory we need to understand the language game of a given document in 
order to predict its potential uses. For example, different theoretical viewpoints present 
in a document may themselves serve as potentialities which can be of use in other social 
contexts, i.e. in other language games. 
Following this understanding, Hjørland’s (1997) critique on Langridge’s conception of subject 
matter needs to be re-evaluated because the latter clearly refers to pragmatic aspects of both 
the document language or the author’s context and the query language or the user’s context. 
Generally, Langridge (1989, 5) distinguishes between “subject analysis” concerned with the 
thematic content of documents and “enquiry analysis” concerned with the information needs of 
users and thus with pragmatic aspects related to the context of consumption. Both of them are 
considered to be important for indexing theory but, like Andersen and Christensen, Langridge’s 
(1989) gives subject analysis methodological priority over enquiry analysis since it is based on 
the systematic thought of individual writers, whereas searching is a highly situational activity 
that involves much more uncertainty. 
Furthermore, Langridge’s (1989, 31) subject analysis makes a distinction between “topic” 









pragmatic aspects of the document language or between the know-that and the know-how of 
the author. While topics are related to perceived phenomena, forms of knowledge describe the 
ways in which phenomena are perceived. For Langridge, disciplines or fields of research tend to 
blur this important distinction and should be broken down into its more fundamental 
components. For example, the discipline of ethics can be seen as the philosophy (form) of morals 
(topic), psychology as the science (form) of human behavior (topic), and zoology as the science 
(form) of animals (topic). Topics are the more obvious features of documents since they are 
expressed in comparatively concrete terms and easily detectable, for example, through words in 
the title, abstract, or introduction, while forms of knowledge are more implicit features of 
documents related to what Bies would call knowledge of methods and paradigms. Compared to 
the plethora of possible topics, forms of knowledge are considered to be relatively few. Langridge 
(1989, 24) offers the following list of forms of knowledge: 
 Prolegomena: the instruments of knowledge  
 Philosophy 
 Natural science 
 Technology (or Useful arts) 
 Human (behavioural or social) science 
 Social practice 
 History 




 Personal experience 
To avoid misunderstanding, Langridge’s terminology should not be misinterpreted as denoting 
scientific disciplines or research fields. Instead, terms like philosophy, natural science, or history 
are meant to indicate different kinds of inquiry or research practices, such as philosophical, 
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scientific, or historical inquiries. It is also important to note that a topic does not automatically 
determine the form of knowledge. For example, a simple topic like milk can be approached by 
different forms of knowledge, such as technology, social practice, art, and so on. Moreover, every 
form of knowledge can also be treated as the topic of a document if it is made an explicit matter 
of reflection. Therefore, topics and forms of knowledge should be carefully distinguished and 
analyzed separately in the indexing process.  
Langridge (1989, 5) concedes that the term “subject analysis” for the investigation of the 
significant characteristics of documents is not entirely satisfactory because the word subject is 
ambiguous and often used for more items than any of its definitions would suggest. For example, 
Langridge (1989, 45) identifies a broad range of “formal characteristics” that include the 
authorial perspectives of documents in terms of world views of religion and ideology (e.g., 
Christianity, Marxism), philosophical viewpoints (e.g., rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism, 
realism, idealism, humanism), schools of thought (e.g., behaviorism and Gestalt school in 
psychology), epochs (e.g., ancient, medieval, modern), cultures (e.g., Western, Chinese, Indian), 
intellectual levels (e.g., elementary, advanced), or rhetoric forms of writing (e.g., description, 
analysis, interpretation, narrative, prescription, evaluation). These formal characteristics are 
distinguished by Langridge (1989, 45) from the “real subject features” because none of them 
alters the subject matter of a document, even though they can make a considerable difference 
in approaching it.  
For that reason, the present study proposes a terminological distinction between the 
traditional subject analysis that is concerned with the explicit know-that (i.e., topic, aboutness) 
of a document and a context analysis dealing with the more implicit know-how (e.g., forms of 
knowledge, methods, viewpoints). This allows distinguishing more clearly between different 
types of document indexing in relation to semiotic branches (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.3  Typology of document indexing in relation to semiotics (based on Kleineberg 2013a, 358: 
Figure 8). 
Traditionally, document indexing is divided into descriptive indexing and subject indexing. 
Descriptive indexing deals with attributes that can be more or less directly taken from the 
document, for example, the features of a book like title and subtitle, name of author, date of 
publication, publishing house, number of pages, and so on. From a semiotic perspective, 
descriptive indexing is related to syntactics or Hutchin’s formal aspect of language. For example, 
in the process of cataloging the title of a document is considered only as a string of characters 
regardless of its meaning and relation to the actual aboutness of the document. The book The 
Chrysanthemum and the Sword by Ruth Benedikt, for instance, has neither flowers nor weapons 
as its main theme, as the title might suggest, but is concerned with Japanese culture. What 
matters here is only the formal aspect of the title, even though the rules for a syntactically well-
formed language can differ for the document language and the indexing language. For example, 
the form of heading in indexing languages usually ignores grammatical articles to create an 
appropriate alphabetical order for an author-title catalog. Likewise, the spelling of foreign names 

















are defined by standards like the Anglo-American Cataloguing Rules, second edition (AACR2) or 
Resource Description and Access (RDA). 
By contrast, subject indexing is concerned with the meaningful content, theme or 
aboutness of a document and requires an analysis of its significant concepts (ISO 1985). From a 
semiotic perspective, subject indexing is related to semantics. In the process of indexing, the 
subject matter will be determined by a conceptual analysis that identifies significant concepts 
and their meaning, that is, words or signs in relation to their signified referents like objects, 
persons, events, or more generally, phenomena. The identified subject matter of the document 
will then be translated into a controlled vocabulary of an indexing language, regardless of the 
syntactical structure of the document language. Note that a translation of a document into a 
different language, say from English to French, does usually not change the semantic aspect but 
first and foremost the syntactic aspect. Informationally rich documentary or indexing languages 
based on KOSs as conceptual ordering systems (e.g., classifications, thesauri, formal ontologies) 
are able to express various semantic relations between concepts or classes, such as hierarchical 
relations (e.g., genus-species relation, part-whole relation), equivalence relations (e.g., 
synonymy, quasi-synonymy), or less structured associative relations (i.e., related terms). These 
semantic relations are explicitly defined by controlled vocabularies for subject indexing, such as 
the Library of Congress Classification or the Medical Subject Headings (MeSH). 
In this study, however, it will be argued that the traditional division into descriptive 
indexing and subject indexing is insufficient to take context information, such as Langridge’s 
forms of knowledge (e.g., methods, research practices) and other formal characteristics (e.g., 
viewpoints, epistemic outlooks) into account. From a semiotic perspective, these more implicit 
features of documents are neither related to syntactics nor to semantics in a proper sense but 
to pragmatics and the author’s context of meaning production. In order to extend the analytical 
framework for document indexing, a third kind of indexing tentatively called context indexing 
37 
will be proposed. Context indexing might be further subdivided into viewpoint indexing 
concerned with the theoretical dimension and method indexing concerned with the practical 
dimension of knowledge production (Kleineberg 2013a; 2014; 2016c). 
One advantage of the semiotically oriented framework depicted in Figure 2.3 is to provide 
an analytical distinction between subject matter (semantics) and context features (pragmatics), 
which corresponds to similar terminological distinctions that can be found in KO literature (see 
Table 2.5). 
Table 2.5 Terminological distinctions between subject matter and context feature. 
Subject matter Context feature Reference 
Aboutness Viewpoint Swift, Winn, and Bramer (1978, 186) 
Theme Viewpoint ISO (1985) 
Content Viewpoint Crowe (1986, III) 
Topic Form of knowledge Langridge (1989, 31) 
Propositional content Illocutionary act Blair (1992, 200) 
Topic Comment Bies (1995, 137) 
Phenomenon Approach Hjørland (1997, 92) 
Object Type of knowledge Brier (2000, 438, 440) 
Content Point of view Biagetti (2006, 241) 
Phenomenon Theory and method Szostak and Gnoli (2008, 203) 
 
Admittedly, semantic and pragmatic aspects are closely related and the opposition between 
subject matter and context feature does not always present a clear-cut distinction. As already 
mentioned, an implicit approach or viewpoint (context feature) can be made an explicit theme 
(subject matter). Furthermore, there is often a conceptual ambiguity of the meaning of basic 
terms that may signify the subject matter of documents. For example, the term information can 
mean very different things depending on different approaches, such as information theory 
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considering information as a mathematical definition of statistical probabilities (Shannon and 
Weaver 1949), cybernetics considering information as a difference which makes a difference 
(Bateson 2000), documentation theory considering information as data or documents imparting 
knowledge (Buckland 1991a), and so on. In this regard, Hjørland (2001) is certainly right that 
subject analysis needs to consider the underlying theoretical views. But even in this case, the 
proposed terminological distinction between subject matter and context feature seems to be 
useful since it helps to identify different sources of conceptual ambiguity. On one hand, authors 
can have different approaches to the same object of interest, which means a difference in terms 
of context features. On the other hand, authors can use similar terminology but are actually 
concerned with different objects, which means a difference in terms of subject matter. Taking 
the example from above, one might easily clarify by means of terminology control that the 
concept of information in information theory and documentation theory refers already 
semantically to very different things, as it is normally evident from the explicit definitions 
provided by the authors. 
Moreover, a document usually covers several subjects that can be more or less relevant 
for different user groups with different information needs or epistemic interests. For example, 
Claire Beghtol (1986, 84) distinguishes between “aboutness” and “meaning” with reference to 
former distinctions like Robert A. Fairthorne’s “extensional aboutness” versus “intensional 
aboutness” and Bert Boyce’s “topicality” versus “informativeness.” According to her, aboutness 
indicates the intrinsic subject that is to some extent independent of the use of the document, 
while meaning refers to a more extrinsic subject that depends on the purpose for which a 
document has been acquired by a library or requested by a user. Another distinction is made by 
Bella H. Weinberg (1988, 4) between “aboutness” and “aspect” reflecting the linguistic 
distinctions between topic and comment or theme and rheme. For Weinberg, aboutness means 
the actual subject of discourse while aspect is related to the new information on a given subject. 
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In other words, the determination of the semantic content of a document depends to some 
extent on the pragmatic context in which subject analysis takes place. Therefore, Beghtol (1986, 
104) speaks of “contextual relevance” that influences the indexer’s subject analysis. 
Nevertheless, it will be argued that a pragmatically oriented approach to document 
indexing should avoid lumping together semantic and pragmatic aspects or the different contexts 
of production, mediation, and consumption within the traditional framework of subject 
indexing. The need for a terminological distinction between subject matter and context feature 
can be illustrated in relation to Hjørland’s pragmatic conception of subject matter. In his user-
oriented approach, Hjørland (1997, 78) gives a simple example of a cow that can be described in 
zoological terms as a mammal or in agricultural terms as a domestic animal. He argues that 
classifying a book on cows according to the subject categories mammals or domestic animals is 
independent of the most significant property of the book, which is to have cows as its central 
theme. Instead, the decision should depend on an evaluation of the usefulness of the book to 
specific user groups like biologists or farmers. Accordingly, subjects are defined as the 
“informative potentials” (Hjørland 1997, 86) of documents for future usage. Although such a 
conception of subject matter is related to pragmatics, it emphasizes the context of consumption 
while marginalizing the context of production and the pragmatic aspect of the document 
language. But it is important to note that to describe cows is not the same as to describe a book 
on cows since the book already presents a description of cows. It makes a difference if the author 
of the book adopted a zoological or an agricultural approach in the first place, regardless of 
potential readers or users of the document. Even Hjørland (1997, 86) emphasizes that searchers 
should be able to identify different theoretical and metatheoretical approaches to a given 
problem and argues that “the analysis of the implicit or explicit epistemological assumptions in 
documents forms a central aspect of subject analysis.” But this task, which refers to the 
pragmatic aspect of the document language and the context of production, seems to have no 
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proper place in the traditional framework of document indexing. To offer such a place is the main 
motivation for the proposed terminological distinction between subject matter and context 
feature. Taking the cow example and using the terminology of Langridge, the topic (subject 
matter) is related to the semantic aspect of the document language and can be identified, in 
accordance with Hjørland, as cows, whereas the form of knowledge (context feature) is related 
to the pragmatic aspect of the document language and can be identified, for instance, as a 
zoological approach (Langridge’s natural science) or an agricultural approach (Langridge’s 
technology or useful arts). The decisive point is that this context feature or authorial perspective 
does neither alter the subject matter of the document nor depends on the user’s context or 
anticipated requests. This allows two important conclusions. First, the document’s subject 
matter and context feature can be analyzed and classified separately. And second, in analogy to 
Beghtol’s (1986, 85) “intrinsic subject,” one might also speak of intrinsic context feature or 
intrinsic pragmatic aspects complementary to extrinsic pragmatic aspects, such as user requests 
or policies of information systems. 
These considerations may also shed new light on different conceptions of subject, such as 
the “content-oriented view” and the “request-oriented view” identified by Hjørland (2017b, 59). 
According to Hjørland (2017b, 59), the content-oriented view considers the subject as something 
inherent in the document that can be determined “objectively,” whereas the request-oriented 
view considers subject as something that is attributed to the document in order to serve certain 
uses and thus determined “subjectively.” But the proposed semiotically oriented framework to 
document indexing shows that a content-oriented view concerned with the document language 
does not necessarily imply an objective approach to subject analysis since it can also take the 
context of production and the author’s implicit knowledge into account (see Figure 2.1). 
Accordingly, subject analysis is an act of interpretation and thus nothing that can be done 
objectively. It requires a hermeneutic circle that involves the subjective horizon or 
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preunderstanding of both the author and the reader or interpreter. Even though a text can have 
a variety of interpretations, the interpretive community requires criteria to distinguish between 
adequate and inadequate interpretations and these criteria can hardly be provided if only the 
reader determined the meaning of a text. In other words, the content-oriented view and the 
request-oriented view to subject analysis should be considered as complementary. Hjørland 
(2017b, 62) is certainly right that the “aim of subject analysis is to identify the most important 
potentials in order to facilitate the identification of documents that supports important human 
activities.” But this should not prevent indexers to consider both intrinsic and extrinsic aspects 
of documents. For example, Hjørland (2017b) argues that a library for feminist studies may index 
a book on Napoleon differently compared to a library for historians because the book can be 
relevant from a feminist perspective (since it informs about women at the time of Napoleon) and 
thus this particular perspective should be expressed in the subject representation. But this 
contextual relevance from a feminist perspective (extrinsic aspect) does not change the fact that 
a book on Napoleon is about Napoleon (intrinsic aspect). Thus, indexers should take both aspects 
into consideration, and subject representation might benefit from an internal differentiation 
between subject matter and context features. It seems also worth noting that there is not always 
a specific user request or institutional policy but still the need to explicate a subject matter. For 
example, the Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data (CIP Data) that can be found on 
the verso of a book’s title page provides a basic bibliographic record containing subject 
representation independently of the anticipation of specific user interests. This indicates a 
limitation of a document indexing that relies solely on the request-oriented view to subject 
analysis. 
Thus, the proposed terminological distinctions between subject matter and context 
feature or between the contexts of production, mediation, and consumption are considered to 
be useful internal differentiations and analytical tools for any pragmatically informed framework 
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of document indexing. In particular, these distinctions show the need to take all social contexts 
or language games involved in information systems and processes into account, including the 
language game of the author, as methodologically prioritized by Langridge (1989) or Andersen 
and Christensen (2001), and the language game of the user, as favored by Hjørland (1997) or Mai 
(2005).  
Interestingly, all these KO theorists and many others agree on the importance of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s (2010) mature philosophy of language for a pragmatic understanding of 
document indexing. For Bernd Frohmann (1990, 99), the whole pragmatic turn in the field of 
knowledge organization can be referred to as the “Wittgenstein shift,” which Elaine Svenonius 
(2004) describes as a move from a referential or picture theory of meaning to an instrumental 
or contextual theory of meaning. While the former assumes that the meaning of a word is its 
referent and that knowledge consists of the totality of true propositions corresponding to reality, 
the latter states that someone knows what a word means when he or she knows how to use it. 
Wittgenstein is one of the first philosophers who fully acknowledges the performative nature of 
language. For him, to say something always means to do something, to take part in what he calls 
a language game, a social practice that is based on public rules and constituted by particular 
forms of life. In his major work Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein (2010, 25) summarizes 
this pragmatic understanding in the famous sentence: “The meaning of a word is its use in 
language.” A decisive consequence for a pragmatically oriented document indexing is pointed 
out by Andersen and Christensen (2001, 22) in this way: 
An indexing theory based on Philosophical Investigations must divide the universe of 
knowledge into a number of relatively stable language games, which must be indexed 
separately. 
As initial orientation for such an approach, David C. Blair (1992; 2003) refers to the philosophers 
John L. Austin and John R. Searle who both elaborate on Wittgenstein’s linguistic pragmatics in 
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a much more systematic way by developing basic typologies of language games or speech acts. 
A speech act can be defined as an utterance that does not only communicate information but 
also performs an action, such as promising, ordering, warning, or apologizing. In this regard, 
Austin (1962) introduces a terminological distinction between locution as the literal sentence or 
propositional content of an utterance, illocution or illocutionary act as the performed action in 
the course of an utterance, and perlocution as the effect of an utterance on a listener. Blair argues 
that document indexing should be able to express different kinds of speech acts, presenting 
Searle’s typology of illocutionary acts as an example (John Searle quoted in Blair 2003, 44):  
Directives:  In which we order others to do things (e.g., “Get me a Guinness Stout and 
a bag of chips”) 
Commissives:  In which we promise to do something (e.g., I’ll return the book I borrowed 
tomorrow.”) 
Declarations: In which we bring about changes in the world solely by our utterances—
in short, “Saying makes it so” (e.g., “I now pronounce you husband and 
wife.”) 
Expressives: In which we express our personal feelings and attitudes (e.g., “You did a 
terrific job!”) 
Assertives: In which we make statements, truly or falsely, about how things are (e.g., 
“The Sears Tower is the tallest building in Chicago.”) 
However, at the current state of the pragmatic turn in knowledge organization and indexing 
theory, the emphasis seems to be much more on the identification of idiosyncratic contexts than 
on a systematic organization and interrelation of different contexts within an overarching 
framework. Therefore, the problem of relativism and its inherent threat of a fragmentation of 
knowledge occurs that will be addressed in the next section.  
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2.2 Epistemic Pluralism and the Problem of Relativism 
2.2.1 Knowledge Organization in Context: The Incommensurability Thesis 
The challenge to cope with epistemic pluralism arises at several dimensions in the field of 
knowledge organization. The present study is concerned with two of them. The first dimension 
is related to knowledge organization in context referring to the fact that knowledge organization 
systems like classifications, thesauri, and formal ontologies are by no means neutral 
representations of reality but culturally and historically embedded human artifacts that serve a 
given purpose (Mai 2004; Hjørland 2018a). The second dimension is related to context in 
knowledge organization referring to the context representation in document indexing that goes 
beyond the traditional subject representation in that it takes the “authorial perspectives” of 
documents into account, such as underlying theories, methodological approaches, and 
epistemic outlooks (Gnoli 2011; Szostak 2014). In the following, it will be argued that both 
dimensions of KO research require adequate tools of context analysis in order to avoid the pitfalls 
of relativism. 
The assumption that there are always multiple perspectives available on a given 
phenomenon or concept implies that even the idea of epistemic pluralism can be conceptualized 
from multiple perspectives. In the present study, the term “epistemic pluralism” is adopted from 
Kaipainen’s and Hautmäki’s (2011, 503) proposal of a multi-perspective knowledge organization 
and used as an umbrella term for various approaches emphasizing the multiplicity of epistemic 
contexts or frames of reference, as expressed by notions like Ingwersen’s (1994b, 101) 
“polyrepresentation,” Jacob’s (2000, 16) “pluralistic universe,” García Gutiérrez’s (2011, 5) 
“logical pluralism,” Mai’s (2011, 723) ”epistemological pluralism,” or Huertas-López’s (2013, 
400) “multidimensional knowledge.”  
The term epistemic—from Greek episteme “knowledge” or “science”—means relating to 
knowledge, the conditions for acquiring it, or the degree of its validation. Technically, there is a 
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terminological distinction between epistemic referring to knowledge itself and epistemological 
referring to the study of knowledge, although neither in philosophy nor in KO discourse these 
meanings are always clearly separated. Epistemology or the study of knowing is commonly 
distinguished from ontology or the study of being, a conceptual opposition that is well 
established in KO discourse (Hjørland and Hartel 2003; Gnoli 2012; Kleineberg 2013a). Note that 
ontology as a field of study and subdiscipline of philosophy should not be confused with the 
same term used in LIS or computer science denoting a documentary language related to 
semantic web technologies, which in this study will be termed formal ontology. While the 
ontological dimension is related to what knowledge is about or to entities or phenomena 
someone is looking at, the epistemological dimension refers to the way in which knowledge is 
constituted and influenced by the frame of reference or the lens someone is looking through. In 
classification research, Mai (2011, 711) describes the role of ontology and epistemology as 
follows: 
This paper traces and interrogates the shift from classification-as-ontology, in which 
everything is defined as it is, to a more contemporary notion of classification-as-
epistemology, in which everything is interpreted as it could be—or more precisely, the 
paper argues for a conceptual move from modern monistic ontology to late-modern 
pluralistic epistemological foundation for classification theory and practice. 
Based on the assumption that any fact can have multiple interpretations, he argues that the way 
the world is understood and the knowledge of the world is organized depends on the worldview 
of the classificationist. The Wittgensteinian notion of world picture (Weltbild) is characterized by 
Mai (1998, 239) as follows: 
1. Our world picture is closely related to our praxis. 
2. Our world picture rest neither on empirical knowledge nor on verifications of 
hypotheses. 
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3. Our world picture is not easily changed due to empirical information which 
contradicts our world picture. 
4. A shift in world picture will be similar to a conversion—a fundamental change in the 
view of the world. 
The divergent perspectives before and after such a fundamental change of worldview is often 
associated with the thesis of incommensurability—from Latin incommensurabilis derived from 
in- “not, opposite of, without” and com- “together” and mensurabilis “measurable” or 
mensurare “to measure”—coined by philosophers of science Thomas S. Kuhn (1970) and Paul 
Feyerabend (1975). This thesis claims that theories related to different frames of reference, such 
as worldviews or paradigms have no common measure for comparison and that significant 
concepts and statements cannot be translated without remainder and loss. The assumed 
incommensurability of frames of reference is often used as an argument that epistemic pluralism 
implies epistemic relativism (Rorty 1979; Foucault 1981; Jacob 2000; Mai 2004; Talja, Tuominen, 
and Savolainen 2005). For the construction and application of knowledge organization systems 
in different epistemic contexts, the thesis of incommensurability points to the challenge of 
conceptual interoperability and the impending problem of a fragmentation of knowledge into 
isolated knowledge domains and untranslatable documentary languages. 
Interestingly, a fundamental change of worldview seems also to take place in the history 
of KO theory itself, as ascertained by Mai (1999; 2004; 2011) as a move from modern to late-
modern or postmodern approaches, indicated by a shifting focus in classification research from 
systems and techniques to contexts and domains in which KOSs are created and used. While 
modern classification theory seeks to represent the universe of knowledge by the attempt to 
create a single best classification system for everyone and everywhere, postmodern classification 
theory aims to provide a pragmatic tool for specific needs that are situated in social contexts. 
47 
The latter acknowledges that the act of classification is inherently political and value-laden since 
it is relative to the epistemic activities of a given knowledge domain.  
In Mai’s (1999; 2011) critique of modern classification theories from the 19th and early 
20th century, as represented, among others, by the work of Melvil Dewey, Henry E. Bliss, Shiyali 
R. Ranganathan, Ernest C. Richardson, and W. C. Berwick Sayers, he identifies the underlying 
principles of dualism, de-traditionalization, and globalization. Dualism means the assumption 
that the known and the knower can be separated, for example, by considering the content of a 
document independently from the reader. Likewise, de-traditionalization refers to the tendency 
to represent documents independently from the activities that create and use them, whereas 
globalization stands for the attempt to create consistency across cultures, domains, and 
languages by standardization. 
These three principles are commonly rejected by postmodern classification theories that 
recognize the “relativistic nature of classifications” (Mai 2004, 39) and criticize the assumption 
that one classification could be a true representation of knowledge or a truer one than others. 
Accordingly, truth and facts cannot be validated by objective criteria, which is why Mai (2011, 
723) arrives at the following conclusion: “The starting point for understanding classification is 
one that any object, any document and any domain could be classified from multiple equal 
correct perspectives.”  
At this point, epistemic pluralism is in danger to end up in epistemic relativism. If all 
perspectives were equally correct, none of them could be more or less valid than any others. 
From an epistemological perspective that takes the validity of knowledge claims into account, 
such a position would appear problematic since it eventually contradicts itself. If epistemic 
relativism was true and fundamentally divergent perspectives were equally correct, then it 
would be forced to acknowledge that an alternative perspective like epistemic absolutism 
claiming that only one perspective could be true was correct as well. This is a contradiction. But 
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if epistemic relativism claimed to be a more valid position compared to a position like epistemic 
absolutism, then it would not be relativistic in the sense that divergent perspectives are equally 
correct. This is another contradiction. The problem can also be illustrated by Mai’s own diagnosis 
of a shift of perspectives from classification-as-ontology to classification-as-epistemology. If Mai 
would subscribe to epistemic relativism, then he should assume that the fundamental change 
from a modern monistic ontology to a postmodern pluralistic epistemology merely presents a 
shift between equally correct perspectives. But this seems not to be the case since he 
vehemently criticizes the former from the vantage point of the latter. As noted by Habermas 
(2001b, 149): 
The assertion of an incommensurability of different paradigms and the “rationalities” 
peculiar to them is difficult to reconcile with the hypercritical attitude of postmodern 
theorists themselves. 
If someone claimed that her or his own epistemological position or epistemic outlook was more 
valid than others, then he or she was implicitly abandoning the relativistic assumption that 
standards of rationality cannot transcend their own context. 
Of course, in the field of knowledge organization, the same document can be classified 
differently according to domain-specific KOSs that serve different policies and purposes to 
support different user groups. According to the widely accepted epistemic pluralism, this is not 
at all a controversial issue since different ways of classifying can very well be appropriate for their 
given contexts. However, it is one thing to claim that there exist multiple perspectives but quite 
another thing to claim that these perspectives are equally correct or valid. Even domain-specific 
KOSs may witness fundamental historical changes due to new scientific evidence that presents 
more convincing validity claims. In other words, for an evaluation of knowledge and multi-
perspective knowledge organization the consideration of validity claims should not be 
abandoned. 
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This normative question of validity refers to the relation between human knowledge and 
reality. Mai (2011, 721) offers a useful conceptual opposition between two kinds of realism that 
he calls “realism1” and “realism2.” Both views agree about the intuition that there is a real world 
outside but while realism1 assumes that human knowledge, particularly the kind of knowledge 
generated by the natural sciences, is able to discover how the world really is, realism2 assumes 
that human knowledge does not reflect the world as such but presents always a view of the 
world from a semiotic distance that inevitably involves a kind of interpretation highly dependent 
on epistemic contexts. This opposition between a monistic ontology of realism1 and a pluralistic 
epistemology of realism2 seems also to involve different notions of context. 
In Brenda Dervin’s (2003, 127) chronological overview of conceptions of context in the 
social sciences an opposition, quite similar to Mai’s two notions to reality, is proposed regarding 
the relationship between reality and knowledge or information about reality. According to her, 
there is a historical development from modern approaches treating context as an analytic factor 
(e.g., structure, culture, person, situation, action, organization) that can be separated from the 
object of interest to postmodern approaches treating context as an inextricable surround and a 
carrier of meaning that to some extent constitutes the object of interest. This stereotypical 
contrast is depicted in Figure 2.4 and echoed by Talja, Keso and Pietiläinen (1999, 752) as the 
opposition between “objectified” and “interpretative” approaches to context. 
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While in picture A context is presented as a mediator between reality and information, in picture 
B neither reality nor information exists outside of context. This distinction has important 
methodological implications for the analysis of contexts. Typical modern approaches (picture A) 
would aim to identify single context factors and to integrate them into a given analytical 
framework, whereas typical postmodern approaches (picture B) would reject such an attempt 
because context factors are considered to be so intertwined that a systematic unraveling appears 
to be pointless. However, both approaches seem to be insufficient for an adequate context 
analysis, as Dervin (2003, 130) concludes: 
Admittedly in this discussion I have refused to be cowed by the polarized arguments of 
either the more postmodern contextualists who see nothing but tyranny in systemati-
Figure 2.4  Different conceptions of context (modified after Dervin 2003, 














zation, or the more modern contextualists who see nothing but chaos in a fully 
implemented contextualism. 
Instead, she seeks to establish a dialectical position in-between in order to adopt a more 
balanced multi-method and multi-perspective approach. Nevertheless, she agrees with Jens-Erik 
Mai and the interpretive turn in the philosophy of science that there is no way back to the 
essentialist and foundationalist assumption of an external, observer-independent world that 
merely awaits discovery. Consequently, the objectified notion of context related to monistic 
ontology needs to be rejected in favor of the interpretive notion of context related to pluralistic 
epistemology. In absence of any kind of context-free foundation, Dervin (2003, 130) argues that 
comparisons and contrasts of different frames of reference provide the most promising analytical 
tools, even though “the infinite regress of context mandates a constant circling in and out of 
frameworks which becomes in itself methodological guidance.”  
This means that researchers who fully acknowledge epistemic pluralism should be able to 
adopt multiple perspectives and to analyze their differences and similarities. At this point, the 
question arises to what extent divergent frameworks can be compared and interrelated to each 
other and whether the validity of mutual contradicting knowledge claims can be evaluated 
across contexts at all. In the following, three influential multi-perspective KO approaches that 
offer tools for the analysis of different frames of references will be exemplarily examined, 
namely, polyrepresentation analysis, domain analysis, and genealogical discourse analysis. Each 
of them focuses on a different aspect of epistemic pluralism, polyrepresentation analysis on the 
cognitive aspect (individual dimension), domain analysis on the social or cultural aspect 
(synchronic collective dimension), and genealogical discourse analysis on the historical aspect 
(diachronic collective dimension). It will be argued that all three approaches fully acknowledge 
epistemic pluralism but are in danger to lead to epistemic relativism without a more systematic 
organization of the epistemological dimension.  
52 
Polyrepresentation analysis and cognitive relativism 
The principle of polyrepresentation is developed by Peter Ingwersen and colleagues (Ingwersen 
1992; 1994b; Ingwersen and Järvelin 2005; Larsen, Ingwersen, and Kekäläinen 2006) based on a 
cognitive approach to information seeking and retrieval in order to improve the intellectual 
access to documents. According to Ingwersen (1992, 21), the cognitive view seeks to avoid the 
“reduction of meaning (and pragmatics) into syntax,” as presented by traditional IR approaches 
based on mere symbol manipulation. Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005, 36) distinguish a “syntactical 
linguistic,” a “semantic,” and a “pragmatic cognitive” level of analysis and emphasize the 
importance of the latter for a context-aware approach. The basic assumption is that there is a 
cognitive variety among individual actors involved in information interaction leading to different 
representations of the same information object. In other words, epistemic pluralism is specified 
as cognitive pluralism. The cognitive actors include authors, indexers, algorithmic system 
designers, interface designers, selectors (e.g., publishers, editors), and searchers or users of 
information systems. The underlying cognitive structures or knowledge structures, which are 
also embedded in documents, information system designs, thesaurus structures, search 
algorithms, or queries, are defined by Ingwersen (1992, 229 [emphasis in original]) in this way: 
The system of categories and concepts which, for an information processing device—
whether human or machine—constitutes his/her model of the world, i.e. the knowledge 
of the device. At any point in time, the actual knowledge structures are determined by 
the individual and its social/collective experiences, education, etc.” 
Such knowledge structures of cognitive actors are seen as highly dynamic and changeable. In 
information interaction, the transformation of a present state of knowledge into a new one can 
either take the form of accumulations of categories and conceptual relations meaning a 
quantitative change or growth of knowledge, or it can take the form of more fundamental 
“reconfigurations” (Ingwersen 1994a, 38) that restructure previous knowledge structures and 
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indicate a qualitative change or growth of knowledge. With reference to cognitive psychologists 
like Jean Piaget, Lev S. Vygotsky, and Alexander R. Luria, Ingwersen (1992, 43) also distinguishes 
between mostly conscious “’surface’ or ‘shallow’ knowledge” and mostly non-conscious “deep 
knowledge.” In addition to individual cognitive structures, Ingwersen (1994a, 39) also speaks of 
“collective cognitive structures” with regard to shared worldviews, social domains, cultural 
horizons, or scientific paradigms. 
Polyrepresentation means the variety of different forms of representations of a given 
information resource derived from the diversity of pre-suppositions and interpretations by 
cognitive actors. In particular, Ingwersen (2002, 285) distinguishes between “author, indexer, and 
user aboutness” which might differ significantly from each other. The principle of 
polyrepresentation applied to information retrieval is based on the idea of “intentional 
redundancy” (Ingwersen 1994b, 101) which, in contrast to non-estimated redundancy that is not 
always productive, seeks to exploit the different cognitive structures involved in information 
interaction. The underlying hypothesis states that the more cognitive interpretations point to a 
set of resources in so-called “cognitive overlaps” (Ingwersen and Järvelin 2005, 208), the higher 
the probability that these resources are relevant or pertinent in a given context of search (see 
Figure 2.5).  
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According to Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005, 30 [emphases in original]), the unavoidable 
divergence of cognitive representations should be used as an asset in information retrieval: 
The turn into a holistic cognitive view implies a shift from believing in the possibility of 
bringing the variety of cognitive and functionally different structures in IR in harmony, to 
the acceptance that such structures are inherently different, and should be exploited as 
such. 
In this regard, Ingwersen (1994a) argues that different modes of indexing (e.g., author 
aboutness, indexer aboutness) should be made transparent for the user of information systems 
in order to cope with the natural variety of language use. Unfortunately, there is not much 
theorizing about the interrelation and systematic organization of divergent cognitive structures, 
particularly, regarding so-called deep structures and qualitative differences of frames of 
references. For example, Ingwersen and Järvelin (2005, 28) refer to Luria’s study on the influence 










Figure 2.5  Cognitive overlap of different actors in information interaction 
(modified after Ingwersen and Järvelin 2005, 19, 207). 
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situational (concrete-associative) and categorical (abstract-hierarchical) classification without 
considering how these different modes of thinking are related to each other in Luria’s (1976) 
cognitive-developmental model, not to mention how the inherent validity claims could be 
evaluated (cp. Kleineberg 2012). In other words, polyrepresentation analysis fully acknowledges 
cognitive pluralism but, at the current phase, seems to be in danger to lead to cognitive 
relativism as one version of epistemic relativism. 
 
Domain analysis and cultural relativism 
In contrast to cognitivism or the cognitive view, domain analysis considers library and 
information science and its subdiscipline knowledge organization as a genuine social science and 
relies on insights from social psychology, sociolinguistics, sociology of knowledge, and sociology 
of science in order to study knowledge domains as thought and discourse communities (Hjørland 
and Albrechtsen 1995). The unit of study is not the individual but what Ingwersen (1994a, 39) 
calls “collective cognitive structures” related to specialties, disciplines, or domains.  
According to Hjørland (2017a), domain analysis as a methodology for knowledge 
organization can be understood in a broader sense that embraces a range of KO approaches (e.g., 
user studies, bibliometrics, studies of special classifications or subject gateways, terminological 
studies, historical studies, critical studies, and studies of scientific communication) and a 
narrower and more technical sense that is particularly concerned with the epistemological and 
sociological dimensions of knowledge domains. Following Hjørland and Hartel (2003, 242), 





 philosophies (of discipline X) 
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 regimes (e.g., treatment regimes) 
 schools (of thought and research) 
 systems (of thought and research) 
 traditions (academic) 
 trends (in a field) 
 views (“point of views”). 
These frames of reference are distinguished from sociological issues, such as disciplines, 
discourse communities, or the social system of science. The epistemological and sociological 
dimensions are closely related and particularly addressed by the family of metatheories 
commonly referred to as social epistemology (Shera 1973; Fuller 2010; Hartel 2018). Following 
this understanding, a domain can be defined as a “specialization in the division of cognitive labor 
that is theoretically coherent or socially institutionalized” (Hjørland 2017a, 439). Although such 
a socio-cognitive view presents an alternative approach to cognition, it can also be regarded as 
an integral part of the cognitive sciences in general, in which a kind of “pragmatic turn” (Hjørland 
2002, 258; see also Engel et al. 2013) has taken place emphasizing human activities and the role 
of culture and society for human cognition.  
The concept of domain in the cognitive sciences refers to the principle of domain-
specificity in contrast to domain-general or universal cognitive mechanisms, a dichotomy that 
also presents a central issue in LIS (Hjørland and Albrechtsen 1995; Hjørland 2017a). For 
example, as a theoretical foundation for domain analysis, Hjørland and Albrechtsen (1995) reject 
Jean Piaget’s more domain-general approach to cognitive development that emphasizes abstract 
patterns in favor of Lev S. Vygotsky’s more domain-specific approach that stresses the 
importance of sociocultural contexts. Hjørland’s (1997) activity-theoretical approach to 
knowledge organization, relying on cultural-historical psychology in the tradition of Lev S. 
Vygotsky, Alexander R. Luria, and Alexei N. Leontiev, as well as on John Dewey’s pragmatism, 
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underlines that subject representation of documents cannot be neutral and general but depends 
on the purpose of a KOS for a given knowledge domain and its prevailing epistemic interest. 
At the same time, Hjørland (1997, 79) concedes that a “danger of the pragmatic viewpoint 
is a relativistic ‘anything goes’” leading to a fragmentation and disorganization of knowledge. He 
even suggests that interpretive approaches like domain analysis tend to imply a “cultural and 
domain relativism” (Hjørland 2002, 263). As explicitly stated by Hjørland (2010), different pre-
understandings or frames of reference are challenged by Kuhn’s thesis of incommensurability. 
Furthermore, Hjørland (2002) argues that schools of thought or paradigms (e.g., 
behavioral, cognitive, psychoanalytic, or neuroscientific schools in psychology) are related to 
even more fundamental metatheoretical assumptions (e.g., empiricism, rationalism, historicism, 
or pragmatism) that can also be found in other fields of research. Accordingly, the most 
promising general framework for a comparison of different knowledge domains would be a 
systematic overview of epistemological positions. In this respect, Hjørland’s proposed typology 
of four epistemological schools in Table 2.3 presents a very fruitful analytical tool that is well 
established as a reference model in KO discourse (Smiraglia and Lee 2012a; Gnoli 2020b). For a 
systematic organization of the epistemological dimension, however, it provides a mere typology 
instead of a genuine classification, which is to say a term list without conceptual relations like 
hierarchical subordination, thematic association, or any other underlying principle of 
organization. Therefore, it is not self-evident how these qualitatively distinct epistemological 
positions are related to each other and whether one position can be considered to be more valid 
than others. This appears to be even more difficult given the fact that many metatheories in KO 
and other fields present rather a mixture of these positions (Dousa and Ibekwe-Sanjuan 2014). 
Even though Hjørland (2002, 266) himself adopts the position of pragmatism as the most 
promising epistemology for LIS and KO, he emphasizes that “there is no neutral platform from 
which the different positions can be evaluated.”  
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Hjørland (2016, 320) argues that the best way to deal with the challenge of interoperability 
across different knowledge domains, for example, in interdisciplinary research is to consider a 
KOS as a kind of “boundary object,” a term coined by Susan L. Star and James R. Griesemer. A 
boundary object is both flexible enough to satisfy the information needs of local communities of 
practice or social worlds and solid enough to maintain a common identity in different contexts. 
In analogy to Ingwersen’s concept of cognitive overlap, one might call such a common identity 
of a boundary object a kind of socio-cognitive overlap that comprises the same limitations 
regarding a systematization of frames of references. In other words, domain analysis fully 
acknowledges cultural pluralism but, at the current phase, seems to be in danger to lead to 
cultural relativism as one version of epistemic relativism. 
 
Genealogical discourse analysis and historical relativism 
In addition to the methodology of domain analysis that is mainly concerned with social and 
cultural differences of frames of reference at a given point in time, some KO approaches 
emphasize the historical nature of these frames and seek to reconstruct their origins and change 
over time. According to Hjørland (2009, 1527), such approaches are related to the metatheory 
of historicism: “The ideal of historicism is to define concepts (a) genealogically and (b) by 
explicating their relations to theories and discourses.” One of the most influential historically 
oriented methodologies in knowledge organization is presented by genealogical discourse 
analysis inspired by Michel Foucault (Frohmann 1994; Budd and Raber 1996; Olson 2002; 
Andersen and Skouvig 2006; Martínez-Ávila 2011; Fox 2015). Following Daniel Martínez-Ávila 
(2011, 108) this approach can be characterized as a kind of critical historiography: 
Foucauldian genealogical discourse analysis thus can be used to reveal the perspective, 
assumptions and goals that drive the organization of concepts and the development of 
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knowledge organization systems through the analysis of the continuities/discontinuities 
in the relations of concepts and practices. 
Foucault (1970; 2001) explicitly refuses to establish methodological rules in order to avoid the 
trap of essentializing his research practice. While this position seems to offer a kind of 
methodological freedom, it is also in danger to become a trap in itself, as noted by Martínez-
Ávila (2011), if researchers omit to explain their methodology in face of the charge of being 
prescriptive. As an initial orientation, Melodie J. Fox (2015, 63) distinguishes several analytical 
strategies that are covered by the umbrella term “Foucauldian Discourse Analysis” such as 
archaeological analysis, genealogical analysis, and self-technology analysis.  
Foucault’s archaeological analysis, presented in The Order of Things (1970) or The 
Archaeology of Knowledge (2004), is concerned with written or spoken utterances of 
institutionally privileged speakers who raise validity claims of truth. It aims to reconstruct the 
underlying rule system of discourses constituting so-called epistemes or discursive formations 
that describe paradigm-like knowledge formations. In the course of history, subsequent 
discursive formations within a given culture can be distinguished but not as parts of an 
overarching developmental trend but as historically contingent archaeological strata. With 
regard to the transformation of epistemes over time, Foucault’s (1970) archaeological analysis 
explicitly rejects explanations and prefers a purely descriptive methodology (cp. Dreyfus and 
Rabinow 1983; Kleineberg 2013b; Fox 2015). 
In contrast, Foucault’s genealogical analysis, outlined in The Order of Discourse (1981) or 
Nietzsche, Genealogy, History (2001), is much more interested in the underlying epistemic 
reasoning of historical changes of discursive formations and the conditions that make their 
appearance possible in the first place. The object of analysis is discursive practices that are 
embedded in technical, organizational, behavioral, or pedagogical processes and considered to 
be constituted by a “network of institutional power relations” (Frohmann 1994, 124).  
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In the field of knowledge organization, genealogical discourse analysis is often applied as 
a combination of Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical analyses, as noted by Martínez-
Ávila (2011), since his genealogy cannot be clearly separated from his archaeology and should 
rather be seen as a natural continuation focusing more on the diachronic dimension and the role 
of power relations. Its critical stance allows revealing idealizations of dominant groups or 
cultures as historically contingent constructions that tend to marginalize alternative perspectives 
and values. For example, Smiraglia, Lee and Olson (2011), use genealogical discourse analysis to 
examine the epistemic presumptions of the concept of authorship from ancient times to the 
present in order to understand the contingent nature of current bibliographic conceptions of 
authorship. Likewise, Fox (2015) investigates the epistemic relation between medical and legal 
discourses and the classification of sex and gender in the history of the Dewey Decimal 
Classification.  
Of particular interest for the study of knowledge organization systems in historical 
contexts appears to be the critical work of Hope A. Olson that draws heavily on Foucauldian 
discourse analysis (Olson 1999; 2000; 2002; 2009; 2011). In a review article on Bowker’s and 
Star’s Sorting Things Out, Olson (2002, 379) applauds the authors for their “archaeological 
exposure” to contextualize classification practices over time but demands an examination of the 
origins and “genealogical sources” of the underlying logical patterns in order to question the 
assumption of the universality of classification. Based on the premise that the current dominant 
classificatory structures employ a culture-specific logic, Olson’s (2002, 390) emancipatorily 
motivated research seeks to analyze the “cultural construction of classification to understand its 
often hegemonic effect both within and across cultures.”  
Olson (1999) identifies exclusivity, teleology, and hierarchy as three basic epistemic 
presumptions of classificatory thought and formal logic in the Western tradition and traces them 
back to ancient Greek philosophers like Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle. Exclusivity means that 
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categories or classes of a knowledge organization system are mutually exclusive or disjoint, 
teleology refers to a linear progression towards a goal as presented by sequences from the most 
concrete to the most abstract or from the most basic to the most developed, and hierarchy is 
related to logical division and the dominance of some classes over others. Consequently, these 
structural elements often lead to marginalizing effects that Olson (2009) summarizes as 
hierarchical force, ghettoization, and diasporization. Hierarchical force mandates that what is 
true of one class is also true for its subclasses. For example, the DDC’s placement of gay people 
under the subclass Homosexuality characterizes them only according to the single characteristic 
of its superclass Sexual Relation. Ghettoization refers to the problem of gathering and isolating a 
topic instead of integrating it across several main classes, as presented, for example, by the LCC’s 
placement of native Americans as a subclass of American History. Finally, diasporization refers to 
the opposite problem of dispersing groups that share common characteristics because they are 
classified according to other characteristics. For example, the DDC disaggregates the topics 
American African Male Youths and American African Middle-Class Women by grouping them 
according to age or sex in the first place. 
As alternative ordering systems, Olson (2002; 2009) refers, among others, to the social 
classification of the Polynesian Pukapuka culture that seeks to avoid polarizations and tries to 
balance multiple allegiances, to the symbolic classification of the Chinese Taoist culture that 
allows overlapping systems (e.g., yin and yang), or to bibliographic classifications of the European 
medieval and Renaissance culture in which order is based on the criterion of similarity rather 
than of difference, corresponding to what Foucault (1970) characterizes as the episteme of 
resemblance in contrast to the episteme of representation. She concludes that classificatory 
thought and the way knowledge is organized need to be considered as an integral part of the 
prevailing ontological and epistemological foundations which differ across cultures and change 
over time.  
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From a historical perspective, however, Olson (2000) strongly rejects Emile Durkheim’s 
and Marcel Mauss’s assumption of a general development from so-called primitive 
classifications towards logical classification. In genealogical discourse analysis, not only different 
cultures but also subsequent discursive formations within a given culture present 
incommensurable frames of reference since historically contingent discontinuities cannot be 
related to each other or analyzed within an overarching framework. In other words, genealogical 
discourse analysis fully acknowledges historical pluralism but, at the current phase, seems to be 
in danger to lead to historical relativism as one version of epistemic relativism. 
 
2.2.2 Context in Knowledge Organization: The Context-Index Illusion 
The problem of epistemic relativism occurs not only when knowledge organization systems and 
processes are considered in their context but also when context information in terms of authorial 
perspectives of documents is provided by KOSs. An informationally rich representation of 
epistemic contexts requires a documentary language that is able to express not only a broad 
variety of frames of reference but also their interrelations based on a systematic organization of 
epistemic contexts in general. Under the premise of epistemic relativism, such a systematic 
attempt to the organization of contexts would be hard to establish since it denies the possibility 
of an overarching framework that offers context-transcending principles of organization or 
criteria for an evaluation of validity claims. 
In early library science, a quite similar problem already occurs with regard to subject 
analysis and indexing. In his The Organization of Knowledge in Libraries and the Subject-
Approach to Books, Henry E. Bliss (1933) argues that a systematic subject approach is required. 
Any attempt to apply a mere alphabetical subject approach without a systematic organization of 
the plurality of knowledge subjects in general is rejected by Bliss (1933, 301) as a kind of “subject-
index illusion.” A mere listing of subjects, as provided by subject headings, would not be able to 
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meet the principle of maximal efficiency that results from the strategies of collocation of 
thematically related classes or subjects and subordination of the specific to the generic. This 
means that a differentiation (analysis) of subjects should only be considered as a necessary first 
step which needs to be succeeded by an integration (synthesis) of subjects into a well-structured 
knowledge organization system, as underlined by Bliss (1933, 104): 
Analytic division tends to dispersion. But synthesis, either collocative or systematic, places 
subjects in effectual relation and efficient organization. A collocative synthesis does not, 
however, forego analysis, which inevitably issues from subdivision; but it collocates the 
results of analytic subdivision. This is the very nature of systematic classification. It 
opposes the false theory that disorder and dispersion can be obviated or compensated by 
an alphabetic key or subject-index. 
In this section, it will be argued that the same problem of disorder and dispersion also appears 
with regard to context analysis and indexing. In analogy to what Bliss calls the subject-index 
illusion, one might speak of the context-index illusion for any attempt to apply a mere 
alphabetical context approach without a systematic organization of the plurality of epistemic 
contexts in general (Kleineberg 2014). 
Alphabetical order as an organizing principle for epistemic contexts would be an important 
first step to create a controlled vocabulary in which terminological issues like synonymy or 
quasisynonymy are harmonized by means of preferred and non-preferred terms to indicate 
equivalence relations. The result would be term lists that in analogy to subject headings might 
be called context headings. But such unstructured listings of terms, similar to glossaries or 
dictionaries, present informationally poor documentary languages without basic conceptual 
relations, such as hierarchy relations and association relations. Consequently, context indexing 
based on mere term lists tends to disorder and dispersion since this kind of documentary 
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languages is not able to interrelate different epistemic contexts and to reduce complexity by 
collocation and subordination. 
Therefore, a systematic approach to context representation requires more expressive 
documentary languages with hierarchy relations and association relations. At this point, the 
question of relativism becomes crucial because the collocation and subordination of divergent 
frames of reference depend on the possibility to find criteria for comparison. 
In the following, it will be examined to what extent recent KOSs already contribute to a 
systematic approach to context representation. In The Organization of Information, Taylor and 
Joudrey (2018) identify some content characteristics that need to be distinguished from subject 
matters because they do not directly affect the aboutness of documents but establish some 
context for a better understanding of information resources. These content characteristics 
include research method, point of view, language (e.g., tone, audience, intellectual level), as well 
as form and genre. Although the authors emphasize the importance of these context features, 
at least for some specialized purposes, they observe that all of them play only a minor role in the 
conceptual analysis of documents. With regard to point of view, Taylor and Joudrey (2018, 463) 
conclude:  
This content characteristic, however, is rarely if ever translated into controlled vocabulary 
terms or classification notations; instead, it may be addressed in summary statements or 
abstracts. 
An early attempt to incorporate viewpoint information in a documentary language is presented 
by Derek Austin’s (1984, 168) Preserved Context Index System (PRECIS) by means of the operator 
“viewpoint-as-form.” Operators indicate a role of given elements in the PRECIS thesaurus and 
this operator distinguishes between viewpoints, perspectives, and aspects. While viewpoints 
refer to classes of people (e.g., Christian viewpoint, Trade union viewpoint) and perspectives 
correspond to disciplines (e.g., sociological perspectives, philosophical perspectives), aspects are 
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not related to the holders of viewpoints but identify facets of the core of a subject in special 
studies (e.g., economic aspects, social aspects). However, for the adjectival phrase that specifies 
the viewpoint-as-form, there is no controlled vocabulary available and its denomination remains 
a decision of the indexer. The only advice given by Austin (1984, 171) is a “policy of deliberate 
generalization” stating that the viewpoint should be generalized as much as possible. For 
example, names of specific organizations (e.g., Greenpeace viewpoints) should be avoided and 
replaced by a more general term (e.g., conservationist viewpoints). 
In a similar way, Swift, Winn and Bramer (1978, 186) propose a “multi-modal approach” 
to document indexing for the social sciences which more than other fields are characterized by 
divergent frames of reference. In order to group together pieces of research employing a 
common theoretical orientation or methodological approach, the indexer takes a clearly defined 
range of viewpoints and generates a title-like phrase for each aspect of the document. These 
phrases are associated with different dimensions that are organized according to their own set 
of headings. For example, for the theory dimension headings can represent types of approach 
(e.g., structural-functionalist), discipleship (e.g., Durkheimian), or content of theory (e.g., 
socialization). More recently, Biagetti (2006) proposes the following four dimensions for a multi-
modal approach: theoretical orientation, method of research, empirical situation under study, 
and data collected. Alternatively, Gnoli (2012, 271) selected the following “facets of the 
epistemic dimension” under the label of perspective: epoch, place, method, theory, discipline, 
culture, activity field or domain, modality, and communicative function. But even if the plurality 
of viewpoints could be clearly defined, the envisioned documentary languages present mere 
term lists in form of various headings which, as argued above, are insufficient for a systematic 
approach to context representation. 
In his monograph Classifying Science: Phenomena, Data, Theory, Method, Practice, Rick 
Szostak’s (2004) presents a further approach in which a broad range of context features is 
66 
incorporated into the faceted structure of a comprehensive phenomenon-based classification 
that seeks to serve interdisciplinary purposes. Terminologically, Szostak (2015, 64) uses the 
umbrella term “authorial perspective” for such diverse context features as discipline or field, 
methods employed, theoretical orientation, ideological outlook, ethical outlook, epistemological 
outlook, aesthetic outlook, and rhetorical strategies. His approach is guided by five simple 
W questions (i.e., Who? What? Where? When? Why?) that can be asked at each stage of 
investigation to structure and identify components of science or scholarship. According to 
Szostak (2004, 7), one of the main goals for his envisioned classification is to provide “potentially 
exhaustive lists of phenomena, types of theory, and methods.” For example, he argues that the 
number of research methods is manageably small and can be covered by the following listing 
(excerpted from Szostak 2004, 101–2): 
 experience (including natural or quasi-experiments) 
 surveys 
 interviews 
 mathematical models (and simulations) 
 statistical analysis 
 ethnographic/observational analysis 
 experience/intuition 
 textual (content, discourse) analysis 
 classification (including evolutionary analysis) 
 mapmaking 
 hermeneutics/semiotics 
 physical traces (as in archaeology) 
 evaluation. 
Leaving the question of exhaustiveness aside, such a term list of methods presents, again, a 
documentary language that lacks conceptual relations like collocation and subordination that 
are indispensable for any systematic account to context representation. Unlike the case of 
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research methods, it appears to be rather impossible to provide an even nearly exhaustive list of 
theories due to their ever-growing and dynamic nature. Therefore, Szostak (2004, 52) develops 
a “typology of theory” based on an application of the five W questions and identifies some 
generalized theory types that are characterized by agency (e.g., intentional/nonintentional, 
individual/group), action (e.g., passive/active), decision-making (e.g., intuition/rational), time 
path (e.g., equilibrium/stochastic), and generalization (e.g., nomothetic/idiographic). Although 
these generalizations provide a more systematic approach because they apply the strategy of 
collocation of similar theories, even Szostak (2004, 226) concedes that the subsumption of 
individual theories to the proposed theory types is often problematic since “different versions 
of a particular theory fit in different cells of the typology.” Moreover, it remains unclear how 
different theory types are interrelated and in which way they can be compared and evaluated.  
Interestingly, this question is discussed with regard to paradigm shifts in the history of 
science, as investigated by Thomas S. Kuhn. Szostak (2004, 208) argues that when scientific 
revolutions come, they “often absorb the older paradigm into a newer one.” In physics, for 
example, Einsteinian relativity theory does not simply displace Newtonian mechanics but 
incorporates its important insights as a special case. Unfortunately, Szostak makes not much use 
of this consideration for theory-building in knowledge organization. But it seems to be important 
to note that from this point of view the interrelation of paradigms before and after a paradigm 
shift can be qualified in terms of both a developmental relation since the older is the 
precondition for the newer, as well as a hierarchical relation because the newer includes the 
older as a specification. At the same time, one might argue that knowledge claims raised within 
the newer and more comprehensive paradigm are likely to be more valid compared to those of 
the older paradigm. These considerations come very close to the notion of Integrative Levels of 




In this chapter, the role of the context factor in the field of knowledge organization is outlined in 
order to specify the overarching research question addressed by this study. After a pragmatic 
turn in KO theory, epistemic pluralism is widely accepted and provides the point of departure for 
theory-building in which the problem of epistemic relativism with its inherent threat of a 
fragmentation and disorganization of knowledge is identified as one of the most important 
challenges. Based on a literature review of recent KO approaches, the context factor regarding 
human knowledge is considered along two analytical dimensions that are concerned with the 
context of mediation and the context of production.  
The first dimension, knowledge organization in context, refers to the frame of reference 
underlying the creation and application of knowledge organization systems. Three of the most 
elaborate context-analytical methodologies, namely, polyrepresentation analysis, domain 
analysis, and genealogical discourse analysis are exemplarily investigated with the result that all 
of them tend to be open for different versions of epistemic relativism. While prevailing context-
aware approaches focus on the idiosyncratic nature of epistemic contexts, much less theorizing 
is provided for their systematic organization. Therefore, the first complex of research questions 
can be specified in this way: Based on which theoretical and methodological foundations can 
epistemic pluralism be approached without falling prey to epistemic relativism? Which principles 
of organization may help to classify epistemic contexts in general? And according to which 
criteria can divergent epistemic contexts in which knowledge organization takes place be 
compared to each other and evaluated? 
The second dimension, context in knowledge organization, is related to document 
indexing and the representation of epistemic contexts in terms of authorial perspectives. It has 
been found that the traditional division into descriptive indexing and subject indexing seems to 
be insufficient for an analysis of epistemic contexts. Therefore, a semiotically oriented 
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framework for document indexing is proposed that distinguishes more clearly between subject 
matter and context feature and introduces a genuine context indexing. Currently, most context-
analytical approaches to document indexing present mere term lists as a documentary language 
for context representation since a more systematic approach seems to be theoretically 
underdeveloped. Therefore, the second complex of research questions can be specified as 
follows: Based on which theoretical and methodological foundations can a genuine context 
analysis and indexing be established? Which principles of organization appear to be appropriate 
to develop an informationally rich documentary language for the representation of epistemic 
contexts? And how can these organizing principles be applied to already existing knowledge 
organization systems? 
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3 ORGANIZING THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION 
 
3.1 Methodological Considerations 
3.1.1 Formal Pragmatics and Rational Reconstruction 
As outlined in the previous chapter, there is a large measure of agreement that after the 
pragmatic turn in the field of knowledge organization the cognitive, cultural, and historical 
contexts of the production, mediation, and consumption of human knowledge are of utmost 
importance and should be made an explicit matter of reflection. Much less agreement exists, 
however, about the question to what extent such epistemic contexts can be organized in a 
systematic way. There is a broad range of pragmatically informed theories and metatheories that 
present different methodological approaches to context analysis and have different implications 
regarding the problem of relativism. While recent KO research often takes recourse to relativistic 
approaches, such as Wittgenstein’s linguistic pragmatics or Foucault’s analysis of discursive 
practices, the present study argues that the organization of the epistemological dimension 
benefits most from a more systematic and non-relativistic approach. In this section, Habermas’s 
universal or formal pragmatics will be introduced as a promising candidate for a theoretical and 
methodological foundation of context analysis and indexing in knowledge organization.  
Some LIS authors note that prevailing context-analytical tools seem to be limited to some 
extent. For example, Luciana de Souza Gracioso (2012, 66) points out that Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy of language and his concept of language game are important to take the context of 
language use into account but “his work does not show any theory or methodology.” Instead, 
she refers explicitly to Habermas’s formal pragmatics as a more operational approach. Likewise, 
Janne Backlund (2005, 124) emphasizes that Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action based 
on formal pragmatics not only heavily relies on the later Wittgenstein but provides a “fully 
developed and powerful theoretical tool” for context analyses. Furthermore, John Buschmann 
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(2010, 169) observes that Habermas’s critical approach seeks to “overcome the totalizing dead 
end and aporia of postmodernism,” that is, a self-refuting epistemic relativism. In fact, 
Habermas’s formal pragmatics already has a significant impact on LIS and KO discourses (Benoît 
1998; Ng 2002; Akkerman 2008; Brier 2008; Budd 2011; Ma 2012; Kleineberg 2016c; 2018). 
As a representative of Critical Theory within the second generation of the so-called 
Frankfurt school, Habermas (2009) characterizes his own work as the attempt to combine a 
radical historical thinking with the justification of a normative diagnosis of the present. Such a 
normative element seems to be necessary for any theory of society that aims to identify 
misguided developments or social pathologies. Therefore, Habermas rejects methodological 
approaches that abandon normative questions because they lead eventually to different 
versions of relativism and remain unable to maintain a critical function since they cannot provide 
analytical tools for an evaluation of validity claims. At the same time, Habermas (1987) 
acknowledges that early Critical Theory, as represented by Theodor W. Adorno, Max Horkheimer, 
and to some extent his own writings before The Christian Gauss Lecture in 1971, still operates 
within the conceptual frame of the philosophy of consciousness that appears to be inadequate 
in face of the significant linguistic turn in philosophy. While early Critical Theory with reliance on 
Sigmund Freud and Karl Marx seeks to analyze the intra-psychic and collective false 
consciousness in terms of self-deception or ideology, Habermas takes the linguistic turn seriously 
and establishes a communicative theory of society within the conceptual frame of the 
philosophy of language.  
In contrast to the philosophy of consciousness or the mentalist paradigm with its 
constitutive concepts of being and appearance reflecting the epistemological relation between 
a known object and a knowing subject, the philosophy of language or the linguistic paradigm 
emphasizes the intersubjective nature of human knowledge that is always already symbolically 
mediated. The two-place relation between subject and object is exchanged by the three-place 
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relation between a symbolic expression claiming validity about a state of affairs for an 
interpretive community (Habermas 1987). Consequently, epistemic authority passes over from 
the knowing subject to the linguistic community. Knowledge can no longer be considered to be 
based on a correspondence of representations and facts since it cannot be separated from the 
process of communication between members of a linguistic community coming to a mutual 
understanding about something. Such linguistic or communication communities constitute 
frames of reference or interpretive horizons that are highly dependent on sociocultural and 
historical contexts. Accordingly, Habermas (1987) argues that a reformulation of Critical Theory 
should replace a critique of ideology or false consciousness (mentalist paradigm) with its 
functional equivalent of a critique of cultural modernity in terms of communication pathologies 
(linguistic paradigm). 
This fundamental paradigm shift also implies a new form of epistemological doubt 
regarding truth claims, as concluded by Habermas (2003a, 356): “contextualism is built into the 
basic concepts of the linguistic paradigm just as skepticism is built into mentalism.” In his critique 
of Richard Rorty’s strong contextualist understanding of the pragmatic turn in philosophy that 
presents a relativistic and anti-realistic version of pragmatism known as neopragmatism, 
Habermas (2003a, 351) draws an analogy between the methodological choices of the mentalist 
paradigm and the linguist paradigm:  
Just as Locke and Hume referred their mentalist reflections to the consciousness of 
empirical persons, Kant referred his to the consciousness of subjects “in general.” 
Linguistic reflections, too, can be referred to communication communities “in general.” 
This opposition between empirical or particular approaches and general approaches marks 
Habermas’s (2003a, 92) important methodological distinction between “empirical pragmatics” 
and “universal pragmatics” or “formal pragmatics,” as he now prefers to call it in analogy to 
formal semantics (Habermas 2003a). Just as Immanuel Kant’s transcendental analysis of reason 
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is intended to overcome the epistemological doubt of skepticism, Habermas’s formal-pragmatic 
analysis of communication is intended to overcome the epistemological doubt of contextualism 
that occurred after the linguistic or pragmatic turn in philosophy and other fields. The basic 
assumption of contextualism is that the validity of knowledge claims depends on the standards 
of a particular linguistic community determining what is acceptable as rational. Following this 
understanding, knowledge is merely a matter of conversation and social practice, while there is 
no “metapractice” (Rorty 1979) from which all possible social practices can be evaluated. In 
contrast, Habermas’s program of formal pragmatics, which can be considered to be the core of 
his entire philosophy (Ingram 2010), defends the possibility to establish an overarching 
framework for the comparison and context-transcending evaluation of knowledge claims.  
Habermas (2009) agrees with the contextualist premise that there is no reason or 
rationality without context but rejects the contextualist conclusion that the standards of 
rationality cannot transcend a given context. His methodology focuses on the similarities of 
different contexts and investigates general patterns of communication that apply to all possible 
languages or linguistic communities. In opposition to empirical pragmatics investigating context-
bound speech acts (e.g., sociolinguistics), the analytic units of formal pragmatics are speech acts 
or communicative actions in general regardless of specific contexts. (see Figure 3.1).  
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Figure 3.1  Derivation of the analytic units of the theory of speech acts (modified after 
Habermas 2003a, 62). 
Habermas defines communicative actions as social actions that are oriented toward reaching 
understanding. In contrast to instrumental actions (e.g., using a hammer to nail something), 
social actions take place between two or more actors. Communicative actions can be 
distinguished from other social actions, such as symbolic actions that present symbolic 
expressions without propositional content (e.g., performing a concert or dance) and strategic 
actions that follow a rational purpose in a utilitarian way without the intent to reach a mutual 
understanding (e.g., competitive behavior, combat games). While explicit communicative actions 
have always a propositional component expressing a state of affairs, implicit or non-linguistic 
communicative actions (e.g., signaling to a taxi or joining a demonstration march) usually lack 
this representational function and are less suitable for analysis. Finally, explicit communicative 
actions can be context-dependent in that particular settings cause shifts of meaning. In such 
cases, the meaning of a speech act may differ from the meaning of the sentence used in the 
speech act (e.g., teenage slang). Leaving aside such milieu-specific use of language, formal-
pragmatic investigations are interested in context-independent patterns of communicative 
actions or what Habermas (2003a, 61) calls the “general contextual conditions” that need to be 
fulfilled for any successful speech act. Accordingly, the task of formal pragmatics is to identify 
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his methodology, Habermas relates formal pragmatics and its object domain to some basic 
semiotic distinctions (see Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1 Semiotic distinctions. 
Theoretical level Object domain 
Linguistics Sentences 
   Grammar    Sentences of an individual language 
   Grammatical theory    Rules for generating sentences in any language whatever 
   Aspects of linguistic analysis 
      Phonetic theory    Inscriptions (language sounds) 
      Syntactic theory    Syntactical rules 
      Semantic theory    Lexical units 
Pragmatics Speech acts 
   Empirical pragmatics    Context-bound speech acts 
   Formal pragmatics    Rules for using sentences in utterances 
   Aspects of formal-pragmatic analysis 
      Theory of elementary propositions    Acts of reference and predication 
      Theory of illocutionary acts    Establishment of interpersonal relations 
      Theory of first-person sentences    Linguistic expression of intentions 
Source: Based on Habermas (2003a, 55). 
While linguistics is concerned with mere sentences, pragmatics investigates the use of sentences 
in speech acts. Linguistics follows two different strategies for the investigation of rules for 
generating sentences, namely, an empirical approach to individual languages (grammar) and a 
formal approach to languages in general (grammatical theory). Only the latter is able to identify 
context-independent patterns. For example, the insight that every known natural language 
possesses a functional equivalent for the system of personal pronouns presents a linguistic 
universal (Habermas 1976). Habermas (2003a) argues that pragmatics, too, should follow these 
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two different strategies, namely, an empirical approach to communicative actions taking place 
in particular contexts (empirical pragmatics) and a formal approach to communicative actions in 
general (formal pragmatics). Again, only the latter is able to identify context-independent 
patterns. In particular, Habermas identifies three pragmatic universals or general pragmatic 
functions of utterances that a competent speaker uses synchronously during the course of a 
speech act. The first function is to represent something by making references or predications in 
propositions (objective world). The second function is to establish a legitimate interpersonal 
relation in illocutionary acts (social world). And the third function is to express intentions in first-
person sentences (subjective world). These basic functions are related to a rule system that, in 
analogy to the grammar of sentences in linguistics, constitutes the grammar of speech acts in 
formal pragmatics. For example, the rule system determines how different modes of 
communication are related to different types of knowledge, world relations, and validity claims 
(see Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2 Formal-pragmatic features. 
 Objective world Social world Subjective world 
World relation „The“ world of external 
nature  
„Our“ world of society „My“ world of internal 
nature  
Type of action Conversation Normatively regulated 
action 
Dramaturgical action 
Mode of communication Cognitive Interactive Expressive 
Characteristic speech act Constatives Regulatives Avowals 
Basic attitude Objectivating Norm-conformative Expressive 
Function of speech Representation of facts Establishment of 
interpersonal relations 
Self-representation 
Theme Propositional content Interpersonal relations Speaker’s intention 
Validity claim Truth Rightness Truthfulness 








Form of argumentation Theoretical discourse Practical discourse Therapeutic and 
aesthetic critique 
Model of transmitted 
knowledge 
Theories Legal and moral 
representations 
Works of art 
Source: Based on Habermas (2003a, 81, 92, 165: Table 2.5, 171: Table 2.6). 
The ability of communicative actors to employ sentences in speech acts is defined by Habermas 
(2003a, 47) as “communicative competence.” Following Wittgenstein’s linguistic pragmatics and 
his notion of language game as a rule-based social practice, Habermas assumes that a player 
who intuitively understands the rules of a game is not necessarily able to describe them. 
Following a rule is a generative capacity and the cognitive ability to understand a rule requires 
first of all the practical skill or know-how of acting according to this rule. Since the only criterion 
for assessing the adequacy of understanding a language game is successful participation, rules 
cannot be private but are public and socially constituted. However, Habermas (2001a, 53) 
criticizes Wittgenstein’s analysis of language games for being an ad hoc procedure with a mere 
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therapeutic intent that aims to exhibit the grammar of language games rather than express it in 
the form of a systematic theory: 
Had Wittgenstein developed a theory of language games, it would have had to take the 
form of a universal pragmatics. Wittgenstein, however, did not even consider this 
theoretical program, which I shall elaborate and endorse as the basis for a communicative 
theory of society. 
Habermas’s (2003a, 29) program of universal or formal pragmatics applies formal analyses that 
can be characterized through the methodological attitude one adopts in the “rational 
reconstruction of concepts, criteria, rules, and schemata.” Such methodologies systematically 
analyze the implicit know-how of competent speakers and are characteristic of disciplines like 
logic, epistemology, ethics, aesthetics, action theory, argumentation theory, or reconstructive 
sciences like linguistics, psychology, and anthropology. Their common goal is to reconstruct the 
implicit knowledge that underlies the production and evaluation of symbolic expressions, such 
as accurate descriptions, explanations, and predictions; good arguments and correct inferences; 
grammatically correct sentences and successful speech acts; and effective instrumental actions, 
appropriate evaluations, and authentic self-representations (Habermas 2003a). These 
reconstructions are termed rational because they ask for the reasons that a communicative actor 
could provide for the validity of her or his utterance. Habermas’s (1990, 30 [emphases in 
original]) pragmatic theory of meaning assumes that to understand a speech act means to know 
under which conditions its implicit or explicit claims of validity are acceptable: 
But only to the extent to which the interpreter also grasps the reasons why the author’s 
utterances seemed rational to the author himself does he understand what the author 
meant. The interpreter, then, understands the meaning of a text only insofar as he 
understands why the author felt justified in putting forth certain propositions as being 
true, in recognizing certain values and norms as being right, and in expressing certain 
experiences (or attributing them to others) as being authentic. 
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Using the prime example of understanding a text document, Habermas (2003a) makes an 
important distinction between two modes of meaning explication. The first mode is concerned 
with the semantic content of a linguistic expression or the author’s explicit know-that. Typically, 
the meaning of a linguistic expression can be explicated through paraphrasing or translating it 
into similar expressions. In these cases, the author and the interpreter share an implicit 
knowledge of the underlying rule system of language use. But sometimes a linguistic expression 
remains incomprehensible and the interpreter needs to alter her or his attitude by shifting the 
focus from the surface structure to the deep structure. This shift leads to the second mode of 
meaning explication that is directed to the author’s know-how in terms of the generative 
structures or rule system according to which a linguistic expression is brought forth. In this case, 
the interpreter no longer shares the position of the author who only applies the intuitive and 
pre-reflexive capacity to follow a rule system. Instead, the interpreter needs to transform this 
implicit know-how into an explicit know-that by means of a “rational reconstruction of 
generative structures” (Habermas 2003a, 33). This mode of meaning explication or 
reconstructive understanding can be considered to be a kind of “depth hermeneutics” (De Mul 
1997b, 240), which Habermas (2001a, 28) calls “hermeneutic reconstructionism” (cp. Kleineberg 
2018). 
According to the Theory of Communicative Action, such rational reconstructions of 
communicative competence need to be considered along two analytical dimensions, namely, a 
synchronic or horizontal dimension that is concerned with the speaker’s know-how of generating 
speech acts according to general formal-pragmatic features, as outlined in Table 3.2, and a 
diachronic or vertical dimension that deals with how this competence develops over time 
(McCarthy 1978; Korthals 1997b; Pedersen 2008). Most important for the present study is that 
the latter dimension regarding the development of communicative competence also reveals a 
context-independent pattern, namely, an inherent logic of development. 
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3.1.2 The Logic of Development 
As a prototype for rational reconstructions of the development of a specific competence, 
Habermas (2003a) refers to Jean Piaget’s genetic or developmental structuralism. This school of 
thought is not only influential in developmental psychology explaining the acquisition of 
cognitive, linguistic, interactive, or moral capacities in ontogenesis or individual development 
but, as stressed by Habermas (1990, 23), seems to be also promising for the analysis of the 
collective dimension in terms of “social evolution and the development of worldviews, moral 
belief systems, and legal systems.”  
As initial orientation, Habermas (1979) observes a convergence of three theoretical 
traditions concerned with individual development, namely, the analytic ego psychology (e.g., 
Erik H. Erikson, Jane Loevinger), cognitive-developmental psychology (e.g., Jean Piaget, 
Lawrence Kohlberg), and symbolic interactionist theory of action (e.g., George H. Mead) (cp. 
Appendix D: Tables D.10, D.11). According to him, all of them share to a large extent the following 
basic assumptions. First, the ability of subjects to speak and act is not only the result of passive 
maturation but also of an active learning process. Second, this learning process runs through a 
series of qualitatively distinct and increasingly complex stages of development, a process in 
which each new stage is built on the preceding stage while no stage can be skipped over. Third, 
this learning process is not only discontinuous but often crisis-ridden in that a stage transition 
can be preceded by a phase of destructuration or even regression. Fourth, this learning process 
has a developmental direction towards increasing autonomy that can be characterized by 
acquired independence through growing capabilities for problem-solving in dealing with the 
objective, social, and subjective domains of reality. Fifth, this learning process is formed in social 
interaction in which ego identity is produced through both socialization into a specific social 
system and individuation as growing independence in relation to social systems. Finally, this 
learning process can be characterized by a transposition of external structures into internal 
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structures, for example, schemata of action transposed into schemata of thought, as well as 
interaction patterns transposed into intrapsychic patterns.  
For Habermas (1990, 128 [emphasis in original]), the key component of models using the 
concept of developmental stages is best described in the cognitive-developmental tradition: 
[T]he notion of a path of development which can be described in terms of a hierarchically 
ordered sequence of structures is absolutely crucial to Kohlberg’s model of developmental 
stages. For Kohlberg as for Piaget, synonymous with this concept of a hierarchical order is 
the concept of a logic of development. 
The path of development is logical in that developmental stages are related to each other in an 
invariant and transitive order, regardless of the context in which development takes place. But it 
is of utmost importance to note that the logic of development says nothing about the learning 
mechanisms over time or the dynamics of development (Habermas 1979; 1984). Wouter van 
Haaften (1997b, 24) illustrates this distinction between the “order of progress” denoting the 
developmental sequence of stages (logic) and the “forms of progression” denoting the 
psychological processes (dynamics) in Figure 3.2: 
 
Figure 3.2  Progression and regression through time, seen in terms of the logic and dynamics of a 
















The dynamics of development depends on the interaction of an individual with the natural and 
social environment and, as a matter of fact, not all contextual conditions are equally supportive, 
which is why the occurrence, rate, and reach of learning processes may differ significantly across 
individuals (Habermas 1979; Van Haaften, Korthals, and Wren 1997). This even includes the 
possibility for regressive tendencies, such as decreasing cognitive capabilities in mature 
adulthood or in extreme stress-situations (Mascolo and Fischer 2010; Overton 2010). According 
to Habermas (1976; 1979), the development of communicative competence, meaning an actor’s 
growing into the symbolic universe, is closely related to ego development and can be 
characterized by three general stages that follow a logic of development (see Table 3.3; Appendix 
B: Tables B.18–B.21). 
Table 3.3 General structures of communicative action. 
































interpretations of need 
Ego identity 
Source: Based on Habermas (1979, 83: Schema 3). 
At the first stage, the child learns to master symbolically mediated interactions but speech and 
action are not clearly differentiated. This means that the semantic content of a symbolic 
expression is bound up with behavioral disposition since the three general pragmatic functions 
of representing facts (objective world), establishing interpersonal relations (social world) and 
self-representation (subjective world) are not yet sufficiently separated. The differentiation of 
the environment into physical and social domains, as well as the demarcation of the self in 
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relation to the environment are not fully developed. The child is not yet able to perceive, 
comprehend and judge situations independently of its own point of view because it acts and 
thinks from a body-bound perspective. This stage is characterized by egocentrism and 
corresponds to Piaget’s preoperational or early concrete-operational cognition and Kohlberg’s 
preconventional moral judgment. 
At the second stage, the child becomes aware of the perspectival character of its own 
point of view and learns to separate sufficiently between subjective, social, and objective world 
relations. Clear distinctions are made between perceptions and fantasies, between impulses and 
obligation, and between linguistic signs and the reference or meaning of symbols. The child is 
able to employ sentences in utterances according to the formal-pragmatic rule system for 
generating speech acts. The differentiation of speech and action also implies the differentiation 
between understanding an utterance and accepting the validity claim raised by an utterance. 
Such claims of validity are evaluated according to cultural norms and values of the child’s social 
system. This stage is characterized by sociocentrism and corresponds to Piaget’s late concrete-
operational cognition and Kohlberg’s conventional moral judgment. 
At the third stage, the system of ego-demarcations becomes reflective and the adolescent 
no longer naively accepts the standards of the social group. Capable to think hypothetically, the 
youth is able to explain the given from contingent boundary conditions and to criticize existing 
norms and values as mere conventions. For example, theories or moral representations can be 
traced back to the cognitive framework of individuals or the will-formation of social groups. The 
adolescent is able to engage in theoretical discourse as a form of communication that is 
uncoupled from the processes of action and experience in order to exchange arguments on 
hypothetical validity claims. The ego can assert its identity independently of concrete roles and 
particular systems of norms based on the ability to differentiate between norms and principles 
according to which norms can be generated. This stage is characterized by universalism and 
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corresponds to Piaget’s formal-operational cognition and Kohlberg’s postconventional moral 
judgment. 
These three stages of communicative competence present a developmental-logical 
learning process running through increasing degrees of reflection that leads to a decentering of 
a person’s understanding of the world. This process is described by Habermas (1976) as partly 
corresponding with, partly based on, and partly complementary to cognitive development. In 
particular, Habermas (1990) considers the development of symbolically mediated interaction as 
a precondition for the formative processes of social perspective-taking and moral judgment in 
ego development. In his formal-pragmatic approach, Habermas (1979, 160) takes recourse to a 
broad range of rational reconstructions of domain-specific competences in individual 
development or the “ontogenesis of knowing and acting abilities,” which will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Four. In this section, Habermas (1979) methodological decision should be 
considered to use such developmental-logical models as a heuristic guide for the analysis of the 
collective development or historiogenesis. Terminologically, it should be noted that the technical 
term ontogenesis meaning individual development originates from biology where it is opposed 
to the term phylogenesis referring to the collective development as the evolution of the species. 
But since human social evolution or cultural development cannot be explained biologically, this 
study prefers the terms historiogenesis for historical development or sociogenesis, as 
counterpart to psychogenesis, for social development (cp. Damerow 1993; Dux 2011). Regarding 
the relation between individual and collective learning processes, Habermas (1979, 99) writes: 
The ontogenetic models are certainly better analyzed and better corroborated than their 
social-evolutionary counterparts. But it should not surprise us that there are homologous 
structures of consciousness in the history of the species, if we consider that linguistically 
established intersubjectivity of understanding marks that innovation in the history of the 
species which first made possible the level of sociocultural learning. 
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To avoid misunderstanding, Habermas does not evoke a kind of recapitulation theory in which 
ontogenesis echoes, to whatever extent, phylogenesis. As noted by Stephen J. Gould (1977, 147), 
even Piaget rejects the so-called biogenetic law as irrelevant for psychology because in this field 
“phylogeny does not cause ontogeny.” Nevertheless, some parallel developments can be 
observed (Strauss 1988; Oesterdiekhoff 2012). In fact, these supposed parallels are the main 
motivation for both Piaget (1975) and Habermas (1979) to study the development of individuals 
at all. First and foremost they are interested in processes of cultural development like the history 
of science or the transformation of collectively shared worldviews. But based on the assumption 
that the logic of development is the same in all sociohistorical contexts, both of them expect to 
gain insights from rational reconstructions of learning processes of individuals. 
According to Habermas (1979, 99), the homologous structures of consciousness in 
individual and collective development can be explained by the fact that the socialization of 
individuals and the reproduction of society are “two aspects of the same process.” There is a 
dialectic between the individual and the society. Individuals are socialized according to the 
standards of a given society but individuals may also develop a level of reflection in which these 
standards can be questioned and, if necessary, replaced or improved by more convincing ones. 
This makes it possible for a given society not only to reproduce itself from one generation to the 
next but also to develop innovative structures of consciousness that are incorporated, for 
example, in worldviews, moral belief systems, and legal systems (Habermas 1979; 1984). 
Nevertheless, Habermas (1979) cautions against drawing too hasty parallels in the 
comparison of individual and collective development. First, content and structure should not be 
confused because individual consciousness and cultural tradition may agree in their semantic 
content without expressing the same generative structure. Second, not all members of a given 
society are equally representative of the collectively shared standards. For example, legal 
systems in modern societies have a universalistic, postconventional structure, even though many 
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members of modern societies are not able to judge according to principles. Reversely, there are 
members of archaic societies who are able to master formal operations, although mythological 
worldviews, which are characteristic of archaic societies, correspond to a less complex 
developmental stage of cognition. Third, ontogenetically early stages (e.g., incomplete 
interaction in communicative competence) seem to have no correspondents in the oldest human 
societies since collective structures hold only for adults, which in any family organization already 
have developed later stages (e.g., complete interaction in communicative competence). Fourth, 
the maintenance of a personality system and the maintenance of a social system are not the 
same. The unifying power of collectively shared worldviews functions not only as protection 
against cognitive dissonance, as in individual development, but also against social disintegration. 
With respect to the latter, legal and moral representations need to be distinguished from 
interpretive systems that serve to stabilize ego and group identities (e.g., conceptions of gods, 
originary powers, souls, and fate) because both of them can represent different developmental 
stages within a given society.  
For these reasons, a global comparison between individual and collective development is 
not possible and should be replaced by an identification of particular reference points for 
comparison. Habermas (1979) suggests, for example, that the process of decentration of 
worldviews corresponds to ego development (see Appendix C: Table C.10). Likewise, the social 
evolution of legal and moral representations is supposed to show the same patterns as the 
individual development of moral judgment (see Appendix C: Table C.12). Furthermore, some 
isomorphisms seem to exist between the ontogenesis of cognition and the development of basic 
concepts and logical structures in collective interpretive systems. Examples of such 
developments of basic concepts are notions of time, from biographically experienced to 
physically measured time, causality, from globally grasped to specified causality that 
differentiates between laws of nature and norms of action, and substance, from undifferentiated 
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to qualified substance distinguishing between animate and inanimate objects. Examples of 
collectively shared logical structures are presented by the development from narrative 
explanations (preoperational cognition) offered by mythologies in the form of exemplary stories 
to deductive explanations (concrete-operational cognition) provided by cosmologies, 
philosophies, and higher religions with reliance on first principles to nomological explanations 
(formal-operational cognition) presented by modern science in the form of revisable theories 
(see Appendix C: Table C.10). Moreover, Habermas (1979) points to some homologous structures 
between the historical development of social worldviews and the ontogenetic development of 
the system of ego-demarcations in which formal-pragmatic distinctions are established (see 
Appendix C: Tables C.10, C.13): 
Corresponding to the first stage of natural identity in ego development, the early 
mythological worldview presents a complex of analogies in which natural and social phenomena 
are not clearly differentiated but interwoven and transformable into one another. In analogy to 
the egocentrism of the child in which phenomena are made relative to the center of the child’s 
ego, such a sociomorphic worldview makes phenomena relative to the center of the tribe or 
social group. Nevertheless, members of the group have not yet formed a distinct consciousness 
of the normative reality of society (social world) apart from the natural environment (objective 
world) since these domains of reality are not clearly separated. 
Corresponding to the second stage of role identity in ego development, the late 
mythological worldview changes the naive attitude to myths towards an understanding in which 
myths are distantiated to a tradition and function as the legitimation of domination in state-like 
societies. These developed myths seek to unify the manifold of appearances and distinguish 
more clearly between society and nature, even though some sociomorphic traits persist. 
Formally, this unity resembles the sociocentrism of concrete-operational cognition and 
conventional moral judgment.  
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Corresponding to the third stage of ego identity in ego development, the rationalized 
worldview breaks with mythological thought. Narrative explanations are replaced by 
argumentative foundations in the form of cosmological worldviews, philosophies, and higher 
religions. The traditions inspired by the great founders (e.g., Confucius, Buddha, Socrates, the 
prophets of Israel, Jesus) present an explicitly teachable knowledge that is open for professional 
rationalization. These rationalized worldviews that are characterized by a cosmological or 
monotheistical totality present homologous structures to the universalism of formal-operational 
cognition and postconventional moral judgment. However, in the course of history this kind of 
universalistic worldview, which first appeared in developed civilizations, needs to be made 
compatible with the predominant traditionalistic attitude and political order of a given society. 
This explains why for a long time the highest principles (e.g., God, Being, Nature, the Absolute), 
to which all argumentation refers, are themselves immunized against objections and excluded 
from argumentation. In modern societies, however, the universalistic potential can be set free 
because the highest principles are no longer unquestionable since religious faith and the 
theoretical attitude become reflective. This means that modern reflective worldviews have lost 
their character as worldviews, that is, as closed totalities based on collectively shared and 
socially prescribed frames of reference.  
According to Habermas (1979), the logic of both individual and collective development is 
directed towards a growing decentration and rationalization of interpretive systems and to an 
increasingly clearer categorical demarcation of the objective, social, and subjective domains of 
reality. Again, this developmental logic says nothing about the dynamics of development, in 
particular, it does not presume a continuous, linear, irreversible, or even necessary development. 
This means that internal factors (e.g., rational learning processes) and external factors (e.g., 
institutional power relations) need to be carefully distinguished and analyzed separately.  
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Furthermore, Habermas (1979, 163 [emphasis in original]) underlines that there is a 
“dialectic of progress,” meaning that a new developmental stage of learning abilities does not 
only expand ranges of options but also involves new problem situations and possible 
pathologies. In particular, learning processes can take the form of a one-sided development 
exhibiting a “selective pattern of rationalization” (Habermas 1984, 240). For example, the 
development of modern societies, characterized by a differentiation of autonomous value 
spheres (i.e., science, moral, and art) or rationality complexes (i.e., cognitive-instrumental, 
moral-practical, aesthetic-expressive), may tend to privilege a single rationality complex, such as 
the cognitive-instrumental mode of science with an objectivating attitude, at the expense of 
others (see Table 3.2). This can lead to dominating or reductionist effects, for example, in the 
form of reification in which the social world of values and norms is approached by an 
objectivating attitude that is only appropriate for the objective world. A further example of 
misguided development is presented by cultural impoverishment meaning the uncoupling of 
professionally rationalized expert cultures from communication in everyday life, while at the 
same time cultural traditions lose more and more their legitimation potential. In other words, 
development towards higher stages does not automatically mean progression towards 
something better or higher valued. 
From a developmental-logical perspective, however, the rationalization of worldviews 
implies what Habermas (1979, 184) calls “levels of justification” referring to the acceptability of 
grounds or reasons and the formal conditions for legitimations. Habermas (1979, 184–85 
[emphasis in original]) continuous: 
These levels can be ordered hierarchically. The legitimations of a superseded stage, no 
matter what their content, are depreciated with the transition to the next higher stage; it 
is not this or that reason which is no longer convincing but the kind of reason. 
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Such devaluative shifts of the legitimation potential of cultural traditions occur historically, for 
example, as a break with mythological thought, or more recently as a break with the 
foundationalism of cosmological, religious, and ontological modes of thought that are grounded 
in highest principles (see Appendix C: Table C.10). The decisive point is that this developmental 
logic enables Habermas’s methodology of hermeneutic reconstructionism to offer a non-
relativistic framework (Kleineberg 2018). In opposition to Gadamer’s (2013) philosophical 
hermeneutics stating that every understanding of a text represents an actualizing appropriation 
of its meaning by the interpreter, Habermas (1984) emphasizes that the author has not 
necessarily a superior knowledge compared to the interpreter and that it is not predetermined 
who will learn from whom. An interpreter who is able to rationally reconstruct the generative 
structures according to which an author has brought forth symbolic expressions could be able to 
receive a better understanding of the rule system that underlies the author’s language use 
compared to the author’s self-understanding. In this sense, one might say that an interpreter can 
gain a deeper and more comprehensive understanding compared to that of the author, which 
enables the interpreter to call into question the raised claims of validity. As Habermas (1984, 
135–36) concludes: 
Philosophical hermeneutics rightly asserts an internal connection between questions of 
meaning and questions of validity. To understand a symbolic expression means to know 
under what conditions its validity claim would have to be accepted; but it does not mean 
assenting to its validity claim without regard to context. 
Unlike purely descriptive approaches that exclude validity claims from consideration, 
Habermas’s pragmatic theory of meaning enables the interpreter to compare and evaluate 
different ways of thinking according to normative standards of rationality in terms of levels of 
justification. This allows hermeneutic reconstructionism to acquire a critical function by 
providing criteria, for example, for the distinction between power-dominated discourses and 
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rationally convincing discourses based on learning processes. In contrast to cognitive, cultural, 
or historical versions of epistemic relativism stating that symbolic expressions originating from a 
particular epistemic context can only be evaluated according to this context-specific frame of 
reference, hermeneutic-reconstructive approaches are able to relate different frames of 
reference to a context-independent logic of development and a hierarchy of levels of 
justification. As noted by Korthals (1997b, 72), this offers a non-relativistic position for 
comparison and evaluation: 
Everybody who learns and develops raises developmental validity claims, and so does the 
theoretican. The fact that there are no objective, non-developmental standards to 
evaluate such claims is not an argument for relativism. The undeniable possibility of 
structural learning, i.e., of learning new conceptual frameworks, undermines the view that 
standards or criteria can only be valid with respect to the particular context of one 
framework. The very fact that such learning takes place shows that comparisons of 
different frameworks in foundational development are possible. 
As a crucial consequence, this non-relativistic approach sheds new light on the 
incommensurability thesis with regard to different paradigms, as Habermas (2003a) exemplifies 
in his critique of Rorty’s relativistic understanding of paradigm shifts in philosophy. Following a 
common conception, Rorty (1979) identifies three succeeding paradigms in the history of 
Western philosophy from ancient and medieval metaphysics or ontology concerned with things 
(objectivity) to early modern epistemology concerned with ideas (subjectivity) to the 
contemporary philosophy of language concerned with words (intersubjectivity). As reported by 
Habermas (2003a, 354), Rorty considers these historical discontinuities as a “contingent 
succession of incommensurable paradigms” because, for him, philosophical questions are not 
settled through finding the right answers but they simply fall into disuse. Habermas (2003a, 353) 
concludes: 
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The contextualist understanding of the linguistic turn from which this anti-realism 
emerges goes back to a conception of the rise and fall of paradigms that excludes 
continuity of the theme between paradigms as well as learning processes that extend 
across paradigms.  
The advantage of hermeneutic-reconstructive approaches that take recourse to rational 
reconstructions is to offer an analytical framework in which discontinuities are embedded in an 
overarching continuity (Apel 1978; Kitchener 1987; Van Haaften 1997b; Tsou 2006). While the 
shifts between qualitatively distinct paradigms are discontinuous, the underlying logic of 
development presents a continuous learning process in which a subsequent paradigm can be 
considered to be an answer to the open questions of the devaluated preceding paradigm. This 
comes very close to Thomas S. Kuhn’s (2000, 227 [emphasis in original]) own conception of 
paradigm shifts: 
Concerned from the start with the development of knowledge, I have seen each stage in 
the evolution of a given field as built—not quite squarely—upon its predecessor, the 
earlier stage providing the problems, the data, and most of the concepts prerequisite to 
the emergence of the stage that followed. 
In the history of Western philosophy, as outlined by Habermas (2003a), the nominalist revolution 
resulting from the dispute about universals at the end of the Middle Ages presents a paradigm 
shift from ontology to epistemology. Since the inner nature or essence of things is questioned, 
the relation between mind and nature can no longer be conceived ontologically in that the rules 
of logic reflect the laws of reality or the order of nature. The paradigm of epistemology responds 
to that challenge by grounding the standards of knowledge in the subjectivity of the knowing 
subject. Likewise, the linguistic turn resulting from a critique of introspection and psychologism 
at the end of the 19th century presents a paradigm shift from epistemology to the philosophy of 
language. Since knowledge is symbolically mediated and symbol systems have a social origin, the 
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consciousness of an individual can no longer be conceived epistemologically as the 
transcendental source. The paradigm of the philosophy of language responds to that challenge 
by grounding the standards of knowledge in the intersubjectivity of a linguistic community. 
Therefore, Habermas (2003a, 354) concludes, against Rorty’s contextualist understanding, that 
“paradigms do not form an arbitrary sequence but a dialectical relationship,” in which older 
paradigms are not simply replaced but to some extent integrated into the newer ones. 
Furthermore, Habermas (2003a, 357) points out that relativism presents a false solution 
to the problem of the context-dependency of knowledge because it contains a “performative 
self-contradiction.” This means a speech act in which a communicative actor says something and, 
in doing so, makes quite the opposite. On one hand, the relativist says that the standards of 
rationality cannot transcend their own contexts and one cannot rationally choose between 
incommensurable frames of reference. On the other hand, the relativist makes a choice to adopt 
her or his own frame of reference and makes judgments on the validity of differing ones. As 
noted by Habermas (2001b, 150): 
To interrupt its own self-referentiality, a relativistic position must make an exception of 
the stated principle of incommensurability, precisely in the performative act of asserting 
it. 
In Rorty’s case, the hermeneutic starting point for a comparison and evaluation of paradigms is 
the philosophy of language from which he offers reasonable arguments for the necessity of a 
linguistic turn in philosophy. This is possible because subsequent paradigms do not form 
arbitrary sequences but processes of rationalization, or as Karl-Otto Apel (1978, 10) concludes, 
“the three paradigms of First Philosophy make up a hierarchical order of levels of critical 
reflection.” This hierarchical order or logic of development represents the well-known organizing 
principle of integrative levels. In the following sections, it will be shown which role this organizing 
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principle already plays in classification theory and how it could be applied to an organization of 
the epistemological dimension. 
 
3.2 Integrative Levels as Organizing Principle 
3.2.1 Integrative Levels in Classification Theory 
The organizing principle of integrative levels has a substantial tradition in the field of knowledge 
organization. In the late 1950s, the British Classification Research Group (CRG) introduced the 
term integrative levels to the discourse on classification theory with reference to biochemist and 
sinologist Joseph Needham (1937), the inventor of this term, and philosopher James Feibleman 
(1954), who is known for his generalized laws of the levels (Vickery 1958; Foskett 1961; 1962). In 
order to determine a scientifically justified sequence of main classes for a general classification 
scheme, Douglas J. Foskett (1978, 204) emphasizes the usefulness of the idea of integrative 
levels, which he describes in this way: 
To put it rather simply, the theory of integrative levels is that the world of entities evolves 
from the simple towards the complex by an accumulation of properties or influences from 
the environment. Each entity preserves its integrity by means of the relationship between 
its parts, but as the relationships between the entity and the environment become more 
complex, the entity grows itself and in due course an aggregation of entities or properties 
become a new whole of a more complex nature. 
In other words, integrative levels can be defined as a developmental hierarchy of increasing 
complexity and integration. The characteristic properties and structures of the older-level 
entities are integrated by newer-level entities that exhibit some emergent qualities in addition, 
which makes them more complex compared to their predecessors. What presents a whole at 
one level becomes a part of a new whole at the more complex level. A prime example of such a 
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developmental sequence of integrative levels is presented by the hierarchical order: atoms—
molecules—cells—organisms (Feibleman 1954, 62).  
The strength of integrative levels as an organizing principle can be seen in its “integrative 
force” (Foskett 1972, 207) that enables a non-reductionist organization of various kinds of 
entities or phenomena based on logical principles and a universal scope of coverage. Following 
Needham (1937), such a big-picture view is required as soon as researchers take the broader 
context of their specialty into account. Feibleman (1954, 59) even proposes of a kind of "super-
science" that is particularly concerned with the interdisciplinary relations between research 
fields like physics, chemistry, biology, psychology, and anthropology (see Table 3.4). 
Table 3.4 Examples of level models. 
 Comte Spencer Needham Hartmann Novikoff Feiblemann 
Atom Physical Inorganic Inorganic Material Physical Physical 
Molecule Chemical Chemical Chemical 
Cell Physiological Organic Biological Organic Biological Biological 
Organism Psychic Psychological 
Human being Social Super-organic Social Spiritual Sociological Cultural 
Source: Modified after Kleineberg (2013a, 347: Table 1; see also Kleineberg 2017: Appendix).  
As an organizing principle, the idea of integrative levels has an even longer history than the term 
itself and can be traced back at least to the classifications of sciences by Auguste Comte and 
Herbert Spencer, which have a great influence on the construction of classifications and thesauri 
from the 19th to the early 20th century. Among others, this includes Charles A. Cutter's 
Expansive Classification, Ernest C. Richardson's Order of the Sciences, James D. Brown's Subject 
Classification, Henry E. Bliss's Bibliographic Classification, and Peter M. Roget's Thesaurus of 
English Words and Phrases (Gnoli 2005; 2017a; Dousa 2009; Kleineberg 2017).  
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Since the foundation of the Classification Research Group, the idea of integrative levels is 
frequently discussed in connection with a critique of discipline-centered approaches to 
classification theory (CRG 1969; Huckaby 1972; Spiteri 1995; ISKO Italia 2007; Szostak, Gnoli, and 
López-Huertas 2016). As noted by Derek Austin (1969a), academic overspecialization challenges 
discipline-centered knowledge organization systems by the problems of keeping the 
classification scheme up to date (currency), inserting new subjects (hospitality), and avoiding 
multiple entries (cross-classification). Therefore, the CRG's new general classification adopts the 
organizing principle of integrative levels for a non-arbitrary hierarchical order of main classes to 
meet James E. Farradane's condition of a "place of unique definition" (Austin 1969b, 111). 
Even though the CRG's new general classification does not reach the status of practical 
application, the assumption that "levels of organization offer the possibility of a new taxonomy 
of the more than 8000 academic disciplines existing today" (Nicolescu 2010, 27) motivates 
similar approaches to knowledge organization that are primarily oriented on phenomena or 
objects of being, such as the Kyle Classification (Kyle 1969), the Information Coding Classification 
(ICC) (Dahlberg 2008), the Integrative Levels Classification (ILC) (Gnoli 2008a), or the Basic 
Concepts Classification (BCC) (Szostak 2012) (see Table 3.5).  
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Table 3.5 Examples of classification schemes derived from the idea of integrative levels. 
CRG ICC ILC* 
Physical entities 
     Fundamental particles 
     Atoms, isotopes 
     Molecules 
     Molecular assemblages, e.g., solids 
 
Chemical entities 
     Elements 
     Compounds 
     Complex compounds 
 
Heterogenous non-living entities 
     Minerals 
     Rocks 
     Physiographic features 
     Astronomical entities 
 
Artefacts 
     Raw materials 
     Processed raw materials 
     Components 
     Finished articles 
 
Biological entities 
     Viruses 
     Organelles 
     Cells 
     Tissues 
     Organs 
     Systems, e.g., digestive systems 
     Organisms 
     Communities, e.g., shoals, herds  
 
Man 
     Individual 
     Group 
     Local community 
     National community 
     International community 
 
Mentefacts 
   Units, e.g., digit, note 
   Words, numbers, bars, etc. 
   Sentences, formulae, musical phrases, etc. 
   Paragraphs, themes, etc. 
   Complete works, philosophical systems, etc. 
General forms and structures 
 
Matter and energy 
 
Aggregated matter 
     (cosmos and earth) 
 
Biological objects 
     Micro-organisms 
     Plants 






Material products of mankind 
     (economy and technology) 
 
Intellectual products 
     (science, information and   
     communication) 
 
Spiritual products 
     (language, literature, music, 
     arts, etc.) 
Form 
     Forms 
 
Matter 
     Spaces 
     Particles 
     Atoms 
     Molecules 
     Bulk matter 
     Celestial objects 
     Rocks 
     Landforms 
 
Life 
     Cells 
     Organisms 
     Populations 
 
Mind 
     Instincts 
     Consciousness 
     Signals 
 
Society 
     Social welfare 
     Land products 
     Artifacts 
     Wealth 
     Organizations 
 
Culture 
     Cultures 
     Art works 
     Knowledge 
     Wisdom 
Source: Based on Kleineberg (2013a, 342–43: Figures 1–2). 
* This version of the ILC scheme is taken from Gnoli (2008), developed before the publication of the first edition 
(ISKO Italia 2011) and second edition (ISKO Italia 2019). 
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In order to define the inherent relations of the principle of integrative levels, Feibleman 
(excerpted from 1954, 59–63) offers some generalizations in which thoughts by Joseph 
Needham, Ludwig Bertalanffy, and Alex B. Novikoff are summarized into a dozen laws of the 
levels: 
1. Each level organises the level or levels below it plus one emergent quality. 
2. Complexity of the levels increases upward. 
3. In any organisation the higher level depends upon the lower. 
4. In any organisation, the lower level is directed by the higher. 
5. For an organisation at any given level, its mechanism lies at the level below and its 
purpose at the level above. 
6. A disturbance introduced into an organisation at any one level reverberates at all the 
levels it covers. 
7. The time required for a change in organisation shortens as we ascend the levels. 
8. The higher the level, the smaller its population of instances. 
9. It is impossible to reduce the higher level to the lower. 
10. An organisation at any level is a distortion of the level below. 
11. Events at any given level affect organisations at other levels. 
12. Whatever is affected as an organisation has some effect as an organisation. 
These explicit laws make it possible to relate the idea of integrative levels to several well-known 
organizing principles in the field of knowledge organization (Gnoli 2017a; Kleineberg 2017). To 
begin with, the principle of increasing complexity is reflected by Feibleman's first and second 
laws stating that integrative levels are cumulative upward in terms of both properties and 
structures, while an emergent quality is added at each more complex or higher level. With regard 
to cumulative properties, as suggested by Broughton (2008), this principle is compatible with 
Bliss's principle of gradation by specialty describing a sequence from the most general to the 
most specific, which is also known as genus-species relation. With regard to cumulative 
structures, one might speak of the principle of successive parthood describing an "organisation 
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as itself a part of some higher and more complex organisation" (Feibleman 1954, 61), which is 
also known as part-whole relation.  
An implication of the principle of increasing complexity is articulated in Feibleman's third 
law stating that each higher level depends upon the lower level(s) but not vice versa. This relation 
could be termed the principle of successive dependence (cp. Gnoli, Bosch, and Mazzocchi 2007). 
Furthermore, Feibleman's eighth law stating that at each higher level the population of instances 
decreases (e.g., there are fewer molecules than atoms and fewer cells than molecules) could be 
called the principle of decreasing span corresponding to the principle of increasing depth, 
following Arthur Koestler's (1967, 342) terminology of "depth" as the number of levels that an 
entity encompasses and "span" as the number of entities that exist at a given level. Finally, levels 
of integration constitute a developmental sequence (Needham 1937; Feibleman 1954; Aronson 
1987; Salthe 1991). This means that they are also in accordance with Ranganathan's (1967, 183) 
principles of “later-in-evolution” and “later-in-time,” which both can be subsumed under 
Austin’s (1969b) principle of consecutiveness.  
It should be noted that the principle of increasing complexity and the principle of 
consecutiveness are apparently irreducible to each other. Not every order of complexity presents 
a developmental or diachronic sequence of entities but sometimes a rather synchronic one (e.g., 
tissue—organ—organism) that comes into being concurrently. Reversely, not every evolutionary 
or developmental change means a change toward increasing complexity (e.g., a new species of 
bacteria). 
In short, the organizing principle of integrative levels can be described in terms of 
evolutionary order based on the combined main principles of gradation by specialty (genus-
species relation), successive parthood (part-whole relation), and consecutiveness 
(developmental relation) indicating "a conceptual progress from the general to the specific, the 
simple to the complex, and the past to the present" (Dousa 2009, 76). These inherent relations 
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are often illustrated by diagrammatic models that evoke notions like lower and higher, or deeper 
and shallower based on different metaphors, such as a nest or a spiral, a pyramid or a staircase, 
a chain or a ladder, each highlighting certain aspects at the expense of some others (see Figure 
3.3). 
Like Chinese boxes or Russian dolls, a nest of concentric circles emphasizes the integrative 
character of the level sequence since a whole level is included as an integral part in the next 
more complex or higher level. For example, atoms (1) are included in molecules (2) while 
molecules are included in cells (3). This two-faced aspect of a given level as a simultaneous whole 
and part is aptly called "holon" (Koestler 1967, 48)—from Greek holos "whole" and the suffix -
on in analogy to proton or neutron suggesting a part or particle—which constitutes the basic 
unit of a part-whole hierarchy or "holarchy" (Koestler 1967, 103).  
Another way to illustrate the same level sequence presents a pyramid where each higher 
level rests and depends on the more fundamental lower level(s). This underlines the decreasing 
span or population of instances at each higher level. For example, there are fewer cells (3) than 
molecules (2) and fewer molecules than atoms (1) (cp. Feibleman 1954; Blitz 1992).  
Figure 3.3 Metaphors for integrative levels as nest, pyramid, and chain (Kleineberg 2017, 355). 
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Finally, the same level sequence can be depicted by a simple chain, either horizontally or 
vertically with increasing or decreasing numbering. Figure 3.3 presents a vertical chain with the 
inverse sequence of the pyramid placing the most general level at the top. This highlights the 
role of the least complex but most fundamental level as a root class of a genus-species hierarchy 
or "specification hierarchy" (Salthe 2009, 87) in which subclasses are derived from a specification 
of the preceding more general class. For example, the physical level based on atomic matter (1) 
is specified by the chemical level based on molecular matter (2) which, in turn, is specified by 
the biological level based on cellular matter (3). 
Arguably, the most characteristic attribute of integrative levels is its underlying 
hierarchical order. In KO theory, hierarchies play a central role in the development of knowledge 
organization systems and are considered to be the most informationally rich and most effective 
conceptual relation for KOSs like classifications, thesauri, or formal ontologies (Svenonius 2000; 
Stock and Stock 2013; Frické 2016; Gnoli 2017a). Unlike equivalence relations or association 
relations, hierarchical relations can be described in terms of an order in the mathematical sense 
(Stock and Stock 2013).  
In mathematics, order theory is concerned with the intuitive notion of ranking and its 
formalization by using binary relations for a comparison of pairs of objects. Order relations can 
be strict or non-strict and rest on the properties of transitivity and antisymmetry (Davey and 
Priestley 2008). A non-strict order (or non-strict partial order) on a set is a binary relation less-
than-or-equal-to on this set such that the following statements hold for all its elements 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧: 
(a) 𝑥𝑥 ≤  𝑥𝑥 (reflexivity),  
(b) 𝑥𝑥 ≤  𝑦𝑦 and 𝑦𝑦 ≤  𝑥𝑥 imply 𝑥𝑥 =  𝑦𝑦 (antisymmetry),  
(c) 𝑥𝑥 ≤  𝑦𝑦 and 𝑦𝑦 ≤  𝑧𝑧 imply 𝑥𝑥 ≤  𝑧𝑧 (transitivity).  
Every relation less-than-or-equal-to induces a relation less-than of strict inequality in that 𝑥𝑥 <
 𝑦𝑦 if and only if 𝑥𝑥 ≤  𝑦𝑦 and 𝑥𝑥 ≠  𝑦𝑦. Therefore, the conditions (a) to (c) can be restated in terms 
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of a strict order (or strict partial order) on a set meaning a binary relation less-than on this set 
such that the following statements hold for all its elements 𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦, 𝑧𝑧: 
(i) 𝑥𝑥 <  𝑥𝑥 does not hold (irreflexivity),  
(ii) if 𝑥𝑥 <  𝑦𝑦 then 𝑦𝑦 <  𝑥𝑥 does not hold (asymmetry),  
(iii) 𝑥𝑥 <  𝑦𝑦 and 𝑦𝑦 <  𝑧𝑧 imply 𝑥𝑥 <  𝑧𝑧 (transitivity).  
While inside mathematics equality is usually allowed as it is implicit in the non-strict order 
relation less-than-or-equal-to, outside mathematics the strict order relation less-than appears 
to be much more common and can be considered to be equally fundamental (Davey and 
Priestley 2008). Interestingly, there seems to be no consensus in KO discourse since hierarchical 
relations are described as both non-strict orders (Jolley 1973; Svenonius 2000) and strict orders 
(Jolley 1973; Stock and Stock 2013; Gnoli 2017a), depending on the understanding of the 
property of reflexivity or irreflexivity. 
This distinction becomes crucial, however, for an application of integrative levels as 
organizing principle in knowledge organization systems. As the name suggests, levels of 
integration are based on the following assumptions: First, there are qualitatively distinct levels 
that can be ranked in a linear developmental sequence from the less complex to the more 
complex. And second, there are hierarchical integrations in the form that each more complex 
level includes the characteristic structures and properties of its predecessors. With regard to 
conceptual systems like KOSs, the question arises whether or not hierarchical relations present 
non-strict orders that hold reflexivity. This would mean that a given set (e.g., a class, a concept, 
a term, a level) includes itself as its own subset (e.g., a subclass, a subordinate concept, a 
narrower term, a lower level). Given Feibleman’s first law of the levels, this seems not to be the 
case for the idea of integrative levels since a given level includes a lower level while adding 
something new. This is often characterized as a process of differentiation and integration, or 
transcendence and inclusion (Spencer 1915; Salthe 1991; Wilber 2000; Lourenço 2016). 
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Consequently, a given level and its next lower level cannot be identical and the relation of 
inclusion needs to be defined as an irreflexive one. Hence the hierarchical relation of integrative 
levels is a strict order that exhibits the properties of irreflexivity, asymmetry, and transitivity.  
These explicit definitions of the inherent order relations are crucial for an evaluation of 
the consistency of proposed level sequences and for a discussion of open problems in the 
application of integrative levels as an organizing principle (Kleineberg 2017). Of particular 
importance appears to be the property of transitivity that is supposed to hold for each one of 
the principles identified above as being constitutive for levels of integration (i.e., increasing 
complexity, gradation by specialty, successive parthood, successive dependence, decreasing 
span, increasing depth, and consecutiveness). But transitivity of a hierarchical order requires a 
homogeneous way of subdivision and this requirement seems to be frequently violated at the 
price of inconsistent relations of inclusion (Beghtol 2000; Svenonius 2000; Guizzardi 2009; Stock 
and Stock 2013; Almeida and Baracho 2014).  
This can be demonstrated with regard to the proposed basic classification schemes in 
Table 3.5. For example, the CRG’s new general classification suggests some levels of integration 
that seem to violate the condition of transitivity, particularly, at the physical level (e.g., 
molecules—molecular assemblages), the biological level (e.g., organisms—communities), and 
the human level (e.g., individual—group). In all these cases, a kind of “aggregative or societal 
level” (Austin 1969c, 88) is considered to be a higher and more complex level compared to the 
level of individual entities. This appears to be problematic in that the principle of 
consecutiveness does not hold since in evolution collective entities like animal communities or 
human groups emerge concurrently with the individual entities that form the parts of these 
collective entities like individual animals or individual human beings. Moreover, different part-
whole relations seem to be confused. While the integrative relation between atoms, molecules, 
and cells presents parts as components, the aggregative relation between individuals and a 
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community or group presents parts as members (cp. Zimmerman 2004). This confusion often 
leads to intransitive hierarchical relations and, therefore, to invalid conclusions, as the following 
syllogism illustrates (based on Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann 1987, 431–32): 
Premises: Simpson’s arm is part (component) of Simpson. 
  Simpson is part (member) of the Philosophy department. 
Conclusion: Simpson’s arm is part (?) of the Philosophy department. 
One might call the equalization of integration and aggregation resulting in intransitive hierarchies 
the “individual/collective inconsistency” (Kleineberg 2017, 358). This sheds also new light on the 
alleged branchings and dead ends observed in modeling integrative levels (Feibleman 1954; 
Foskett 1961; Austin 1969c; Kyle 1969; Tomlinson 1969). As claimed by Tomlinson (1969), for 
example, the development from the level of molecules branches into non-living phenomena 
(e.g., minerals, rocks) and living phenomena (e.g., cells, tissues). But while the development from 
molecules to cells presents a truly integrative relation, molecules and molecular assemblages 
like rocks or astronomical entities present a mere aggregative relation. This tendency to consider 
aggregates like gross material bodies with a quantitative increase in the spatial dimension as 
increasingly higher levels of integration is called by John L. Jolley (1973, 72) a “dimensional 
fallacy.”  
Furthermore, the principle of consecutiveness seems to be violated if non-living human 
artifacts are placed before living entities, as proposed by the CRG, since artifacts depend on the 
evolutionary appearance of human beings, as emphasized by Austin (1969b) and Dahlberg 
(1974) who both refer to Feibleman’s (1954, 64) rule that the “reference of any organisation 
must be to the highest level which its explanation requires.”  
Another typical violation of the transitivity condition, which can be observed in all three 
classification schemes presented in Table 3.5., is related to what philosopher Nicolai Hartmann 
(1953, 79) calls the “psychophysical border line.” In the basic scheme of the Integrative Levels 
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Classification, for example, this border line marks the distinction between life and mind (Gnoli 
2008a). Obviously, biological properties and structures at the level of life (e.g., spatial exteriority, 
cellular structure) are not integrated at the next higher level of mind in which psychological 
properties and structures appear to be categorically different (e.g., non-spatial interiority, 
cognitive structure). Therefore, the principles of gradation by specialty and successive parthood 
do not hold for the relation between life and mind. Consequently, any attempt to consider this 
relation as integrative levels might be termed the “exterior/interior inconsistency” (Kleineberg 
2017, 358). 
Of course, such a categorical mistake can be avoided if one adopts a pure materialist 
approach, as favored by Austin (1969c, 88) who restricts the number of levels to not more than 
four “truly integrative” ones: fundamental particles—elements—compounds—living 
compounds. Actually, there exists a well-established tradition of materialism in the discourse on 
level theories (Novikoff 1945; Rowe 1961; Jolley 1973; Pettersson 1996; Bunge 2003; Vickery 
2005). But these approaches appear to be strongly reductionist since they do not take psychical 
or cultural phenomena into account.  
Admittedly, there are significant doubts that the organizing principle of integrative levels, 
which might be appropriate for a hierarchical order of phenomena studied by the natural 
sciences, can be equally applied to phenomena investigated by human-related research fields 
like psychology, social sciences, or humanities (Huckaby 1972; Langridge 1976; Spiteri 1995; Poli 
2001; Dousa 2009). Nevertheless, some authors criticize the overemphasis on things or material 
entities and propose an application of the idea of integrative levels to nonmaterial phenomena, 
such as ideas, concepts, and other mental products of human beings (Tomlinson 1969; Dahlberg 
1974). For example, Barbara Kyle (1969, 14) introduces the term “mentefacts” into classification 
theory, denoting intellectual concepts and systems including theories and philosophies (see also 
Gnoli 2018b). Her attempt to identify integrative levels of such mentefacts results in the 
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following exemplary sequence: words—sentences—paragraphs—complete works (see also 
Table 3.5). But it remains unclear to what extent this kind of phenomena represent genuine 
nonmaterial mental phenomena in contrast to material artifacts in which works or theories are 
manifested. An alternative proposal is made by Phyllis Richmond’s levels of mental entities 
(quoted in Foskett 1978, 207): 
1. An observation    Human being turns red in face 
2. A group of observations Human being red-faced, eyes flashing, makes  
noise, gesticulates, etc. 
3. 1st level generalization  Human being is angry 
4. 2nd level generalization Human being is frustrated 
5. A law    Anger stems from frustration 
Such a level sequence appears to be more promising since it is really concerned with mental 
phenomena and presents a level sequence that can be considered to be subsequent mental 
reflections on previous levels. This conception comes close to cognitive-developmental models 
presenting hierarchical integrations in accordance with the principle of integrative levels 
(Kleineberg 2014; Lourenço 2016). Nevertheless, the concept of mentefacts and the notion of 
“levels of ideas” (Huckaby 1972, 100) still remain theoretically underdeveloped in classification 
theory (Tomlinson 1969; Foskett 1978; Spiteri 1995; Dousa 2009). Not much progress seems to 
be made since Richmond’s statement (quoted in Foskett 1978, 206): 
[I]t is possible to utilize the theory of integrative levels to build a table showing a 
completely different set of levels, considered solely as mental aggregates, but it does not 
make it clear what criteria are necessary for the argument or the philosophic approach 
needed to fit them into one big set of levels. 
Regarding the overall architecture of level models, any non-reductionist approach that seeks to 
incorporate both material and nonmaterial phenomena is challenged by some categorically 
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orthogonal domains of reality that cannot be arranged as a linear sequence with transitive 
relations due to a lack of hierarchical integration. This is emphasized, for example, by Roberto 
Poli’s (2001) three domains of the material, the mental, and the social, as well as Ken Wilber’s 
(2000) four domains of the objective, the subjective, the intersubjective, and the interobjective 
(Kleineberg 2016a). Basically, there are two different strategies to deal with that challenge since 
either the linear sequence of levels will be defended at the price of a hierarchical integration or 
the hierarchical integration of levels will be defended at the price of a linear sequence. 
The first strategy is followed, at least to some extent, by Hartmann’s (1940) model of levels 
of reality or strata of being. In this school of thought, the idea of integrative levels is weakened 
to the more general but less qualified notion of “level of organization” (Gnoli 2017a, 40) stating 
that each emergent or higher level depends historically and logically on the previous or lower 
level(s) but without necessarily to integrate lower-level structures and properties. Consequently, 
even though the principle of consecutiveness still holds, the principles of successive parthood 
and gradation by specialty are abandoned. 
The second strategy is consistently developed by Wilber’s (2000) conception of co-
evolutionary holons. In this tradition, the idea of integrative levels in the proper sense is 
maintained while the linearity of the level sequence is given up and replaced by the co-evolution 
of categorically orthogonal domains of reality that are presented as four interdependent 
correlates in a quadrant model (Kleineberg 2016a). One advantage of this approach is that the 
multiple transitive order relations inherent in levels of integration offer an informationally richer 
organizing principle compared to the idea of levels of organization that seems to dominate the 
modeling of levels in KO research today (cp. Gnoli 2017a). Another advantage is that it provides 
a more elaborate level concept for psychical and cultural phenomena, namely, the concept of 
Integrative Levels of Knowing. Therefore, the present study adopts this framework of co-
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evolutionary holons as a heuristic tool and point of reference for a discussion of various 
conceptions of Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
 
3.2.2 The AQAL Framework 
The analytical framework known as AQAL (All Quadrants, All Levels) is developed by Ken Wilber 
(2000; 2006) and presents the core elements of his Integral Theory that aims to highlight the 
complementary character of existing branches of human knowledge, including natural sciences, 
social sciences, humanities and arts, as well as non-academic approaches like folk science or 
wisdom traditions. These core elements are explicitly based on formal-pragmatic distinctions in 
order to provide a “content-free framework that is suitable to virtually any context and can be 
used at any scale” (Esbjörn-Hargens 2010, 34). The two most important core elements are 
quadrants and levels, which are supplemented by lines, types, and states.  
The first elements of the AQAL framework, the quadrants, represent four domains of 
reality derived from the intersection of two fundamental categorical border lines, namely, the 
interior/exterior distinction and the individual/collective distinction (Kleineberg 2016a). Similar 
but independently developed quadrant models can be found in other research fields like 
sociology (Ritzer 2001), psychology (Juckes and Barresi 1993), anthropology (Ingold 1999), and 
cybersemiotics (Brier 2008). Each quadrant depicts categorically distinct phenomena (i.e., 
subjective, objective, intersubjective, interobjective) that cannot be reduced to any other 
domain of reality (see Figure 3.4). 
109 
In contrast to pure materialist approaches, this quadrant model also acknowledges the 
ontological status of psychical or subjective phenomena (interior-individual) and cultural or 
intersubjective phenomena (interior-collective). This corresponds to Habermas’s (1984, 45) 
formal-pragmatic extension of traditional Greek metaphysics and its restriction to the objective 
world of existing things (Welt des Seienden): 
There is no corresponding concept in philosophy that includes relations to the social and 
the subjective worlds as well as to the objective world. The theory of communicative 
action is also meant to remedy this lack. 
Note that what Habermas calls the objective world is subdivided here into objective phenomena 
(exterior-individual) and interobjective phenomena (exterior-collective). This allows a more 
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Figure 3.4  Quadrants of the AQAL framework (modified after 
Esbjörn-Hargens 2010, 36: Figure 1.1, 41: Figure 1.5). 
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phenomena into account without falling prey to the individual/collective inconsistency. In other 
words, this distinction avoids to treat collective phenomena (e.g., an animal species) as a higher 
integrative level compared to the corresponding individual phenomena (e.g., individual animals 
of that species) because from an evolutionary perspective both of them come into being 
concurrently and co-evolve together (Kleineberg 2016a). Another advantage is that the 
differentiation between interobjective phenomena (exterior-collective) and intersubjective 
phenomena (interior-collective) provides a clear-cut distinction between material and 
nonmaterial aspects that are often lumped together in notions like social or cultural (Wilber 
2000, 130). This is important because, as emphasized by Brier (2008, 362), “Each of these four 
worlds demands its own type of narrative,” that is, a description language that is adequate for 
the given kind of phenomena. Brier (2008, 361–62) uses these four different domains of reality 
also to illustrate how human beings as knowing subjects are situated in categorically distinct 
contexts: 
1. embodied and biologically situated – our body is the principal system for the 
manifestation of life and cognition [objective, M.K.]; 
2. conscious and intentionally situated – consciousness is the source of an inner life of 
cognition, volition, feeling, and perceptual qualities (qualia) [subjective, M.K.]; 
3. meaning-situated in cultural practice – that is, through language in a social and cultural 
activity with a network of other living, linguistic, conscious systems [intersubjective, 
M.K.]; and 
4. environmentally situated – in a nature or a universe that is partly independent of our 
perception and being [interobjective, M.K.]. 
The four quadrants of the AQAL framework can also be represented by the formal-pragmatic 
system of personal pronouns that defines the communicative roles of the speaking person (first 
person), the person being spoken to (second person), and the person who is spoken about (third 
person). The subjective quadrant is represented by the first-person singular (I) and those 
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phenomena to which the speaker has privileged access, such as feelings and thoughts. The 
intersubjective quadrant is represented by the first-person plural (WE) that is constituted by the 
reciprocal relationship between a first person speaking to a second person. This domain of 
intersubjectivity that is concerned with communicative experience and collectively shared 
nonmaterial phenomena (e.g., languages, worldviews, cultural mentalities, values, norms) is 
identified by Habermas (1984, 111) as the “’forgotten theme’ in the analytic theory of science.” 
Finally, the objective quadrant represented by the third-person singular (IT) and the 
interobjective quadrant represented by the third-person plural (ITS) are related to material 
phenomena that are usually approached by an objectivating attitude characteristic for any third-
person perspective. In other words, these four quadrants are also in accordance with the widely 
agreed-upon distinction of three domains of reality or spheres of values, referred to by Wilber 
(2000, 149) as the “Big Three” (see Table 3.6). 
Table 3.6 The “Big Three.” 
 First person Second person Third person 
Buddhism Buddha Sangha Dharma 
Plato The Beautiful The Good The Truth 
Immanuel Kant Judgment Practical reason Pure reason 
Max Weber Art Moral Science 
Karl Popper World II World III World I 
Jürgen Habermas Subjective world Social world Objective world 
Ken Wilber Subjective Intersubjective Objective/Interobjective 
Source: Based on Wilber (2000, 149, 426).  
The second elements of the AQAL framework, the levels, represent developmental stages in each 
domain of reality according to the chronological and logical order in which phenomena come 
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into being. These levels are characterized as a hierarchy of holons, a notion that fully applies to 
the definition of integrative levels (Esbjörn-Hargens 2010, 41 [emphases in original]): 
Levels or waves in each quadrant demonstrate holarchy, which is a kind of hierarchy 
wherein each new level transcends the limits of the previous levels but includes the 
essential aspects of those same levels. Thus, each wave inherits the wave of the past and 
adds a new level of organization or capacity. As a result, each level of complexity or depth 
is both a part of a larger structure and a whole structure in and of itself. 
The term waves is supposed to indicate the rather fluid dynamics of development compared to 
the reconstruction of the stage-like logic of development. In the AQAL framework, 
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Figure 3.5 Quadrants and levels of the AQAL framework.  
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The exemplary levels mentioned in Figure 3.5 are supposed to indicate that development takes 
place in each of the four quadrants. This includes an application of the principle of integrative 
levels to psychical and cultural development in the left-hand quadrants. As proposed by 
comparative psychologist Wojciech Pisula (2016, 51), this can be accomplished by “incorporating 
the levels of consciousness into the framework of integrative levels theory.” Accordingly, the 
AQAL framework introduces the notion of interior holon for both subjective and intersubjective 
level sequences. This conception of interior holons building up an interior holarchy presents 
what in the present study is termed Integrative Levels of Knowing. This conception seems to be 
well-established in various cognitive-developmental approaches in psychology and other fields, 
although often referred to in different terminology (see Appendix A). 
Many of these cognitive-developmental approaches agree about the importance to 
include biological, psychological, and social aspects, often summarized as the “biopsychosocial 
paradigm” (Robinson 2013, 13). This means that development takes places under the reciprocal 
influence and constant interaction of these different aspects. Consequently, none of them should 
maintain methodological primacy over any other since biological, psychological, and social 
approaches are valid within their own description languages and models of explanation but they 
need to be integrated into a comprehensive framework in order to avoid reductionism (Overton 
2006; Robinson 2013; Newman and Newman 2016). 
As developmental psychologist Oliver Robinson (2013, 21) emphasizes, Wilber’s AQAL 
framework provides an effective way of illustrating the interrelation between biological, 
psychological, social, and ecological aspects of human development: 
This helps us to see how the psychological perspective fits in—it views the human being 
as a conscious individual with an inner life and intentions, who is simultaneously a 
biological being and part of social and ecological systems. Psychology should therefore 
constantly interact with biology, sociology and ecology to glean insights from the 
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disciplines that specialise in the other three quadrants, while maintaining its 
distinguishable features. 
In other words, the AQAL framework helps to illustrate the multiplicity of aspects that are 
relevant for cognitive-developmental theories and conceptions of Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
It helps to better locate the various approaches with their different focuses, as well as to 
emphasize their divergent but complementary character. For example, models of Integrative 
Levels of Knowing are applied in such diverse fields as comparative psychology (Pisula 1998; 
Parker and McKinney 1999; Tomasello 2014), neuroanthropology (Deacon 1997; Donald 2001), 
cultural and cognitive anthropology (Hallpike 1979; Atran 1990), cognitive archaeology (Mithen 
1998; Renfrew and Scarre 1998), medieval history (Radding 1985), history of English literature 
(LePan 1989), art history (Gablik 1979), among others (see also Appendices B–D). 
The AQAL framework also illustrates the interdependent relations between aspects that 
are often approached from seemingly contradictory positions based on basic dichotomies like 
subjective-objective or mind-body, biology-culture or nature-nurture, and individual-society, or 
intrapsychic-interpersonal. As emphasized by developmental psychologist Willis F. Overton 
(2006), these kind of dichotomies should be overcome by any comprehensive approach to 
human development. For example, neuroscience investigates cognitive phenomena with a focus 
on the objective quadrant since there is obviously a kind of correspondence between interior 
mind and exterior brain with its neuronal activities. But in contrast to pure materialism reducing 
the human mind to a mere function of the human brain, a more balanced approach should 
acknowledge that the neuroplasticity of the brain (objective quadrant) is itself influenced by 
personal experience (subjective quadrant), cultural backgrounds (intersubjective quadrant), and 
ecological or societal environments (interobjective quadrant) (Thompson 2010; Downey and 
Lende 2012; Robinson 2013). Likewise, cultural anthropology investigates cognitive phenomena 
with a focus on the intersubjective quadrant since ways of thinking or forms of knowing in 
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individuals obviously depend on sociocultural frames of reference. But in contrast to pure 
sociologism reducing the individual mind to a mere function of the collective culture, a more 
balanced approach should acknowledge that sociocultural frames of reference (intersubjective 
quadrant) are themselves influenced by innovative ideas or new levels of reflection achieved by 
individuals (subjective quadrant), bodily and neuronal activities (objective quadrant), and 
socioeconomic or technological infrastructures (interobjective quadrant) (Donald 1991; Dux 
2011; Oesterdiekhoff 2015). 
In short, the four quadrants distinguished by the AQAL framework are inextricably 
interwoven and development in one of them is both affected by and affecting developments in 
the others. As a heuristic device, this framework also offers an orientation for the identification 
of structural parallels or isomorphisms of development across quadrants, for example, between 
individual and collective development (Dux and Wenzel 1994; Dinzelbacher 2015; 
Oesterdiekhoff 2014) or between interior and exterior development (Feinberg 2011; Downey 
and Lende 2012; Oesterdiekhoff 2015). Although there is no one-to-one correspondence 
between level sequences across quadrants, one might speak of an interdependent co-evolution. 
This does not mean that the contextual setting illustrated by the AQAL framework completely 
determines the development in a particular quadrant. But it shows important interrelations that 
are indispensable for a non-reductionist understanding and should not be neglected in the 
analysis of the development of human cognition (cp. Brier 2008). 
The AQAL framework also allows to trace back levels of development to its pre-human 
origins in the animal kingdom or in even earlier forms of evolution (see Appendix C: Tables C.5, 
C.15–C.18). In fact, the center of the quadrant model represents the starting point of evolution 
in the most general sense, commonly referred to as the Big Bang (see Figure 3.6).  
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In Figure 3.6, Wilber depicts some milestones in the cosmological evolution up to the present 
with reference to a broad range of already existing developmental models originating from 
diverse disciplinary backgrounds (SF is an abbreviation for Structure Function as a placeholder 
for neural-physiological correlates of mental development). Besides objective levels (e.g., from 
atoms to molecules to cells to more and more complex organisms) and interobjective levels (e.g., 
from solar systems to planetary systems to ecosystems to more and more complex social 
systems), this also includes subjective levels and intersubjective levels regarding the psychical and 
cultural development. The terminology is adopted from already existing models of development, 
Figure 3.6 AQAL framework with exemplary levels of development (Wilber 2000, 198: Figure 5-1).  
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among others, from Jean Piaget, Erik H. Erikson, Jean Gebser, Erich Neumann, Erich Jantsch, and 
Jürgen Habermas (Wilber 2000; Kleineberg 2016a). 
It seems to be still a matter of controversial debates to what extent these subjective and 
intersubjective levels can be reconstructed to its evolutionary origins. While many comparative 
psychologists would probably agree with Alexei N. Leontiev’s reconstruction of consciousness 
development beginning with the transition from irritability to sensitivity and leading to 
perceptivity to animal intellect up to human consciousness (Tolman 1987), much less agreement 
should be expected for Lynn Margulis’s (2001, 55) starting point of “microbial consciousness” at 
the cell level or even for Alfred N. Whitehead’s (1978, 18) notion of “prehension” as a kind of 
non-sensory awareness at the atomic level. Wilber (1999, 710) himself proposes a kind of 
panpsychism, which he calls “pan-interiorism”, assuming that every exterior holon has also an 
interior holon as counterpart and that all four quadrants as categorically different domains of 
reality have come into being concurrently (Kleineberg 2016a). But this assumption remains 
hypothetical and, as Wilber (2000) admits, appears to be unnecessary for using the AQAL 
framework as a heuristic device since the starting point of interior developments in the left-hand 
quadrants can be freely chosen and depicted at any level that one considers to be appropriate.  
Moreover, Wilber (2000, 198) emphasizes that the “schematic and simplifying nature” of 
Figure 3.6 should be kept in mind. In particular, the level sequences depicted in each quadrant 
are restricted to one or only a few domains of development at the expense of others. For 
example, the subjective levels (interior-individual) focus on the domain of logico-mathematical 
development as reconstructed by the Piagetian tradition (e.g., rule means concrete-operational, 
formal means formal-operational, and vision-logic means postformal cognition) at the expense 
of others, such as moral, interpersonal, and aesthetic development. 
The third elements of the AQAL framework, the lines, are thus intended to address the 
domain-specificity of development. Different lines of development can be qualified within each 
118 
of the quadrants. Besides subjective lines just mentioned, there are objective lines (e.g., organic 
structures, neural systems, skeletal-muscular growth), interobjective lines (e.g., forces of 
production, geopolitical structures), and intersubjective lines (e.g., worldviews, cultural values, 
philosophical positions) (Esbjörn-Hargens 2010). These qualifications are important because 
development in different lines usually occurs in an asynchronical way, which means that the 
same person (or the same group or society) at a particular point in time can be highly developed 
in one line while averaged or even poorly developed in other lines. It is important to note that 
for this reason the notion of a logic of development applies only within a particular line of 
development. Terminologically, subjective or intersubjective lines are also often referred to as 
“domains” (Mascolo 2008, 330), “dimensions” (Korthals 1997a, 93), “streams” (Parsons 1987, 
XIII), or “specialized capacity spheres” (Demetriou, Mouyi, and Spanoudis 2010, 328). 
Nevertheless, for the vast majority of existing level models of cognitive development it 
seems to be possible to be aligned along a common developmental continuum. As outlined by 
Zachary Stein (2008a, 5), Integral Theory relies on the notion of “altitude” as an orienting 
generalization. Different developmental lines in the subjective quadrant can be presented by a 
so-called psychograph (for the intersubjective quadrant it is called sociograph) that presents a 
generic developmental continuum using different degrees of altitude as common points of 
reference (see Figure 3.7). 
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Figure 3.7 Exemplary lines of development (modified after Esbjörn-Hargens 2010, 44: Figure 1.7). 
The psychograph in Figure 3.7 shows hypothetical developments in six distinctive lines for two 
different persons. This helps to illustrate two important points regarding the conception of 
Integrative Levels of Knowing. The first point is that there does not exist an overall 
developmental level of an individual person but a complex distribution and an asynchronous 
growth of skills or competences across domain-specific lines. For example, at the same time 
person A is highly developed in the cognitive and kinesthetic lines, on average in the 
interpersonal and moral lines, and poorly developed in the emotional line. By comparison, 
person B appears to be less developed in some lines but more developed in some others. This 
means that a global comparison, resulting in the claim that one of these persons is at a higher 
or lower level of development, would be inappropriate. There is a stage-like logic of development 
for domain-specific and task-specific skills or competences but not for an individual as a whole.  
The second point is that it seems to be possible to compare different developmental lines 
according to their degree of altitude, that is, the depth or height of developmental levels, as 
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based on empirical data that show correlations between developmental lines. For example, 
empirical findings may show that individuals at a given level in one developmental line (e.g., 
postconventional level in the line of moral judgment) correlate most often with certain levels in 
other lines (e.g., formal-operational level in the line of cognition) (Stein and Heikkinen 2008; 
Lourenço 2014). If such correlations were significant for a large sample of individuals, they could 
be used for a mapping of different level models. Another way to interrelate different 
developmental lines is to identify isomorphisms based on structural analysis. For example, 
Michael J. Parsons (1987, XIII) observes structural similarities or “corresponding streams” in the 
cognitive, moral, and aesthetic lines of development, explaining them with reliance on 
Habermas’s formal-pragmatics and rational reconstruction. Such a structural analysis allows 
authors like Robert L. Selman (1980), James W. Fowler (1981), Michael J. Parsons (1987), and 
Susanne R. Cook-Greuter (2010a) to adopt, for example, Kohlberg’s terminology of 
preconventional, conventional, and postconventional stages or levels for other domain-specific 
lines of development, such as interpersonal, spiritual, aesthetic, and ego-identity development. 
Similar approaches that identify isomorphisms across multiple domain-specific lines are 
presented by Michael L. Common’s (Commons and Richards 1984; Commons et al. 1989) General 
Stage Model or Zachary Stein’s and Katie Heikkinen’s (2008) Lectcial Assessment System (see 
also Appendix D). Some authors use a terminologically neutral color code to indicate such 
general degrees of altitude (Wilber 2006; Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman 2009; Laloux 2014; 
DiPerna 2018; see also Appendix B: Tables B.14–B.16; Appendix C: Table C.14; Appendix D: Table 
D.30). 
Finally, the AQAL framework comprises two further core elements that help to qualify 
different kinds of phenomena and to distinguish developmental from non-developmental 
patterns. The fourth elements of the AQAL framework, the types, refer to non-developmental 
differences of phenomena within each quadrant (Esbjörn-Hargens 2010). There are objective 
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types like blood types (e.g., A, B, AB, 0) or body types (e.g., ectomorph, mesomorph, 
endomorph). There are interobjective types like biome types (e.g., steppe, tundra, islands) or 
regime types (e.g., monarchy, oligarchy, democracy). There are subjective types like personality 
types (e.g., extroverted, introverted) or gender types (e.g., feminine, masculine). And there are 
intersubjective types like worldview types (e.g., theocentric, cosmocentric) or cultural types (e.g., 
high or low power distance, high or low uncertainty avoidance) (Esbjörn-Hargens 2010). The fifth 
elements of the AQAL framework, the states, refer also to non-developmental but more 
temporary differences of phenomena. They include objective states like brain states (e.g., alpha, 
beta, delta, or theta waves activities), interobjective states like economic states (e.g., recession, 
boom), subjective states like emotional states (e.g., elevated, depressed), and intersubjective 
states like group states (e.g., mass hysteria, crowd excitement) (Esbjörn-Hargens 2010). 
For the present study, it appears to be particular useful that the AQAL framework can be 
applied in two fundamentally different ways. The first way is that the quadrants, levels, lines, 
types, and states can be used ontologically by depicting and organizing the plethora of world 
phenomena. This refers to the ontological dimension someone is looking at and is related to the 
subject matter in document indexing. For example, the subject matter of Kohlberg’s (1976) 
research article Moral and Moralization – The Cognitive-Developmental Approach is concerned 
with the phenomenon of Integrative Levels of Knowing in individual development (subjective 
quadrant) in terms of preconventional, conventional, and postconventional stages (subjective 
levels) for the domain of moral judgment (subjective line). The second way is that the elements 
of the AQAL framework can also be used epistemologically by depicting and organizing the 
plethora of world perspectives. This refers to the epistemological dimension and the frame of 
reference or lens someone is looking through and is related to the context features in document 
indexing. For example, Kohlberg’s moral stages can also be used to describe the authorial 
perspectives of documents, such as the Old Testament (e.g., Exodus 21:24 “eye for eye, tooth for 
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tooth”) and the New Testament (e.g., Matthew 5:39 “If anyone slaps you on the right cheek, turn 
to them the other cheek also”), which apparently express very different justice concepts or moral 
views (Bible 1978; see also Appendix E: Table E.1). 
From a theoretical perspective, it appears to be also useful that the AQAL framework 
applies the three main principles of Wilber’s Integral Theory that may function as a heuristic 
guide for a non-relativistic approach to the organization of the epistemological dimension 
(Wilber 2006; Esbjörn-Hargens 2010). First, the principle of non-exclusion seeks to avoid 
reductionism by taking as much as possible methodological approaches and epistemological 
perspectives regarding a given object of interest into account. Second, the principle of 
enfoldment seeks to avoid relativism by acknowledging that not all approaches or perspectives 
are equally valid but some of them tend to be more comprehensive and more convincing than 
others. And third, the principle of enactment seeks to avoid unnecessary metaphysical 
assumptions by considering phenomena not simply as ontological givens but as partly 
constructed by individual subjects or epistemic communities in the process of knowing them. 
This also implies that the AQAL framework does not present a neutral perspective and can be 
understood from different levels of knowing (Stein 2010; see also Appendix B: Table B.41).  
Nevertheless, there are also some weaknesses in Wilber's overall approach, which in the 
present study are partly viewed as methodological limitations and partly as unnecessary 
assumptions. Regarding the methodological limitations, Wilber’s (2000, 5) attempt to integrate 
various branches of knowledge refers to the notion of “orienting generalizations” in the sense of 
“already-agreed-upon knowledge,” which appears to be problematic in that it tends to ignore 
the fact that often some issues are still a matter of debate (Meyerhoff 2010). Regarding the 
unnecessary assumptions, Wilber presents some speculative conclusions that are insufficiently 
grounded and contradict the mainstream views. For example, with reference to Alfred N. 
Whitehead, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, Erich Jantsch, among others, he argues for a kind of 
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panpsychism and a spiritual view of evolution that assumes a directionality toward increasing 
complexity based on a generic drive towards self-organization (Visser 2020). But as argued by 
Cook-Greuter (2005), there is no need to fully agree with Wilber’s philosophy in order to 
appreciate the heuristic value of the AQAL framework. Thus, this framework will be used only 
heuristically in the following chapter as a point of reference for a discussion of various 
conceptions and models of Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
 
3.3 Summary 
This chapter is concerned with the theoretical and methodological foundation of a systematic 
organization of the epistemological dimension of human knowledge. It has been argued that 
such a systematization requires analytical tools and principles of organization that can be applied 
to epistemic contexts in general, not restricted to particular contexts. In semiotic terms, the 
analysis of epistemic contexts refers to the field of pragmatics that investigates the relation 
between a symbolic expression and its use by communicative actors. In this regard, Jürgen 
Habermas’s (2003a) approach of universal or formal pragmatics concerned with the 
reconstruction of general patterns and conditions of language use has been introduced as a 
theoretical and methodological foundation. It has been demonstrated that formal-pragmatic 
analyses are able to rationally reconstruct the underlying rule system and generative structures 
of communicative actions in a systematic way. This includes a horizontal reconstruction of distinct 
speech acts (e.g., constatives, regulatives, avowals), their world relations (e.g., objective, social, 
subjective), and their validity claims (e.g., truth, rightness, truthfulness), as well as a vertical 
reconstruction of the underlying logic of development of communicative competence.  
This study refers to such a developmental-logical pattern as Integrative Levels of Knowing 
because it shows the same constitutive properties that are attributed to the traditional 
organizing principle of integrative levels, as introduced by Joseph Needham (1937) and James 
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Feibleman (1954). The advantage of this terminological decision is that developmental-logical 
approaches to human cognition and communication can be related to the existing discourse on 
integrative levels in the field of knowledge organization in which the consideration of cognitive-
developmental aspects appears to be largely neglected or theoretically underdeveloped. As a 
heuristic device, Ken Wilber’s (2000) AQAL framework is introduced to present a consistent 
architecture of categorically distinct domains of reality in which development takes place. In 
particular, this framework helps to differentiate more clearly between individual and collective 
dimensions, as well as between different domain-specific lines of the development of human 
cognition and thus offers an orienting guide for a cognitive-developmental approach to 
knowledge organization. 
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4 THE COGNITIVE-DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH TO KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION 
 
4.1 Conceptions of Integrative Levels of Knowing 
4.1.1 Cognition and Development 
As outlined in the previous chapter, a systematic organization of the epistemological dimension 
of human knowledge might benefit from an orientation on basic formal-pragmatic distinctions 
in relation to communicative actions. This includes a synchronic or horizontal dimension 
distinguishing between different world relations (e.g., objective, social, subjective) and 
different domain-specific lines of development (e.g., cognitive, interpersonal, moral, ego-
identity, aesthetic), as well as a diachronic or vertical dimension distinguishing between 
different stages of development in terms of Integrative Levels of Knowing. From a 
methodological point of view, this refers to depth-hermeneutic approaches that take recourse 
to both a “horizontal reconstruction” and a “vertical reconstruction” (Korthals 1997b, 57, 59). 
In this chapter, it will be explored to what extent already existing theories and models on 
cognitive development from a broad multidisciplinary background offer such rational 
reconstructions on which depth-hermeneutic analyses can be grounded. After a discussion of 
the basic concepts of cognition and development, the notion of Integrative Levels of Knowing 
will be distinguished in strong and weak conceptions as they can be found in different research 
traditions. Furthermore, a range of exemplary cognitive-developmental models will be 
presented that provide domain-specific sequences of Integrative Levels of Knowing for both 
individual and collective development. This chapter closes with an outline of how such models 
of Integrative Levels of Knowing can be applied to document indexing, taking Kohlberg’s 
reconstruction of developmental stages of moral consciousness as an example. 
Admittedly, it might be misleading to speak of the cognitive-developmental approach 
since there is a broad range of different disciplines, theories, and methodologies involved and 
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some important issues are still a matter of controversial debates. Nevertheless, it will be 
argued that despite their differences many research traditions present similar conceptions of 
cognitive development. Therefore, the present study uses the notion of cognitive-
developmental approach as an umbrella term for those theories and models that present a 
developmental-logical conception of cognitive growth and thus a version of the organizing 
principle of Integrative Levels of Knowing (see Appendix A).  
The proposed cognitive-developmental approach, however, should not be equated with 
the cognitive view to knowledge organization, as discussed in Chapter Two. In particular, the 
cognitive-developmental approach does neither assume that cognition takes place in an 
isolated individual mind nor that the “human mind is physiologically and psychologically the 
same since the homo sapiens was born” (Neelameghan et al. quoted in Hjørland 2013c, 15). 
Instead, it is acknowledged that cognition is embedded in a rich contextual network, as 
emphasized by Hjørland (2018b, 322) with reference to new perspectives and concepts from 
the cognitive sciences, such as: 
 embodied cognition (cognition as actively constructed from select environmental 
features) 
 enculturated cognition (the co-evolution of cognition and culture) 
 distributed cognition (cognition stretching across systems of humans and artifacts) 
 situated cognition (cognition located in and arising from interactions within 
situations) 
 the cognitive-historical approach (reconstructing conceptual changes in the history 
of science). 
In fact, these notions are also reflected by the AQAL framework that serves as a point of 
reference for the cognitive-developmental approach. For example, embodied cognition refers 
to the fact that human cognition (subjective quadrant) is bound to the human body and brain 
(objective quadrant), enculturated cognition stresses the interrelation between human 
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cognition (subjective quadrant) and human culture (intersubjective quadrant), and distributed 
cognition means that human cognition (subjective quadrant) takes place in complex systems 
and environments (interobjective quadrant). While situated cognition emphasizes particular 
contextual settings or ways in which the quadrants of the AQAL framework interact with one 
another, the cognitive-historical approach indicates the diachronic dimension of contextual 
change that can be related to the levels of the AQAL framework.  
Furthermore, the cognitive-developmental approach rejects the common limitation of 
the cognitive view to user studies or user-based approaches to knowledge organization (cp. 
Hjørland 2013c). Instead, all actors of information systems are taken into account including the 
producers, mediators, and consumers of documents. In this regard, Hjørland (2013c, 23) 
underlines the important distinction between individual and social aspects or between 
psychological and epistemological approaches: 
Psychology is about general models of minds or about individual minds. Epistemology, 
on the other hand, is about ways of thinking (“paradigms”) as reflected by scientific 
disciplines and by groups of people. 
He argues for a turn from psychology-oriented user studies concerned with abstract minds like 
the cognitive view to epistemology-oriented approaches like the domain-analytic approach to 
knowledge organization. But Hjørland’s distinction between psychology and epistemology 
appears to be somewhat misleading when psychology is exclusively related to the individual 
dimension and epistemology is exclusively related to the social or collective dimension. Indeed, 
psychology is concerned with models of how people think and know but this also includes the 
collective dimension. For example, social psychology and cultural psychology investigate how 
groups and cultures shape the psychological processes of their members (Christopher and 
Bickhard 2007). The other way around, epistemology is not at all restricted to the collective 
dimension of knowing as investigated, for example, by social epistemology or historical 
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epistemology but also includes the individual dimension. The decisive feature of epistemology, 
not explicitly mentioned in Hjørland’s quoted distinction, is its consideration of validity claims. 
While psychology is largely descriptive, epistemology is normative in its core since it does not 
only ask how people think and know but also to what extent different ways of thinking or forms 
of knowing are valid in terms of truth, rightness, and truthfulness. One of the most prominent 
traditions of epistemology is rooted in Jean Piaget’s genetic epistemology that is concerned 
with both individual and collective development of new forms of knowing. Although his 
“historisch-kritische Methode” (historical-critical method) (Piaget 1975, 21) is interested in 
significant changes of ways of thinking in the history of science or human history in general, he 
considers the investigation of individual development methodologically more fruitful for an 
understanding of structural transformations of thinking. Interestingly, even Thomas S. Kuhn 
(2000) refers to Piaget’s work on cognitive development of children as a major inspiration for 
his own conception of paradigm shifts in the history of science (cp. Tsou 2006). The decisive 
point is that epistemology, like psychology, is concerned with both the individual and collective 
dimensions of cognition and none of them should be neglected. The dialectics between the 
individual dimension and the collective dimension suggests that Hjørland’s turn from an 
individual-oriented cognitive view to an collective-oriented domain-analytical approach is in 
danger to replace one reductionism (psychologism) with another (sociologism). Instead, the 
proposed cognitive-developmental approach is intended to integrate both dimensions, which is 
why models of both individual and collective development of knowing are considered to be 
important. 
In order to distinguish developmental-logical from other conceptions of cognitive 
growth, the basic terms cognition and development need to be more qualified. According to 
the traditional division of psychology into the studies of thinking (cognition), feeling (emotion), 
and acting (motivation), the subfield of cognitive psychology is concerned with genuine 
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cognitive processes, such as attention, perception, reasoning, calculating, classifying, problem-
solving, or remembering. But these cognitive processes are so fundamental that they affect 
virtually any branch of psychology (Harré 2002; Overton 2006; Mascolo and Fischer 2010). 
Therefore, a narrower and a broader understanding of the concept of cognition should be 
distinguished. In the narrower understanding, cognition refers to the mental processes just 
mentioned. According to the AQAL framework, the adjective cognitive, then, refers to a 
domain-specific developmental line besides others (e.g., interpersonal, moral, ego-identity; cp. 
Figure 3.7). For example, Piaget’s model of logico-mathematical development refers to this 
narrower understanding. In the broader understanding, however, cognition means the process 
of thinking in general, covering all other developmental lines of knowing. In this sense, authors 
like Robert L. Selman (1975), Lawrence Kohlberg (1976), and Michael J. Parsons (1987) use the 
term cognitive-developmental approach also with regard to interpersonal, moral, and aesthetic 
lines of development. For the present study, both meanings are important. On one hand, the 
proposed cognitive-developmental approach is intended to be wide enough to include any 
domain of human knowledge that can be developed in terms of integrative levels. On the other 
hand, it should be noted that human thinking does not develop evenly across domains, which 
means that one should avoid speaking of levels of cognition or levels of knowing without 
qualifying the domain-specific line of development. 
In a similar way, the term development can have different meanings in different 
developmental theories. Not all of them are in line with the organizing principle of integrative 
levels and even cognitive-developmental theories that subscribe to the notion of Integrative 
Levels of Knowing can be differentiated into strong and weak versions. As initial orientation, 
Willis F. Overton (2006, 29) proposes an “inclusive definition of development” emphasizing the 
interdisciplinary and comparative character of developmental inquiry. This broad 
understanding includes developmental change in phylogenesis (development of the species), 
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historiogenesis (development of culture), embryogenesis (development of the embryo), 
ontogenesis (development of the individual across the life span), microgenesis (development 
across a short time span), orthogenesis (normal development), and pathogenesis 
(development of psychopathology). According to Overton, virtually all developmental theories 
agree that development is about change over time. Lesser agreement exists, however, about 
the question whether or not enduring change is sufficient to be characterized as development 
(Van Haaften, Korthals, and Wren 1997; Overton 2006; Robinson 2013). For example, 
development is often contrasted with aging to distinguish between mere change of a person 
over time and a directed scale of optimal development that allows to identify, for instance, 
age-related declines occurring in mature adulthood. As Overton (2006) notes, age is only an 
index of time and time as such cannot be an independent variable since it simply presents a 
dimension along which processes operate. Therefore, developmental psychologists Barbara 
Newman and Philip Newman (2016, 3 [emphasis in original]) offer the following more qualified 
definition: 
The term development implies change that occurs over time and has a direction. The 
direction is usually from simple to more complex, from less organized and coordinated to 
more organized and coordinated, or from less integrated to more integrated. 
According to Robinson (2013, 8), there are at least five different understandings of “direction” 
for optimal development, namely, the orthogenetic, evolutionary, veridical, eudaimonic, and 
virtuous directions. Orthogenetic direction means change towards higher levels of integrated 
complexity. The orthogenetic view, coined by developmental psychologist Heinz Werner (1948), 
describes development in terms of differentiation and integration. Since this view is in 
accordance with the principle of Integrative Levels of Knowing, it is the most important one in 
this study and should be distinguished from other understandings of directed development. 
Evolutionary direction refers to an improved capacity to survive for reproduction. This view 
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considers development as reproductive success regardless of levels of complexity and 
integration. Veridical direction aims to more authenticity and truthfulness by replacing false or 
biased beliefs with more accurate ones. This view is related to normative-philosophical 
questions that need to be analytically distinguished from empirical questions regarding levels 
of integrated complexity. But it is important for rational reconstructions of cognitive 
development and their argument that, at least in some respect, higher levels can be considered 
to be more adequate or more accurate than lower levels. Eudaimonic direction describes a 
tendency towards happiness, fulfilment, and well-being. This view has a focus on themes like 
purpose in life, self-acceptance, environmental mastery, positive relationships, autonomy, and 
personal growth. Since happiness or well-being appear to be highly subjective, they do not 
simply correspond to levels of complexity and integration. Virtuous direction is oriented on the 
goal to be a good or righteous person. The ideal of a mature person is often considered as 
being less self-centered and more oriented towards others. But there can be very different 
indicators of maturity across cultures and these are not necessarily related to levels of 
integrated complexity. The crucial point is that all these five directions for optimal 
development should be analyzed separately because orthogenetic complexity may or may not 
be related to evolutionary reproduction, veridical authenticity, eudaimonic fulfilment, or 
virtuous maturity. 
A further important distinction is emphasized by Overton (2006, 25) between 
“variational” and “transformational” developmental changes. Variational development means 
the extent or degree that change varies from a norm or standard. This can be a skill or ability 
becoming more precise and more accurate like the toddler’s improvement of walking or the 
child’s growth of vocabulary. This kind of development is additive in nature meaning that it is 
quantitative and continuous. Transformational development, in contrast, refers to change in 
structure, form, or organization that results in the emergence of novelty. This kind of 
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development is qualitative and discontinuous. It is directed towards increasing complexity, 
understood in terms of pattern rather than additive elements, and often described in terms of 
stages or levels following an invariant order or sequence.  
Regarding the organizing principle of Integrative Levels of Knowing, the most important 
cognitive-developmental theories and models are those concerned with transformational 
developmental change in terms of orthogenetic directionality since they present the 
constitutive feature of a logic of development. Among them, four of the most influential 
research traditions on human development will be described in more detail in the next section. 
 
4.1.2 Strong and Weak Conceptions of Integrative Levels of Knowing 
The idea of a hierarchically ordered sequence of forms of knowing or ways of thinking for both 
individual and collective development has a significant but not uncontested history (Kleineberg 
2017). For good reasons many theories of development from the 18th and 19th centuries are 
rejected due to a naive and contrafactual progressivism claiming a certain necessity of linear 
change directed towards betterment along a path supposed to be predetermined for human 
beings all over the world (Trigger 1998; Carneiro 2003; Sanderson 2007). But it is important to 
distinguish different claims of developmental theories and to identify constitutive properties in 
contrast to unnecessary assumptions (Van Haaften 1997b). In this section, more elaborate 
traditions of developmental theories will be discussed in order to show to what extent 
conceptions of Integrative Levels of Knowing can still be used fruitfully today, even though 
strong and weak versions need to be distinguished. This discussion of theoretical traditions is 
also intended to offer a background orientation regarding various models of Integrative Levels 
of Knowing that will be introduced in the follow-up sections. 
According to an overview of theories of human development provided by Newman and 
Newman (2016), research traditions that are concerned with the logic of development include 
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cognitive-developmental theory rooted in genetic structuralism (e.g., Jean Piaget, Lawrence 
Kohlberg, Robert L. Selman), psychosocial theory rooted in analytic ego psychology (e.g., Erik H. 
Erikson, Jane Loevinger), cognitive social-historical theory rooted in the cultural-historical 
school of Russian psychology (e.g., Lev S. Vygotsky, Alexander R. Luria, Alexei N. Leontiev), and 
dynamic systems theory also known as relational developmental systems theory (e.g., Kurt W. 
Fischer, Willis F. Overton, Richard M. Lerner). Despite their different origins, all of these 
research traditions present a conception of Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
 
Cognitive-Developmental Theory 
The tradition of cognitive-developmental theory—here understood as a specific school of 
thought since all presented theories in this section are concerned with cognitive 
development—is stimulated particularly by the work of Jean Piaget. Far from being a mere 
child psychologist, Piaget establishes the discipline of genetic epistemology concerned with the 
origin and development of new forms of knowing rather than the development of individuals. 
Therefore, his analytical unit is what he calls in Kantian terms the “epistemic subject” (Piaget 
1977, 738) meaning the knowing human being in general or the aspects that are common to all 
individual subjects at the same level of development, in contrast to the psychological subject 
represented by empirical individuals. In other words, Piaget is primarily interested in 
nomothetic reconstructions of general patterns or regularities rather than in idiographic 
descriptions of individual or cultural peculiarities (Chapman 1988; Lourenço 2016).  
In contrast to a more or less passive development considered by nativism or 
maturationism, Piaget’s genetic or developmental structuralism assumes that knowing is an 
active process of achieving a balance of organized structures called equilibrium. Such an 
equilibrium is not a constant state but only temporary since the underlying structures or 
cognitive schemes are partial and imperfect. For Piaget, cognitive development is a two-sided 
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adaptation process between assimilation and accommodation. While assimilation means the 
interpretation of new experiences in terms of existing schemes, accommodation refers to the 
modification of these schemes in order to account for new aspects of an experienced object or 
event that are revealed (Newman and Newman 2016). In this process, lower and higher forms 
of equilibrium can be distinguished with regard to the number and scope of cognitive 
operations that they make comprehensible. This concept of equilibrium allows to define 
development in contrast to mere change and offers “a normative standard for distinguishing 
more adequate forms of knowing from less adequate forms” (Chapman 1988, 8).  
Piaget (1977) characterizes stages of intellectual development as follows. First, there is a 
constant order of succession of stage acquisitions. This invariant sequence needs to be 
distinguished from mere chronological change that is extremely variable since it depends on 
previous experiences of the individuals and the social milieu that can accelerate, retard, or 
even prevent the appearance of a new developmental stage. Therefore, the mean ages of 
individuals operating at a given stage are essentially relative to the investigated populations. 
Second, there is an integrative character of stages. Structures or cognitive schemes of a given 
stage become an integral part of the following stage which constitutes new structures but rests 
on the older ones. Third, there is a structure of the whole that characterizes a given stage. This 
means that a stage is not presented by a juxtaposition of unrelated properties but by a 
multiplicity of distinct operations that can be reduced to a collection of underlying operatory 
schemes. Fourth, there is a phase of preparation in the acquisition of a stage that precedes the 
completion of a full stage or relative equilibrium. Phases of preparation typically take several 
years and later acquisitions can bear on more than one stage with varied overlaps. And fifth, it 
is important to distinguish in every stage sequence the genesis or process of formation from 
the forms of equilibrium since only the latter constitute the structures of the whole. A 
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distinction that is also emphasized by Habermas’s opposition between the dynamics of 
development and the logic of development.  
Although Piaget considers the conception of developmental stages as an indispensable 
instrument for the analysis of formative processes, he emphasizes that different dimensions of 
growth, corresponding to developmental lines of the AQAL framework, must be taken into 
account. He compares the multiplicity of functions in the growth of an organism with relatively 
independent developments (e.g., dental age, skeletal age, cerebral age, endocrinal age) to the 
functionally differentiated growth of cognition. Since an individual develops unevenly in 
different dimensions or lines and since competences acquired at lower stages are not lost but 
integrated at higher ones, Piaget (1977, 818) strongly rejects the assumption of a structural 
unity of the person: 
I have nowhere seen structural unity, at any stage of development of the child. Neither 
do I see it in most adults. I am myself a multiple personality, divided and contradictory. In 
certain cases, I force myself to be a serious man, as in professional situations. But in 
other situations I am infantile or I behave like an adolescent. 
In this light, many criticisms of Piaget’s conception of developmental stages appear to be based 
on misunderstanding (Chapman 1988; Lourenço and Machado 1996; Kesselring 2010; Lourenço 
2016). In particular, the accusation that his stage theory is overly general and does not consider 
domain-specific developments, individual differences, and cultural influences seem to be 
unjustified to the extent that they ignore Piaget’s primarily epistemological research interest 
focusing on the nomothetic reconstruction of the epistemic subject.  
Concerned with the epistemological question of the origin and development of 
knowledge, Piaget arrives at the conclusion that abstract entities like logico-mathematical 
phenomena should not be located in a preexisting reality and thus completely outside of the 
subject, neither in the form of an outerworldly Platonism nor in the form suggested by the “so-
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called linguistic solution” (Piaget 1977, 819) because this cannot explain the occurrence of 
regular stages of assimilation. Piaget criticizes the linguistic determinism claiming that the child 
acquires knowledge solely by cultural transmission mediated by language because it should be 
expected that the preexisting social reality penetrates the child’s mind either as a unit or at 
random. The fact that the child assimilates external realities in a stage-like order can be better 
explained, according to Piaget, if cognitive operations including logico-mathematical 
phenomena are considered to be the most developed forms of the coordination of actions 
rooted in preverbal sensorimotor activities. Therefore, Piaget emphasizes the active role of the 
subject in the development of new forms of knowing. 
Within the tradition of cognitive-developmental theory, Piaget’s stage model presents 
the foundation of many empirically tested stage models in other domains of developmental 
psychology, such as Lawrence Kohlberg’s (1983) moral reasoning, Robert L. Selman’s (1980) 
social perspective taking, Michael J. Parsons’s (1987) aesthetic judgment, or James W. Fowler’s 
(1991) faith, whereas the so-called Neo-Piagetian research focuses more on adult development 
and the reconstruction of postformal stages beyond formal operations (Dasen and Ribaupierre 
1987; Demetriou et al. 1992; Sinnott 1998; Young 2011). Based on the dialectic between 
individual and society, as described in the previous chapter, Piaget’s stage model is also 
adapted in theories on social evolution or collective development (Harten 1977; Hallpike 1979; 
Döbert 1981; Habermas 1984; Miller 1986; Oesterdiekhoff 1992; Damerow 1996; Barnes 2000; 
Wilber 2000; Bammé 2011; Dux 2011). 
 
Psychosocial Theory 
The tradition of the psychosocial theory is concerned with ego-identity development as a result 
of the continuous interaction between the individual and the society reflected in self-
understanding, identity formation, social relationships, and worldview. As one of the most 
137 
influential representatives, Erik H. Erikson builds on psychoanalytic theory and Sigmund Freud’s 
psychosexual stages (i.e., from oral to anal to phallic to latent to genital) but considers the 
whole life span of an individual and is first and foremost interested in the skills necessary to 
participate in social life (Newman and Newman 2016). 
His concept of stages of development refers to patterns of changes in self-concept or ego 
identity based on the epigenetic principle meaning a biological ground plan of growth in which 
each stage develops at its proper time, emerging from the previous stage without replacing it. 
Erikson (1980, 95) describes ego-identity development as an evolving configuration of 
successive ego syntheses and re-syntheses: “Ego identity, then, develops out of a gradual 
integration of all identifications, but here, if anywhere, the whole has a different quality than 
the sum of its parts.” While each stage is qualitatively distinct and characterized by a dominant 
way of understanding regarding self, society and world, a transition from one stage to another 
entails a potential crisis because of a radical change in perspective. In normal or healthy 
development, these phase-specific psychosocial crises can be resolved by the growing 
personality but sometimes there occur disturbances that can lead to retardations and even 
phase-specific pathologies (Erikson 1980; see also Wilber 1999).  
The different functions of psychosocial development (e.g., basic trust, autonomy, 
initiative) appear in characteristic life periods of an individual and will be integrated typically in 
an orderly sequence (see Table 4.1). 
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Table 4.1 Stages and components of psychosocial development. 
 Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 
Stage I Basic trust (earlier form) (earlier form) 
Stage II (later form) Autonomy (earlier form) 
Stage III (later form) (later form) Initiative 
Source: Modified after Erikson (1980, 55: Figures I, II [underlines added, M.K.]). 
Erikson’s model of ego-identity development describes eight different stages of psychosocial 
development (cp. Appendix D: Tables D.10, D.21). The sequence of stages presents a gradual 
differentiation and integration of components or functions, indicated in Table 4.1 by the 
diagonal of underlined items. All these components are systematically related to each other 
and exist in some form before and after their own critical time. But in contrast to Piaget’s 
structural stages, which could be compared to the vertical dimension of a single component, 
Erikson’s stages are best described in terms of functional phases since they rely on specific 
developmental tasks in certain periods of life and the cumulative capabilities of an individual to 
resolve them. Thus functional phases are representative of different ego functions or 
components in response to different tasks, whereas structural stages present different ways of 
thinking in response to a single function or task, such as logical reasoning or moral judgment 
(Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983). This difference is important because developmental tasks, 
as well as the nature and number of life periods (e.g., infancy, childhood, adolescence, 
adulthood) and the corresponding social expectations may vary from culture to culture. This 
means that the sequence of functional phases does not necessarily present a context-
independent logic of development, which is considered to be constitutive for the conception of 
Integrative Levels of Knowing in the proper sense.  
Therefore, structural stages and functional phases need to be carefully distinguished. 
According to Snarey, Kohlberg, and Noam (1983), functional phases present a hybrid form with 
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characteristics of both structural stages (logic of development) and cultural age (context-
dependent change) (see Table 4.2).  
Table 4.2 Characteristics of structural stage, functional phase, and cultural age conceptions. 
Structural stage Functional phase Cultural age 
Development versus aging 
Stages are not based on particular 
ages, although it is generally possible 
to give modal age ranges for each 
stage. Chronological age does not 
guarantee a corresponding stage of 
development; some adults are fixated 
at stages typical of children and a 
precocious child may be more mature 
than age would predict. 
 
Phases are based on the 
synchronization of structural 
development (stage change) 
and cultural aging (aging in the 
context of cultural 
expectations). Similar to ages, 
they are somewhat inevitable; 
the next phase comes in a 
maturational sequence. Similar 
to stages, the successful 
resolution of later tasks is 
partially dependent on the 
resolution of prior 
developmental crises. 
 
Periods, as times of stability and 
transition in the life cycle, are critically 
linked to age. All societies divide their 
membership into age categories (e.g., 
infant, lap child, yard child, elder). 
These function as taxonomic devices to 
organize the process of status and role 
changes within the life cycle and to 
establish the person’s participation in 
society in a way that takes into 
consideration maturation, physical 
energy, and needs. 
Qualitative versus quantitative 
Stages represent distinct qualitative 
structural differences in thinking about 
and orienting one’s self to the world. A 
child’s developmental stage is not 
simply an immature version of adult 
meaning making, but is a general 
organizing tendency that is truly 
different from adults. Stages are total 
ways of thinking, qualitatively 
consistent from one task to the next 
and qualitatively different from other 
stage approaches to the same task. 
 
Phases involve both qualitative 
and quantitative change. For 
instance, as a result of 
qualitative changes in cognitive 
structures and quantitative 
changes in social status, the 
individual is faced with a new 
developmental task in ego 
functioning. 
 
Culturally defined periods put much 
greater emphasis on quantitative 
changes in age, mastery, performance, 
knowledge, rights, and responsibilities. 
Puberty rites, for instance, often 
involve exposure to greater quantities 
of stress and knowledge than a 
younger person is permitted to 
experience. 
Hierarchical versus nonhierarchical 
Stage sequences are hierarchical. A 
higher stage is constructed on the 
previous stage, reintegrating it into a 
more highly differentiated, flexible, 
and complex stage. Later stages are 
more adequate than earlier stages 
since they include earlier stage 
patterns, resolve the same problems 
better, and are more justifiable in 
terms of the universal inclusiveness of 
their ordering of experience. 
 
Later phases are more 
adequate than earlier phases, 
not necessarily in terms of 
complexity, but in terms of 
their ability to give order to or 
make sense of one’s life in a 
form that is stable and 
meaningful. 
 
Age periods are relatively 
nonhierarchical. It is difficult to say 
that a later period is more adequate 
than an earlier one because 
attainment of and the adequacy of 
performance at a particular age period 
are distinct. Furthermore, the period 
that society defines as life’s best time 
varies from culture to culture. 
(continued) 
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Table 4.2 Characteristics of structural stage, functional phase, and cultural age conceptions. 
Structural stage Functional phase Cultural age 
Invariance versus variation 
Stages are invariant; each stage 
develops out of the previous one and a 
person must progress up the hierarchy 
one step at a time, without skipping or 
reversing any of the stages. Although 
an individual may become fixated at a 
particular stage, or even regress, all 
forward progress requires an invariant 
sequence of development in accord 
with the stage hierarchy. 
Environmental factors and innate 
capabilities may help one person reach 
a given stage of development earlier 
than another, but all people go 
through the same stage sequence. 
 
The achievement of earlier 
phases or the resolution of 
previous crises serves as a 
foundation for new phases. 
Later phases subsume earlier 
phases. The successful 
achievement of later tasks is 
partially but not completely 
dependent on the successful 
achievement of earlier tasks. 
The specific sequence of 
adjoining phases may be 
reversed or difficult to 
distinguish among some 
individuals in our culture and 
many individuals in some other 
cultures. 
 
Cultural ages vary in sequence 
between cultures and between 
subcultures within a particular culture. 
The accepted sequence in one 
sociocultural system may be reversed 
or absent in another. Even such 
generally defined periods as 
adolescence or the elderly can be 
absent where the culturally defined life 
cycle takes a person directly from late 
childhood into adulthood or where a 
person does not reach full adulthood 
until very late in life. 
Universal versus relative 
Stages are structurally universal 
phenomena. Stage theories form an 
international road map predicting the 
sequential development of the ability 
to structure or make sense of the 
world. All persons, regardless of their 
sociocultural setting, can be expected 
to go through the same stages. The 
order of forward movement is 
universal, although individuals raised 
in different environments will no doubt 
progress through the stages at varying 
rates. 
 
Phases are neither as universal 
as stages nor as relative as 
cultural ages. More plastic than 
the former and firmer than the 
latter, phases address both the 
commonality and uniqueness 
of personal experience and 
developmental conflicts. 
 
Cultural age periods are local road 
maps that predict the contents one will 
be concerned with during various ages 
of life in that particular culture. Periods 
cannot be universal since they vary 
tremendously from one culture to 
another. The relativity of age periods 
between cultures, however, also 
implies a general uniformity within a 
culture or subculture. 
Source: Excerpted from Snarey, Kohlberg, and Noam (1983, 328–30: Table 2 [underlines added, M.K.]). 
However, more recent research within the psychosocial tradition does not only expand the 
number of stages but focuses much more on the formal or structural aspects of development 
(Kegan 1982; Loevinger 1983; Cook-Greuter 2010a). As emphasized by Kohlberg, Levine and 
Hewer (1983), structural characteristics can be derived from functional phases, even though 
not all criteria for developmental stages, as described by Piaget, can be met. Therefore, these 
authors make a further distinction between “hard structural stages” and “soft structural 
stages” (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983, 33). The concept of hard structural stages refers to 
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developmental stages in the Piagetian sense defined by a formalization of thought operations 
that manifest themselves in actual symbolically mediated responses of individuals to problems, 
conflicts, or tasks. By comparison, soft structural stages refer less to a way of thinking or form 
of knowing but more to the structure of fairly stable personality functions and contents that 
involves a consciously reflecting ego or self as source of a totalistic meaning-making or 
worldview (cp. Perry 1968; Fowler 1981; Gilligan 1982; Kegan 1982; Loevinger 1983). Unlike 
structures of thought operations, structures of the ego or “self-system” (Loevinger 1983, 347) 
cannot be observed directly and abstracted in formalizations but can only be hypothetically 
constructed and described in terms of ideal types, illustrative exemplars, or “prototypes” 
(Loevinger 1983, 344). Such ideal-typical representations of stages, however, are partly 
described in terms of structures but also in terms of function, content, and motives regarding 
the whole personality.  
As argued by Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer (1983), this mixture leads to some important 
differences compared to hard structural stages. First, the varying contents of reflection (e.g., 
self, society, nature, the ultimate) may lead to an uneven development across these different 
content domains or developmental lines and this would remain undifferentiated in the more or 
less global stages of ego-identity development. Therefore, the increasing complexity of 
conscious reflectivity related to soft structural stages should not be conflated with Piaget’s 
concept of “reflective abstraction” (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983, 35) describing a more 
or less unconscious transformation of a structure of the whole to the next higher stage 
regardless of the content of reflection. Second, the lack of differentiation between structure 
and content leads to an ambiguous distinction between competence and performance since 
competence needs to be described in terms of structure. Third, the sequence of stages is 
cumulative rather than transformational since new stages are characterized by an addition of 
new developmental aspects without taking recourse to underlying operations of reasoning and 
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their hierarchical integration. Fourth, the ambiguity of the inner logic of the stage sequence 
makes it more difficult to formulate a normative model of development that establishes a 
justification why a higher stage can be considered to be a more adequate stage. And fifth, the 
lack of a normative model of development prevents the conception of a developmental 
endpoint upon which all rational actors could agree. The latter point, however, can also be seen 
as an advantage since it allows the conception of stages of mature adulthood that go beyond 
criteria of rationality, which are often termed postrational, postrepresentational, 
transcendental, or transpersonal (cp. Appendix B: Tables B.1, B.10, B.15, B.16, B.45, B.46, B.47; 
Appendix D: Tables D.15–D.30). 
Given these analytical distinctions, the present study considers both hard structural 
stages and soft structural stages, in opposition to mere functional phases, as conceptions of 
Integrative Levels of Knowing but not without the qualification of a strong and a weak version. 
The strong conception based on hard structural stages has the advantage of a precise 
articulation of the inner logic of the developmental sequence but the disadvantage that the 
stage descriptions reflect only a small part of the personality. By comparison, the weak 
conception based on soft structural stages has the advantages of a less abstract and much 
more vivid description of the growing personality and a more adequate account of adult 
development but the disadvantage that the presumed logic of development appears to be less 
well justifiable. This is because a reconstructed sequence of soft structural stages is primarily 
based on empirical findings and much less on the rational reconstruction of abstract operations 
that are a priori built on lower-level operations (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983; Korthals 
1997b). 
In opposition to hard or soft structural stages, functional phases are not considered to 
be conceptions of Integrative Levels of Knowing since their lack of a context-independent logic 
of development makes them less suitable for a systematic organization. Developmental models 
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based on functional phases are presented, for example, by Erich Neumann’s (1954, XV) 
“archetypal stages,” Abraham Maslow’s (1943, 386) “hierarchy of basic needs,” or Clare W. 
Graves’s (1970, 131) “levels of existence.” These models can be correlated to some extent to 
models based on structural stages but it should be noted that such attempts are merely based 
on age-related correlations and not on structural isomorphisms (see Appendix D: Tables D.21, 
D.25). 
 
Cognitive Social-Historical Theory 
The tradition of the cognitive social-historical theory is concerned with the social and cultural 
basis of thinking and emphasizes the role of cultural tools, such as language and other symbolic 
systems (e.g., counting systems, diagrams, pictorial systems), as means of the development of 
higher-order mental processes. Its origins are rooted in the cultural-historical school of Russian 
psychology that includes members like Alexander R. Luria, Alexei N. Leontiev, and the 
influential Lev S. Vygotsky (Newman and Newman 2016).  
Vygotsky’s developmental model is often described as opposite to Piaget’s approach 
while both are stylized to a kind of individual-social antinomy (cp. Cole and Wertsch 1996; 
Matusov and Hayes 2000; Lourenço 2012). But the supposed clear-cut difference between a 
Piagetian individualism and a Vygotskian collectivism needs to be rejected since both theorists 
present a much more balanced “relational perspective” (Lourenço 2012, 283) that 
acknowledges individual and social influences. In fact, Vygotsky shares some important 
similarities to Piaget regarding the conception of developmental stages, most importantly, a 
genuine genetic or developmental perspective concerned with transformational change 
directed towards increasing complexity (Overton 2006; Lourenço 2012; Newman and Newman 
2016). 
144 
Vygotsky distinguishes between lower mental processes (e.g., spontaneous concepts, 
comparable to Piaget’s sensorimotor and preoperational cognition) developing more or less 
naturally in the child and higher mental processes (e.g., scientific concepts, comparable to 
Piaget’s concrete- and formal-operational cognition) that develop in an interpersonal context 
as the child interacts with others and learns to master the cultural tools of its social 
environment. Consequently, higher cognitive functions in the child’s development appear first 
on a social plane between people (interpsychological) and then inside the child 
(intrapsychological). Since the cultural-historical context may vary, the child’s development is 
considered to be a “product of social history” (Luria 1976, 10).  
At this point, it is important to note that the cultural-historical school of Russian 
psychology is based on the philosophy of Marxism in the form of historical materialism 
(Newman and Newman 2016). According to this doctrine, social differences are not simply 
considered to represent different culturally relative ways of life but rather different 
developmental stages in the history of societies as such. As noted by Matusov and Hayes 
(2000, 218), this assumption of a directed development is also reflected in terminology:  
In Russian, the word “kul’tura” has more connotation with art, literature, technology, 
education, and even quality [...] than with ways of life, as the word “culture” usually 
connotes in English. 
In other words, culture is considered to be a matter of degree along a continuum or 
developmental sequence. It is supposed that there are lower and higher culturally developed 
societies and that these different cultural environments have an impact on the rate and the 
expected endpoint of the child’s cognitive development. But the decisive point is that the 
sequence of developmental stages for all individuals remains invariant regardless of the 
cultural-historical context. For this reason, Matusov and Hayes (2000, 224) conclude that 
Vygotsky is a universalist who believes that rationality, logic, and scientific thinking have 
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universal applicability. Logic is not based on a context-specific activity but, on the contrary, 
presents an abstraction, or in Vygotsky’s words, a deliberation from the context.  
This nomothetically oriented research interest is also characteristic for Vygotsky’s (1986, 
187) concept of the “zone of proximal development” since it already implies a logic of 
development. The zone of proximal development describes the distance between the actual 
developmental level of an independently problem-solving child and the potential 
developmental level of the child when guided by an adult or more advanced instructor. For any 
child in any context, however, the next higher level of development is predetermined by the 
invariant sequence of stages or levels. For example, Vygotsky (1986) reconstructs such an 
invariant sequence for concept development from syncretic images to thinking in complexes 
(pseudoconcepts) to potential concepts, and finally to true concepts (see also Kleineberg 2012; 
Appendix B: Table B.44). Since earlier developmental stages are not completely superseded by 
later ones but still available for the developing person, Vygotsky (1986, 140) also presents a 
conception of Integrative Levels of Knowing:  
Different genetic forms coexist in thinking, just as different rock formations coexists in 
the earth’s crust. [...] Even after the adolescent has learned to produce concepts, he 
does not abandon the more elementary forms; they continue for a long time to operate, 
indeed to dominate, in many areas of his thinking. 
From a methodological point of view, it should be noted that more recent approaches within 
the cognitive social-historical tradition, such as the Cultural Historical Activity Theory (CHAT) 
and some approaches of cross-cultural psychology, tend not only to reject the underlying 
historical materialism as Marxist ideology but also to lose interest in nomothetical questions 
(Cole 1976; Roth and Yew-Jin Lee 2007). The premise that social environments and cultural 
tools shape the child’s cognitive development is still considered to be fundamental, whereas 
the assumption that social environments and cultural tools themselves can be defined in 
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developmental terms is often questioned (Matusov and Hayes 2000). But this lack of a genetic 
or developmental perspective on social evolution or the collective dimension leaves an open 
question because the assumption that the individual’s higher cognitive functions originate 
from the social plane does only displace the problem. The question, then, is how these 
collectively shared higher forms of knowing have come into being in the first place. Without 
taking recourse to a developmental sequence of social evolution, it would not even make sense 
to speak of lower and higher forms of knowing. This genetic or developmental perspective, 
originally emphasized by the cultural-historical school of Russian psychology, is taken more 
seriously again by some approaches that are deeply inspired by Vygotsky’s work and still 
interested in a nomothetic reconstruction of a logic of development (Tomasello 1999; Donald 
2001). 
  
Dynamic Systems Theory 
The tradition of dynamic systems theory emphasizes the interdependence of genetic, neural, 
behavioral, physical, cognitive, social, and cultural influences on human development in order 
to provide an overarching explanatory framework. In relation to the AQAL framework, dynamic 
systems theory considers more explicit than the other introduced theories developmental 
change as a nonlinear and probabilistic outcome of the interaction of all quadrants and all 
levels. As a non-reductionist attempt, it seeks to integrate important insights from as much as 
possible existing developmental approaches by taking both universal structures and contextual 
variability into account (Overton 2007; Witherington 2007; Lerner 2011; Newman and 
Newman 2016).  
A system (e.g., a molecule, a neuron, an organ, an individual, a family, a corporation) is 
defined as a whole of interdependent elements or parts that share some common goals, 
functions, and boundaries. Such a system can be regarded as an open system to the extent that 
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its organization, function, and identity is maintained even when their parts continuously 
change. A dynamic system is characterized by an evolving self-organization and the emergence 
of novelty in terms of new properties or behavior. As summarized by Newman and Newman 
(2016, 319), three criteria are important for the notion of self-organization and the 
“emergence of order and new levels of complexity.” First, the levels of organization should be 
qualitatively distinct before and after self-organization takes place. Second, the level of 
complexity in the system should increase. This means that more information is required to 
predict the behavior of the system. And third, the new organization should be to a significant 
degree internally caused and not merely the result of external forces.  
In order to avoid a linear understanding of development, the common metaphor of the 
ladder is sometimes replaced by the notion of an “emergent developmental web” (Mascolo 
and Fischer 2010, 163). The metaphor of the web highlights context-specific variation of 
activity within a global order. Variability of behavior across tasks and domains, as well as across 
individuals and groups is acknowledged while at the same time it is assumed that “higher-
order psychological structures emerge from the integration or coordination of lower-order 
structures” (Mascolo and Fischer 2010, 163). Development is considered to be a complex 
network of distinct pathways or trajectories, corresponding to lines in the AQAL framework, 
that can move in diverging or converging directions allowing both forward progression and 
backward transitions. It is presumed that a person is able to function at multiple levels at a 
given point in time depending on the context (e.g., domain, task, support, time of day, 
emotional state). This also means that the level of competence and the level of performance is 
not necessarily the same. Similar to Vygotsky’s notion of the zone of proximal development, 
the level of performance (e.g., automatic, functional, optimal, scaffolded) is considered to be 
highly dependent on the social context and the provided support by advanced instructors 
(Mascolo and Fischer 2010).  
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However, it is important to note that the variability illustrated by the metaphor of the 
web refers to the dynamics of development or the process of formation of psychological 
subjects, whereas the metaphor of the ladder is supposed to represent the logic of 
development or the forms of equilibrium of epistemic subjects. This distinction is also reflected 
by Michael F. Mascolo’s and Kurt W. Fischer’s (2010, 168) opposition between “historical 
change” in the sense of change-over-time across the life span and “developmental change” as 
a transformation directed towards higher levels of complexity.  
 
In short, all four introduced research traditions concerned with human development 
present a developmental-logical conception of cognitive growth, that is, a strong or weak 
conception of Integrative Levels of Knowing. Although the emphasis is often put differently and 
some controversial issues remain, the shared nomothetical interest in the reconstruction of 
general patterns and regularities, such as invariant sequences of developmental stages, 
contribute significantly to a cognitive-developmental understanding of epistemic pluralism. It 
cannot be emphasized enough that these research traditions do not present any kind of 
progressivism. Instead, they underline the dialectics of progress, as well as the analytical 
distinction between the dynamics and the logic of development. The actual dynamics of 
development is non-linear, to some extent contingent, even reversible, and thus context-
dependent. By comparison, the logic of development presents the result of a reconstruction 
after the fact in terms of developmental sequences that are supposed to be invariant or linear 
and thus context-independent, as long as these generalizations are not challenged by empirical 
findings. In the next section, some of the most elaborate developmental-logical models of 
cognitive development will be introduced as potential means for knowledge organization. 
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4.2 Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing 
4.2.1 Individual Development 
After discussing major research traditions that use theoretical conceptions of Integrative Levels 
of Knowing, the focus is now on empirically tested models derived from these traditions. Each 
one of these developmental models presents a small classification of domain-specific forms of 
knowing and a collection of these models may help to reduce the complexity of epistemic 
pluralism. As a means of knowledge organization, the developmental sequences of these 
models can be considered to be documentary languages or controlled vocabularies that may 
contribute to a systematic organization of the epistemological dimension of human knowledge. 
In this regard, three main steps are important. First, the domain of knowing needs to be 
specified. As argued above, there is no global development of the person as a whole but 
development takes place along domain-specific and largely independent developmental lines. 
Therefore, the domain of cognitive competence (or skill, task, function) must be determined, 
such as logico-mathematical reasoning, moral judgment, or aesthetic experience. Second, the 
variation in contents needs to be reduced to structural types or forms of knowing. For example, 
moral judgment varies from culture to culture in that it is oriented on highly context-specific 
conventions but with regard to the underlying cognitive structures, there are also some 
abstract characteristics that describe cross-cultural forms of moral judgment, such as 
Kohlberg’s preconventional, conventional, and postconventional moral views (Kleineberg 
2018). And third, the remaining differences between forms of knowing need to be explained 
genetically as differences in the stage of development or level of knowing. This last step is 
decisive for the use of the developmental sequences of these models as documentary 
languages and marks the distinction between typologies and classifications. While forms of 
knowing present mere typologies of qualitative distinct types based on shared abstract 
characteristics (Bliss’s strategy of collocation), levels of knowing present genuine classifications 
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that additionally provide internal relations between these types or classes in terms of genus-
species or part-whole hierarchies (Bliss’s strategy of subordination).  
Some of the most elaborate models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in individual 
development are derived from literature analysis and collected in Appendix B with detailed 
descriptions of their particular level characteristics. These models present promising tools for 
viewpoint indexing in the field of knowledge organization (see Table 4.3).  
Table 4.3 Domain-specific models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in individual development. 
Domain of knowing Reference Appendix 
Consciousness (according to Vedic psychology) Alexander et al. (1990) Table B.1 
Ethical reasoning Armon (1984) Table B.2 
Value Beck and Cowan (1996) Table B.3 
Religious representation Bellah (2011) Table B.4 
Epistemology Benack (1984) Table B.5 
Interpersonal reasoning Blanchard-Fields (1989) Table B.6 
Natural philosophy Broughton (1978) Table B.7 
Representation Bruner (1974) Table B.8 
Tasks Commons (2008)* Table B.9 
Ego identity Cook-Greuter (2010a)* Table B.10 
Thought Demetriou et al. (2017) Table B.11 
Naming and knowing Dewey and Bentley (1949) Table B.12 
Understanding experiences of beauty Diessner et al. (2016) Table B.13 
Religious orientation Diperna (2018) Table B.14 
Self Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman (2009) Table B.15 
Ecological identity Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman (2009) Table B.16 
Faith Fowler and Dell (2006)* Table B.17 
Communicative action Habermas (1979) Table B.18 
Interactive competence and moral consciousness Habermas (1979) Table B.19 
Ego identity Habermas (1979) Table B.20 
(continued) 
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Table 4.3 Domain-specific models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in individual development. 
Domain of knowing Reference Appendix 
Interaction, social perspective and moral judgment Habermas (1979) Table B.21 
Leadership agility Joiner (2011) Table B.22 
Self Kegan (1982) Table B.23 
Consciousness and curricular complexity in history Kegan (1994) Table B.24 
Reflective judgement King and Kitchener (1994) Table B.25 
Moral judgement Kohlberg (1976)* Table B.26 
Cognition Koplowitz (1984) Table B.27 
Social cognition Kramer (1989) Table B.28 
Self-representation Labouvie-Vief et al. (1995) Table B.29 
Knowing Lewis (2015) Table B.30 
Ego identity Hy and Loevinger (1996) Table B.31 
Counting, story-telling, and drawing Mascolo and Fischer (2010)* Table B.32 
Religious judgment Oser and Gmünder (1991) Table B.33 
Aesthetic experience Parsons (1987)* Table B.34 
Intelligence and ethics Perry (1968)* Table B.35 
Logico-mathematical reasoning Piaget (1999)* Table B.36 
Classification Inhelder and Piaget (1964) Table B.37 
Social perspective-taking Selman (1980)* Table B.38 
Social perspective-taking and interpersonal action Selman (2003)* Table B.39 
Tasks in physics Stålne, Commons and Li (2014) Table B.40 
Reasoning about the AQAL framework Stein (2010) Table B.41 
Personal action-logics Torbert (2003) Table B.42 
Social conventions Turiel (1983) Table B.43 
Concept formation Vygotsky (1986) Table B.44 
Consciousness Wade (1996) Table B.45 
Mind Wilber (2000) Table B.46 
Transpersonal mind Wilber (2017) Table B.47 
* Models that are exemplarily described in the main text. 
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In the following, some examples of these domain-specific models of individual development 
will be introduced in more detail to determine their particular domains of knowledge, to name 
their reconstructed developmental sequences, and to give some hints regarding the empirical 
evidence. 
 
Piaget’s Model of Logico-Mathematical Development 
Arguably, the most influential developmental model, not only in the tradition of cognitive-
developmental theory but in cognitive psychology in general, is presented by Jean Piaget. After 
four decades of genetic studies, Piaget (1977, 352) summarizes the main finding that, at a level 
below conscious reflection and prior to language, there is a “logic of coordinations of actions.” 
This logic comprises, among other things, relations of order and inclusion that regulate actions 
and, at later stages of development, also regulate thought (i.e., internalized actions). 
Concerned with the development of intelligence, Piaget (1977, 352) concludes that logical 
operations, as known from adult thinking, present a higher form of these sensorimotor 
regulations: “Logico-mathematical activities are thus to be conceived psychologically as an 
inexhaustibly fruitful prolongation of the coordination of actions.” An operation transforms a 
state A into a state B, leaving at least one property invariant (conservation) and allowing the 
possibility of return from B to A (reversibility). An example of the reversibility of operations is 
that the action of uniting (addition) can be inversed into the action of dissociating 
(subtraction). Piaget’s (1977) studies show, however, that a child who is able to internalize an 
action and to imagine the results is not necessarily capable to visualize the reverse action due 
to a lack of conservation. For example, in his famous experiment with a ball of clay that is 
manipulated and formed into a sausage, a pancake, or a number of pieces, younger children 
are not yet able to conserve the notions of substance, weight, and volume throughout the 
transformations. Consequently, these children are not yet able to return to the point of 
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departure by anticipating in thought the reverse action, which is why their thinking remains 
preoperational. Genuine operational thinking appears first at the level of concrete operations 
(e.g., logic of classes and relations) and later as second-degree operations or thinking on 
thinking at the level of formal operations (e.g., logic of propositions). Although Piaget 
acknowledges that there is more to thinking than logic, he considers the stages of logical 
thinking to be foundational for various other aspects of thinking, such as conceptions of time, 
space, geometry, speed, chance, and probability (Inhelder and Piaget 1958; Piaget 1977). 
From an empirical point of view, Piaget’s research is based on his so-called clinical 
method, that is, a combination of standard intelligence tests and open-ended conversations 
that include experiments on problem-solving tasks. Starting with the study of his own three 
children, empirical research soon expands into more comprehensive cross-sectional and 
longitudinal studies with Geneva children. Today Piagetian research is well-documented and 
includes many cross-cultural studies (Dasen and Ribaupierre 1987; Molitor and Hui-Chin Hsu 
2011; Oesterdiekhoff 2013) and even cross-species studies (Langer 1988; Parker and McKinney 
1999). Despite some legitimate criticisms, the findings tend to confirm the universality of the 
stage sequence, even though there are asynchronous developments in specific domains and 
differences in the rate and endpoint of development (Lourenço 2016). Although the logico-
mathematical formalizations appear to be too narrow to characterize stages of cognitive 
development as a whole, they indicate important milestones in that particular domain. Piaget 
reconstructs the following sequence of integrative levels of intelligence or logico-mathematical 
reasoning (see Appendix B: Table B.36): 
1. Sensorimotor 
2. Preoperational 
3. Concrete operations 
4. Formal operations 
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Kohlberg’s Model of Moral Development 
One of the best-known models within the tradition of cognitive-developmental theory is 
presented by Lawrence Kohlberg’s moral stages. Kohlberg (1971) considers himself as both a 
moral psychologist and a moral philosopher because he attempts to combine empirical findings 
on moral development with normative evaluations regarding the adequacy of moral views. This 
division of labor is important in order to avoid the naturalistic fallacy, that is, the premature 
conclusion “from is to ought” (Kohlberg 1971, 151). As emphasized by Kohlberg, Levine and 
Hewer (1983), this normative dimension of the evaluation of moral judgments should not be 
mistaken as a measure of the moral worth of individuals. The research interest focuses on the 
cognitive aspect of moral understanding and rational moral judgment based on general rules 
and principles, leaving aside affective and motivational aspects and questions of moral actions.  
According to Kohlberg (1976), the stages of moral judgement parallel Selman’s (1980) 
stages of social perspective or role-taking concerned with the way how individuals differentiate 
their perspectives from other perspectives and relate these perspectives to one another. 
Kohlberg (1976, 173) assumes that both moral judgement and social role-taking are based on a 
more general structural construct that is conceptualized as “socio-moral perspective” referring 
to the point of view taken by an individual in defining social facts and sociomoral values. 
Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer (1983) also acknowledge Carol Gilligan’s (1982) distinction 
between a moral orientation on justice (e.g., fairness, rightness, duty) and a moral orientation 
on care (e.g., responsibility, loyalty, obligation), even though they consider this not as a 
distinction between two separate general moralities but rather between two different ways or 
preferences of moral considerations, corresponding to types in opposition to lines of the AQAL 
framework (cp. Kegan 1982; Wilber 1999). Kohlberg, Levine and Hewer (1983) argue that 
justice reasoning is more likely to be rationally reconstructable compared to the ethics of care 
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taking place in the sphere of personal decisions and special relationships to family, friends, and 
group-members (cp. Habermas 1990). 
Empirical studies concerned with Kohlberg’s sequence of justice reasoning show that the 
postconventional Stage 5 seems not to be developed in all cultures or in the majority, for 
instance, of the US adult population (Gibbs et al. 2007), while Stage 6 cannot be detected at all 
by longitudinal studies and seems to be represented only by a small elite sample including 
thinkers like Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King, or moral philosophers like John Rawls 
and Jürgen Habermas (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983). Despite some controversial issues, 
Gibbs et al. (2007, 491) conclude in their meta-analysis summarizing 45 cross-cultural studies 
in 27 countries that “Kohlberg was in principle correct regarding the universality of basic moral 
judgment development.” The assumption that justice reasoning follows an invariant sequence 
of stages is supported for both cultural differences as well as sex differences (Kohlberg, Levine, 
and Hewer 1983; Jorgensen 2006; Boom, Wouters, and Keller 2007; Gibbs et al. 2007).  
Kohlberg and colleagues also consider a soft structural Stage 7 occurring after the six 
previous hard structural stages of justice reasoning (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983; 
Kohlberg and Ryncarz 1990). This stage is characterized by a cosmic or infinite perspective 
attributed, for example, to Marcus Aurelius or Baruch Spinoza. Such a quasi-religious 
orientation, however, is larger in scope than the justice orientation because it addresses not 
only the question what morality can be but also the metaethical question why one should be 
moral at all. Therefore, this way of justice reasoning is less amenable to rational 
reconstructions since these require a developmental endpoint on which all rational agents 
could agree. Kohlberg reconstructs the following sequence of integrative levels of moral 
judgment or justice reasoning (see Appendix B: Table B.26): 
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1. Heteronomous morality 
2. Individualism, instrumental purpose and exchange 
3. Mutual interpersonal expectations, relationships and interpersonal conformity 
4. Social system and conscience 
5. Social contract or utility and individual rights 
6. Universal ethical principles 
 
Selman’s Model of Interpersonal Development 
Educational psychologist Robert L. Selman, a coworker of Lawrence Kohlberg, studies the 
development of interpersonal understanding or social cognition based on the assumption that 
it is based in part on stages of social perspective taking. Social perspective taking means the 
ability to coordinate the psychological points of view of self and other. The focus of Selman’s 
(1980; 2003) studies lies on the developing conceptions of individual, friendship, peer-group 
relations, and parent-child relations and also on interpersonal action in terms of sharing 
experience and negotiation strategies. All of them are considered to be functions of 
developmental stages of the individual’s coordination of social perspectives. In speaking of 
social cognition and action, Selman (1980, 14) uses the term “social” with reference to the 
assumption that the specified behavior has some meaning for the participants.  
The empirical foundation is based on several cross-sectional and longitudinal studies 
comprising a sample of 143 interviewed persons, mainly from the US middle-class population 
of the 1970s and 1980s (Selman 1980; Gurucharri and Selman 1982). The data provide strong 
evidence for the developmental sequence of social perspective taking in which levels appear 
sequentially with increasing age. No person skips levels or shows regression, nothing in 
interview responses suggest the representation of an alternative level, and no significant sex 
differences can be found. As an outgrowth of the cognitive-developmental research tradition, 
Selman’s (1980, 23) describes his approach as “strongly structural-developmental” meaning 
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that his model presents hard structural stages. Selman reconstructs the following sequence of 
integrative levels of interpersonal understanding (see Appendix B: Tables B.38, B.39): 
1. Undifferentiated and egocentric 
2. Differentiated and subjective 
3. Self-reflexive / second-person and reciprocal 
4. Third-person and mutual 
5. In-depth and societal-symbolic 
 
Parsons’s Model of Aesthetic Development 
As professor in art education, Michael J. Parsons is heavily influenced by the cognitive-
developmental tradition and the work of Lawrence Kohlberg. Following Habermas’s distinction 
between three different world relations (the external world of objects, the social world of 
norms, and the inner world of self), Parsons (1987, XIII) assumes that there are “three 
corresponding streams of cognitive development” and he seeks to establish, besides Piaget’s 
focus on the external world and Kohlberg’s focus on the social world, a third account of 
development concerned with the inner world and the aesthetic experience of the self. In his 
study, he investigates the understanding of famous paintings of art history in terms of subject 
matter, expression, medium, form, style, and judgment. Parsons considers higher stages to be 
more adequate than lower ones but he distinguishes between aesthetic and psychological 
aspects. From an aesthetic point of view, each higher stage achieves new insights and 
interprets paintings in a more comprehensive way than before. From a psychological point of 
view, the sequence of stages presents an increasing ability to take the perspective of others. In 
this respect, Parsons applies Kohlberg’s distinction between preconventional, conventional, 
and postconventional views to the understanding of artworks. While these psychological 
aspects are characteristic for hard structural stages, the aesthetic aspects of Parsons model 
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should rather be considered to be soft structural stages since they present a cumulative rather 
than a genuine transformational sequence. 
Empirically, this stage model is based on more than 300 interviews conducted as a cross-
sectional study during a ten-year period in the region around Salt Lake City, US. The 
interviewed persons range from preschool children to art professors and present a 
convenience sample. In each interview five or six paintings are discussed, among them, Pierre-
August Renoir’s The Luncheon of the Boating Party (1881), Paul Klee’s Head of a Man (1922), 
Marc Chagall’s La Grand Cirque (1927), Ivan Albright’s Into the World Came a Soul Called Ida 
(1930), and Pablo Picasso’s Head of a Weeping Woman with Hands (1936). Parsons 
reconstructs the following sequence of integrative levels of aesthetic experience (see Appendix 
B: Table B.34): 
1. Favoritism 
2. Beauty and realism 
3. Expressiveness 
4. Style and form 
5. Autonomy 
 
Fowler’s Model of Faith Development 
Influenced by Erik H. Erikson and Lawrence Kohlberg, theologist and developmental theorist 
James W. Fowler studies the structural development of faith (Fowler 1981; 1996). The notion of 
faith is understood in a broad sense that extends beyond religious faith and refers to the 
generic process underlying the formation of beliefs, values, and meaning including secular 
ideologies. Faith is considered to be foundational to social relations, personal identity, and 
cultural meaning in that it gives coherence and direction to the life of individuals, connects 
them to others by means of shared trust and loyalties, offers them a sense of relatedness to a 
larger identity, and helps them to deal with the challenges of life and death with reliance on a 
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quality of ultimacy (Fowler and Dell 2006). From this point of view, faith is a cross-cultural 
phenomenon and its development begins in early childhood with the basic trust in bonding to 
caregivers.  
The empirical foundation of Fowler’s (1981) stage model is based on a sample of 359 
interviews conducted as a cross-sectional study in the US during the 1970s and 1980s. This 
sample is balanced in relation to gender (male 50.1%, female 49.9%) but not in relation to 
ethnic groups (white 97.8%, black 2.2%) or religious orientation (protestant 45.0%, catholic 
36.5%, Jewish 11.2%, orthodox 3.6, other 3.6%). Although Fowler (1981, 99) claims that his 
model meets “the structural-developmental criteria for stages,” as defined by Piaget, Kohlberg, 
and Selman, it seems to present soft structural stages rather than hard structural stages (cp. 
Snarey, Kohlberg, and Noam 1983). Fowler reconstructs the following sequence of integrative 









Perry’s Model of Intellectual and Ethical Development 
In a seminal study, educational psychologist William G. Perry (1968) investigates the intellectual 
and ethical development from adolescence to adulthood. The focus is on the structure or form 
in which individuals perceive their world rather than the particular contents of attitudes or 
concerns. This refers to the formal properties of the individuals’ assumptions and expectancies 
regarding the nature and origin of knowledge and value. Of particular interest is the variety of 
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responses to the challenge of intellectual and moral relativism, and the notion of multiple 
frames of references in a pluralistic culture. Since this involves the individual’s conscious 
worldview or totalistic meaning-making, this model presents soft structural stages. Perry 
identifies an invariant developmental sequence of nine epistemological positions grouped into 
three tiers from dualism to relativism to commitment in relativism. He argues that higher 
stages are more adequate than lower ones but acknowledges that his own normative 
statement has no absolute status but needs to be seen as relative to the context of his scheme.  
The empirical foundation is based on a longitudinal study of US college students from 
Harvard and Radcliffe during the 1950s and 1960s. Two samples comprise 140 students and 
646 interviews including 84 complete four-years reports with follow-up interviews each year. 
Perry reconstructs the following sequence of integrative levels of knowing and valuing (see 
Appendix B: Tables B.35): 
1. Basic duality 
2. Multiplicity pre-legitimate 
3. Multiplicity subordinate 
4. Multiplicity correlate or relativism subordinate 
5. Relativism correlate, competing, or diffuse 
6. Commitment foreseen 
7. Initial commitment 
8. Orientation in implications of commitment 
9. Developing commitment(s) 
 
Cook-Greuter’s Model of Ego-Identity Development 
Educational psychologist Suzanne R. Cook-Greuter (1990; 2010a) continues Jane Loevinger’s 
research on ego-identity development within the psychosocial research tradition. The concept 
of the ego is defined as “the central processing unit that orchestrates and aims at coherent 
meaning” (Cook-Greuter 2010a, 26). Cook-Greuter seeks to demonstrate that the concepts of 
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self and reality evolve together in a developmental-logical sequence of differentiation and 
integration. Her underlying concept of developmental stage takes recourse to the Piagetian 
tradition but present aspects of both hard and soft structural stages. While her sequence of 
perspective-taking indicates hard structural stages, her characteristics of ego identity as 
totalistic meaning-making describe soft structural stages. The sequence of eleven stages is 
grouped into four more general tiers by adopting Kohlberg’s distinction between 
preconventional, conventional, and postconventional views to ego-identity development and 
adding a further so-called postautonomous tier. Cook-Greuter’s research takes the whole life 
span of the individual into account and is particularly interested in adult development beyond 
the stage of autonomous ego identity, that is, beyond the rational and representational realms 
of cognition. With reference to theorists of transpersonal developmental psychology, such as 
Charles N. Alexander (Alexander, Druker, and Langer 1990; Alexander et al. 1990) and Ken 
Wilber (Wilber, Brown, and Engler 1986; Wilber 2017), she identifies two postautonomous or 
postrepresentational stages of development. But she has to admit that such ways of thinking 
are hard to evaluate by means of standard scientific methods. This is even more difficult since 
the experience and expertise of these forms of knowing are very rare among both test persons 
and researchers themselves. Methodologically, she refines Loevinger’s so-called Sentence 
Completion Test (SCT), in which test persons are ask to end incomplete sentences (e.g., “My 
conscience bothers me if ...”) in any way they like. After decades of empirical research in the 
form of cross-sectional studies on individuals with an age range from 16 to 82, Cook-Greuter’s 
(2010a) database includes more than 6,800 SCT protocols with around 250,000 sentence 
completions. Cook-Greuter reconstructs the following sequence of integrative levels of ego 
identity (see Appendix B: Tables B.10): 










10. Construct-aware (ego-aware) 
11. Unitive 
 
Fischer’s Model of Skill Development 
Within the research tradition of dynamic systems theory, Michael F. Mascolo and Kurt W. 
Fischer (2010, 156) use the analytic unit of “dynamic skills” in order to reconstruct 
developmental change in terms of universal structures. Skills are defined as the capacity of 
organized actions in specific domains and contexts, such as drawing artworks, writing literary 
narratives, or calculating with numbers. The notion of dynamic skills indicates that skills are 
changing as they become more advanced since each skill begins in some rudimentary form of 
action and is able to transform along a developmental trajectory of hierarchical complexity. 
What develops is not the person as a whole but local skills within particular domains. However, 
skills in different domains can be compared in terms of structural complexity. Mascolo and 
Fischer (2010, 161) present a scale of behavioral complexity that offers a common measure for 
transformational change since “skills develop through the same abstract sequence of structural 
transformations across different conceptual domains.” The original sequence presented by 
Neo-Piagetian theorist Kurt W. Fischer (1980) includes ten levels of skills grouped into three 
tiers from action to representation to abstraction, largely corresponding to Piaget’s 
sensorimotor, preoperational, and formal-operational thought. For the domains of counting, 
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story-telling, and drawing, Fischer and Mascolo reconstruct the following sequence of 
integrative levels of skills (see Appendix B: Table B.32): 
1. Single representations 
2. Representational mappings 
3. Representational systems  
4. Single abstractions 
5. Abstract mappings 
6. Abstract systems 
7. Single principles 
 
Commons’s Model of Task Development 
Quite similar to Kurt W. Fischer’s model of skill development with reliance on dynamic systems 
theory, Michael L. Commons’s (2008) so-called Model of Hierarchical Complexity (MHC) refers 
to problem-solving behavior and structures of tasks in order to describe universal patterns of 
evolution and development. Behavioral tasks are broadly defined as the activity to organize or 
coordinate information. On one hand, this includes thinking and knowing, as Commons (2008, 
305) notes: “Thought is action.” On the other hand, entities that are able to organize 
information also include social organizations, non-human organisms, and even machines like 
computers. The MHC presents a quantitative conception of behavior presuming that tasks (e.g., 
adding numbers) are either completed correctly or not completed at all. But tasks may differ in 
their degree of complexity. For example, the task of adding numbers correctly is less complex 
than the task of multiplying numbers correctly since the former is a necessary precondition of 
the latter but not vice versa. According to Commons, the MHC’s orders or levels of hierarchical 
complexity are grounded in objective criteria derived from mathematical models and 
information theory. Therefore, the analysis of task performances does not require to take 
recourse to the consciousness of the problem-solving entity and can be equally applied to 
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human and artificial intelligence. In this regard, Commons (2008, 308) distinguishes between 
“horizontal complexity” and “vertical complexity.” Horizontal complexity is merely the sum of 
accumulated bits of information about an event in order to perform a task, as described, for 
example, in Shannon’s and Weaver’s classical information theory. Vertical complexity, in 
contrast, refers to a hierarchy of tasks in the sense that a higher-level task requires the 
coordination of two or more lower-level subtasks (for an application to physics see Stålne, 
Commons, and Li 2014; Appendix B: Table B.40). This also means that sequences of vertical 
complexity present hard structural stages or strong conceptions of Integrative Levels of 
Knowing. These highly abstract formalizations allow to compare task performances across 
multiple domains and even across species (Commons et al. 1989; Commons and Ross 2008a; 
2008b). Commons reconstructs the following sequence of integrative levels of tasks (see 
Appendix B: Tables B.9): 
0. Calculatory 
1. Sensory and motor 















4.2.2 Collective Development 
The development of innovative forms of knowing does not take place in a social vacuum. There 
is a dialectic between individuals and society. Individuals are both products and producers of 
their social environment. As emphasized by Michiel Korthals (1997a), neither does individual 
development simply recapitulate collective development nor do social stages only reflect 
individual stages. Individual development and collective development present different 
processes following their own mechanisms. Korthals (1997a) argues that the distinction 
between logical and dynamical aspects of development helps to distinguish problems 
concerning the developing structures of reasoning from problems regarding the developing 
individual subject or collective group. Only with regard to the logic of collective development, it 
is possible to appeal heuristically to models that are originally designed for reconstructing the 
individual dimension (or the other way around). According to Korthals (1997a, 95), it remains 
possible and useful to identify developmental stages of collective development: 
The social context is in itself a result of individual and collective developments. As such it 
can be structured according to a stage pattern. 
As in individual development, there are many different domains or lines of development in 
collective development that need to be analyzed separately. In this regard, Korthals (1997a) 
admits that collective development is much more complex compared to individual 
development since human societies can be highly stratified and segmented, and thus 
encompass a variety of different conceptual subsystems that coexist and may reflect different 
developmental stages. But this does not prevent theorists to orient their reconstruction of 
collective development on models of individual development. Historian Peter Dinzelbacher 
(2015) identifies three influential models on which approaches of collective development are 
primarily oriented. First, Sigmund Freud’s model of psycho-sexual development that inspires, 
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among others, Norbert Elias’s (1994) theory of the process of civilization and Lloyd deMause’s 
(2000) theory of psychohistory. Second, Carl. G. Jung’s model of psychological development 
that influences Erich Neumann’s (1954) theory on mythological stages in the evolution of 
collective consciousness, besides the work of other developmentalists like Jean Gebser (1985), 
Willy Obrist (1988), and Franz Zwilgmeyer (1981). And third, Jean Piaget’s model of cognitive 
development that is fruitfully applied, for example, by medievalist Charles Radding (1985), 
social anthropologist Christopher R. Hallpike (1979), and historian of English literature Don 
LePan (1989). As already mentioned, this list of Piagetian approaches to social evolution or 
collective development could easily be expanded (Harten 1977; Döbert 1981; Habermas 1984; 
Brunner-Traut 1992; Oesterdiekhoff 1992; Damerow 1996; Barnes 2000; Wilber 2000; Bammé 
2011; Dux 2011). 
Some of the most elaborate models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in collective 
development are derived from literature analysis and collected in Appendix C with detailed 
descriptions of their particular level characteristics. As in the previous section, these models 
can be considered to be promising means for knowledge organization (see Table 4.4). 
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Table 4.4 Domain-specific models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in collective development. 
Domain of knowing Reference Appendix 
Science and Religion Barnes (2000)* Table C.1 
Religion Bellah (1964)* Table C.2 
Numerical concepts and arithmetic thought Damerow (1999) Table C.3 
Worldview De Witt and Hedlund (2017) Table C.4 
Cognition and culture Donald (2001)* Table C.5 
Understanding Egan (1997) Table C.6 
Cultural consciousness Fowler (1996) Table C.7 
Spatial representation in pictorial arts Gablik (1979)* Table C.8 
Education Gidley (2016) Table C.9 
Worldview Habermas (1979)* Table C.10 
Collective identity Habermas (1979)* Table C.11 
Moral and legal representations Habermas (1979)* Table C.12 
Understanding of validity spheres Habermas (1987)* Table C.13 
Organization Laloux (2014) Table C.14 
Cognition in anthropoid primates Parker and McKinney (1999) Table C.15 
Cognition and culture (modified after Merlin Donald) Parker and McKinney (1999)* Table C.16 
Consciousness Pisula (2016) Table C.17 
Cognition and culture (modified after Merlin Donald) Renfrew (1998)* Table C.18 
Spatial thinking Renn (2020) Table C.19 
Organizational action-logics Torbert (2003) Table C.20 
Spatial cognition in stone-tool technology Wynn (1985) Table C.21 
* Models that are exemplarily described in the main text. 
In the following, some examples of these domain-specific models of collective development 
will be introduced in more detail in order to determine their particular domains of knowledge 
and to name the reconstructed developmental sequence. 
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Habermas’s Model of Worldview Development 
One of the most elaborate and differentiated reconstructions of collective development 
oriented on findings regarding individual development is presented by Habermas (1979; 1984; 
1987), as already described in detail in Chapter Three. It should be made clear that social 
evolution or historiogenesis does not simply present a recapitulation of ontogenesis. 
Nevertheless, the logic of development in certain domains of individual development can also 
be found in collective development. In this regard, Habermas formal-pragmatic distinction 
between objective, social, and subjective world relations is of utmost importance. On one 
hand, this distinction indicates that each one of these world relations is related to a domain-
specific line of development (e.g., cognitive, moral, ego-identity) following its own logic of 
development. On the other hand, this distinction is by itself a product of development, namely, 
of the growing ability to differentiate world relations as different validity spheres. Therefore, 
Habermas’s analysis of worldview development distinguishes between domain-specific 
reconstructions, such as moral or legal representations (see Appendix C: Table C.12) and 
collective identity (see Appendix C: Table C.11), and the reconstruction of the differentiation of 
world relations or validity spheres in general (see Appendix C: Tables C.10, C.13). In both cases, 
it is important to realize that societies are complex and often highly stratified and segmented, 
which means that not all of its members, social groups, institutions, or artifacts are equally 
representative for the dominant worldview structure or the corresponding level of knowing. 
This is particular the case for the distinction between sacred and profane domains of actions 
(see Appendix C: Table C.13). For example, archaic societies typically show a confusion of 
relations of validity and effectiveness in the sacred domain of rites and myths but a 
differentiation of both in the profane domain of day-to-day communication. Likewise, 
civilizations typically lack a clear distinction of specific validity claims (e.g., truth, rightness, 
truthfulness) in the sacred domain but distinguish them in the profane domain. Keeping these 
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differentiations in mind, Habermas reconstructs the following sequence of integrative levels of 







Bellah’s Model of Religious Development 
Sociologist Robert N. Bellah (1964; 2011) investigates the development of religion that he 
defines, following Gliffort Geertz, as a system of symbols that establishes powerful and long-
lasting motivations and moods involving an idea of a general order of existence. This notion of 
religion does not consider a belief in supernatural beings or gods to be an essential aspect. 
Religious reality is seen as both a realm of experience and a realm of representation. Bellah 
(2011) describes different modes of religious representation or symbolization as ideal types 
that are systematically related to conceptions of religious action and religious organization. 
With reference to Jean Piaget and Jerome S. Bruner, Bellah (2011) locates these modes of 
religious representation in stages of cognitive development of the child following an invariant 
order from unitive to enactive to symbolic to conceptual representation (see Appendix B: Table 
B.4). According to Bellah (2011), these ontogenetically described stages parallel descriptions of 
the development of human culture, as presented particularly by Merlin Donald’s sequence 
from episodic to mimetic to mythic to theoretic cultures (see Appendix D: Table D.2). For Bellah 
(2011; 2012), religious evolution or development needs to be considered in relation to the 
more general processes of socio-cultural evolution. These should even be related to the macro-
perspective of the so-called deep history that also includes biological and cosmological 
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evolution in order to recognize common developmental principles, such as an increasing 
differentiation and complexity of organization. Regarding religious development this includes, 
among other things, an increasing freedom of personality and society relative to the environing 
conditions (Bellah 1964, 374): 
Freedom has increased because at each successive stage the relation of man to the 
conditions of his existence has been conceived as more complex, more open and more 
subject to change and development. 
Bellah reconstructs the following sequence of integrative levels of religion (see Appendix C: 
Table C.2): 
1. Primitive (later: Tribal) 
2. Archaic 
3. Historic (later: Axial) 
4. Early modern 
5. Modern 
 
Barnes’s Model of Scientific and Religious Development 
As a religious studies scholar, Michael H. Barnes (2000) investigates the long-term development 
of cognitive styles in culture with particular interest in parallel developments of scientific and 
religious thought in human history. He heavily draws on cognitive psychology and the traditions 
of cognitive-developmental theory and cognitive social-historical theory. In comparing a broad 
range of developmental approaches, Barnes comes to the conclusion that many of them are 
consistent with a Piagetian interpretation of history. These approaches include, among others, 
Robert N. Bellah’s (1964) development of religious systems, Bernard Lonergan’s (1992) 
development of theological method, Charles Radding’s (1985) development of law and 
jurisprudence in medieval Europe, Ernst Gellner’s (1990) development of cognition, Don 
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LePan’s (1989) development of literary narratives, Merlin Donald’s (1991) development of 
culture and cognition, Robert Kegan’s (1994) application of his ontogenetic model of ego-
identity development to history (e.g., traditionalism—modernism—postmodernism), Richard 
H. Schlagel’s (1995) development of scientific thought in Greek antiquity, James W. Fowler’s 
(1996) application of his ontogenetic model of faith development to history (e.g., pre-
Enlightenment—Enlightenment—post-Enlightenment), and Kieran Egan’s (1997) development 
of understanding. Barnes argues that collective developments in various domains of knowing, 
such as religion and science, show some parallels because they are derived from the same 
underlying thought styles. According to Barnes (2000, 45 [emphases in original]; see also 
Appendix D: Table D.1), Piaget’s general description of cognitive development provides a 
fruitful descriptive framework, even though there may be justified criticisms of Piaget’s theory: 
Piaget’s description of stages helps to categorize thought styles more clearly. His theory 
also helps to recognize the particular sequence in which stages of thought appear in 
cultural history. In cultures as in individuals, the easier modes of thought appear first and 
continue to be used even when more difficult modes of thought are added. 
Regarding the history of religion, Barnes criticizes the assumption that religious thought 
presents an earlier and less complex mode of thought compared to scientific thought, as put 
forward by older developmental theories like Auguste Comte’s influential law of three stages. 
Instead, he argues that both scientific and religious thought develop along a pathway towards 
increasing complexity. Barnes reconstructs the following sequence of integrative levels of 
scientific and religious thought (see Appendix C: Table C.1):  
1. Primitive 
2. Archaic 
3. Classical (axial) 
4. Empirical-critical 
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Donald’s Model of Cognitive-Cultural Development 
Neuropsychologist and neuroanthropologist Merlin Donald (1991; 2001) studies the 
development of human cognition and culture. Since individual and collective development are 
considered to be highly interdependent, Donald (2001, 251) considers the interplay between 
cognition and culture in terms of “hybrid minds” that are partly formed by symbolically 
mediated culture, as well as in terms of “cognitive communities.” Although the term culture 
usually refers to a shared set of habits, languages, or customs defining a population or group of 
people, Donald (2001, XIV) emphasizes the cognitive aspect of culture as the underlying 
“cognitive web” that defines and constrains the ways in which memories, knowledge, and 
thought are shaped in its members. In tracing back the evolutionary history of consciousness, 
Donald (2001, 11) distinguishes between levels of basic awareness that can also be found in 
many nonhuman species and levels of distinctively human consciousness that are shaped by 
the co-evolution of brain, culture, and cognition, also labeled as “deep enculturation.” 
According to Donald, the multi-layered human consciousness is made possible by an expanded 
executive brain system, extreme cerebral plasticity, and a greatly expanded working memory 
capacity. But in opposition to pure neurological approaches, Donald (2001, 90) argues for a 
“new science of consciousness that maps out the phenomenology of inner cognitive spaces” 
and for comparative studies that offer a taxonomy or cladistic tree of conscious capacity. 
Donald’s own model distinguishes three genuine human-specific levels of cognition and culture 
from an action-based mimetic culture to an oral-linguistic mythic culture to external-symbolic 
theoretical culture, largely corresponding to Piaget’s stages of sensorimotor, preoperational, 
and operational cognition or to Bellah’s stages of religious representation (see Appendix D: 
Table D.2; cp. also Appendix D: Table D.7). There are also some extensions of Donald’s model 
introducing additional levels, such as Colin Renfrew’s (1998) subdivision of the theoretical level 
into an external-symbolic level and a genuine theoretical level (see Appendix C: Table C.18), or 
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Sue T. Parker’s and Michael L. McKinney’s (1999) subdivision of the episodic level into a 
genuine episodic level and a level of rudimentary symbolic capacities (see Appendix C: Table 
C.16).  
Although his model presents a clear hierarchy of nested layers or integrative levels of 
conscious capacity, Donald strongly underlines the fact that this sequence says nothing about 
value judgments since higher forms of consciousness cannot be per se considered to be better 
or more valuable compared to lower ones. Indeed, there are many cases in which mimetic or 
mythic knowledge representations can be even more adequate than theoretical ones, as it is 
often the case in the domains of art, politics, or interpersonal relationships (Donald 2006). 
Donald’s original model reconstructs the following sequence of integrative levels of cognition 






Gablik’s Model of Artistic Development 
Art historian Suzi Gablik (1979) considers the history of art in the light of cognitive-
developmental psychology in order to understand major changes of spatial representation in 
pictorial arts. She argues that there is a general developmental pattern of all knowledge 
branches based on fundamental transformations of thought processes in the evolution of 
human cognition, such as the evolution of logical or rational thinking from more image-based 
modes of thought. Accordingly, her approach to art history is not primarily interested in 
individual artistic styles or specific epochs but considers the history of art as a manifestation of 
more general transformative processes in human culture. Gablik’s approach is mainly based on 
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Piaget’s model of cognition in which perception and representation of the world become 
progressively more structured by thought processes. She treats artworks as representations of 
a particular form of world knowledge and analyzes them in terms of intellectual organization 
and underlying cognitive structures. Her investigation is focused on the different ways of spatial 
representation in pictorial arts and based on the assumption that cognitive-developmental 
stages can be considered to be levels of problem-solving competence. For example, she argues 
that the essential difference of Renaissance art compared to medieval art is the introduction of 
the third spatial dimension or perspective projection that requires the ability to solve the 
problem of rendering space, distance, volume, and mass. In general, she identifies a trend in 
spatial representation from topological relations with a lack of depth (e.g., ancient and 
medieval art) to projective relations that arrange spatial figures within a coordinate system 
(e.g., Renaissance art) to indeterminate spatial relations (e.g., modern art). But as noted by De 
Mul (1997a, 197), Gablik is fully aware that she is “reconstructing just one artistic dimension” 
and not the development of art as such. Even though she is interested in the question of 
progress in art, comparable to progress in science, Gablik’s (1979, 24) “epistemological view of 
art history” stresses the fact that her study strictly excludes the question of aesthetic judgment 
since particular modes of spatial representation say nothing about the aesthetic values of 
artworks. Borrowing Jerome S. Bruner’s terminology, Gablik reconstructs the following 





It should be noted, however, that Gablik’s (1979) use of terminology appears to be problematic 
because Bruner’s (1974) understanding of the enactive, iconic, and symbolic modes of 
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representation differs markedly from Gablik’s reconstruction of three modes of spatial 
representation. According to Bruner, enactive representation refers to action patterns (e.g., 
tying a knot), iconic representation refers to images (e.g., a picture of a knot), and symbolic 
representation refers to a symbol system like language (e.g., a verbal description of a knot) (see 
Appendix B: Table B.8). This means that Gablik’s three modes of spatial representation should 
be related to Bruner’s iconic mode since all of them are image-based representations of space. 
Gablik seems to confuse what Piaget (1999) calls sensorimotor schemata (Bruner’s enactive 
representation) and their integration into imaginal schemata (Bruner’s iconic representation), 
which in turn can be integrated into concrete schemata or formal schemata (Bruner’s symbolic 
representation) (see Appendix B: Table B.36). For a similar reason, Gablik’s interpretation of 
the perspective projection in Renaissance art as being related to Piaget’s concrete-operational 
cognition, instead of formal-operational cognition (cp. Wilber 2000), does not appear very 
convincing in her otherwise insightful structural analysis. 
  
4.3 Document Indexing based on Integrative Levels of Knowing 
In this section, it will be sketched out how the organizing principle of Integrative Levels of 
Knowing has already been applied by several theorists for the analysis of authorial perspectives 
of text documents (cp. Kleineberg 2018; 2020). The following examples are restricted to the 
domain of moral consciousness and taken from historical and cross-cultural studies on ethics 
and morals (Radding 1978; Schluchter 1981; Apel 1988; Rosenberg, Ward, and Chilton 1988; 
Roetz 1993; Hallpike 2017). All these theorists apply explicitly or implicitly Habermas’s (1990, 
28) methodology of “hermeneutic reconstructionism” by taking recourse to an already existing 
domain-specific ILK model, namely, to Kohlberg’s model of moral development or “rational 
reconstruction of the ontogenesis of justice reasoning” (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983, 
10). 
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As described in Chapter Three, Habermas (1979) distinguishes two modes of meaning 
explication. The first mode is related to the surface structure in terms of the semantic content 
of a symbolic expression or the author’s explicit know-that. In document indexing, this 
traditional form of interpretation is concerned with subject analysis and the aboutness of a 
document. The second mode refers to the deep structure in terms of the generative structures 
according to which a symbolic expression is brought forth or the author’s implicit know-how. In 
document indexing, this depth-hermeneutic form of interpretation is concerned with context 
analysis and the authorial perspective of the document.  
In this case, the generative structures can be interpreted in the light of Kohlberg’s model 
of moral development. According to Habermas’s (1990) formal-pragmatic perspective, moral 
consciousness dealing with norms and values refers to regulative speech acts in relation to the 
social world claiming validity in terms of rightness. In this respect, moral consciousness is a 
universal and cross-cultural phenomenon. From a developmental-logical perspective, however, 
there can be found stage-like qualitative differences in the justification of what can be 
considered to be morally just and reasonable (see Table 4.5).  
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Action and judgment are directed by a naive hedonism and not by internalized 
expectations of others, group solidarity, or general ideas of justice. Sanction: punishment 




The physical consequences decide whether an action is right or wrong. Obedience to 
authority is guided by the egocentric interest in benefits and the avoidance of physical 
harm. Egocentric perspective: complementarity of order and obedience. 
Stage 2 
Instrumental exchange 
What is right, is, like at Stage 1, that which satisfies one’s own immediate needs while 
strategically also recognizing the interests of others. The orientation is towards 
elementary rules of reciprocity and concrete exchange like “you scratch my back and I’ll 
scratch yours.” Egocentric perspective: symmetry of compensation. 
Level B 
Conventional 
Action and judgment are directed in an alienated way (especially at Stage 4) by means of 
self-identification with heteronomous rules and norms. The aim is not only adjustment to 
a given order, but its maintenance for its own sake. Sanction: shame (withdrawal of love 
and social recognition). 
Stage 3 
“Good boy—nice girl” 
orientation 
The right is what “pleases” and what is motivated by the rules, values, and expectations 
of groups. Primary group perspective: conformity to roles. 
Stage 4 
Law and order 
orientation 
The right is what is in accordance with the prescriptions of one’s role in state and society. 
Action and judgment are motivated by the respect for authority and doing one’s duty as 
a value per se. Perspective of a collectivity (the system’s point of view): conformity to the 
existing system of norms. 
Level C 
Postconventional 
Conventional morality is not necessarily rejected (except at Stage 4½), but its acceptance 
is accompanied by a clear awareness of the possible conflict between conventions and 
law on the one hand and morality on the other. Sanction: guilt (reaction of conscience). 
Stage 4½ 
“Anything goes” and 
youthful protest 
What is right is a question of arbitrary subjective decisions. This stage is characterized by 
a radical rejection of the alienated conventionalism of Level B and the recourse to the 
naive pleasure principle of Level A. Instead of new normative rules, this stage proclaims 





What is right is not predetermined, like on Level B, by the existing institutions and social 
conditions. It is first of all a matter of personal, relative values and opinions. Beyond this 
it is defined in terms of standards that have been agreed upon by free and equal 
individuals and that can be changed by regulated procedures. Principled perspective 




The right is what is in accordance with abstract, consistent, and universally valid 
principles. It is based on the autonomous decision of conscience. Procedural perspective 
(ideal role taking): orientation toward procedures for justifying norms. 
Source: Kleineberg (2018, 403–4: Table 1) based on Roetz (1993) and Habermas (1979; 1990). 
Even though there is a variety of perspectives on justice or morality, the structural 
development of moral consciousness appears to follow an invariant sequence of stages across 
cultures and sex differences (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983; Jorgensen 2006; Gibbs et al. 
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2007). This allows to establish a non-relativistic and comparative framework for a systematic 
organization of different moral views, as highlighted by Habermas (1990, 117 [emphases in 
original]): 
Opponents of universalistic ethics generally bring up the fact that different cultures have 
different conceptions of morality. To oppose relativistic objections of this kind, 
Kohlberg’s theory of moral development offers the possibility of (a) reducing the 
empirical diversity of existing moral views to variation in the contents, in contrast to the 
universal forms, of moral judgment and (b) explaining the remaining structural 
differences between moralities as differences in the stage of development of the 
capacity for moral judgment. 
As already discussed, one might expect some “homologous structures of consciousness in the 
histories of the individual and the species” (Habermas 1979, 99; see also Wilber 1999; Barnes 
2000; Bammé 2011; Bellah 2011; Dinzelbacher 2015). This means that viewpoint analyses 
based on Kohlberg’s moral stages are not restricted to individual authors of a document but 
can also be applied to collectively shared interpretive systems like religious or philosophical 
ethics (Apel 1988; Roetz 1993; Hallpike 2017) and institutionalized legal or moral 
representations (Radding 1978; Schluchter 1981; Rosenberg, Ward, and Chilton 1988; 
Oesterdiekhoff 2014a). Generally, a document presents at the same time a manifestation of 
individual cognitive structures and collectively shared forms of knowing. Thus, it is possible to 
analyze the authorial perspective of a documents in terms of both individual and collective 
development. However, the analytical distinction between individual and collective 
development remains of utmost importance for the rational reconstruction of competences 
and for modeling Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
The analysis and indexing of authorial perspectives according to Kohlberg’s stage 
descriptions of moral development requires a depth-hermeneutical interpretation of significant 
features of the document. But, again, this does not mean to judge an individual author as a 
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person or a given culture as a whole since hermeneutic reconstructionism is restricted to an 
understanding of particular validity claims raised in communicative actions, for example, by 
means of written documents (Backlund 2005; Budd 2011). The following examples in Table 4.6 




Table 4.6 Examples of viewpoint analysis and indexing using Kohlberg’s model of moral development. 
Document Significant features Level Reference 
Shujing (Book of 
Documents), chapter Pan 
Geng, c. 1100 BCE 
Orientation towards role and upholding 
of the system instead of preference for 
kin. Establishment of a political state 
order. 
Stage 4 Roetz (1993, 35) 
Iliad, attributed to 
Homer, 8th century BCE 
Thoughts being placed in the mind by 
gods. Lack of rights for individuals. 
Heroism and despotism based on power.  
Stage 2 Barnes (2000, 107–8) 
Recorded sayings of 
Buddha, Confucius, the 
Jewish prophets, and 
Muhammad, 6th century 
BCE to 7th century CE 
Reflection on society as a whole, on 
individuals independently of social 
status. Distinction between moral 
principles and duties or customs. 
Importance of conscience. Significance of 
intention. 
Stage 5 Hallpike (2017, 301) 
Zhuangzi, 4th to 2nd 
centuries BCE 
Rejection of conventional compulsion. 
Youthful protest. Glorification of freedom 
of the child. Defense of opportunism. 
Stage 4½ Roetz (1993, 257) 
Xunzi, 3rd century BCE The state as product of reasonable 
deliberation. Utilitarian rationale. 
Critique of conventional role-morality: 
“Follow the Dao and not the ruler, follow 
justice and not the father.” 
Stage 5 Roetz (1993, 63–65, 269, 
274) 
Leges Henrici Primi (Laws 
of Henry I), 1114-1118 
Interchangeability of intention and 
behavior. Lack of abstract principles. 
Justice as exchange. 
Stage 2 Radding (1978, 578–79, 586) 
Song of the Nibelungs, 
early 13th century 
Morality of loyalty. Conventions of tribal 
society. 
Stage 3 Apel (1988, 473) 
The Social Contract by 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
1762 
Critique of feudal system. Inalienable 
rights of liberty. Principles of democracy 
based on natural law and social contract. 
Stage 5 Bammé (2011, 566) 
United States Declaration 
of Independence, 1776 
Inalienable rights based on equality and 
mutual respect. Adjudicating public law 
derived from rational debate and 
consent. 
Stage 5 Rosenberg, Ward & Chilton 
(1988, 152) 
Critique of Practical 
Reason by Immanuel 
Kant, 1788 
Ethic of responsibility in monological, not 
yet dialogical form. Validity based on 
reflexive principles. Evaluation of 
consequences of conduct. 
Stage 5 Schluchter (1981, 63–64) 
Beyond Good and Evil by 
Friedrich Nietzsche, 1886 
Denunciation of validity claims of 
morality. Genealogy as naturalistic 
reductionism.  
Stage 4½ Apel (1988, 388) 
A Theory of Justice by 
John Rawls, 1971 
Moral principles designed to reach 
agreement in situations of potential 
moral conflict. Justice as reversibility. 
Stage 6 Kohlberg, Levine & Hewer 
(1983, 61–62) 
Source: Kleineberg (2018, 405–6: Table 2). 
181 
Document indexing based on the organizing principle of Integrative Levels of Knowing is 
exemplified in this section by Kohlberg’s moral stages but can easily be extended to other 
domains of human cognition by means of other ILK models (see Appendix E: Table E.1). The 
main contribution of Habermas’s hermeneutic reconstructionism to indexing theory is that it 
allows analyzing mutually contradicting perspectives or forms of knowing in a systematic and 
non-relativistic way (Cooke 1994; Bookman 2002; Backlund 2005; Pedersen 2008). In contrast 
to a strong contextualism resulting in a relativistic “hermeneutic nihilism” (Campbell 1988, 
505), such a depth-hermeneutical analysis considers different points of view not simply as 




This chapter outlines the proposed cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge 
organization in that it introduces conceptions and models of Integrative Levels of Knowing as 
helpful tools for a systematic organization of epistemic contexts. More clearly than the 
cognitive view to knowledge organization, this approach acknowledges the dialectic between 
individual and collective development and the rich contextual settings in which human 
cognition is embedded. Similar to cognitive-historical approaches, it is concerned with the 
structural change of forms of knowing but the focus is less on the context-specific dynamics of 
development but more on the context-independent logic of development. In this regard, the 
cognitive-developmental approach is unique in presenting an organizing principle that can be 
applied across various cognitive, cultural, and historical contexts.  
This organizing principle in the form of strong or weak versions of Integrative Levels of 
Knowing is the common feature of different research traditions on human development that 
are summarized in this study as the cognitive-developmental approach. These research 
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traditions include the cognitive-developmental theory in the narrower sense, the psychosocial 
theory, the cognitive social-historical theory, and the dynamic systems theory. All of them 
provide a broad range of domain-specific models of Integrative Levels of Knowing that are 
collected in the Appendices B–C with detailed descriptions of the characteristics of particular 
levels of knowing. Some of the most elaborate models for individual and collective 
development are exemplarily introduced, while one them serves as an example for the 
application of ILK models for viewpoint analysis in document indexing. Using Kohlberg’s model 
of moral development, it is shown how the organizing principle of Integrative Levels of 
Knowing is already applied by several theorists who use the methodology of hermeneutic 
reconstructionism in order to analyze and index the authorial perspectives of text documents. 
In the following two chapters, the cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge 
organization will be applied in two case studies. The first one will be concerned with the 
analytical dimension of knowledge organization in context or the information professionals’s 
frames of reference (context of mediation), whereas the second one will be concerned with the 
analytical dimension of context in knowledge organization or the authorial perspectives 
(context of production). 
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5 CASE STUDY I: THE ANCIENT CHINESE LIBRARY CLASSIFICATION SEVEN EPITOMES 
 
5.1 The Seven Epitomes in Context 
5.1.1 The Socio-Epistemological Approach 
This case study is concerned with a specific knowledge organization system under consideration 
of its epistemic context. The overarching goal is to demonstrate exemplarily the contribution of 
the proposed cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge organization, that is, a 
methodological extension to domain analysis, complementary to the prevailing socio-
epistemological approach. While the socio-epistemological approach mainly focuses on unique 
characteristics of a given epistemic context, the cognitive-developmental approach takes also 
structural similarities and differences across contexts into account. This comparative interest 
requires additional methodological tools to analyze the underlying rule system or generative 
structures according to which a cultural artifact like a knowledge organization system is brought 
forth. It will be shown that a formal-pragmatic analysis based on rational reconstructions of 
those cognitive competences that are involved in the construction of knowledge organization 
systems can offer such methodological tools. These rational reconstructions already exist in the 
form of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing and are characterized by a logic of development 
that is independent of particular contexts. Thus, the decisive advantage of the cognitive-
developmental approach is to offer a point of departure for cross-cultural and historical 
comparisons and a clearer distinction between culture-specific and transcultural features of 
knowledge organization systems. 
The object under investigation is the ancient Chinese library classification known as the 
Seven Epitomes. One reason for this choice is that the classificatory structure of the Seven 
Epitomes presents a significant contrast to those of today’s dominant library classifications (e.g., 
DDC, UDC, LCC) due to its original formative context that presents both a cultural distance and a 
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historical distance. Another reason is that the Seven Epitomes, as an object of study in the field 
of knowledge organization, is well documented in a research project under the lead of Hur-Li Lee 
in which the epistemic foundation is the explicit focus of the investigation (Lee 2008; 2010a; 
2010b; 2012a; 2012b; 2016; Lee and Lan 2009; 2011). As an initial orientation, this section 
describes the Seven Epitomes according to Lee’s (2016, 3) “socio-epistemological approach.” The 
next section discusses some limitations of this methodology and the potential contribution of 
the cognitive-developmental approach. Finally, the remainder of this case study applies the 
cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge organization, taking a comparison of the Seven 
Epitomes with the Dewey Decimal Classification as an example. 
The Seven Epitomes presents the first classified library catalog in China and has a strong 
influence on the history of Chinese classification and bibliography until the early 20th century 
(Tsien 1952; Liu-Lengyel 1987; Jiang 2007; Lee 2016). Its origin dates back to a book collation 
project during the Former Han dynasty (206 BCE–8 CE), initiated by Emperor Wu (reign 141–87 
BCE) and put into effect per special decree in 26 BCE by Emperor Cheng (reign 33–7 BCE). After 
20 years of scholarly work guided by Liu Xiang (77–6 BCE) and later by his son Liu Xin (53? BCE–
23 CE), the Seven Epitomes is completed as the catalog of the imperial library around 7 or 6 BCE.  
Unfortunately, the Seven Epitomes is only extant in fragments. As reported by Lee and Lan 
(2009), the outcome of the book collation project are two bibliographical tools. First, the 
Separate Résumés (Bie lu) containing detailed abstracts of each finally edited book as a report to 
the Emperor. Today, only eight of these résumés are still extant. And second, the Seven Epitomes 
(Qi lue)—sometimes translated as Seven Abstracts or Seven Summaries since the character lue 
means something that forms a “condensed record or representation ‘in miniature’” (Lee 2016, 
79)—containing abbreviated texts from the Separate Résumés and an additional classification 
scheme for organizing the entries in the library catalog. The complete texts of both works 
disappear between the late ninth century and the early tenth century and are still lost today.  
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Only during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) some scholars make the attempt to reconstruct 
the Seven Epitomes by collecting the surviving fragments of the original text quoted in various 
ancient writings. The main source of these reconstructions is a chapter from the History of the 
Former Han Dynasty (Han shu) by Ban Gu (32–92) known as the Han Bibliographic Treatise or 
simply the Han Treatise, written about a hundred years after the completion of the Seven 
Epitomes. As summarized by Lee (2016), the accepted view today is that the Han Treatise 
presents an abridged edition of the Seven Epitomes in which a few entries are added, relocated, 
or removed, while the majority of entries and the classification scheme are still congruent to the 
original. According to Lee and Lan (2009), the version reconstructed by Yao Zhenzong (1843–
1906) at the end of the 19th century can be regarded as the most valuable basis for studying the 
Seven Epitomes.  
In order to locate the formative context of the Seven Epitomes, two historical timelines 
are presented. The first one gives an overview of Chinese dynasties from ancient times to the 
early 20th century (Table 5.1), while the second one shows some milestones in the history of 
Chinese literature until the completion of the Seven Epitomes at the end of the Former Han 
dynasty (Table 5.2).  
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Table 5.1 Periodization of Chinese dynasties. 
Dynasty Time (according to LCC) Time (according to Chinese historians) 
Xia ca. 2205–1766 BCE 21st–16th centuries BCE 
Shang 1766–1122 BCE  16th–11th centuries BCE 
Western Zhou 1122–771 BCE 
11th century–249 BCE 
Eastern Zhou 771–256 BCE 
     Spring and Autumn 722–481 BCE 770–475 BCE 
     Warring States 403–221 BCE 453–221 BCE 
Qin 221–207 BCE 221–206 BCE 
Western (Former) Han 202 BCE–9 CE 206 BCE–8 CE 
Xin 9–23 8–23 
Eastern (Later) Han 25–220 25–220 
Three Kingdoms 220–265 220–280 
Jin 265–419 265–420 
Northern and Southern Dynasties 386–589 386–588 
Sui 581–618 581–618 
Tang 618–907 618–907 
Five Dynasties and the Ten Kingdoms 907–979 907–979 
Northern Song 960–1127 960–1127 
Southern Song 1127–1279 1127–1279 
Yuan 1260–1368 1271–1368 
Ming 1368–1643 1368–1644 
Qing 1644–1912 1644–1911 
Source: Based on Lee (2016, III). 
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Table 5.2 Literary timeline from antiquity to the completion of the Seven Epitomes. 
Period Literary history 
Spring and Autumn era 
(770–475 BCE) 
Confucius (551–479 BCE) was the person credited as the first to spread literacy in private 
teaching and outside families. Prior to that, writing was the exclusive privilege of the very 
few in government and often taught by father to son. 
Warring States era 
(453–221 BCE) 
Most of the “hundred schools of thought” (e.g., Classicists, Daoists, Mohists) emerged 
and thrived. 
Simple categorizations of masters appeared in literature (e.g., Zhuangzi, Xunzi). 
Qin dynasty 
(221–206) 
First Emperor of the Qin (reign 221–210 BCE) instituted policy to place formal learning 
under the exclusive control of the central government, ban private ownership of texts, 
and have certain writings burned in 213 BCE. 
In 206 BCE, the rebels set fire to the palace compound, which lasted for three months, 
burning down all buildings and destroying the majority of government records and all its 
book collections. 
Former Han dynasty 
(206 BCE–8 CE) 
In 191 BCE, the policy on book banning was officially lifted. 
Emperor Wu (reign 141–87 BCE) implemented plans to systematically collect books and 
set up new offices for hand-copying texts.  
In 136 BCE, Emperor Wu changed the positions of court Academicians and designated 
them only for selected scholars specializing in one of the Five Classics.  
In 124 BCE, Emperor Wu founded the Imperial Academy. Pupils at the Academy, studying 
exclusively the Classics under Academicians, took an examination at the completion of 
their study that would determine their entrance into the officialdom. This second policy is 
regarded in history as the one establishing the examination system for civil service 
throughout imperial China. Together, this policy and the previous one instituted Ru 
Classicism (mostly referred to as Confucianism in the West) as the imperial orthodoxy.  
During Emperor Cheng’s reign (33–7 BCE), two significant events involving books took 
place: an official messenger, Chen Nong, was sent all over the empire to find lost works, 
and, in 26 BCE, a special decree started a monumental collation project to salvage the 
books already collected at the depositories of the inner court.  
Approximately in 7 or 6 BCE, Liu Xin (53? BCE–23 CE) completed the Seven Epitomes—the 
classified catalog for the imperial library that held all books from the above collation 
project. 
Source: Based on Lee (2016, 5: Table 1.1). 
According to Lee (2016), the Seven Epitomes can be considered to be both a bibliography and a 
library catalog. The Chinese term mulu refers to different meanings like table of contents, 
bibliography, or library catalog without clear distinctions (Lee 2016). Indeed, library catalogs in 
imperial China often circulate outside libraries and function as bibliographies. 
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As a bibliography, the Seven Epitomes presents a listing of books in terms of title, name of 
the author (or attributed author if known at all), and a short annotation containing information, 
for example, about variant titles, the author’s courtesy name, the theme and origin of the work, 
or even a brief evaluation (e.g., “it is superficial”). From a bibliographical perspective, the 
concept of book refers to the intellectual work or content rather than the physical document. 
 As a library catalog, the Seven Epitomes also provides information about the physical 
documents as an inventory of the imperial library and offers a classification scheme as a tool for 
information retrieval. In ancient China, written documents are commonly available in the form 
of wooden and bamboo slips bound to a literary unit, much less frequently in the form of the 
more expensive silk cloth. Due to the bulkiness and weight of these materials, the possibility to 
compile long texts in a single unit is limited. Therefore, shorter units are often combined into 
chapters or volumes which in turn can be further combined into more extensive books. The 
Seven Epitomes counts more than 13,000 chapters or volumes of the imperial library, listed 
separately for each Division of the catalog. The classification scheme consists of six Epitomes or 
main classes preceded by the so-called Collective Epitome containing introductions to the other 
Epitomes, resulting in the number of seven from which the name of the classification is derived. 




Table 5.3 Classification scheme of the Seven Epitomes with estimated chapter/volume count. 

















Spring and Autumn Annals 
Analects 
Book of Filial Piety 
Philology 























Ru Classicists (Confucians) 
Daoists  
Theorists of Yin-Yang (Naturalists)  
Legalists  
Logicians (Sophists)  
Mohists  
Diplomatists (Strategists)  
Eclectics (Syncretists or Generalists) 
Agronomists 
Novelists  























Lyrics and Rhapsodies 
(shifu lue) 
Rhapsodies 1  
Rhapsodies 2  
Rhapsodies 3  
Diverse Rhapsodies  
Lyrics  















Military Tactics  
Military Terrain  
Military Yin-Yang  
Military Skills  











Divination and Numbers 
(shushu lue) 
Patterns of Heaven  
Chronology  
Five Phases  
Milfoil and Turtle Shell  
Diverse Prognostications  
System of Forms  
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Total: 13,278* 13,510 
Source: Based on Lee (2016, 67: Table 2.2, 79). 
*In Lee (2016), the sum of the chapter/volume count in the Han Treatise is incorrectly added to 13,728, due 
obviously to transposed digits, while Lee and Lan (2011, 29: Table 1) present slightly different counts which also 
appear to be incorrectly added to a sum of 13,269 instead of 13,065 chapters or volumes. 
As knowledge organization system, the Seven Epitomes organizes books since knowledge is not 
a normalized concept in ancient China, nevertheless, “its classification is based entirely on the 
aggregate content of the library collection, not the physical features of the books” (Lee 2016, 
133–34). It should be noted, however, that the coverage of this classification has a limited scope 
since it is neither intended to present a comprehensive record of all writings available at the time 
nor to construct a universal scheme. For example, certain kinds of writings (e.g., law, elementary 
math) are excluded from consideration, and a main class like History that is common in later 
Chinese library catalogs is missing.  
According to Lee and Lan (2009), the Seven Epitomes is the result of a conscious and 
deliberate endeavor rather than a thoughtless act. Lee (2016, 30) emphasizes that for a deeper 
understanding of the underlying intentions of its creators, it is important to consider this ancient 
Chinese library classification in its particular “sociocultural context,” that is, in relation to its 
function for the library of the Imperial Academy during the Former Han dynasty and to the 
prevailing cultural identity, ideological orthodoxy, and political agenda at the time.  
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In her attempt to reconstruct the epistemological and ideological foundations of the Seven 
Epitomes, Lee (2016, 134–42 [excerpted]; order of principles taken from Lee 2012a, 396) takes a 
broad range of historical sources into account and identifies five main principles: 
1. Imperial library collection as the literary warrant; 
2. Government functions considered for structuring texts; 
3. Classicism determining the main classificatory structure; 
4. Knowledge perceived and organized as a unity; 
5. Correlative thinking connecting all text categories to a supreme knowledge.  
The first principle, imperial library collection as the literary warrant, states that the Seven 
Epitomes is oriented on the body of existing writings of the imperial library collection. This 
becomes evident by the fact that the classification scheme is not universal in scope but excludes 
text categories that are outside of the collection parameters and does not reserve space for 
potential categories that might be relevant in the future. Examples indicating the literary warrant 
are the inclusion of philology and the exclusion of elementary math as text categories. This 
means that the classificatory structure does not present a comprehensive picture of the 
intellectual landscape of the Han dynasty. A further indication of literary warrant, not explicitly 
mentioned by Hur-Li Lee, is a correlation of increasing Divisions of Epitomes with the increasing 
count of chapters or volumes within a given Epitome. For example, the highest chapter/volume 
count is found in the Epitome of the Masters which contains with ten Divisions the highest 
number of subclasses, whereas the Epitomes with the lowest chapter/volume counts, namely, 
the Epitome of Military Texts and the Epitome of Formulae and Techniques are divided into not 
more than four subclasses (see Table 5.3).  
The second principle, government functions considered for structuring texts, means that 
the Seven Epitomes as a result of the book collation project and part of the library of the Imperial 
Academy serves the Emperor in his governing. As such it is part of a grand strategy for empire 
building, in particular, as a means for the education of the cultural elite that holds the offices of 
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the inner court. According to Lee (2012a, 395), this principle is even more important than the 
aboutness principle: 
Government functions rather than topical similarities serve as dictates there for textual 
categories. This explains why texts on the same topics are sometimes classified in different 
epitomes.  
For example, books on Yin Yang theory are entered under both the Epitome of Military Texts and 
the Epitome of Divination and Numbers because they are used in different official functions. 
Such government functions also imply that the Seven Epitomes reflects the prevailing orthodox 
ideology of the Former Han dynasty which is known as Classicism. 
The third principle, Classicism determining the main classificatory structure, states that 
the Seven Epitomes is not merely a tool for information retrieval but also a cultural artifact with 
an intended authoritative function to provide intellectual guidance for its users oriented on the 
value system of Classicism. Lee (2016, 36) refers to such a purposeful promotion of a particular 
way of thinking or selected worldview as “intellectual activism,” showing what she calls a 
deliberate bias. Classicism or Ru Classicism (Ruxuek or Rujia) is often labeled as Confucianism, 
which is criticized by Lee (2016) for being reductionist and inappropriate since its connotations 
are limited to the followers of Confucius. Classicism in the Former Han dynasty is established by 
the policy of Emperor Wu to compile a canonization of the Classics that build the exclusive object 
of study for pupils of the Imperial Academy. In the following, it will be described in more detail 
how, according to Lee (2016), the ideology of Classicism determines the main structure of the 
Seven Epitomes. 
The canonization of the Classics includes six groups of texts considered to be passed down 
from ancient sage kings, known as the Six Classics. At the same time, these groups of texts 
present the six branches of learning or the Six Arts referring directly to the supreme wisdom of 
the Way (dao), a key concept of traditional Chinese philosophy denoting the proper path in life 
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followed by the sages (cp. Lloyd and Sivin 2002). The Epitome of the Six Arts contains the text 
groups of Odes, Documents, Rites, Music, Changes, as well as Spring and Autumn Annals. Since 
the texts compiled under Music are largely lost in Han times, the corpus is sometimes also 
referred to as the Five Classics. The Classics build the first Divisions of the first Epitome, the Six 
Arts, in which the Division of Changes is placed on top, reflecting the value system of the Han 
times (Lee 2016). Additionally, the Seven Epitomes places the works attributed to Confucius, the 
Analects and the Book of Filial Piety, also in the Epitome of the Six Arts instead of the Epitome 
of the Masters in which these should be expected. This is because the master Confucius is valued 
to be the most important representative of Classicism in Han times. Likewise, the Division of 
Philology completes the Epitome of the Six Arts since these texts are directly concerned with the 
writings of the Classics.  
In comparison to the Classics representing the wisdom of the Way, the texts grouped into 
the second Epitome, the Masters, are considered to be corrupted to some extent, presenting 
only a second-rate and fragmented knowledge of the Way. Following the value system of 
Classicism, the most important writings are considered to be those grouped into the top Division 
of Classicists, followed by other schools of thought ranked according to their decreasing value. 
In contrast to the intellectual diversity in the Warring States era, the Former Han government 
seeks to control the intellectual discourse by dictating a “state-sanctioned ideology” (Lee 2008, 
280). Besides the dominating doctrine of Classicism, which absorbs many elements from other 
traditions resulting in mixed forms like “Yin Yang Confucianism” (Lee 2016, 130), the Han 
government also sustained further ideologies, particularly, Daoism and Legalism. As noted by 
Lee (2016), the Divisions of the Epitome of the Masters do not present mutually exclusive classes 
and entries appear to be arbitrary to some extent.  
The third Epitome, Lyrics and Rhapsodies, includes writings of poets mainly concerned 
with morality and connected to the teachings of the Way. From a Classicist perspective, however, 
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“poetry is not evaluated as belle-lettres” (Lee 2016, 91) and, therefore, ranked lower than the 
Six Arts and the Masters. The last three Epitomes of Military Texts, Divination and Numbers, as 
well as Formulae and Techniques are concerned with more technical and pragmatic-functional 
aspects (e.g., military, astrological/astronomical, and health issues) that cannot be traced back 
to the ancient sage kings, which is why they are even less valued and ranked the lowest in the 
scheme.  
In her analysis of how Classicism determines the main classificatory structure of the Seven 
Epitomes, Lee (2012b) identifies two principal methods, namely, hierarchization and dichotomy. 
The method of hierarchization refers to the principle of subordination in the arrangement of text 
categories and document entries both vertically and horizontally, to follow Lee’s deliberate 
anachronistic use of modern terminology.  
A vertical hierarchy expresses the relation between an Epitome (main class) and its 
subordinated Division (subclass), for example, between the Epitome of the Masters and the 
Division of the Classicists. As emphasized by Lee (2012a, 392), such vertical hierarchies may 
resemble genus-species relations known from taxonomies based on logic but there is no 
evidence that “Liu Xin or his father applied deductive methods to divide the six broad categories 
into subcategories.” It seems to be more likely that the kind of vertical hierarchies of the Seven 
Epitomes presents a “subjective structure, imposed by a Classicist, that emphasizes unique moral 
strength rather than mutual exclusivity of individual categories” (Lee 2012a, 393).  
By comparison, a horizontal hierarchy expresses the subordination between main classes 
or between subclasses within the same class or between entries under the same category. In the 
Seven Epitomes, horizontal hierarchies reflect either the “Classicist moral ladder” (Lee 2016, 
136), as described above, or the “Classicist temporal principle” (Lee 2016, 182) that relates 
document entries in chronological order indicating the intellectual genealogy and the age-
related value of the writings. It should be noted, however, that the metaphor of a ladder 
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illustrates a vertical instead a horizontal relation, showing thus the inadequacy of the modern 
term horizontal hierarchy. The crucial point is that these subordinate relations present value 
rankings from the most to the least important classes or text categories, independent of their 
representation in a horizontal form (see Lee 2016, 173: Figure 5.8) or a vertical form (see Lee 
2016, 159: Figure 5.1). Value rankings, in turn, should not be confused with hierarchies based on 
logical principles like genus-species or part-whole relations. In her analyses, the Classicist value 
rankings prioritize the theoretical over the practical, the broad over the narrow, and the general 
over the particular, and Lee (2016, 139) concludes that “moral hierarchies in Classicist thought 
morph into the structural hierarchies in the classification.” 
The fact that the method of hierarchization presents one of the “signature characteristics 
of Classicism” (Lee 2016, 170) is also reflected by dichotomy as the second principal method. 
Dichotomy means a division into a binary opposition or dualism like origin/end, ruler/minister, 
father/son, or husband/wife. In these traditional Chinese dichotomies, the former part of each 
pair is considered to be superior to the latter part. As emphasized by Lee (2012b), however, 
Chinese dichotomies do not present strict logical binary oppositions because they require no 
assumption of mutual exclusivity. Regarding the six main classes of the Seven Epitomes, Lee 
reconstructs five underlying dichotomies that help to explain the resulting ranked order of the 
Epitomes (see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 The Seven Epitome’s six main classes in ranked order derived from value dichotomies 
(based on Lee 2016, 159: Figure 5.1). 
In Figure 5.1, five value dichotomies are depicted in which the shadowed parts indicate the 
inferior and less valued categories. First, the ideological/labor dichotomy (D1) distinguishes 
between philosophical texts and technical writings, known as the “Classicist Way/vessel 
dichotomy” (Lee 2016, 68). Second, the classic/non-classic dichotomy (D2) distinguishes 
between the more important canonized works of the Classics and those of their followers like 
masters, disciples, and poets. Third, the expository/poetic dichotomy (D3) distinguishes between 
prose writings and works of poetry, the latter with less political functions. Fourth, the 
military/non-military dichotomy (D4) distinguishes between technical writings relevant to 
imperial warfare and other less important technical writings concerned with shamanic practices. 
And fifth, the divinatory/medical dichotomy (D5) distinguishes between texts concerned with 
natural or heavenly phenomena (e.g., astrology/astronomy, chronology, divination) and less 
valued writings dealing with the human body (e.g., medicine, hygienic practices). As outlined in 
detail by Lee (2016), the same method of ranked dichotomization can also be found at the level 
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ranking, even though it can also be depicted vertically, as the ranked main classes of the Seven 
Epitome in Figure 5.1. As characteristics of Classicist thought, hierarchization and dichotomy play 
also a key role in the last two main principles identified by Hur-Li Lee regarding the epistemic 
foundation of the Seven Epitomes. 
The fourth principle, knowledge perceived and organized as a unity, states that the Seven 
Epitomes as knowledge organization system presents a holistic approach to the knowledge 
universe at the time. The traditional Chinese philosophy can be characterized as a “holistic 
worldview” (Lee 2010b, 5) perceiving the world as an organic whole. According to Lee (2010a), 
this way of thinking is extended into all areas of thought in ancient China, including the view 
towards knowledge. Summarizing a consensus of leading sinologists, Lee (2012a, 385 
[excerpted]) highlights five aspects of knowledge in the Classicist tradition:  
 knowledge must be useful, 
 knowledge is unified, not fragmented; 
 knowledge is hierarchical, 
 knowledge is not discrete and thus must be contextual, 
 knowledge is both personal and social.  
This means that knowledge in ancient China is first and foremost related to moral knowledge. It 
is considered to be useful only if it is tied to actions leading to moral consequences. The unity of 
knowledge reflects the unity of the moral world, just as the hierarchy of knowledge reflects the 
hierarchy of the moral world. Knowledge is less concerned with discrete phenomena and 
isolated properties but more concerned with contextual relationships among phenomena. 
Finally, knowing how to act morally concerns not only the individual but also the family and the 
government. Everything is interconnected since the world is perceived as an organic whole. 
Although the classificatory structure of the Seven Epitomes is not comprehensive in its 
scope, it can be regarded as being holistic in the sense that it reflects the Classicist holistic 
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worldview in which all knowledge is related to the supreme wisdom of the Way: “According to 
this point of view, the classification applied in the catalog is a unified scheme that has a focal 
class with five lesser, but unquestionably related classes” (Lee 2010b, 5). Scholars who specialize 
in a single Classic or dwell on interpretations of disjoint characters or phrases are criticized for 
their fragmentary approach. Indeed, Lee (2016, 151) finds “no trace of disciplinary thinking 
anywhere in the catalog.” The ideal of a “unity of knowledge” (Lee 2016, 139) already appears 
to be the guiding principle for the book collation project in which all corrupted texts and the 
multiplicity of text variants are prepared for the “rebuilding of a unified text collection” (Lee 
2016, 140).  
The fifth and last principle, correlative thinking connecting all text categories to a supreme 
knowledge, states that all Epitomes and Divisions of the Seven Epitomes are connected to the 
wisdom of the Way derived from correlative thinking based on associations and analogies rather 
than from analytic thinking based on deductions and inductions. According to Lee (2016, 141) 
this principle is closely related to the holistic worldview:  
Chinese correlative thinking is a way to view the world as a complex system or structure 
consisting of elements that are interrelated with one another. Such thinking is often 
associated with the theories of yin, yang, and the Five Phases. 
Like other Classicist scholars, the creators of the Seven Epitomes, Liu Xiang and Liu Xin, are heavily 
influenced by Yin Yang and Five Phases theories (Lee 2012a). The core idea of Yin Yang theories 
is that the world can be categorized into dualisms of seemingly opposites which appear to be 
complementary, interconnected, and interdependent. The words yang and yin refer to the 
original dualism of bright/dark—literally the sunny/shady sides of a hill (Schwartz 1985)—which 
is then correlated with a broad range of other dualisms like heaven/earth, summer/winter, 
day/night, action/inaction, ruler/minister, man/woman, father/son, older/younger, noble/base, 
giving/receiving, and so on (cp. Graham 1989). The first elements of these pairs are considered 
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to be superior to the second elements but in a relative way that allows the same element to be 
superior in one pair but inferior in another pair (e.g., man/woman but father/son, even if the 
son is already an adult man). Similarly, Five Phases theories correlate different typologies based 
on five categories. For example, five elements (i.e., wood, fire, soil, metal, water) are correlated 
with five seasons (i.e., spring, summer, transitional period, autumn, winter) and five cardinal 
directions (i.e., east, south, center, west, north) (cp. Graham 1989). 
Lee (2012a, 391) argues that “correlative thinking can indeed be detected throughout the 
classification,” whereas little, if any, traces can be found of logical procedures and analytic 
thinking. Even the introductory passages of the Collective Epitome apply “correlative language” 
(Lee 2016, 141) in that the Five Classics are correlated to five norms of conduct, five learnings, 
and the Five Phases themselves. A further example of correlative thinking is that all text 
categories are somehow connected to the Way. Many sectional introductions serve to connect 
diverse text categories, for example, by linking non-classic categories to the Classics, first and 
foremost to Confucius as the most important representative of the Classics. 
In short, the findings of Hur-Li Lee’s socio-epistemological approach demonstrate the 
need for a context-aware analysis that takes the epistemic foundation of a given knowledge 
organization system into account. As a cultural artifact, the Seven Epitomes should be 
understood in terms of its own sociocultural and historical context. Lee (2012b, 75) draws the 
following conclusion:  
The analysis confirmed that the Seven Epitomes is unscientific and illogical in that no 
scientific constructs or logical operations were used to develop the catalog’s structure. 
That by itself, however, is no reason for considering the catalog or its approach as inferior 
or unworthy. On the contrary, the catalog is shown to be a deliberate design that reflects 
the epistemological frame of the time. Even more importantly, the catalog serves the need 
of the throne by binding texts with classicist morality and government functions. 
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5.1.2 A Methodological Critique 
The main argument of this case study is that the socio-epistemological approach to knowledge 
organization, exemplified by Hur-Li Lee’s study on the Seven Epitomes, restricts itself by 
methodological choice to the description of context-specific characteristics, whereas the 
proposed cognitive-developmental approach provides a comparative method that also allows to 
identify and to explain similarities and general regularities across different contexts. Thus, the 
latter helps to deal with the complexity of epistemic pluralism more systematically. However, the 
following methodological critique is not intended to reject the socio-epistemological approach 
in favor of the cognitive-developmental approach but to emphasize their complementary 
character. Indeed, a socio-epistemological analysis should be considered to be a necessary first 
step before a cognitive-developmental analysis.  
Such a methodological extension of the socio-epistemological approach, or domain 
analysis in general, seems to be at least compatible with Lee’s (2010a, 207) own “unique cultural 
perspective.” Even though she emphasizes that her study is “not intended to be a comparison 
between East and West or between the ancient and the modern” (Lee 2016, 80), her monograph 
ends with the outlook that it “will hopefully aid in future comparative studies” (Lee 2016, 237). 
To illustrate the potential added value of the cognitive-developmental approach, Lee’s (2012a, 
379) methodology or “socio-epistemological framework” will be shortly recapitulated. 
The starting point is the assumption that knowledge organization systems, such as the 
Seven Epitomes, are not neutral and objective representations but cultural artifacts that are 
deeply embedded in sociohistorical contexts and intended to serve certain pragmatic purposes. 
To understand the underlying conscious intentions of its creators, the “methodological choice of 
hermeneutics” (Lee 2016, XII) is made in the sense of a “hermeneutic inquiry into the catalog’s 
epistemology and ideology, focusing specifically on the catalog’s knowledge structure” (Lee 
2016, 2). Besides the textual evidence (e.g., fragments of the Seven Résumés, Han Treatise, 
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reconstruction of the Seven Epitomes), Lee’s and Lan’s (2011, 33) “multidimensional framework” 
consults additional sources including biographic material of the catalog’s compilers Liu Xiang and 
Liu Xin, as well as contextual information regarding the intellectual, political, and technological 
history up to the Former Han times. While Lee’s (2016, 32) hermeneutic study rejects the “radical 
interpretive position,” often linked to postmodernist approaches claiming that various 
interpretations of the same text are equally valid, she agrees with Mary Fulbrook’s statement 
that progress in historical understanding is possible. The goal of her study is “to contribute to 
diversification and expansion of classification research” (Lee 2010a, 201) by showing alternatives 
to the prevailing analytic approach to bibliographic classification and thus illuminating the fallacy 
of universality (Lee 2010b). Her study of the culturally and historically distant Seven Epitomes, 
compared to current Western-oriented library classifications, emphasizes the “uniqueness of 
Chinese bibliography” (Lee 2016, 237) as a manifestation of a fundamentally different worldview. 
Against the background of a “cultural multiplicity” (Lee 2010a, 200), she argues that the creators 
of the Seven Epitomes are “neither correct nor incorrect in classifying texts” (Lee 2016, 72) 
because each knowledge organization system needs to be understood within its own context. 
These methodological considerations appear to be limited to some extent. Most 
importantly, the assumption appears to be problematic that differences found between cultures 
can automatically be considered to present genuine culture-specific differences. While in many 
cases this conclusion may be valid, in other cases it might prove premature. For example, Lee’s 
(2010b) distinction between a correlative approach and an analytic approach to classification 
might reflect a cultural difference between China and the West or a historical difference between 
ancient and modern times or even a function of something third. The decisive point is that the 
socio-epistemological approach offers no tools of analysis to verify or falsify such claims. This 
lack often leads to an overemphasis on the uniqueness of a sociohistorical context, as noted by 
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archaeologist Jeremy Tanner (2009, 89) in a comparative study of ancient China and ancient 
Greece: 
The emphasis on the uniqueness of the Classical world was only reinforced by post-
structuralism and post-modernism, which in their strongest forms suggested that cultures, 
like languages, were fundamentally incommensurable, and thus not accessible to outsider 
knowledge, let alone comparable. 
Regarding the example from above, Tanner shows that neither correlative thought is alien to 
Greek culture (e.g., the Pythagorean table of opposites) nor analytic or causal thought is alien to 
the Chinese culture (e.g., the Mohist logic). Instead of hypostatizing divergent cultural 
mentalities, Tanner (2009, 92) considers both ways of thinking as “two potentially available 
modes of cognition in each culture.” With reference to Zong-qi Cai’s comparative methodology, 
Tanner (2009, 104) argues for a combination of “intracultural,” “cross-cultural,” and 
“transcultural” approaches. As a first step, an intracultural analysis should examine a tradition 
in its own terms without imposing the investigator’s perspective upon it. As a second step, a 
cross-cultural analysis should compare the differences and similarities between different 
traditions, avoiding the kind of premature comparisons that describes differences in terms of 
one tradition’s lack of something that is considered to be the core of the other tradition. And 
finally, a transcultural analysis should open a more embracing interpretive horizon in which 
similarities and differences can be seen as context-specific choices from “general potentialities 
given in our ‘common humanity’” (Tanner 2009, 104). According to Tanner (2009, 104), one 
advantage of this comparative methodology is to establish a “long-term developmental 
perspective” that avoids both the particularism of short-term or punctual cultural analyses and 
the cultural essentialism of approaches that neglect the dynamic change of a given tradition. 
From this point of view, Hur-Li Lee’s socio-epistemological approach presents the first step 
of an intracultural analysis that should be complemented by cross-cultural and transcultural 
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perspectives. The proposed cognitive-developmental approach is intended to offer these 
complementary methodological tools. The remainder of this case study will be concerned with 
what Lee (2016, 237) explicitly avoids, that is, a “direct comparison between the Seven Epitomes 
and its modern-day, Western-styled counterparts.” As a prime example of such counterparts, the 
Dewey Decimal Classification will be chosen because it presents a strongly influential and 
currently world-wide spread bibliographic classification that is both modern and Western. The 
applied methodology goes beyond a socio-epistemological analysis in the following ways: 
First, the findings of Lee’s study of the Seven Epitomes (SE) will be compared to the 
characteristics of the Dewey Decimal Classification (DDC) to describe significant differences 
between both classification systems regarding their epistemic foundations. It will be argued that 
Lee’s distinction between a correlative approach and an analytic approach to bibliographic 
classification presents an adequate description of SE and DDC.  
Second, a long-term developmental perspective from ancient to modern times will be 
adopted to take the dynamic changes of both cultural traditions into account. It will be shown 
that the correlative approach can also be found, for example, in Western medieval library 
classifications, whereas the analytic approach is dominating in modern Chinese bibliography and 
cataloging.  
Finally, the similarities and differences of both traditions will be compared against the 
background of the context-independent logic of development that can be found in various 
models of Integrative Levels of Knowing. This method is inspired by the comparative 
developmental approach by Heinz Werner and Bernard Kaplan (1956, 872) and their criticism of 
the cultural relativists:  
The contemporary Humboldtians [i.e., cultural relativists, M.K.] have typically concerned 
themselves with showing the varieties of language patterns in relation to world views. 
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They have presented differences among languages and cultures without raising the 
question of whether these differences are orderable within a developmental sequence. 
Such a comparative analysis requires a methodological shift from empirical pragmatics to formal 
pragmatics, as described in Chapter Three. While the socio-epistemological approach is 
concerned with the uniqueness of a given context using empirical-pragmatic analyses and 
traditional hermeneutics, the cognitive-developmental approach is interested in structural 
isomorphisms and general regularities across contexts using formal-pragmatic analyses and 
depth hermeneutics. Consequently, Lee’s hermeneutic inquiry needs to be complemented by 
Habermas’s hermeneutic reconstructionism that takes also rational reconstructions of context-
independent developmental sequences or ILK models into account. This task requires the 
consultation of additional sources from a broad multidisciplinary field, including developmental 
psychology and developmental sociology, as well as comparative historiography, social 
anthropology, and cultural studies. It will be argued that the correlative approach of the Seven 
Epitomes and the analytic approach of the Dewey Decimal Classification do not simply reflect 
differences of unique sociocultural contexts but can be related to different integrative levels 
within given developmental-logical sequences of human cognition. 
 
5.2 A Comparison of the Seven Epitomes and the Dewey Decimal Classification 
5.2.1 The Correlative Approach and the Analytic Approach to Classification 
Although Hur-Li Lee’s research project on the Seven Epitomes is at pains to avoid cross-cultural 
comparisons between ancient Chinese and modern Western bibliographic classifications, there 
are many explicit hints and starting points for such a task. Frequently, the so-called “Classicist 
bias” (Lee 2016, 135) is contrasted to the “Western bias” (Lee 2016, 30), as the following 
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examples may illustrate. Regarding the explanation of classifications schemes, Lee (2016, 145) 
writes: 
His [Liu Xin’s, M.K.] own explanation of the scheme in the Collective Epitome comprises 
only descriptions and analogies, rather than analyses and syntheses, and his scheme lacks 
taxonomic relations among concepts and categories that are characteristic of the common 
analytic thinking in the West. 
After locating the roots of analytic thinking in ancient Greek epistemology, Lee (2012a, 379) 
explains: 
This analytic approach begins with identification of individual concepts and their 
properties. Concepts are placed into categories according to their shared properties, and 
categories are further aggregated into larger categories according to their shared 
properties. 
Consequently, Lee (2012a, 394) identifies differences in the process of class-building: “Also 
missing from this classification [i.e., the Seven Epitomes, M.K.] is mutual exclusivity required for 
categories – a criterion in the Western classical theory of categories since Aristotle through to 
the mid-twentieth century.” Then Lee (2012a, 392) summarizes: “Whereas taxonomic categories 
form the foundation of Western classification, it is thematic relations that dominate the scheme 
of the Seven Epitomes.”  
Regarding the authorship and authority, Lee (2016, 88) writes: “For the Chinese, who is 
speaking through a text is essential. This view differs from that of many Western thinkers from 
the twentieth century onward.” Lee (2016, 229) further states: 
A notable distinction between the Seven Epitomes and the modern library catalog is the 
former’s clear intent on exerting intellectual authority over the knowledge contents it 
represents. As for the present-day catalog, contemporary mainstream bibliographic 
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theory makes no such claim or even suggestions and describes the catalog in objective 
terms. 
Regarding the fixability or change-orientation of classification schemes, Lee (2016, 235) writes: 
In other words, those classifications [traditional Chinese library catalogs, M.K.] were never 
intended to be forward-looking or hospitable to new topics like their counterparts used in 
modern libraries with ever-growing collections. 
Occasionally, there are even direct references to the Dewey Decimal Classification that is 
characterized, in contrast to the Seven Epitomes, as being a “disciplinary approach of 
universalistic classification” (Lee 2016, 152) with an “explicit statement that its purpose is to 
organize knowledge” (Lee 2016, 133), while exhibiting a “Western male bias” (Lee 2016, 154). 
She also emphasizes that the DDC serves as a role model for many other schemes all around the 
world, including modern library classifications in China like the New Classification Scheme for 
Chinese Libraries. Finally, Lee (2016, 124) concludes that “bibliographic classifications of today 
invariably take an analytical approach.” 
To outline such an analytic approach to classification, the example of the DDC and its 
epistemic foundation will be considered more closely. The Dewey Decimal Classification is 
developed by American librarian and educator Melvin Dewey since 1873 and published three 
years later with the subtitle: A Classification and Subject Index for Cataloguing and Arranging 
the Books and Pamphlets of a Library (Dewey 1876). According to Joan S. Mitchell and Diane 
Vizine-Goetz (2009), the DDC presents a general knowledge organization system that is 
continuously revised and used in 138 countries, applied in over 60 national bibliographies, and 
translated into more than 30 languages. Thus, the DDC can be considered to be the most 
influential and wide-spread library classification in modern times. Since the end of the 19th 
century and during the 20th century, its innovative decimal principle is adopted, for example, by 
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the Universal Decimal Classification (UDC), the Korean Decimal Classification (KDC), the Nippon 
Decimal Classification (NDC), and the Chinese Decimal Classification (CDC) (Šamurin 1977; Yi and 
Jin 1996; Oh 2012).  
The decimal principle means that a classification notation is based on the decimal system 
of Arabic numerals. Accordingly, a classification scheme consists of ten main classes, each of 
them is divided into ten subclasses, which can be divided further into ten sub-subclasses, and so 
on. Dewey divides his scheme into nine main classes or Classes represented by powers of 
hundred (e.g., 100 Philosophy, 200 Theology, 300 Sociology), then into nine subclasses or 
Divisions represented by powers of ten (e.g., 310 Statistics, 320 Political Science, 330 Political 
Economy), and finally into nine sub-subclasses or Sections represented by single-digit numbers 
(e.g., 321 Patriarchal Institutions, 322 Feudal Institutions, 323 Monarchic Institutions). But 
Dewey also uses the ordinary significance of null or the zero power within the decimal system. 
This means that a “0” in the classification notation indicates a placeholder for a class of its own. 
For example, a book with the notation 320 refers to a class that is located in Class 3 and Division 
2 but not restricted by a particular Section (i.e., Political Science in general). Likewise, the 
notation 050 (or short: 50) refers to a very generic class that is not restricted by one of the nine 
main classes but located within the additional Class 0, where it can be found in Division 5 and 
Section 0 (i.e., General Periodicals). The result is a ten-fold hierarchical classification that can be 
further subdivided according to the decimal principle to whatever extent is needed (see Table 
5.4).  
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Table 5.4 Basic classification scheme of the Dewey Decimal Classification (1st edition). 
Class (main class) Division (subclass) 
0   10  Bibliography 
  20  Book Rarities 
  30  General Cyclopedias 
  40  Polygraphy 
  50  General Periodicals 
  60  General Societies 
  70  --- 
  80  --- 
  90  --- 
100 Philosophy 110 Metaphysics 
120 --- 
130 Anthropology 
140 Schools of Psychology 
150 Mental Faculties 
160 Logic 
170 Ethics 
180 Ancient Philosophies 
190 Modern Philosophies 
200 Theology 210 Natural Theology 
220 Bible 
230 Doctrinal Theology 
240 Practical and Devotional 
250 Homiletical and Pastoral 
260 Institutions and Missions 
270 Ecclesiastical History 
280 Christian Sects 
290 Non-Christian Sects 
300 Sociology 310 Statistics 
320 Political Science 
330 Political Economy 
340 Law 
350 Administration 
360 Associations and Institutions 
370 Education 
380 Commerce and Communication 
390 Customs and Costumes 








490 Other Languages 
(continued) 
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Table 5.4 Basic classification scheme of the Dewey Decimal Classification (1st edition). 
Class (main class) Division (subclass) 









600 Useful Arts 610 Medicine 
620 Engineering 
630 Agriculture 
640 Domestic Economy 
650 Communication and Commerce 
660 Chemical Technology 
670 Manufactures 
680 Mechanical Trades 
690 Building 
700 Fine Arts 710 Landscape Gardening 
720 Architecture 
730 Sculpture 














890 Other Languages 
900 History 910 Geography and Description 
920 Biography 
930 Ancient History 
940 Modern Europe 
950 Modern Asia 
960 Modern Africa 
970 Modern North America 
980 Modern South America 
990 Modern Oceanica and Polar Regions 
Source: Based on Dewey (1876, 12). 
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Besides the decimal principle, the structure of the DDC is based on academic disciplines that are 
further divided into fields of study or subjects, except for some general classes in each Division 
that are based on the form of treatment (e.g., 102 Compends, 103 Dictionaries, 104 Essays). 
According to Dewey (1876, 6), the most important guiding principle for bibliographic 
classification is practical usefulness for the users of libraries, which means that each book should 
be put “under the subject to the student of which it would be most useful.” All books on a given 
subject should be found together while the most nearly allied subjects should precede and 
follow. This disciplinary approach, however, is aware of the fact that every subject-based 
classification scheme is forced to put many minor subjects into categories to which they do not 
strictly belong. Therefore, Dewey (1876, 4) makes his premise very clear:  
In all the work, philosophical theory and accuracy have been made to yield to practical 
usefulness. The impossibility of making a satisfactory classification of all knowledge as 
preserved in books, has been appreciated from the first, and nothing of the kind 
attempted. 
From a theoretical point of view, as Dewey admits, the ten-fold division of every discipline or 
subject appears to be quite arbitrary and the decimal principle even tends to “destroy proper 
coordination” (Dewey 1876, 4). For example, the subject Chess owns an entire Section in the 
same way as the subject History of England. But such disadvantages are accepted in favor of the 
simplicity and efficiency of the decimal notation and ten-fold hierarchical structure. The Arabic 
numerals also provide a “mnemonic aid” (Dewey 1876, 5) since they can be written, found, and 
memorized more quickly than traditional classification notations based on letters or 
combinations of letters and numerals. Even more important, the hierarchical structure of the 
classification is itself expressed in the notation, as Mitchell and Vizine-Goetz (2009, 8) observe: 
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For a class within a given hierarchy, the next broader topic will generally be represented 
by a number one digit shorter, and subordinate topics will generally be one digit longer. 
Coordinate topics are usually represented by the same number of digits. 
In this way, the classification notation reflects the “general-to-specific arrangement” (Mitchell 
and Vizine-Goetz 2009, 2) of disciplines or subjects and applies the important principle of 
hierarchical force. This principle means that the features of a given class also apply to its 
subordinate classes, a principle that characterizes genus-species relations. According to Olson 
(2009, 4810), this kind of hierarchy is “the logical result of arranging mutually exclusive 
categories in linear sequences,” that is, from abstract to concrete. The principle of hierarchical 
force also allows that given classes can be further subdivided in the future when their subjects 
are getting more complex and needed to be more specified. Indeed, this is the case in more 
recent versions of the DDC, as the following example taken from the 23rd edition (Dewey 2011) 
shows: 
500 Natural sciences and mathematics 
     510 Mathematics 
          516 Geometry 
               516.3 Analytic geometry 
                    516.37 Metric differential geometries 
                         516.375 Finsler geometry 
In a library catalog, the DDC abandons the principle of absolute location for arranging books on 
shelves in favor of the “relative location” (Dewey 1876, 6) by class numbers that also serve as 
location numbers: “In this system the catalogue and book numbers remain unchanged through 
all changes of shelving, buildings, or arrangement” (Dewey 1876, 8). Furthermore, in contrast to 
the literary warrant of the Seven Epitomes and its limited scope oriented on the imperial library 
collection, the DDC has a general scope and “provides a place for books on all subjects, whether 
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the library has them or not” (Dewey 1876, 43). This helps to explain why, unlike the SE’s basic 
scheme, the DDC’s count of subclasses is independent of the volume count of an individual 
library collection. In other words, both the principle of relative location and the general scope 
allow to use the same bibliographic classification and notation system for any library.  
Another interesting feature of the DDC, as noted by Mitchell and Vizine-Goetz (2009), is 
that some notations in the Divisions and Sections are not used. For example, in the DDC’s 1st 
edition, the Class 100 Philosophy shows neither entries for the Division notation 120 nor entries 
for the Section notations 101, 108, 114-129, and 164-169. The simple fact of the existence of 
empty classes in a bibliographic classification requires a logical conception of an empty set 
having no elements. This indicates not only a significant difference to ancient library catalogs like 
the Seven Epitomes but seems also to conflict with the idea of a unity of knowledge. An empty 
class makes only sense as a placeholder for future knowledge but within ancient China’s closed 
worldview there is no significant future knowledge and everything is connected as an organic 
whole, which is why knowledge is considered to be not discrete and not fragmented. The DDC’s 
lack of unity becomes already apparent by Dewey's disciplinary separation, his forward-looking 
change-orientation, and his privilege of practical usefulness over theoretical accuracy. 
In order to compare the ideological and epistemological foundations of the DDC with Lee’s 
findings regarding the SE, Wayne A. Wiegand (1998) offers a useful analysis of Dewey’s thinking 
and the contextual forces that influences his classification structure. Dewey (1876, 10) admits 
that his nine main classes follow the “inverted Baconian arrangement” of the St. Louis Library 
developed by William T. Harris, and Wiegand (1998) shows further evidence of some influential 
precursors.  
First, Dewey’s decimal principle might be copied from geologist Philipps Blake, who 
organizes an exhibition into ten departments that are each subdivided into ten groups. 
Furthermore, the use of Arabic numerals seems to be influenced by Jacob Schwartz’s system of 
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the New York Mercantile Library in which Arabic numerals are used for first and all subsequent 
divisions. But Wiegand (1998) also suggests that Dewey, as a modern reformer and advocate of 
the metric system, besides his own reform of a simplified English orthography, is already 
convinced of the simplicity, efficiency, and unlimited potential for expansions of the decimal 
principle.  
Second, the adopted main classes from Harris’s system are influenced by the philosophy 
of Georg W. F. Hegel, in which Francis Bacon’s three faculties of the human mind (i.e., memory, 
imagination, reason) and the corresponding three categories of learning (i.e., history, poetry, 
philosophy) are inverted, giving more prominence to philosophy. According to Hope A. Olson 
(2009, 4807), this Bacon-Hegel tradition of classification oriented on the faculties of the human 
mind represents what she calls “epistemological warrant.” According to Rodrigo de Sales and 
Thiago B. Piris (2017, 61), Bacon and Hegel agree that classification can be natural or non-
artificial to some extent and able to represent reality rationally by adopting both “a deductive 
logic (from the general to the specific) and an inductive logic (from the specific to the general).” 
But as emphasized by library historian Evgenij I. Šamurin (1977), Bacon’s idea that the three 
faculties of the human mind build a unity of knowledge is not taken over by Dewey’s 
arrangement of distinct disciplines.  
And third, the main motivation for Dewey’s new system, originally developed for the 
Amherst College Library, is to support the education of students. Wiegand (1998, 183) writes: 
One of the jobs of any nineteenth century institution of higher education was to build 
character, and at Amherst—like most other New England colleges—the building blocks 
used to construct character came from a combination of Protestant orthodoxy and 
Western culture and classics. The curriculum was designed to communicate universal 
truths already known and unquestioned, not to expose students to contemporary political 
issues or even to sample contemporary literature. 
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According to Wiegand (1998, 183), Dewey’s cultural milieu and its worldview can be 
characterized as a patriarchal White Western and Christian “Anglo-Saxonism” that highly values 
an objective and rational approach to knowledge. Similarly, Jens-Erik Mai (1999, 547) takes 
Dewey as an example of the “modern belief” that is characterized, in contrast to postmodern 
views, as a belief in the possibility to create an objective and neutral knowledge organization 
system.  
These considerations allow a more direct comparison of the Seven Epitomes and the 
Dewey Decimal Classification, as depicted in Table 5.5 in which Hur-Li Lee’s five main principles 
are taken as points of reference. 
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Table 5.5 Comparison of the Seven Epitomes and the Dewey Decimal Classification. 
Seven Epitomes Dewey Decimal Classification 
1. Literary warrant Epistemological warrant 
          Limited scope of imperial library collection           General scope of all knowledge in books 
          Count of subclasses depends on volume count            Count of subclasses independent of volume count 
2. Government functions Educational institution functions 
          Catalog’s intent on exerting intellectual authority           Describing catalog in objective terms 
          Main classes related to imperial offices           Main classes based on academic disciplines 
3. Worldview of Ru Classicism in Han times (China) Worldview of Anglo-Saxonism in 19th century (USA) 
          Holistic worldview (closed)           Scientific worldview (open) 
          Unscientific, illogical           Scientific, logical 
4. Unity of knowledge Separate disciplines or fields of study 
          Organization based on thematic relations           Organization based on taxonomic categories 
          Hierarchy as value ranking           Hierarchy as genus-species relation 
          Fixed and stable scheme            Change-oriented scheme 
          No empty classes           Empty classes possible 
5. Correlative thinking Analytic thinking 
          Explanation based on description and analogy            Explanation based on analyses and syntheses 
          Reasoning based on association and analogy           Reasoning based on deduction and induction 
          Categorization based on relationships           Categorization based on isolated properties 
          Overlapping classes           Mutual exclusive classes 
          No strict class inclusion           Logical class inclusion (hierarchical force) 
          Principle of value dichotomy           Decimal principle 
 
Besides the differences regarding functional aspects, such as the purpose of the library 
(government functions versus educational institution functions) and the scope of the 
bibliographic classification (literary warrant versus epistemological warrant), the most important 
differences between SE and DDC can be found in the structural aspects of the underlying ways 
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of thinking or worldviews. As noted by Lee (2012a; 2016), the holistic worldview characteristic 
for China during the Han dynasty and the conception of knowledge as a unity are derived from 
correlative thinking. In the same way, one might suggest that the scientific worldview 
characteristic for the West during the second half of the 19th century and the disciplinary 
approach to knowledge organization are derived from analytic thinking. Indeed, Hur-Li Lee’s 
distinction between correlative and analytic ways of thinking can be considered to be an 
adequate description of the most significant differences between the epistemic foundations of 
SE and DDC. 
This correlative/analytic distinction can also be found in different terminology in 
knowledge organization discourse. For example, Elin Jacob (2004) distinguishes between 
categorization and classification, and Uta Priss (2001) distinguishes between associative 
representation and formal representation. For Jacob (2004), a classification system is constituted 
by a hierarchical structure of well-defined and mutually exclusive classes arranged as genus-
species relations, whereas a system of categorization consists of variable clusters of entities or 
overlapping classes that may or may not form hierarchical structures (see Table 5.6). 
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Table 5.6 The correlative/analytic distinction according to Elin Jacob. 
 Categorization Classification 
Process Creative synthesis of entities based on 
context or received similarity 
Systematic arrangement of entities based on 
analysis of necessary and sufficient 
characteristics 
Boundaries Because membership in any group is non-
binding, boundaries are “fuzzy” 
Because classes are mutually-exclusive and 
non-overlapping, boundaries are fixed 
Membership Flexible: Category membership is based 
on generalized knowledge and/or 
immediate context 
Rigorous: an entity either is or is not a 
member of a particular class based on the 
intension of a class 
Criteria for assignment Criteria both context-dependent and 
context-independent 
Criteria are predetermined guidelines or 
principles 
Typicality Individual members can be ranked-
ordered by typicality (graded structure) 
All members are equally representative 
(ungraded structure) 
Structure Clusters of entities; may form hierarchical 
structure 
Hierarchical structure of fixed classes 
Source: Based on Jacob (2004, 528). 
According to Jacob (2004), both systems have advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, 
systems of categorization are much more flexible and responsive to the context of use but they 
tend to prohibit the establishment of meaningful relationships between classes due to their 
fleeting and ephemeral character. On the other hand, classification systems are rather resilient 
to the context of use due to the rigidity of structure but they better serve as a means for the 
accumulation, storage, and communication of knowledge or information. Jacob (2004, 530) 
writes: 
The structure of a classification system provides a powerful cognitive tool—an external 
scaffolding—that minimizes the cognitive load on the individual by embedding 
information about reality through the organization of classes within the system. 
Priss (2001) considers her distinction between associative and formal representations as similar 
to Jacob’s distinction between categorization and classification. For her, the important difference 
is that even formal concepts are not always required to be mutually exclusive. In contrast to tree 
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hierarchies, concept lattices consist of formal concepts based on precise definitions while they 
can still be overlapping. For example, the concepts of dog and pet can be formally defined but 
their related classes of objects are overlapping since not all but some dogs are pets while not all 
but some pets are dogs. Her version of the correlative/analytic distinction is depicted in Table 
5.7.  
Table 5.7 The correlative/analytic distinction according to Uta Priss. 
 Associative Formal 
Concepts are … Fuzzy Precise 
Generated by Emergence, Gestalt laws, bottom-up Abstraction, design, top-down 
Extensional features Prototypes, exemplars Set of “objects” 
Intentional features Stereotypes, image schemata, family 
resemblance 
Formal definitions, formal logic rules 
Relations Association, similarity, contiguity, co-
occurrence 
Is a-hierarchy/lattice, logical, formal, causal 
Reasoning Association, induction, clustering Inference, deduction, classification 
Representation Subsymbolic, emergent Symbolic, designed by humans 
In a context that is Associative, local Formal, general 
Systems are Probabilistic, dynamic, micro-level, 
continuous, “chaotic” 
Correct, complete, macro-level, discrete 
Metaphors Biologically inspired (neural networks, 
evolution) 
Information processing 
Implementations Fuzzy logic, learning-based Formal logic, algorithmic, modular 
Source: Based on Priss (2001, 54: Table 1). 
Both Jacob (2004) and Priss (2001) criticize the limited focus of classification research on formal 
concepts or logical classes. With reference to cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch and her 
theory on prototypes in human cognition, Priss (2001) considers associative representation and 
formal representation as two complementary forms since the human mind combines both types 
of representation and seems to be able to shift between them seamlessly. Therefore, Priss (2001, 
60) argues for more encompassing “multilevel approaches” to concepts and knowledge 
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organization systems that take both sides of the associative/formal distinction (i.e., 
correlative/analytic distinction) into account.  
This appears to be important for cultural comparisons of knowledge organization systems. 
With reference to cross-cultural studies in linguistics, Priss (2001, 59) emphasizes existing 
“cultural differences in the degree of formality of concepts.” Findings show that the use of formal 
concepts is less prevalent in cultures without a tradition of writing compared to cultures with a 
writing system. This suggests that the correlative/analytic distinction presents a structural 
difference of ways of thinking or forms of knowing that is not per se culture-specific but 
characteristic for two fundamental modes of cognition that are potentially available to the 
human mind in general, depending on specific technological or civilizational achievements. In 
the following section, these two approaches to classification will be considered from a cognitive-
developmental perspective. 
 
5.2.2 Classificatory Cognition and Integrative Levels of Knowing 
In characterizing the correlative/analytic distinction, Lee (2010b; 2012a; Lee and Lan 2011) draws 
heavily on similar distinctions made by cognitive psychologists like Lawrence W. Barsalou (1992) 
and Steven A. Sloman (1996), as well as cultural psychologists like Richard E. Nisbett (2003) or 
Emma E. Buchtel and Ara Norenzayan (2009). This already indicates the importance of 
psychological approaches to classification or classificatory cognition for a deeper understanding 
of knowledge organization systems in their epistemic contexts.  
The term classificatory cognition is intended here to embrace those cognitive aspects that 
are involved in the creation of knowledge organization systems, including classification systems 
that express themselves in language or other collective representations. Thus, classificatory 
cognition encompasses several distinct domains of cognition, most importantly, logico-
mathematical operations (e.g., class-building, class-inclusion, identity, complementarity, 
transitivity) but also concept formation (e.g., categorization, prototype-building, 
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intension/extension coordination, genus-species relations), and further cognitive domains that 
constitute a broader worldview (e.g., symbolic representation, differentiation of validity spheres, 
moral judgment).  
According to Lee (2010b; 2012a; 2012b), correlative thinking can be related to associative 
thinking and thematic thinking, as described in psychological literature. She refers, for example, 
to Sloman’s distinction between associative and rule-based cognitive systems (see Table 5.8).  
Table 5.8 The correlative/analytic distinction according to Steven A. Sloman. 
Characteristic Associative system Rule-based system 
Principles of operation Similarity and contiguity Symbol manipulation 
Source of knowledge Personal experience Language, culture, and formal systems 
Nature of representation   
   Basic units Concrete and generic concepts, images, 
stereotypes, and feature sets 
Concrete, generic, and abstract 
concepts; abstracted features; 
compositional symbols 
   Relations Associations Causal, logical, and hierarchical 
Soft constraints Hard constraints 
Nature of processing Reproductive but capable of similarity-
based generalization 
Productive and systematic 
Overall feature computation and 
constraint satisfaction 
Abstraction of relevant features 
Automatic Strategic 
Illustrative cognitive functions Intuition Deliberation 
Fantasy Explanation 
Creativity Formal analysis 
Imagination Verification 
Visual recognition Ascription of purpose 
Associative memory Strategic memory 
Source: Based on Sloman (1996, 7: Table). 
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Likewise, she refers to Barsalou’s distinction between thematic and taxonomic relations, in which 
the former is characteristic for cognitive frames or schemata that “represent spatial, temporal, 
causal, and intentional relations between entities and events in familiar situations” (Barsalou 
quoted in Lee 2012a, 392). In his cross-cultural study of Asian and Western ways of thinking, 
Nisbett (2003), to whom Lee also refers, provides rich material to illustrate the difference 
between thematic and taxonomic relations. A simple example is presented by a sorting task of 
three items like monkey, panda, and banana. While American participants show a preference for 
grouping based on common category membership in that panda and monkey belong to the same 
broader category of animal, Chinese participants show a preference for grouping based on 
thematic relationships in that monkey and banana belong together since monkeys eat bananas. 
Similar findings are described by Buchtel and Norenzayan (2009, 224) who distinguish between 
holistic and analytic forms of understanding: “East Asian cultures were most likely to use family 
resemblance than the single attribute as method of classification.” 
Although Lee equates correlative thinking to associative or thematic thinking described in 
psychology, it should be noted that she only refers to approaches that are concerned with 
synchronic analyses at the expense of a diachronic or developmental perspective. For example, 
Nisbett’s (2003, XX) The Geography of Thought assumes that both Western and Eastern 
orientations present “a self-reinforcing, homeostatic system.” Such a marginalization of dynamic 
change suggesting that significant differences in the way of thinking are merely the result of 
geography, that is, spatial or cultural distance, should be compensated by something that one 
might call The History of Thought that also takes long-term developments and alternative trends 
within cultural traditions into account.  
In this section, it will be argued that the correlative approach and the analytic approach 
to classification can be related to different cognitive-developmental stages, as reconstructed by 
various domain-specific models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (cp. Kleineberg 2012). This 
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means that non-developmental conceptions of the correlative/analytic distinction should be 
complemented by developmental conceptions, and this for both the individual and the collective 
dimension (see Table 5.9). 
 
Table 5.9 Non-developmental and developmental conceptions of the correlative/analytic distinction. 
 Correlative approach Analytic approach Reference 
Non-developmental 
Individual Prototype classification Logical classification Rosch (1983) 
Thematic organization Hierarchical organization Barsalou (1992) 
Associative representation Formal representation Priss (2001) 
Categorization Classification Jacob (2004) 
Holistic thinking Analytic thinking Buchtel and Norenzayan (2009) 
Collective Emblematic thinking Analytic thinking Granet ([1934] 1985) 
Episteme of resemblance Episteme of representation Foucault ([1966] 1970) 
Symbolic classification Hierarchical classification Needham, R. (1979) 
Thematic relationships Taxonomic categories Nisbett (2003) 
Correlative thinking Analytic thinking Lee (2010b) 
Developmental 
Individual Complex Concept Vygotsky ([1934] 1986) 
Concrete classification Abstract classification Werner and Kaplan (1956) 
Collection (preoperational) Class (operational) Inhelder and Piaget (1964) 
Graphic grouping Categorical classification Luria ([1974] 1976) 
Resemblance sorting Hierarchical classification Hoppe, et al. (1977) 
Collective Mythic class-building Empirical-theoretical class-building Cassirer ([1925] 1955b) 
Complexive classification Hierarchical classification Hallpike (1979) 
Archaic classification Logical-conceptual classification Klix ([1980] 1993) 
Correlative thinking Analytic thinking Graham (1989) 
Correlative thinking Analytic thinking Bodde (1991) 
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It is important to note that even many non-developmental conceptions of the 
correlative/analytic distinction emphasize the fact that neither correlative thinking is restricted 
to the Chinese tradition nor analytic thinking to the Western tradition, as cultural essentialists 
like the sinologist Marcel Granet (1985) and his hypostatization of a genuine Chinese thought 
might suggest. For example, for the individual dimension, cognitive psychologist Eleanor Rosch’s 
(1983) prototype classification, stating that categorization is graded and some subclasses are 
more central than others based on their similarity to a prototype or exemplar, can be found not 
only in East-Asia but all around the world. In fact, she originally identifies this form of human 
categorization in her research with samples of Westerners. Likewise, for the collective 
dimension, social anthropologist Rodney Needham (1979, 32) emphasizes that symbolic 
classification, taking the Chinese Yin Yang theory as a prime example, can be found at all periods 
in history and in every part of the world:  
Ethnographically, it is very remarkable that civilizations most distant from each other in 
time and space should have constructed practically identical dual classifications, 
composed of such standard oppositions as right/left, male/female, strong/weak, 
superior/inferior, light/dark, and so on. 
In contrast to hierarchical classification, symbolic classification is based on symbolic classes that 
exhibit connections by analogy and do not need to be mutually exclusive. Members of a symbolic 
class do not necessarily share common features and a symbolic classification does not require 
genus-species relations. Interestingly, Needham (1979, 70) identifies both classification systems 
even within one and the same cultural tradition: 
The history of Europe alone shows that symbolic classification disintegrates or is very 
much reduced in scope in the face of scientific and technological advance. The medieval 
Englishmen lived in a civilization in which not only his religious life but even the way he 
plowed his fields was ordered by symbolic directives. The modern farmer acts within a 
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pragmatic classification of the world, in terms of metereology, soil chemistry, the 
capacities of his machines. 
Similarly, Michel Foucault (1970) distinguishes between two discourse formations in European 
history, the episteme of resemblance during the Middle Ages and Renaissance followed by the 
episteme of representation. In line with the characteristics of correlative thinking, he presents 
examples of the episteme of resemblance like hierarchies of analogy (e.g., continuous 
connection between plants, animals, and man) and total systems of correspondence (e.g., 
microcosm/macrocosm, theory of four elements). In contrast, the episteme of representation is 
exemplified by classification in natural history (e.g., Carl Linnaeus’ Systema Naturae) and analysis 
in terms of identity, difference, inference, and proof by comparison, in one word, by rationalism. 
It is also important to note that from a methodological point of view non-developmental 
conceptions to the correlative/analytic distinction can only describe individual, cultural, or 
historical similarities and differences of classificatory cognition but are not able to explain them. 
For example, they cannot explain why the correlative approach characteristic of ancient China 
can also be found in various other cultures. Likewise, they cannot explain why within one and 
the same cultural tradition like the European West both the correlative and the analytic approach 
can be found in different historical epochs, or even at the same time but in different social strata 
or under otherwise different circumstances.  
This is what, for example, Foucault (1970) freely admits in his pure descriptive approach 
and what forces him to conclude that the transitions from one episteme to another are merely 
based on historical contingency. Even Rodney Needham’s (1979) hints to the scientific and 
technological advance remain rather vague and cannot explain the structural transformation 
from symbolic classification to hierarchical classification, as part of a broader change of 
worldview. Therefore, approaches based on mere descriptions of contextual differences may 
acknowledge epistemic pluralism but are itself in danger to lead to epistemic relativism, as 
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analyzed in Chapter Two, taking the form of cognitive relativism (individual dimension), cultural 
relativism (synchronic collective dimension), and historical relativism (diachronic collective 
dimension). 
Instead, developmental conceptions to the correlative/analytic distinction do not only 
describe contextual differences but can also explain them by taking recourse to rational 
reconstructions of learning processes in terms of stage or level sequences and their underlying 
logic of development. Anthropologist Donald E. Brown (1991, 46) calls such evolutionary or 
developmental sequences “implicational universals” because they imply a logical order of 
universal validity. He gives the example that the locomotive can only emerge after the wheel. 
This does neither mean that locomotives nor wheels exist in all cultures but that whoever wants 
to learn how to construct a locomotive, needs to learn first how to construct a wheel since the 
latter constitutes an integral part of the former. Brown (1991) rejects the simplifying assumption 
that universals can only be found in human biology, whereas human culture shows unavoidably 
variation. Indeed, developmental-logical sequences of Integrative Levels of Knowing present 
such implicational universals and offer thus a comparative framework that, to the extent that 
the underlying rational reconstructions are valid, is not itself context-dependent.  
In the following, it will be argued that the correlative approach to classificatory cognition 
presents a developmental-logically earlier stage or level compared to the analytic approach. But 
it should be clear that this presumed logic of development says nothing about the chronological 
appearance of these approaches in history or individual biographies. On one hand, the dynamics 
of development is not predictable and can sometimes show regressive trends regarding cognitive 
abilities. On the other hand, developmental levels of knowing are integrative and preserve 
earlier cognitive abilities that can determine the dominant way of thinking under certain 
circumstances. 
226 
 For a long time, the characteristics of correlative thinking are described by ethnographers, 
anthropologists, historians, and psychologists under a developmental perspective, often using a 
terminology like archaic, magical, mythic, primitive, or pre-modern mentality or worldview, in 
contrast to a modern worldview characterized as a more rational, logical, scientific, or reflexive 
one (Stern 1893; Wundt 1916; Lévy-Bruhl 1923; Frazer 1927; Kelsen 1946; Werner 1948; 
Frankfort 1951; Redfield 1953; Cassirer 1955b; Huizinga 1975; Hallpike 1979; Gurevich 1985). 
But this kind of terminology is highly problematic for at least two main reasons. First, terms like 
primitive bear undoubtedly pejorative connotations. Even though many authors use these terms 
according to their etymology in a strictly technical sense to denote the early stages of 
development, such a use of language should be avoided or at least reflected on today (for 
thoughtful discussions see Werner and Kaplan 1956; Barnes 2000; Hallpike 2011). And second, 
terms like pre-modern tend to conflate chronological and developmental-logical aspects. 
Temporal terms like pre-modern and modern (or postmodern, for that matter) define certain 
epochs in the chronology of history but appear to be inappropriate to denote levels of cognitive 
development. For example, since correlative thinking is still alive in contemporary societies, as 
many authors emphasize, it would be misleading to define this as a pre-modern phenomenon. 
Likewise, since analytic thinking can be found in ancient times, as the Mohist school in China or 
Aristotle in the West exemplify, it would be misleading to define this as a modern phenomenon. 
From a methodological point of view, the differentiation between chronological and 
developmental-logical aspects is of utmost importance for developmental conceptions to the 
correlative/analytic distinction. As argued above, a mere description of ways of thinking in 
relation to their sociocultural context and historical change is insufficient to rationally 
reconstruct the underlying logic of development that alone might offer an explanation of the 
structural transformation from correlative thinking to analytic thinking. Therefore, 
developmental conceptions that take recourse to already existing rational reconstructions of 
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classificatory cognition appear to be the most promising methodological tools for cross-cultural 
comparisons. In the following, such developmental-logical approaches are described in more 
detail. 
A rich source is presented by social anthropologist Christopher R. Hallpike (1979) who 
investigates the thinking and collective representations of contemporary indigenous cultures, 
with a special focus on classificatory cognition. He adopts a comparative perspective and refers 
extensively to developmental psychology, particularly, to the traditions of Jean Piaget and Lev S. 
Vygotsky. In correspondence to the correlative/analytic distinction, Hallpike (1979, 178–79) 
distinguishes two modes of classificatory cognition that he calls “complexive classification” and 
“taxonomic classification.”  
The complexive classification is named after Vygotsky’s phrase “thinking in complexes,” 
that characterizes a developmental stage in his model of concept formation leading from 
syncretism to thinking in complexes or pseudoconcepts to protoconcepts to true concepts (see 
Appendix B: Table B.44). In contrast to the first stage of syncretism in which the child puts objects 
together in an unorganized congeries or heap because subjective impressions are mistaken for 
real relations, the second stage of thinking in complexes enables a kind of grouping in which the 
objects are defined by objective factors, such as appearance, use, association, and function.  
For Vygotsky (1986), family names present a prime example of complexes. Just like family 
names subsume individuals that belong together into separate families, complexes subsume 
individual elements like objects, events, or phenomena that belong together into separate 
complexes. The bonds between elements of a complex are concrete and factual rather than 
abstract and logical, while any factually present connection, association, or analogy may lead to 
the inclusion of an element into a given complex. Obviously, the idea of thinking in complexes 
anticipates Wittgenstein’s (2010, 36) idea of “family resemblances,” in which different language 
games (complexes) subsume communicatively used words or concepts (elements) that belong 
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together, even though the underlying family resemblance cannot strictly be defined by a set of 
common properties. 
According to Vygotsky (1986), there are different types of complexes, most importantly, 
the associative complex, the functional complex, and the chain complex. The most elementary 
type, the associative complex, is based on mental associations where the underlying criteria for 
the inclusion of an element are not defined by a single criterion but by a thematic relatedness. 
For example, a complex can include such elements as a bird, a bush, a house, and a car based on 
the common association that a bird sits on a bush, a bush grows next to a house, and a car parks 
outside a house. According to Hallpike (1979, 203), associative complexes are typical for 
indigenous cultures that “tend to classify their universe into ‘realms’ such as ‘things of the forest’, 
‘things of the village’, ‘things of the sea’, and so on.” Associative complexes present what Lee 
(2010b) refers to as groupings based on thematic relationships. In the Seven Epitomes, the 
Epitome of Six Arts, for example, can be considered to be an associative complex that groups 
documents together based on their direct association to the supreme wisdom of the Way, 
despite their above described different nature.  
The next type, the functional complex, is based on functional complementarities between 
elements based on their participation in a practical operation. For example, items like cups, 
saucers, and spoons, or different items of clothes complement each other, while serving the 
same function, such as drinking or dressing. Functional complexes present what Lee (2016) refers 
to as correlative thinking exemplified by Five Phases theories. Each typology of five categories, 
such as five seasons (i.e., spring, summer, transitional period, autumn, winter) and five cardinal 
directions (i.e., east, south, center, west, north), groups elements that complement each other 
with regard to the same function, such as periodization or spatial orientation. In the Seven 
Epitomes, the typology of the Five Classics, for example, seems to echo this principle. A further 
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example is presented by the principle of government functions that is more important than 
topical similarity to group documents. 
Finally, the purest type of thinking in complexes, according to Vygotsky (1986), is 
presented by the chain complex that is built by a dynamic and consecutive joining of individual 
links into a single chain. For example, when a child is given a yellow triangular block as original 
sample and asked to pick other blocks that are alike, the child may pick a few triangular blocks 
but after a while, the child’s focus of attention can switch to the blue color of the block just 
added and then the child picks blue blocks regardless of the shape for a while, before the 
criterion of selection may change again. This is because a new element enters the complex with 
all its attributes since single properties like color or shape are not yet abstracted from the 
element. Consequently, each attribute of the new element can be a potential new criterion that 
is equally important as the original criterion for the inclusion of further elements into the 
complex, resulting in new links into an ever-growing chain. Chain complexes present what Lee 
(2016) refers to as correlative thinking exemplified by Yin Yang theories. Each dualism like 
heaven/earth, summer/winter, day/night, or ruler/minister, man/woman, father/child 
constitutes a single link within the chain complex of Yin Yang derived from an attribute that may 
have something in common with a previous link but not necessarily with the whole chain. This 
type of grouping is aptly called “classificatory current” by Rodney Needham (1979, 67) and 
described as an indefinitely extendable “stream of correlation” by sinologist Agnus C. Graham 
(1989, 322). 
In general, the distinctive characteristic of all thinking in complexes, according to Vygotsky 
(1986), is that a complex, unlike a true concept, does not rise above its elements in the sense of 
abstraction but merges with the concrete objects, events, or phenomena that compose it. This 
means a fusion of the complex and its elements, the general and the particular. Consequently, 
the pattern of reasoning is neither inductive (i.e., from particular to general) nor deductive (i.e., 
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from general to particular) but transductive (i.e., from particular to particular). As Hallpike (1979, 
15–16) put it: 
Transductive reasoning ignores either the whole in favour of the parts (juxtaposition) or 
the parts in favour of the whole (syncretism) because the child is unable to think 
simultaneously of the parts as separate things and of the relations that unite them into 
larger wholes. 
The concept of “transduction” denoting a kind of reasoning that lacks logical necessity is coined 
by Piaget (1977, 106) who ascribes the invention of the term to William Stern. The underlying 
analogical reasoning (Analogieschluss) is analyzed by Stern (1893, 71 [my translation from 
German, M.K.]) in this way: 
Premises: M has property P. 
S equals M in properties a, b, c … 
Conclusion: Therefore, S probably also has property P. 
For Stern, this analogical reasoning builds the foundation of mythological thinking in that, for 
example, external natural processes are transductively correlated to those of the human body 
or human behavior, as known from the principles of personification and anthropomorphism. 
Similar examples of transduction that move from particular to particular are also described early 
by ethnographers and anthropologists, for example, by Lucien Lévy-Bruhl (1923, 35) as “mystic 
participation” (participation mystique), and by James G. Frazer (1927, 223) as “sympathetic 
magic” based on the law of similarity and law of contact. According to Richard A. Shweder (1977, 
648), this so-called magical thinking, which he also identifies in everyday thought, “is inductive 
in its intent but mistaken in its conclusion.” He argues that this leads typically to a confusion of 
propositions about the world and propositions about language, that is, a confusion of co-
occurrence likelihood (empirical relationship) and likeness or resemblance (conceptual 
affiliation). 
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Vygotsky (1986, 128) observes some structural similarities of this kind of reasoning, often 
referred to as “participation,” in indigenous cultures, children, and mentally ill people, illustrated 
by examples from the works of Jean Piaget, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and Alfred Storch. Participation 
means a relation of partial identity or close interdependence between two or more objects, 
events, or phenomena that have no recognizable connection (cp. Appendix B: Table B.46; 
Appendix C: Table C.2). A famous example is that the members of the Bororo tribe of Brazil claim 
to be red parrots, not merely in the sense of a common name or a relationship but as a matter 
of identity and belonging together. For Vygotsky (1986), the phenomenon of participation can 
be explained by the principles of thinking in complexes based on pseudoconcepts instead of true 
concepts. In complex thinking, a given element can be included simultaneously in different 
complexes based on its different concrete attributes. Consequently, one and the same element 
can have several names or identities, depending on the complex that is activated at the time. In 
opposition to true concepts defined by a common set of abstracted properties, pseudoconcepts 
refer to a “family name for a group of concrete objects belonging together, not logically, but 
factually” (Vygotsky 1986, 129). Thus, the idea of belonging together is markedly different in 
thinking based on complexes compared to thinking based on concepts.   
The same conclusion is drawn by Inhelder and Piaget (1964) in their investigation of the 
growth of logico-mathematical thinking with a focus on classificatory cognition in children (see 
Appendix B: Tables B.36, B.37). Inhelder and Piaget (1964, 8) distinguish strictly between “class 
membership” and “partitive membership” or “schematic membership,” a distinction that 
Hallpike (1979, 179) refers to as “similarity” and “belonging.”  
Class membership is a relation between an element x and the class A in which it is a 
member, while class A is defined by the inclusion of all the elements having property a and only 
elements having property a. For example, the individual dog called Fido is a member of the 
general class of all dogs because he exhibits all necessary and sufficient properties attributed to 
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dogs like being a domesticated carnivorous mammal, originating from wolves, having an acute 
sense of smell, a barking voice, and so on. In contrast, partitive membership is a relation in which 
an element x is only a spatial part or piece of a whole, like a nose belongs to the face. In a similar 
way, schematic membership is a relation in which an element x is identified with a perceptual or 
sensori-motor schema based on assimilation by recognition, like a dog that is recognized as such 
based on previous experiences and the resemblance to a mental image of a prototypical dog. 
The crucial point, according to Inhelder and Piaget (1964), is that the understanding of class 
membership requires the cognitive-developmental competence to use concrete operations, 
whereas the understanding of partitive or schematic membership is also possible at a 
preoperational level since it is primarily based on perception (see Appendix B: Table B.37).  
Therefore, Inhelder and Piaget (1964, 49) distinguish between an abstract logical “class” 
and a perception-based pre-logical “collection.” They argue that there is an important difference 
between the division of a collection into subcollections compared to the division of a class into 
subclasses since only the latter implies a hierarchical structure of class-inclusion. This 
class/collection distinction, which will be described below in more detail, is important for an 
understanding of the structure of the Seven Epitomes because its subunits, the Divisions, 
apparently do not present subclasses in the logical sense but merely subcollections that lack the 
principle of class-inclusion and, therefore, the principle of hierarchical force. A further difference 
between class and collection is that a singular class containing only one element and an empty 
class without any elements at all contradict the idea of a collection which is always perceived as 
a group of elements. According to Inhelder and Piaget (1964), the use of singular classes requires 
concrete-operational cognition, whereas the use of empty classes even requires formal-
operational cognition that is able to abstract from concrete items and allows hypothetical 
reasoning. Thus, the lack of logical operations that Lee identifies for the Seven Epitomes seems 
to indicate that this classification is primarily based on preoperational thinking, a level of 
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cognition that is not sufficient yet to exhibit features like the decimal principle based on class-
inclusion and hierarchical force, or the possibility of empty classes, as known from the Dewey 
Decimal Classification. 
Inhelder and Piaget (1964) argue that the central problem in the development of 
classificatory cognition is the understanding of class-inclusion which requires the coordination 
of intension and extension. While the qualitative term intension means the set of necessary and 
sufficient properties that define a concept or a class, the quantitative term extension refers to 
the total number of elements that are denoted by a concept or included as members of a class. 
The decisive point is that such a logically defined class can never be perceived as such because 
it generally has an indefinite extension. For example, one can recognize an individual dog as a 
dog based on schematic membership but this involves only intension without consideration of 
extension since one cannot see or otherwise perceive all elements that belong to the class of 
dogs, including those that existed in the past or will exist in future. Instead, the understanding 
of a logical class requires to abstract from spatio-temporal conditions and to apply cognitive 
operations beyond mere perceptions.  
As described in Chapter Four, Piaget (1977, 354) defines operations as “internalized 
actions that become reversible,” which means thought processes that transform a state A into a 
state B leaving at least one property invariant throughout the transformation and allowing the 
reverse operation from B to A. As also described in Chapter Four, the example of transformed 
balls of clay demonstrates that at a preoperational level such transformations are conceived 
without any conservation, which makes it impossible to return to the point of departure. The 
required new cognitive abilities for this task emerge first at the level of operational thinking and 




Figure 5.2 Hierarchy of classes (based on Hallpike 1979, 20: Figure 2). 
 
From the hierarchy of classes in Figure 5.2, which presents the foundation of hierarchical or 
logical classification, can be derived a series of a priori and logically necessary relations that are 
independent of experience or perception. These logical relations constitute an integrated system 
of transformations, as listed by Hallpike (1979, 21): 
A < B < C; A < C 
C > B > A; C > A 
B  �< 𝐶𝐶 > 𝐴𝐴 
B > A 
A + A' = B, therefore A = B - A', A' = B - A 
All B  is some C 
Some B  is all A 
A + A' + B = B, or B + B = B 
Operational thinking allows, for example, to understand relations of transitivity (e.g., if 𝐴𝐴 < 𝐵𝐵 <
𝐶𝐶, then 𝐴𝐴 < 𝐶𝐶), complementarity and reversibility (e.g., 𝐴𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴′ = 𝐵𝐵, therefore 𝐴𝐴 = 𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴′ and 
𝐴𝐴′ = 𝐵𝐵 − 𝐴𝐴), identity (e.g., 𝐴𝐴 + 𝐴𝐴′ + 𝐵𝐵 = 𝐵𝐵 or 𝐵𝐵 + 𝐵𝐵 = 𝐵𝐵) and, most importantly, class-
inclusion (e.g., All 𝐵𝐵 is some 𝐶𝐶 and some 𝐵𝐵 is all 𝐴𝐴). The achievement of these operations 
indicates a milestone in the development of hierarchical categorization in children (Hoppe, 
Schmid-Schönbein, and Seiler 1977; Blewitt 1994; Müller, Sokol, and Overton 1999). According 






milestone marks two main cognitive-developmental stages, first the ability to form categories at 
different levels of generality, and second the ability to include the same object into multiple 
categories. The more advanced stage of development can also be characterized by the ability to 
apply the “multiple membership rules” and “inclusion rules” (Kofsky quoted in Hoppe, Schmid-
Schönbein, and Seiler 1977, 80), which means to understand that an element can be a member 
of two or more classes simultaneously and that all elements of a class present some elements of 
its superordinate class. However, Blewitt (1994) emphasizes that children who realize, for 
example, that the dog Fido is also an animal are far from a full understanding of the hierarchical 
structure of class-inclusion and the quantitative implications of genus-species relations, which 
require the grasp of the quantifiers all, some, none, and the relations more than, less than, and 
equal to.  
In this regard, Hallpike (1979, 280) notes that studies of folk taxonomies often focus solely 
on the intension of classes at the expense of their extension and the logical quantification of 
class membership. Simply because informants may use words like all and some, “it does not 
follow that their indigenous users grasp the logical, as opposed to the concrete, implications of 
these terms.” This can also be illustrated by Luria’s (1976, 108–9) field study among illiterate 
Uzbek peasants, to which Hallpike also refers, and the finding that uneducated adults often lack 
an understanding of logical quantification in syllogisms and seem to be resistant to make 
deductions from hypotheses:  
The following syllogism is presented:  
In the Far North, where there is snow, all bears are white. Novaya Zemly is in the Far North 
and there is always snow there. What color are the bears there? 
“There are different sorts of bears.” 
Failure to infer from syllogism. The syllogism is repeated. 
“I don’t know; I’ve seen a black bear, I’ve never seen any others … Each locality has its own 
animals: if it’s white, they will be white; if it’s yellow, they will be yellow.” 
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Appeals only to personal, graphic experience. 
But what kind of bears are there in Novaya Zemly? 
“We always speak only of what we see; we don’t talk about what we haven’t seen.” 
The same. 
The same study also shows a clear correlation between increasing education and an increasing 
trend from classifying objects in terms of graphic groupings based on complexes towards 
categorical classification based on true concepts or logical classes (see Table 5.10): 
Table 5.10 Groupings and classification. 
Group Number of 
subjects 
Graphic method of 
grouping 
Graphic and categorical 
methods of grouping 
Categorical 
classification 
Illiterate peasants from 
remote villages 
26 21 (80%) 4 (16%) 1 (4%) 
Collective-farm activists 
(barely literate) 
10 0 3 (30%) 7 (70%) 
Young people with one to 
two years’ schooling 
12 0 0 12 (100%) 
Source: Based on Luria (1976, 78: Table 7). 
These considerations should allow a re-evaluation of Lee’s (2012a, 378) claim that the ancient 
Chinese classicists are “fully aware of taxonomically hierarchical relationships (both instance and 
whole-part) as observed through perception.” She gives one example of a genus-species relation 
(hu and lian [unfortunately both Chinese terms are not translated into English, M.K.] as two types 
of vessels for practical use, as mentioned in the Analects) and one example of a whole-part 
relation (a shoulder is part of the human body, as mentioned in the Mencius). But both of them 
are insufficient evidence to proof an understanding of taxonomic hierarchies. On one hand, 
whole-part relations of concrete objects like a human body and a shoulder can already be 
understood at the preoperational level since there is no involvement at all of taxonomic 
hierarchies based on class-inclusion. On the other hand, genus-species relations cannot be 
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observed through perception, as claimed by Lee, but require cognitive operations in the 
Piagetian sense. To realize that hu and lian are vessels is analogous to the realization that Fido, 
the dog, is also an animal. Again, this is far from a full understanding of the hierarchical structure 
of class-inclusion and the quantitative implications of genus-species relations. 
As Lee (2012a) herself emphasizes, there is little evidence that the Classicists, with a few 
exceptions like the Mohists and Xunzi, apply logical operations in their works. However, her 
conclusion that during the Han dynasty the Chinese prefer correlative thinking but are not 
incapable of analytic thinking seems to be insufficiently grounded. From a cognitive-
developmental perspective, the lack of logical operations does not necessarily indicate a cultural 
preference but could also indicate the contemporary developmental status of cognitive 
capabilities. This question is hard to answer because it is closely related to the difficulty to 
distinguish between performance and competence. Against the assumption that mainstream 
Chinese intellectuals in ancient times have the competence to use logical operations but prefer 
not to perform them in symbolic expression speaks the fact that translations of imported Indian 
writings on logic, beginning in the 7th century CE, are full of errors and misunderstandings 
(Nakamura 1985; Nisbett 2003).  
But there is no need to speculate about this competence/performance problem since it 
does not change the finding that the predominant way of thinking manifested in ancient Chinese 
symbolic expressions, such as the Seven Epitomes, is primarily based on preoperational 
cognition. This does not even contradict the exception that some works of a few intellectual 
elites show a breakthrough to more advanced levels of cognition, a breakthrough though that 
seems to find little resonance in the broader society. 
This view is supported by Hallpike (1979) who concludes that the distinction between 
complexive classification and taxonomic classification, as another terminology of the 
correlative/analytic distinction, can be clearly related to different cognitive-developmental 
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stages, particularly, to Vygotsky’s transition from complex to concept within his model of concept 
development, and to Piaget’s transition from collection to class or from preoperational to 
operational thinking within his model of logico-mathematical development. From this 
developmental point of view, it becomes evident why Hallpike’s (1979, 202) explanation of 
developmental-logically early forms of classification in recent indigenous people shows some 
striking similarities to the ancient Chinese library classification Seven Epitomes: 
Since primitives base their classification primarily on complexes derived from the 
functional and associational relations between things experienced in real life rather than 
on logical class and taxonomic criteria, it is inevitable that while it will be possible to 
construct hierarchical classificatory systems with large general categories divided into 
more particular categories, such systems may be based on shifting criteria and may 
contain overlapping classes and classes that are not united in any superordinate class. 
In many respects, Hallpike’s (1979) analysis of complexive classification is in large agreement 
with Lee’s (2016) findings regarding the Seven Epitomes. However, the decisive advantage of his 
developmental conception of the correlative/analytic distinction is to be able to take cultural 
comparisons based on a developmental sequence of classificatory cognition into account. In 
particular, Hallpike (1979) argues that there is no evidence that thinking and collective 
representations in indigenous people—or in other historical epochs, as cognitive psychologist 
Friedhart Klix (1993) suggests—employ a completely different logic compared to the prevalent 
modern Western thinking, an assumption that, for Hallpike’s awareness, could not be 
demonstrated yet. Hallpike’s (1979, 490) cognitive-developmental perspective rather suggests 
an incomplete logic that makes much less use of cognitive operations and appears to be much 
less rational: 
To the extent that primitive thought is bound up in imagery and the concrete, phenomenal 
properties and associations of the physical world, permeated by moral values and affective 
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qualities, uncoordinated, dogmatic and unsubstantiated by argument, static, relying on 
perceptual configurations and prototypes and the reification of process and realms of 
experience, it is not “rational” according to these criteria. 
However, this does not mean that correlative thinking (i.e., preoperational thinking or thinking 
in complexes), as a developmental-logically early form of reasoning, needs to be described 
exclusively in terms of a lack of something, such as a lack of concrete and formal operations. 
Correlative thinking can be rationally reconstructed and explained according to its underlying 
generative structure. Compared to operational thinking or thinking based on true concepts this 
cognitive deep structure presents a qualitatively distinct way of thinking based on the principles 
of participation and transduction. As such, it makes perfect sense to its users and a depth-
hermeneutical analysis of the underlying structure enables the interpreter to understand 
symbolic expressions based on correlative thinking. 
Therefore, Hallpike (1979, 490) emphasizes that preoperational thinking “is not ‘absurd’ 
or ‘mistaken’ but rather of limited generality.” This statement is in agreement with Lee’s (2012b) 
conclusion that correlative thinking is unscientific due to its lack of logical operations but not 
unworthy or inferior since it has its own strength and value for certain purposes. Hallpike (1979) 
too stresses the fact that preoperational thinking is quite capable of solving practical problems 
of daily life and appears to be particularly well adapted to the requirements of social relations, 
where values, affect, and participation in action are more important than explicit verbal analysis, 
abstract generalizations, and reversible mental transformations, not to mention that 
preoperational thinking is predominant in art, imagination, practical knowledge, feelings, values, 
and faith, which present essential aspects of all human societies. 
The rational reconstruction of an overarching developmental sequence of classificatory 
cognition that includes both correlative thinking and analytic thinking as distinct stages or levels 
is also supported by empirical research (Hoppe, Schmid-Schönbein, and Seiler 1977; Neimark 
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1983; Halford, Andrews, and Jensen 2002; Fujita 2012). Edith Neimark (1983, 117), for example, 
identifies concrete-operational cognition as the decisive requirement of logical classification and 
“supports the view that prototypical classification is ontologically [sic, it should read 
“ontogenetically,” M.K.] earlier and phylogenetically more primitive than logical classification.”  
This can be made also plausible by taking recourse to rational reconstructions of some 
broader cognitive domains compared to Inhelder’s and Piaget’s logico-mathematical operations 
and Vygotsky’s concept formation. For example, Merlin Donald’s (2012; see also Appendix C: 
Table C.5) distinction between mythic and theoretic stages within his developmental model of 
cognition and culture apparently captures the correlative/analytic distinction fairly well (see 
Table 5.11):  




Slow, deep Fast, shallow 
Inner focus Outer focus 
Implicit analog logic Explicit symbolic logic 
Highly emotive Much less emotive 
Closed beliefs Open-ended beliefs 
Allegorically grounded Analytically grounded 
Largely oral mediation Largely technological mediation 
Fixed, stable Change-oriented, unstable 
Source: Donald (2012, 71: Table, 3.3). 
According to Donald (2012, 70), the transition from mythic to theoretic cognition and culture can 
be described as an “evolutionary trend in the direction of institutionalized analytic thinking” that 
takes place as an initial historical shift during the so-called Axial Age, consolidates itself in the 
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last two centuries, and is still not completed yet. Indeed, the debate on the Axial Age presents 
an interesting test case for the methodological contribution of a cognitive-developmental 
approach and should be considered more closely. 
The term Axial Age (Achsenzeit) is invented by philosopher Karl Jaspers (1956) to denote 
deep-seated intellectual and cosmological shifts that take place roughly at the same time, 
between the 8th and the 2nd century BCE, in various, largely independent cultures and manifest 
themselves, for example, in the thought of Confucius and Mencius in China, Buddha in India, the 
Hebrew prophets in Palestine, and the philosophers in Greece. These cultural transformations 
are related to the emergence of the great world religions and new political orders, while their 
characteristic features are described, for example, as transition from mythos to logos and 
towards a reflexive, critical awareness of being as a whole (Jaspers 1956), as break up with 
mythological thought and the search for first principles (Nakamura 1975), as transcendental 
breakthrough to new spiritual, intellectual, and ethical responses (Schwartz 1975), as second-
order thinking and tension between the transcendental and the mundane order (Eisenstadt 
1986a), as movement from ethical conventionalism towards independent ethical positions 
(Harbsmeier 2005), as increasing reflexivity, historical consciousness, and agentiality in the sense 
of an awareness of the potentials of human action within the bounds of human temporality 
(Wittrock 2005), as new forms of symbolization that express universal aspirations (Jung 2012), 
and as revolution of worldview and cognitive breakthrough towards a transcending of 
mythological awareness of self and world (Habermas 2019). 
Many authors argue that the term Axial Age is misleading because it should not be 
considered as a specific historical epoch in world history but rather as an indicator of major 
societal transformations that show striking similarities in different cultures (Nakamura 1975; 
Eisenstadt 1986b; Harbsmeier 2005; Wagner 2005; Assmann 2012). Therefore, the preferred 
terms are “axial transformation” (Wagner 2005, 103), or “axiality” and “axialization” in analogy 
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to globality and globalization (Assmann 2012, 400). In other words, the aspect of synchronicity 
of axial transformations should not be regarded as decisive for the concept of axiality that is 
even by critical voices within the debate considered to be an “indispensable tool in the 
comparative study of cultures” (Assmann 2012, 375). For example, Shmuel N. Eisenstadt (1986a) 
speaks of an axial breakthrough even in Islam that takes place almost a millennium after what is 
commonly referred to as the classical Axial Age.  
Consequently, Eisenstadt’s (2005, 531) distinction between “chronological” and 
“typological” aspects directs the focus of analysis on the structural change and demands a “view 
towards transformative logics” (Thomassen 2010, 336). This is exactly what a cognitive-
developmental approach is able to offer since it reconstructs these intellectual and cosmological 
shifts against the background of developmental-logical sequences of human cognition. In fact, 
axial transformations are often described and explained with reference to Piaget’s transition 
from preoperational to mature concrete-operational and early formal-operational cognition, as 
well as Kohlberg’s transition from conventional to postconventional moral judgment (Habermas 
1984; Apel 1988; Roetz 1993; Bammé 2011; Dux 2011). Further examples of developmental-
logical references for axial transformations are Habermas’s (1979) transition from mythological 
to rationalized worldview, Barnes’s (2000) transition from archaic to classical or axial culture, 
Bellah’s (2011) transition from symbolic to conceptual representation or from archaic to historic 
religions, and Donald’s (2012) transition from mythic to theoretic cognition and culture (see also 
Appendix C: Tables C.1, C.2, C.5, C.10; Appendix D: Tables D.1, D.2). 
From this cognitive-developmental perspective, the concept of axial transformation can 
function as a point of reference for the comparison of long-term developments in China and the 
West. As noted by Graham (1989), it is a common place that in ancient times rational 
demonstration has a much smaller place in Chinese thought compared to Greek thought. 
Nevertheless, one can speak of genuine axial transformations in China between the late 6th and 
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the early 3rd century, exemplified by Confucius’s universal ethics and skeptical attitude against 
supernatural events, Mozi’s expression of second-order thinking and logical principles, as well as 
Zuangzi’s break with conventional epistemological and moral views (Elvin 1986). Other 
representatives of axial breakthroughs often mentioned are the Confucians Xunzi and Mengzi 
(Barnes 2000; Wittrock 2012).  
In general, axial transformations in China are not accompanied by dramatic break ups with 
the cultural tradition but are often derived from the use of old ideas in new ways (Bellah 2011). 
As noted by Elvin (1986), for example, the meaning of the concept of Heaven (tian) changes from 
an anthropomorphic supreme deity to an amorph and unspeaking supreme principle, later also 
associated to the Way (dao). While the archaic, preaxial China is characterized by the worship of 
deities and a belief in nature spirits of mountains and rivers, and in powerful ancestors, the axial 
transformations show a clear trend towards universalizing thought, analyzing language in critical 
reflection, and seeking an ultimate principle, such as the Confucian principle of humaneness 
(ren) or the Daoist principle of the Way (dao) (Elvin 1986; Barnes 2000; Jung 2012). This long 
process from polytheism, as manifested in brief stories and folktale myth of relative brevity and 
lack of logical connection, towards universalism, often expressed in orderly essays like the Mozi, 
is related by Barnes (2000) to the transitions from preoperational to operational thinking and 
from conventional to postconventional morality.  
In order to describe the historical context of the Seven Epitomes, Lee (2012a, 386) refers 
to this intellectual shift in this way: 
As Chinese society experienced a long process of rationalization in early times, knowledge 
possessed and practiced by shamans (wu), diviners (bu), astrologers (shi), physicians (yi), 
and so on that was passed down orally, mostly from father to son, gradually lost its 
privilege. 
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As described in Chapter Three, this indicates what Habermas (1984, 68) calls “devaluative shifts” 
related to the emergence of a new level of justification in which not this or that traditional reason 
but the kind of reason is no longer convincing. As Lee and Lan (2011) write, this process of 
rationalization is closely related to the new social group of an intellectual elite that may function 
as catalyst for the intellectual shift. However, it is not only important to recognize that these new 
cognitive abilities are distributed very unevenly among ancient Chinese society but also that in 
many ways the intellectual history after these axial transformations until the Han dynasty and 
the creation of the Seven Epitomes needs to be described in terms of cognitive regression. For 
example, historian Cho-Yun Hsu (1986, 316) argues that the result of Emperor Wu’s 
establishment of Confucian orthodoxy is an “inevitable degeneration and vulgarization” of early 
Confucianism. According to Hsu (1986), political interests dominate the interpretation of works 
of the mythified Classics, which are supplemented by superstitious materials known as 
prognostic and apocryphal texts, often taken as prophecy. In this way, Han Confucianism 
presents a mixture of very different traditions and integrates Yin Yang theories, Five Phase 
theories, and theories of the correspondence between macrocosm (i.e., universe, natural world) 
and microcosm (i.e., human body, human behavior, human world), resulting in a “mythical mist” 
(Hsu 1986, 320). The conclusion drawn by Hsu (1986, 323) is that for the intellectual elite 
represented by Han Confucianism—and this includes the creators of the Seven Epitomes—
genuine axial breakthroughs are most unlikely: 
What would happen is perpetuation of old thinking with meticulous efforts to organize 
the current knowledge, instead of offering a new angle of speculation and a new 
dimension of exploration. 
Even though Lee (2016) observes the same fusion of Confucianism or Classicism with elements 
of other schools of thought, the structural differences between preaxial and axial thinking are 
not taken into consideration. From a cognitive-developmental perspective, it becomes evident 
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that the intellectual and epistemological foundation of the Seven Epitomes is derived from an 
intellectual milieu in which the prevalent way of thinking falls back behind a level that the axial 
transformations once achieved in China a few centuries earlier (cp. Roetz 1993). This helps to 
understand why correlative thinking is the most characteristic feature of the catalog of the 
imperial library, even though more advanced forms of reasoning can be found in older writings.  
By taking axial transformations as points of reference, the comparison of long-term 
developments in Chinese and Western intellectual history shows some striking parallels. As 
pointed out by Graham (1989), one can find different levels of thinking, that is, correlative 
thinking and causal or analytic thinking, in both China and the West. According to him, the 
uniqueness of correlative thinking, as expressed in theories of Ying Yang or Five Phases, for 
example, has nothing to do with being Chinese but can also be found in the West, as manifested 
in Pythagorean numerology, Galen’s doctrine of Four Elements and Four Humors, and later in 
the writings of Hermes Trismegistus, Albertus Magnus, and even Johannes Kepler. This view is 
supported by Benjamin I. Schwartz (1985, 350) who describes the Chinese “correlative 
cosmology” or, more precisely, “correlative anthropocosmology,” in which phenomena of the 
human world correspond to phenomena of the natural world, not at all as a culture-specific way 
of thinking but, with reference to Claude Levi-Strauss’s “science of the concrete,” as the 
dominant mode of thought in most indigenous or preliterate societies. Even in literate societies, 
as Schwartz (1985) with reference to Joseph Needham emphasizes, the microcosm/macrocosm 
doctrine can be found, not only in ancient China but also in medieval and Renaissance Europe 
(see also Foucault 1970; Gurevich 1985; Dinzelbacher 2006). This cross-cultural phenomenon of 
the microcosm/macrocosm doctrine is something that Habermas would describe in 
developmental terms as an early stage in the differentiation of validity spheres, in which the 
social world and the natural world are still fused and considered holistically (see Appendix C: 
Table C.13). 
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In other words, both the Chinese tradition and the Western tradition show dynamic 
changes in intellectual history in that sometimes correlative thinking and sometimes analytic 
thinking is prevalent, depending on the particular sociohistorical contexts. On one hand, Graham 
(1989) observes that both traditions show occasional episodes in which analytic thinking 
temporarily replaces correlative thinking but without significant resonance or institutionalization 
in the broader society (e.g., Mohist school in China; Archimedes, Grosseteste, and Roger Bacon 
in the West). On the other hand, Jose Casanova (2012, 210) notes that both traditions also show 
regressive trends or “archaic resacralizations,” such as Greek culture in Hellenism or Confucian 
thought in the Han dynasty, the latter termed as “sacro-magical religio-political imperial cult.”  
A further prominent example of cognitive regression in collective development within the 
Western tradition is the beginning of the Middle Ages after the so-called barbaric invasion, 
characterized by a decline of social complexity, technological infrastructure, and educational 
institutions (Radding 1978; 1985; Roetz 1993; Dinzelbacher 2006; Habermas 2019). Barnes 
(2000) states that from the sixth to the tenth century in Europe the archaic level of cognition, 
which he relates to preaxial or preoperational thinking, reappears more strongly than centuries 
before. In a similar way, historian of mentality Peter Dinzelbacher (2006) notes that early 
medieval thinking presents a decline of the ability to abstraction and of intellectual flexibility, 
while the relatively closed worldview is dominated by religion, dogmatic authorities, and 
associative, image-based thinking.  
If the intellectual milieus in medieval Europe and ancient China are indeed dominated by 
the same levels of knowing, one should expect some significant structural similarities between 
the ancient Chinese Seven Epitomes and early medieval European library catalogs. In fact, library 
historian Buford Scrivner (1980) offers some hints that seem to support this view. Scrivner (1980) 
analyzes four monastic library catalogs of the ninth and tenth centuries, namely, the catalogs of 
the monasteries of Reichenau (822), St. Riquier (831), St. Gall (9th century), and Bobbio (10th 
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century). These exemplary library catalogs are regarded as typical of monastic institutions in 
general and examined as cultural artifacts closely related to the intellectual milieu of the time 
and as an expression of the needs and values of the users of the libraries. Up to the late Middle 
Ages, monastic library catalogs are essentially inventories and neither designed as finding tools 
nor developed with a full classification scheme. Nevertheless, principles of organization can be 
identified, such as the use of headings or main classes for author, subject, and form. One of the 
most significant characteristics, according to Scrivner (1980, 440), is that fields of knowledge are 
distinguished and disposed into a hierarchical structure in the sense of a “valuative hierarchy of 
forms of knowledge” (see Table 5.12).  
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Table 5.12 Valuative hierarchy of the library catalog of the monastery of Reichenau (822). 
Catalog Reconstructed valuative hierarchy 
De libris Veteris ac N. Testamentari (Books of the Old and New Testaments) Scriptures: Divine revelation 
De opusculis S. Augustini (Works of St. Augustine) 
De opusculis B. Hieronymi (Works of St. Jerome) 
Church fathers:  
Interpretation revealing moral and 
anagogical levels of meaning 
There follow six headings of identical form introducing works by Gregory 
the Great, Leo I., Cyprian, Eusebius (his church history), Hilary, Basil, and 
Athanasius. 
De vita patrum (Chiefly lives of the church fathers, but also accounts of the 
destruction of Troy, Appollonius of Tyre, and a book on architecture. 
De libris Iosephi (Josephus’s history of the Jews)  
Law (Civil, Roman, and Germanic codes) 
History and Geography (Secular history only) 
Medicine 
Service books (Lectionaries, psalters, and antiphonaries) 
De opusculis S. Ambrosi (Works of St. Ambrose) 
There follow author heading for the works of John Chrysostom, Orosius, 
Cassian, Eucherius, Prosper (prose works only), Isidore of Seville, Bede, 
Cassiodorus, Primasius, Aldhelm (both poetry and prose), and Boethius. 
De libris canonum (Canon law) 
De libris homilarium (Collections of homilies, one noted as being arranged 
according to the calendar of church holidays) 
De regulis (Monastic rules of Benedict and others) 
De passionibus sanctorum (Hagiography) 
De libris glossarum (Miscellanies of writings by “diversis doctoribus”) 
De libris Prisciani 
   Grammar and rhetoric (Priscian, Donatus, and others) 
   Poetry 
      Christian (Juvencus, Sedulius, Prosper, Aldhelm, and others) 
      Pagan (The Georgics and portions of the Aeneid of Virgil) 
Grammar and rhetoric texts,  
poetic works:  
Language study, access to literal level 
Source: Based on Scrivner (1980, 429: Table 1). 
The example of the monastery of Reichenau can illustrate some typical characteristics of 
monastic library catalogs of the time. Like the Seven Epitomes, the Reichenau catalog is arranged 
as an order of importance or value ranking. The Holy Scriptures—generally referred to as 
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“bibliotheca” (Jackson 1967, 193 [emphasis in original])—are related to divine revelation and 
enjoy a place of honor at the top, followed by the so-called church fathers as the most important 
interpreters of the biblical writings and further approaches to their study and understanding, 
while grammatical and rhetorical texts grouped with poetical works are placed at the end of the 
catalog and valued less because they are concerned with linguistic studies that offer access only 
to the literal meaning of the Scriptures.  
Also like the Seven Epitomes, the organization is not especially rigorous since the 
conflicting interests of headings for author, subject, and form find varying solutions and tend to 
overlap to some extent. For example, the subject heading De vita patrium includes not only 
works on the lives of the church fathers but also works on the pagan hero Appollonius of Tyre, 
on the Trojan War, and on architecture. As Scrivner (1980) suggests, the true subject of this 
heading should rather be seen as History in a broad sense. Among the church fathers, Augustine 
is listed first because he is considered to be the most important authority (cp. Jackson 1967), 
similar to the treatment of Confucius in the Seven Epitomes. Sometimes particular texts are 
separated from the group to which they actually belong and placed higher in the value ranking 
“out of reverence for their ages and association with saints” (Scrivner 1980, 434), strikingly 
similar to the principles of the Seven Epitomes that Lee (2016, 136, 182) calls the “Classicist 
temporal principle” and the “Classicist moral ladder.” 
A further example for groupings that are not mutual exclusive is presented by the author 
heading De libris Prisciani that not only includes works of Priscian, the authority regarding Latin 
grammar, but also works of other authors that are either concerned with the same subject (i.e., 
grammar and rhetoric) or written in the same form (i.e., verse instead of prose). As the case of 
Prosper indicates, this means that not all works of an author are listed under the respective 
author heading but that, for example, poetical works are separated due to its form and listed 
under the subheading of Poetry. Interestingly, the subdivision of Poetry into higher valued 
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Christian texts followed by pagan texts shows a quite similar value dichotomy as typically 
underlies the Seven Epitomes.  
According to Scrivner (1980, 436), the relative location of grammar and rhetoric texts 
combined with poetical works under the same heading and near the end of the catalog can be 
found in all four monastic libraries and presents one of “two major recurrent patterns of 
association.” This first one goes back to the classical ancient tradition of the seven liberal arts 
(septem artes liberales), divided into the elementary Trivium (i.e., grammar, rhetoric, dialectic) 
and the advanced Quadrivium (i.e., arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music). The liberal arts, as 
opposed to the lesser valued mechanical arts concerned with useful or practical knowledge, are 
considered to be studies that lead to moral and intellectual excellence. This is another similarity 
to the Seven Epitomes and its implicit Way/vessel dichotomy that separates philosophical from 
technical writings and connects all branches of knowledge to an overarching unity. As noted by 
philosopher James A. Weisheipl (1965, 89), the Greco-Roman heritage of the liberal arts 
education is an indispensable foundation for the study of philosophy or Christian theology in the 
Middle Ages and its underlying classification of sciences typically presents an ascending 
hierarchy in which each science is “resolved into a higher and more universal science.” 
The second pattern of association identified by Scrivner (1980) in relation to monastic 
library catalogs is that service books form large clusters with works concerned in various ways 
either with law (e.g., civil law, canon law, monastic rules) or with time (e.g., history, the 
computation of time, the observance of time through liturgy). For Scrivner (1980), this can be 
explained by taking the user groups of these libraries into account and their routine of life in the 
monastery that is highly regulated by monastic rules, liturgical hours, and the Christian calendar. 
As Scrivner (1980, 443) concludes, such patterns of association can be related to the underlying 
worldview, in this case to the worldview of Christianism in medieval Europe: 
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That the associative type of organization was possibly less a result of conscious attempts 
at imposing order than an unforced expression of world view perhaps argues against its 
being admitted as cataloging in the strict sense of the term, something constructed kata 
logos, or ‘according to reason.’ 
Without speculating whether the organization of the Seven Epitomes is the result of conscious 
attempts, as Lee’s (2016, 36) “intellectual activism” claims, or an unforced expression of an 
unreflected worldview, the structural similarities between ancient Chinese and medieval 
European bibliographic classification and cataloging should have become obvious. Both of them 
show the characteristics of complexive classification based on correlative thinking. 
Finally, the comparison of the Chinese and Western traditions should not be restricted to 
examples of correlative thinking but also include those of analytic thinking. As noted by Lee 
(2012a, 379), since the early 20th century Chinese bibliographic classifications are commonly 
modeled on Western-style counterparts, following the “same analytic approach to knowledge 
organization.” According to Lee (2012b, 63), this is the result of a “dramatic westernization.” But 
as Yu Keping (2008) emphasizes, learning from the West does not necessarily mean 
westernization but should rather be considered to be a part of the process of modernization in 
which the own cultural identity can keep its autonomy from Western hegemony.  
In the following, it will be argued that the development of analytic thinking in China is 
closely related to long-term processes of rationalization that begin with the axial transformations 
in ancient times and find their full expression in the 20th century, a time highly influenced by the 
world-wide trends of modernization and globalization. As a corollary, the modern analytic 
approach to classification in China should not simply be regarded as an effect of cultural 
imperialism but rather as a result of rational insight that gives Chinese classificationists and 
catalogers convincing reasons for its adoption in order to cope with new challenges. 
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As Hajime Nakamura (1975, 476) emphasizes, there is a “gradual indigenous development 
of ‘modern’ conceptions,” corresponding to, although different from those in the West. This 
includes the already mentioned axial transformations in ancient China, most importantly, the 
tradition of the Mohist school and its invention of logical principles. According to Harbsmeier’s 
Logic and Language, the Mohist definition of reason (ku) comes very close to Western 
conceptions and is alien to the prevalent analogical reasoning or correlative thinking in 
contemporary China, while the syllogisms by first-century philosopher Wang Chung are more 
Aristotelian than the standard medieval Western form (Kim 1999).  
Nevertheless, as emphasized by Graham (1989), there is nothing similar in China to the 
scientific revolution in the West that takes place from the 16th to the 18th century. Although Lee 
(2012a) with reference to Joseph Needham notes that science and technology in imperial China 
is by no means underdeveloped compared to the West, Needham’s famous question ”Why did 
the ‘scientific revolution’ not take place in China?” (Kim 1999, 451) points to a significant 
difference. Here is neither the place to answer this question nor to recapitulate the long-standing 
debate on the multiple factors and historical conditions that influence the dynamics of 
development in both cultural traditions. But two aspects seem to be worth noting.  
First, a cognitive-developmental perspective suggests that the emergence of modern 
science is related to advanced levels of knowing that allow hypothetico-deductive reasoning, 
nomological explanations, and revisable theories based on empirical testing, such as Piaget’s 
transition from concrete-operational to formal-operational cognition (see Appendix B: Tables 
B.36, B.37, B.46), Barnes’s transition from classical or axial thought to empirical-critical thought 
(see Appendix C: Table C.1), and Habermas’s transition from rationalized to reflexive worldview 
(see Appendix C: Table C.10). These developmental-logical differences are independent of the 
causal explanations of the mechanism or dynamics of historical change but may at least indicate 
the important role of cognitive development in the diachronic dimension of cultural traditions. 
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The second aspect is that the significant difference between China and the West regarding 
the scientific revolution does not need to be reduced to culture-specific peculiarities. Graham 
(1989, 320) argues that what cultural essentialism considers as a difference between China and 
the West should rather be seen as a “transcultural difference between proto-science and 
science.” There is a broad range of other transcultural differences resulting from societal 
developments like the neolithic or agricultural revolution, the use of bronze, the invention of 
writing systems, and the axial transformation. In all these cases, structural transformations take 
place in various and often independent cultural traditions in a similar way, which points to causal 
explanations that are not culturally specific but rather characteristic for stage transitions in 
societal development in general. As it is typically the case, the dynamics of development varies 
from culture to culture, which means that the onset, pace, and effectiveness of these 
transformations might differ from one context to another and also that not all cultural traditions 
take part of these processes. In a similar way, the scientific revolution may indicate the 
emergence of a new developmental stage that takes place first in the West but is by no means 
limited to this particular cultural tradition. In other words, one should not equate westernization 
and modernization, as stressed by Nathan Sivin (1990, 167): 
Nevertheless, the transforming influence of the scientific and industrial revolutions was 
so great that earlier sciences of China and Europe resemble each other more than either 
resembles the modern variety. It is important, if one is to think clearly about science and 
technology as worldwide phenomena, to avoid confusing differences between China and 
the West with differences between traditional societies and societies that have become 
essentially modern. 
This view is supported by Barnes (2000), who states that modern science is not a local enterprise 
guided by social values or cultural preferences but is based on universal validity claims. After the 
scientific revolution, as Graham (1989) notes, the explanations of both Chinese and Western 
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medieval and Renaissance proto-science are not considered to be explanations at all since they 
stand neither critical reflection nor empirical testing—a further example of Habermas’s 
devaluative shifts.  
Therefore, Ken Baskin and Dmitri M. Bondarenko (2014, 2) take up Jaspers’s idea to 
consider modernity as a “second axial age,” and thus modernization as a transcultural process. 
In this regard, the debate on Eisenstadt’s (2000, 1) notion of “multiple modernities” also shows 
the need to emphasize the variety of ways this process can take (see also Sachsenmaier and 
Riedel 2002; Thomassen 2010). For example, Nakamura (1985) identifies different accents that 
cultural traditions place on particular world relations, for example, on the natural world in the 
West, on the subjective world in India, and on the social world in China—something that 
Habermas’s (1984, 240) would call a “selective pattern of rationalization.” Nevertheless, 
modernization is essentially a transcultural process of rationalization. 
Admittedly, the process of modernization in China is closely related to external influences 
from the West, particularly, between the 17th and 19th century, in which Jesuits spread not only 
new religious ideas but also the principles of European logic and geometric models that, at least 
in certain fields like astronomy, are enthusiastically recognized by Chinese scholars (Sivin 1995; 
Kurtz 2001). Interestingly, the 19th century is also the time in which the ancient writings of the 
Mohist school, unread and forgotten in Han times, are rediscovered and newly edited (Lloyd and 
Sivin 2002). Finally, in the early 20th century a “strikingly rapid naturalization of the alien notion 
of logic in Chinese discourse” (Kurtz 2001, 149) takes place and logic establishes itself as an 
academic field. As Wang Hui (2008) states, the main characteristic of Chinese thought in the 20th 
century is the extensive application of the concept of science that serves as a symbol of 
liberation. Wang Hui (2008, 132) even speaks of an “enlightenment movement” in which the 
traditional worldview based on heavenly principles is replaced by a scientific worldview based 
on axiomatic principles, even though the former may still exist as an element within the latter. 
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Unsurprisingly, this new scientific interest of mainstream intellectuals also leads to new forms of 
a “rationalized classification of knowledge” (Wang 2008, 125). 
The influence of Western culture, often described as an imperialist intrusion or cultural 
invasion, and the increasing amount of foreign books challenge the traditional Chinese 
bibliographic classification (Tsien 1952; Huan Wen 1991; Yi and Jin 1996). These traditional 
classifications are deeply influenced by the Seven Epitomes that functions as a model for many 
four-fold classifications divided into Classics, History, Philosophy, and Belle-lettres, such as the 
Bibliographical Classification of the Four Branches of Literature (1793) (Tsien 1952; Jiang 2007; 
Lee 2016). As summarized by Hong Yi and Zhan Jin (1996), these traditional classifications are 
not adequate for Western books and the whole field of modern knowledge, their lack of 
numbering is not effective for shelving and organizing bibliography, and their reliance on a 
particular library collection hinders independence, compatibility, and availability. Therefore, at 
the end of the Qing dynasty the Dewey Decimal Classification begins to function as the new role 
model and soon dominates Chinese bibliographic classification and cataloging (Huan Wen 1991; 
Yi and Jin 1996). According to Hong Yi and Zhan Jin (1996), Chinese classificationists and 
catalogers create more than 20 different decimal classifications modeled on the DDC, such as 
the Chinese Classification of Books (1929), representing a shift from collection-based 




Table 5.13 Comparison of traditional and DDC-influenced Chinese library classifications. 







Dewey Decimal Classification 
CCB (1929) 
Chinese Classification of Books 
Basic classes Confucian 000 General 000 General 
Classics 100 Philosophy 100 Philosophy 
History 200 Religion 200 Religion 
Philosophy 300 Social Sciences 300 Natural Science 
Belle Lettre 400 Linguistics 400 Applied Science 
500 Natural Sciences 500 Social Science 
600 Applied Sciences 600/700 History and Geography** 
700 Art 
800 Literature 800 Language and Literature 
900 History and Geography 900 Art 
Notation system none Pure notation with Arab numerals 
Decimal hierarchical 
Pure notation with Arab numerals 
Decimal hierarchical 
Major structure A main table A main table 
7 common auxiliary tables 
An index 
A handbook 
A main table 
8 common auxiliary tables 
2 special auxiliary tables 
Compiling technique  Double-table listing 
The usage of “0” 
Multiple listing 
Offering reserved classes 
 
Source: Based on Yi and Jin (1996, 214). 
* The DDC scheme presented by the authors is taken from the 20th edition published in 1989. 
** In the original table, there is no main class 700. But as noted by Tsien (1952), the main classes 600 and 700 are 
combined by the creator of the CCB. 
As the example of the Chinese Classification of Books (1929) demonstrates, what is adopted from 
the DDC is first and foremost the decimal principle with its logical structure and hierarchical force 
combined with the notation based on Arab numerals including the usage of the zero power. But 
there are also some significant modifications in order to adapt to the Chinese context, for 
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example, some main classes and many subclasses are modified or merged together, and empty 
classes of the original DDC are often used for additional classes covering traditional Chinese 
topics (Tsien 1952; Liu-Lengyel 1987; Huan Wen 1991). Parallel adaptations to sociocultural 
contexts and needs also take place in other East Asian countries like Korea and Japan (Oh 2012; 
Choi 2017). These context-aware adaptation processes, as well as the fact that many Chinese 
librarians even study library science in the US in order to improve Chinese library theory and 
practice (Huan Wen 1991), indicate that the Western model is not simply adopted blindly but 
based on rational insights. Only these features or principles are adopted that appear to be most 
promising to cope with the new challenges, while others are neglected or modified. These 
features and principles, in turn, are essentially those that are characteristic of taxonomic 
classification based on analytic thinking.  
These considerations allow to conclude that the turning point in Chinese library history 
from an orientation on the Seven Epitomes towards an orientation on the Dewey Decimal 
Classification should not be described solely in terms of westernization but rather in terms of 
modernization and rationalization, as suggested by Tsuen-Hsuin Tsien’s (1952, 323) distinction 
between the epochs of “classical classification” and “modern classification.” The proposed 
cognitive-developmental approach shows that these two major approaches to classification can 
be related to distinct developmental stages of classificatory cognition that are potentially 
available for human beings in general. In many respects, the Seven Epitomes presents culture-
specifically “the Chinese way” (Lee 2010b, 1) to knowledge organization while the Dewey 
Decimal Classification presents the Western way. But a significant result of this case study is that 
according to the underlying depth structures both of them should rather be described in 





The case study on the ancient Chinese library classification Seven Epitomes demonstrates a 
methodological contribution of the cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge 
organization. The premise that knowledge organization systems, in general, are by no means 
neutral representations of reality but culturally and historically embedded human artifacts that 
serve a given purpose is shared with the prevailing context-aware approaches of domain 
analysis, such as Hur-Li Lee’s socio-epistemological approach to the Seven Epitomes. But the 
socio-epistemological approach that explicitly adopts a cultural perspective is merely concerned 
with the unique characteristics of a given epistemic context and does not consider structural 
similarities and implicational universals across contexts. The cognitive-developmental approach 
takes a cross-cultural or transcultural perspective and offers an analytic framework for a 
comparison of different cultural and historical contexts, exemplified in this case study by a 
comparison of the Seven Epitomes and the Dewey Decimal Classification.  
The main finding is that Lee’s distinction between correlative and analytic approaches to 
knowledge organization can neither be derived from cultural differences between China and the 
West nor from historical differences between ancient and modern times but needs to be 
described in transcultural terms, that is, against the background of the context-independent 
developmental logic of human cognition. Accordingly, correlative and analytic thinking present 
different deep structures or stages along one and the same developmental sequence. Thus, the 
epistemic pluralism presented by the multiplicity of cultural and historical contexts can be 
organized according to both structural similarities and structural differences related within a 
developmental continuum. In other words, the organizing principle of Integrative Levels of 
Knowing offers a broader view to see the big picture, or, to invoke the metaphor from the 
introduction, the daylight for the blind men who investigate an elephant. 
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6 CASE STUDY II: THE INTERDISCIPLINARY INTEGRATIVE LEVELS CLASSIFICATION 
 
6.1 Context Representation in the Integrative Levels Classification 
6.1.1 The Phenomenon-Based Facet-Analytical Approach 
While the first case study is concerned with the analytical dimension of knowledge organization 
in context or the information professionals’s frames of reference (context of mediation), this 
second case study is concerned with the analytical dimension of context in knowledge 
organization or the representation of epistemic contexts or authorial perspectives of documents 
(context of production) in a specific knowledge organization system. The overarching goal is to 
demonstrate exemplarily the contribution of the proposed cognitive-developmental approach 
to knowledge organization, which can be considered to be a methodological extension to the so-
called phenomenon-based facet-analytical approach in that is offers two novel organizing 
principles for a classification of epistemic contexts. The phenomenon-based facet-analytical 
approach to knowledge organization presents one of the most elaborate endeavors to an explicit 
context representation in terms of authorial perspectives in KOSs. But in its current state it seems 
to be mainly concerned with a differentiation of epistemic contexts, as they can be derived 
inductively from the documents or from academic discourses. This often results in a kind of term 
lists of different but largely unstructured epistemic contexts or perspectives.  
Departing from this point, the cognitive-developmental approach is primarily interested 
in a systematic organization of epistemic contexts in terms of collocation and subordination. This 
systematic interest aiming to establish a documentary language that goes beyond the 
expressiveness of term lists requires additional methodological tools to analyze and interrelate 
the often only implicit authorial perspectives of documents, that is, the underlying rule systems 
or generative structures according to which these documents are brought forth. It will be shown 
to what extent the cognitive-developmental approach can provide such tools by taking recourse 
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to Jürgen Habermas’s (1984; 1987) Theory of Communicative Action and Ken Wilber’s (2000) 
AQAL framework, as described in Chapter Three. The decisive contribution for context 
representation is to offer two novel organizing principles, namely, the Integral Methodological 
Pluralism (IMP) for a basic classification of methods and the Integrative Levels of Knowing (ILK) 
for a basic classification of viewpoints. 
The object under investigation is the interdisciplinary knowledge organization system 
Integrative Levels Classification (ISKO Italia 2004). One reason for this choice is that the ILC, as a 
current research project under the lead of Claudio Gnoli, presents one of the most ambitious 
and most elaborate attempts of context representation in KOSs while it explicitly discusses its 
underlying theoretical and methodological assumptions (ISKO Italia 2004; Szostak, Gnoli, and 
López-Huertas 2016; Gnoli 2020a; 2020b; Park, Gnoli, and Morelli 2020). Another reason is that 
the ILC, as an experimental KOS testing innovative features, seems to be open in principle for a 
future application of the proposed new principles of organization. This appears to be particularly 
promising since the ILC’s basic structure is already based on the organizing principle of 
integrative levels and thus provides a point of departure for a complementary application of the 
organizing principle of Integrative Levels of Knowing.  
As an initial orientation, this section describes the Integrative Levels Classification 
according to Gnoli’s (2016, 3) “phenomenon-based facet-analytical approach.” The next section 
discusses some limitations of its underlying methodology in its current state and outlines the 
potential contribution of the cognitive-developmental approach. Finally, the remainder of this 
case study introduces the organizing principles IMP and ILK and explores possibilities of a future 
application to the Integrative Levels Classification. 
The Integrative Levels Classification, developed since 2004 and published online as first 
edition in 2011 (ISKO Italia 2011), is a knowledge organization system that is intended to be 
general in scope in order to cover all areas of knowledge and “to enable interdisciplinary and 
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intercultural communication” (Gnoli 2020b, 40) in that it allows to express multiple perspectives 
and a broad spectrum of contextual relations regarding the knowledge represented in 
documents. In opposition to domain-specific KOSs that seek to adopt the particular view of a 
more or less demarcated epistemic community to support the specific information needs of 
users in that domain, the general approach of the ILC seeks to establish a documentary language 
that supports “conceptual interoperability” (Gnoli 2020b, 40) by representing as many 
perspectives as possible to allow users to shift from one domain-specific view to another. As 
pointed out by Gnoli (2020b, 38), “KOSs should enable their users to represent the different 
cultural perspectives of documents and their authors, not just a dominant one.” 
For that reason, the basic structure of the ILC is not based on disciplines or fields of 
knowledge, as is the case for many traditional library classifications with a general scope (e.g., 
DDC, UDC, LCC, CC), but on phenomena as the actual objects or things that are studied from 
various disciplinary perspective or, more generally, within various epistemic contexts. These 
phenomena as basic units cannot only be related to other phenomena but to a variety of context 
information, such as the underlying theoretical and methodological approaches investigating 
these phenomena (Szostak and Gnoli 2008). For the representation of such context information, 
the ILC uses the analytico-synthetic technique of faceted classification, as known, for example, 
from Ranganathan’s Colon Classification but shows also some innovative features. For a better 
understanding of the ILC, its core structural components will be considered in more detail, as 
defined by Gnoli (2016; 2017a; 2017b; 2018) in terms of dimensions, types and levels, facets, as 
well as themes and rhemes. Unless indicated otherwise, this study refers to the second edition 
of the Integrative Levels Classification (ISKO Italia 2019) as the latest stable online version 
containing 10,851 classes and facets (Park, Gnoli, and Morelli 2020). 
The first structural component, the dimensions, refers to the kind of metadata that are 
provided by classification notations, which is why it is sometimes also called “metadata 
262 
dimensions” (Gnoli 2011, 272). The ILC distinguishes seven dimensions that are indicated by 
Greek lower-case letters (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1 Dimensions of the Integrative Levels Classification (2nd edition). 
Dimension of knowledge organization Corresponding field 
α  reality in itself mysticism 
β phenomena ontology 
γ perspectives epistemology 
δ documents bibliography, epigraphy, etc. 
ε collections library, archive and museum science 
ζ information needs cognitive and information science 
η people sociology 
Source: Based on Gnoli (2016, 406: Table 1). 
While the α dimension is considered to have little significance for knowledge organization 
because reality in itself is inaccessible and human knowledge about reality is always experienced 
indirectly through sense organs and the central nervous system, the most important dimensions 
are considered to be those related to phenomena, perspectives, and documents (Gnoli 2016).  
The β dimension refers to phenomena as “the most universal knowledge units, on which 
an analytico-synthetic KOS should be based” (Gnoli 2012, 273). The underlying concept of 
phenomenon follows Immanuel Kant’s distinction between noumena as the unknowable thing-
in-itself (Ding an sich) and phenomenon as any object of the senses (cp. Ridi 2016). Nevertheless, 
this concept is not related to any school of phenomenology but used in a broad sense that allows 
to consider any object, process, or relation to be a phenomenon, including the perspectives, 
documents, collections, information needs, and people treated within the other metadata 
dimensions (Gnoli 2016). The main advantage of such a phenomenon-based approach compared 
to a traditional discipline-based approach to knowledge organization is seen in its advanced 
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expressiveness or “representational power” (Gnoli 2016, 412). Since literally everything can be 
treated as phenomenon, everything can be related to everything else. This allows a 
phenomenon-based KOS to represent even disciplines as a special kind of phenomena and, 
therefore, to “mimic the logic of classmarks in a common disciplinary classification” (Gnoli 2016, 
412), while the opposite seems to be impossible since a phenomenon cannot be treated as a 
special kind of discipline. As outlined in Chapter Three, there are other challenges of discipline-
based KOSs like currency, hospitality, and cross-classification, as identified by the Classification 
Research Group (CRG 1969). The ILC project places itself in the tradition that considers 
phenomena as the most basic and most important units of a KOS with a general scope, as 
exemplified not only by the CRG’s general scheme but also by Brown’s Subject Classification, 
Scheele’s Universal Facet Classification, Shpackov’s Universal Classification, and Szostak’s Basic 
Concept Classification, among others (Gnoli 2016). This priority of phenomena over disciplines 
or perspectives in general is grounded in a metatheory that prioritizes ontology over 
epistemology (Gnoli and Poli 2004). While Gnoli (2011) agrees that human knowledge consists 
of both ontological and epistemological components since complete neutrality in the process of 
knowing appears to be utopian, he argues that the ontological foundation of knowledge 
organization should be “as culturally neutral and as generally agreed as possible” (Gnoli 2008b, 
140). Accordingly, the basic structure of a phenomenon-based KOS like the ILC should aim to be 
an intendedly neutral “general reference scheme” (Gnoli 2011, 98). In fact, the name of the first 
draft is Naturalistic Classification in order to indicate this ontological orientation on the 
structures of reality, before its renaming in Integrative Levels Classification to avoid the 
suggestion of a limitation to natural sciences (ISKO Italia 2004).   
The γ dimension refers to perspectives in a broad sense as ways of looking at or 
approaching phenomena that determine the subject matter or aboutness of documents. This 
includes established concepts from KO discourse, such as Szostak’s theories and methods, 
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Hjørland’s and Albrechtsen’s domains, Svenonius’s aspects, Beghtol’s viewpoints, and Vickery’s 
activities (Gnoli 2016). The following list of different kinds of perspectives is provided by Gnoli 
(2016, 407) as particular relevant for context representation in KOSs: 
 communicative function, e.g. report, operational instruction, advertisement 
 discipline, field of study, e.g. physics, engineering, architecture 
 domain of discourse, community, e.g. astronomers, sport fans 
 cultural context, viewpoint, e.g. modern Western, indigenous 
 activity field, e.g. cultivation, healing, education 
 theory, e.g. evolutionism, creationism 
 method, e.g. laboratory testing, interviews 
 locus of knowledge, e.g. China, Africa 
 epoch of knowledge, e.g. Medieval, contemporary 
For this study, the perspective dimension is by far the most important one. Since the ILC treats 
such perspectives as particular facet categories with numerous subcategories, these will be 
outlined below in more detail.  
The δ dimension refers to documents as physical or digital artifacts with all their features 
that are relevant for bibliographic records and descriptive indexing, such as title, name of author 
or producer, publisher, format, language, material, size, duration, and so on. As emphasized by 
Gnoli (2016), the document dimension should not be limited to libraries and the LIS field but 
also encompass documents organized in museums, galleries, archives, and other memory 
institutions. Taking this broader perspective into account, the ILC also defines the ε dimension 
referring to whole collections of documents, in which metadata offer information, for example, 
about storage, management, and access to collection. Furthermore, the ζ dimension refers to 
information needs that may vary in different contexts and for different purposes, such as 
information needs for school, job, leisure, or a dissertation project. And Finally, the η dimension 
refers to people and is concerned with metadata like age, gender, education, wealth, and so on. 
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According to Gnoli (2012), these metadata dimensions are often mixed up or lumped together 
in knowledge organization practice and he argues that they should be treated separately. 
The second structural component, the types and levels, represents the organizing 
principles of the basic structure of the ILC, most importantly, the order of main classes and their 
relation to subsequent subclasses. Both types and levels constitute hierarchical relations which 
are the distinctive features of a classification system compared to term lists. In mathematical 
terms, as Gnoli (2017a) writes, hierarchical relations present ordered sets in which all elements 
or classes as basic units are ordered within a linear sequence and a prescribed position compared 
to other classes. This is what qualifies a classification system to be a systematic order in contrast, 
for example, to an alphabetical order of term lists (Gnoli 2020b). According to Gnoli (2017a), 
types refer to the hierarchical relation of inclusion and form chains of classes, while levels refer 
to the hierarchical relation of dependence and form arrays or levels of classes. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, “inclusion relationships” (Gnoli 2017a, 44) are well-known as genus-species 
relations defined by the inheritance of features from the superordinate class to the subordinate 
class (e.g., organisms—animals—mollusca). By contrast, the “dependence relationship” (Gnoli 
2017a, 44) means that the existence of a given class of phenomena depends logically and 
chronologically on the existence of other classes of phenomena. Therefore, classes of newer or 
higher-level phenomena should be listed after classes of older or lower-level phenomena on 
which they depend, resulting in a sequence of evolutionary order of appearance or emergence 
(e.g., organisms—consciousness—artworks). At this point, the ILC project takes recourse to the 
theory of integrative levels and the notion of “level of organization” (Gnoli 2017a, 40) that 
combines explicitly Ranganathan’s principles of later-in-time, later-in-evolution, and increasing 
complexity. The sequence of main classes of the ILC, indicated by Latin lower-case letters, is 
arranged according to such levels or arrays of classes based on dependence relations (see Table 
6.2): 
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Table 6.2 Main classes of the Integrative Levels Classification (2nd edition). 
Main classes 
a forms n populations 
b spacetime o instincts 
c branes p consciousness 
d energy, wave-particles q language 
e atoms r rituals 
f molecules s communities 
g continuum bodies t polities 
h celestial bodies u enterprises 
i rocks v technologies 
j land w artifacts 
k genes x artworks 
l bacteria, prokaryotes y knowledge 
m organisms (eukaryotes)   
Source: Based on Park, Gnoli and Morelli (2020, 40). 
The main classes of the ILC present differentiations of Nicolai Hartmann’s sequence of six major 
levels of reality (i.e., forms, matter, life, mind, society, and culture), limited to the number of 
letters in the Latin alphabet (Gnoli 2017a). Note that the missing letter z, occupied in the first 
edition with the main class religion that is now integrated in r rituals (ISKO Italia 2011), 
functions in the second edition only as expanding notation for other classes, called “emptying 
digit” (Park, Gnoli, and Morelli 2020, 41). For reasons of better readability, classification 
notations of the ILC and its verbal meaning will be set in a different font (cp. ISKO Italia 2004).  
While each main class can be divided into a free number of subclasses in the sense of 
types based on inclusion relations, the order of the resulting sibling classes can be arranged in 
the sense of levels based on dependence relations, at least where it seems to be appropriate 
(Gnoli 2017a). In the following example excerpted from the ILC, subclasses are indicated by an 
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additional Latin lower-case letter for each subdivision, while the alphabetical order of sibling 
classes indicates the increasing levels of organization (cp. Gnoli 2017a): 
m    organisms 
mn    fungi 
mp    plants 
mq    animals 
mqe   flatworms 
mqm   mollusca 
mqv   chordates 
This excerpt shows how the classification notation can provide information about both the 
structure or morphology and the origin or phylogeny of phenomena. On one hand, the mq- part 
of the notations means that flatworms, mollusca, and chordates share sufficient morphological 
features to identify them as different types of animals in contrast to fungi or plants, which in 
turn share sufficient morphological features with animals to identify all of them as types of 
organisms. On the other hand, the alphabetical order of the --e, --m, --v parts of the notations 
indicates that these sibling classes as different types of animals present a phylogenetic or 
evolutionary order, just like the sequence of -n fungi, -p plants, and -q animals. Note that 
the letter -a is always reserved to express attributes of a class (e.g., processes, properties and 
parts), which is why genuine subclasses begin with the letter -b (Gnoli 2020a). Important for this 
study, types and levels can also be used to classify phenomena of consciousness or cognition, 
which offers an important point of departure for an application of the organizing principle of 
Integrative Levels of Knowing. In fact, the ILC already entails, with explicit reference to Kleineberg 
(2018) in a scope note, a first attempt to represent levels of moral consciousness according to 
Kohlberg’s developmental stages: 
p    consciousness 
pc    perception 
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pe    emotion 
po    cognition 
      pod   attention 
poe   memory  
pou   moral consciousness 
   poud   punishment and obedience orientation 
   poug   instrumental exchange 
   pouj   pleasing expectations 
   poum   law and order orientation 
   poup   youthful protest 
   pous   utilitarian orientation 
   pouv   universal ethical principle orientation 
However, this excerpt of classification notations refers exclusively to the β dimension of 
phenomena, which means that Integrative Levels of Knowing like Kohlberg’s stages of moral 
consciousness are treated first and foremost as the subject matter or aboutness of a document, 
as it would be the case for books on moral development. But to treat them as genuine context 
information related to the γ dimension of perspectives like an author’s moral view, a further 
component of the ILC needs to be introduced.  
The third structural component, the facets, refers to categories that represent attributes 
of a given phenomenon like properties or relationships. In online environments like OPACs, 
resource discovery systems and product search engines, facets may function as search filter but 
are often limited to the δ dimension of documents and descriptive metadata like date, size, and 
language (Gnoli 2012). But the original notion of facets developed by the tradition of library 
classification initiated by Ranganathan (1989; 1992) refers to more substantive facets in relation 
to both the β dimension of phenomena and the γ dimension of perspectives. Gnoli (2017b) 
provides examples of facets as fundamental categories applied in KOSs that include 
Ranganathan’s famous PMEST formula (Personality, Matter, Energy, Space, Time), 
Bhattacharyya’s DEPA formula (Discipline, Entity, Property, Action), Giunchiglia’s DERA formula 
269 
(Domain, Entity, Relation, Attribute), and Vickery’s extension of the CRG’s faceted general 
scheme (i.e., thing, part, system, attribute, patient, relation and interaction, operation, agent, 
place and condition, time). Following this tradition, the ILC defines ten fundamental categories 
as facets, indicated by single digits. As an innovative feature, these facets can even be divided 
into subcategories by adding further digits to the notation, as illustrated in Table 6.3 for the facet 
of perspective: 
Table 6.3 Facets of the Integrative Levels Classification (2nd edition). 
Fundamental categories Subcategories of the perspective facet 
0 as for, relating to perspective, aspect, bias, 
viewpoint, phase relationship, dimension γ 
0 as for, relating to perspective, aspect, bias, 
viewpoint, phase relationship, dimension γ 
1 at time 01      as known in epoch 
2 in place 02      as known in locus 
3 by agent 03      as studied by method 
4 affected by disorder 04      subjected to difficulty, aporia, critics 
5 with transformation 05      applied to activity field, sphere, domain 
6 having property 06      according to theory 
7 with part 07      studied in discipline, field 
8 as form 08      illustrated by story, modality 
9 of kind 09      conveying communicative function, mood 
Source: Excerpted from ISKO Italia (2019). 
The idea of facets in the ILC is that they can be related to any other class of phenomena, which 
is why the ILC is called a freely-faceted KOS in contrast to bound faceted classifications like CC or 
BC2, in which facets are usually defined only in context to a given discipline (Gnoli 2017b). Within 
the classification notation, the facet usually follows the class of phenomena, for example, mq07 
means mq animals 07 studied in discipline, field. Besides such free or common facets 
expressing a general meaning across the whole classification scheme, the ILC also provides some 
special facets, indicated by subcategories of 9 of kind, that are defined locally to a given main 
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class and its subclasses. For example, the special facet 99 for the main class m organisms is 
defined as m99 organisms with sex, gender, whereas the same special facet 99 for the main 
class e atoms is defined as e99 atomic number (Gnoli 2017b). Thus, special facets have only 
local meaning and would be inappropriate for any other main class. Moreover, facets as 
categories can take different values or foci. For example, a facet like season could take the four 
values of winter, spring, summer, and autumn. Such values or foci can be any kind of phenomena 
and present either extra-defined foci that can be taken from other already existing parts of the 
classification scheme or context-defined foci that need to be established locally for a given facet 
(Gnoli 2017b). In general, ILC notations can consist of free combinations of classes with other 
classes, facets, and foci, while the citation order starts with the most important or significant 
element. The simplest way to combine different phenomena, keeping in mind that in the ILC 
everything can be considered to be a phenomenon, is to express an unqualified relationship or 
association indicated by a blank space between each element. For example, the notation mq k 
u represents documents about the main topic mq animals in some relation to the phenomena 
of k genes and u enterprises. A more qualified expression of relationships is offered by the 
combination of classes with facets and foci, the latter indicated by letters following digits. For 
example, the notation mq0k05u means mq animals 0 as for perspective, aspect k genes 05 
applied to activity field, sphere, or domain u enterprises. Using this analytico-
synthetic technique that breaks down a subject matter or context feature into its basic elements 
in order to combine these elements in complex notations, the ILC is able to relate elements 
within and across metadata dimensions. References within the β dimension of phenomena are 
made by using blank space (e.g., mq u means mq animals in some relation to u enterprises), 
while references to the γ dimension of perspectives are made by using the 0 facet or its 
subcategories (e.g., mq03 means mq animals 03 as studied by method), to the δ dimension of 
documents by using the 00 facet or its subcategories (e.g., mq009 means mq animals 009 in 
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document format), to the ε dimension of collections by using the 000 facet or its subcategories 
(e.g., mq0009 means mq animals 0009 kept in document collections), to the ζ dimension of 
information needs by using the 0000 facet or its subcategories (e.g., mq0000 means mq animals 
0000 relevant to information needs), and to the η dimension of people by using the 00000 
facet or its subcategories (e.g., mq00000 means mq animals 00000 relevant to people). 
Finally, the fourth structural component, the themes and rhemes, refers to the aboutness 
or the topics of documents and their differentiation according to relevance and pertinence. In 
the ILC project, a theme is defined as a subject in a statement or document (Gnoli 2018a). The 
notations of a theme consist of basic classes of phenomena with or without facets and foci. 
Several themes of a single document can be separated by blank space, while the citation order 
should prioritize the most significant base theme by notating it before other particular themes 
(Gnoli 2018a). This allows to cluster and weight documents with similar themes that might be 
relevant for a given user query. As an innovative feature, the ILC defines a rheme, a term 
borrowed from linguistics, as the comment or new element of information concerning a given 
theme (Gnoli 2018a). The example provided by Gnoli (2018a, 46) is a research article describing 
how the diet of wolves in Liguria is affected by the greater or lesser abundance of wild cervids, 
which would have “diet of wolves in Liguria” as its theme and “is affected by cervids abundance” 
as its rheme. While traditional subject indexing often only considers the theme part, Gnoli 
(2018a) argues with reference to Bella H. Weinberg that the rheme part is of particular 
importance for expert researchers who are usually aware of the existing body of literature 
concerning a given theme but are in need of additional information to make a relevance decision 
according to their specialized information needs. In the terminology of information retrieval, 
although not used by the ILC project, this theme/rheme distinction is closely related to the 
difference between “topical relevance” and “cognitive relevance” or “pertinence” (Cosijn and 
Ingwersen 2000, 537), in which the latter also depends on the current state of knowledge of a 
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user. According to Gnoli (2018a), the expression of rhemes is often related to the linguistic 
function called deixis, that is, a reference to an actual object in context rather than an abstract 
class of phenomena. Depending on these contexts, deictic words (e.g., here, now, tomorrow, 
there, those, later) may vary in their pointing meaning but can help to qualify a rheme. The ILC 
provides some special classes, indicated by Latin upper-case letters, to represent such deictic 
functions (see Table 6.4): 
Table 6.4 Special classes of the Integrative Levels Classification (2nd edition). 
Special classes 
A those 
B the 1st ones 
C the 2nd ones 
D-T (etc.) 
U the typical 
V the entirety 
W together with 
X something 
Y the actual 
Z the mentioned 
Source: Excerpted from ISKO Italia (2019). 
To give just one example, the special class Y, notated after an element, stands for a specific 
specimen of a class (e.g., mqvtoccg means gray wolves, Canis lupus in general but mqvtoccgY 
means these actual gray wolves, Canis lupus) or a facet (e.g., 36 means influenced by 
factor in general but 36Y means actually influenced by factor). Taking the example of the 
research article from above, its theme and rheme could be expressed as the complex ILC 
notation mqvtoccg5osk36Ymqvtur2ttfad (i.e., mqvtoccg wolves 5 through change osk 
feeding 36Y influenced by these actual mqvtur deers, cervidae 2 in location ttfad 
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Liguria). As a documentary language, as emphasized by Gnoli (2018), classes and facets in 
combination with such special classes are expressive enough to translate natural language 
statements into ILC notations. A set of such statements about phenomena can be considered to 
form a knowledge base, as known from semantic web technologies like formal ontologies. In 
fact, the second edition of the ILC is already available in SKOS format (Simple Knowledge 
Organization System) as a standard to support knowledge organization systems within the 
framework of the semantic web (Park, Gnoli, and Morelli 2020; Binding et al. 2020). 
As Gnoli (2020a) admits, it is highly unlikely that any new KOS like the ILC is able to 
compete with traditional general classifications like the widely used DDC, UDC, or LCC. 
Nevertheless, practical applications of the ILC include the Basel Register of Thesauri, Ontologies 
and Classifications (BARTOC), the BioAcoustic Reference Database (BARD), the Friuli Venezia 
Giulia Regional Laboratory of Environmental Education (LaREA), the Dandelion Bibliography of 
Facet Analysis, and the website Where the Apennine Begins (Gnoli 2020a). The value of the 
experimental Integrative Levels Classification can be seen in its study of the functions and effects 
of some innovative features in KOSs. For the present study, the most important feature is the 
rich potential of context representation, particularly, regarding the epistemological dimension of 
authorial perspectives. The next section will discuss how the expressiveness of the ILC’s context 
representation can be further improved by a cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge 
organization. 
 
6.1.2 A Methodological Critique 
The main argument of this case study is that the phenomenon-based facet-analytical approach 
to knowledge organization in its current state, exemplified by Claudio Gnoli’s international 
project Integrative Levels Classification, appears to be limited to a context representation mainly 
focusing on the differentiation or analysis of epistemic contexts without an integration or 
synthesis into a systematic organization. As described in Chapter Two, this challenge could be 
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termed, modified after Henry E. Bliss, as “context-index illusion” since a mere alphabetical order 
or term list of different epistemic contexts is in danger to lead to disorder and dispersion. It will 
be argued that the proposed cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge organization is 
able to offer two novel organizing principles for a more systematic approach that meets Bliss’s 
(1933) principle of maximal efficiency based on the strategies of collocation and subordination. 
This will be demonstrated with regard to the γ dimension of perspectives that is expressed with 
the 0 facet and its subcategories. However, the following methodological critique is not intended 
to reject the phenomenon-based facet-analytical approach in favor of the cognitive-
developmental approach but to emphasize the potential contribution of the latter to the former. 
This is in line with Bliss (1933) who considers the analytic division of basic units of a KOS as a 
necessary first step before their collocative and systematic synthesis. But before the novel 
organizing principles will be outlined, two further issues concerning the theoretical and 
methodological foundations of the ILC should be discussed in more detail, namely, the 
underlying concept of phenomenon and the underlying model of the integrative levels.  
The first issue, the concept of phenomenon, is related to the basic units of the ILC and its 
ontological and epistemological status. Although Gnoli (2011) concedes that phenomena as 
perceived by human beings are always influenced by both the ontological and epistemological 
dimensions, his ontological approach tends to consider phenomena as “neutral objects of 
knowledge, independent from any approach or viewpoint by which they can be treated” (ISKO 
Italia 2007, 8). This would imply that “the same phenomenon can be considered and discussed 
under different perspectives” like disciplines, domains of discourse, cultural contexts, as well as 
theories and methods (Gnoli 2017b, 55). As outlined in Chapter Two, this conception presents 
the standpoint of modernist contextualism in contrast to a postmodernist contextualism, 
following the terminology of Brenda Dervin (2003). Modernist contextualism treats epistemic 
contexts as analytic factors that can be separated from the object of interest, the phenomenon. 
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But such an objectified notion of context is challenged by postmodern contextualism that 
criticizes the essentialist and foundationalist assumption of an external, observer-independent 
world awaiting discovery. Instead, a fully implemented contextualism or perspectivism should 
acknowledge that the ontological and epistemological dimensions are inextricably intertwined, 
as stated by Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman (2009, 35): 
Perspectivalists maintain that mind—far from being a mirror that passively receives 
independent phenomena—plays an active role in co-constructing phenomena. 
Methodologies not only reveal, but also in some respect constitute the phenomena under 
investigation. What we call “facts,” in other words, are not ready-made but emerge in a 
complex process of perceptual, emotional, and cognitive negotiation between knower and 
known. 
The crucial consequence for phenomenon-based KOSs like the ILC should be a revision of the 
concept of phenomenon in the way that each phenomenon needs to be considered as a relation 
between a known object and a knowing subject situated within the social context of an epistemic 
community (Kleineberg 2013a). This means that the analytical distinction between phenomena 
and perspectives, which is fundamental for the dimensions defined by the ILC project, should 
abandon the notion of an “intendedly neutral scheme” (Gnoli 2011, 95). Apparently, Gnoli 
(2008b, 142) considers the advancement in the history of knowledge as a trend towards more 
and more neutral descriptions of reality, as his terminology seems to suggest: 
The concept of, say, the magic attributes of a given plant in a traditional culture could be 
accounted for in a place in the scheme reflecting the classification of the world from that 
viewpoint, and at the same time be linked to the definition of that plant in the basic 
neutral scheme. 
But even a basic scheme containing classes of phenomena defined according to the recent 
scientific worldview still remains a product of this particular worldview and should not be 
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described ahistorically as something reflecting a neutral perspective or a view from nowhere (cp. 
Kleineberg 2013a). This does not prevent a non-neutral basic scheme to function to some extent 
as a commonly shared reference point and switching device that allows to relate divergent 
perspectives within a KOS. For example, Ken Wilber’s (2000, 5) AQAL framework with its “broad 
orienting generalizations” seeks to integrate multiple perspectives without claiming neutrality.  
It is also important to note, as emphasized by Birger Hjørland (2013a) in his critical 
evaluation of facet analysis, that the philosophical assumption of the analytico-synthetic 
technique seems to be that concepts or classes of phenomena do not change their meaning in 
different contexts. According to Hjørland (2013a), this assumptions conflicts with recent theories 
of meaning and also with Thomas S. Kuhn’s thesis of incommensurability. Therefore, it appears 
to be problematic to use a “set of preestablished classes” (Hjørland 2013a, 555) in alternative 
orderings to express different perspectives. Hjørland (2008a) gives the example that chemicals 
might be described by chemists in terms of their structural properties, whereas pharmacologists 
would describe them in terms of their medical effect. New conceptual structures, as Hjørland 
(2013a) concludes, require new classification systems. In defense of such a criticism, Szostak, 
Gnoli, and Lopez-Huertas (2016, 205) argue that different classification systems for different 
context-specific conceptual structures in the sense of the domain-analytical approach are not 
sufficient to meet the demands of interdisciplinary knowledge organization: 
But while views may differ within a domain, some of the most important differences occur 
across domains and thus will be obscured by an exclusive reliance on domain analysis. 
To avoid barriers between communities with different perspectives, a general KOS should enable 
users to shift perspectives within one system (Szostak, Gnoli, and López-Huertas 2016). The 
phenomenon-based facet-analytical approach seeks to reduce ambiguity by using the analytico-
synthetic technique to distinguish phenomena, relations between phenomena, and authorial 
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perspectives. Taking the example from above, chemicals would be classified according to their 
structural properties in terms of levels of organization, located higher than atoms and lower than 
cells, while their medical effects would be expressed by a facet of causal links, such as the 
fundamental category 3 by agent, cause, external factor or its subcategories (Gnoli and 
Szostak 2009). Even though chemists and pharmacologists have different perspectives on 
chemicals they should generally agree about their structural properties and medical effects. 
Thus, both of them might benefit from a KOS that allows to take the perspective of the other 
(Kleineberg 2016b). A different case is the historical change of concepts (e.g., time and space in 
the physics of Aristotle, Newton, and Einstein) and what one might call the simultaneity of the 
non-simultaneous in situations where traditional, modern, and postmodern views confront each 
other in current discourses on the supposedly “same” phenomenon (Kleineberg 2016b). While 
it is true that historical paradigm shifts result to some extent in incommensurable concepts, 
there is often an overarching continuity that holds them together within a developmental logic 
of the transformation of these concepts. For example, the concept of time in classical mechanics, 
although radically reinterpreted by the theory of general relativity, is largely integrated as a 
special case in the historically later and more comprehensive framework (Thagard 1992; cp. 
Appendix B: Table B.12). But even without such a continuity it should be possible to refer to a 
kind of “basic concepts” (Szostak, Gnoli, and López-Huertas 2016, 68) that are less ambiguous 
compared to complex concepts and that may function as common reference points interrelating 
a variety of perspectives or epistemic contexts. For example, the incommensurable concepts of 
time in the history of paradigms in physics or physical thinking in general could be expressed in 
ILC by means of the basic concept or class bb time combined with facets and foci as follows: 
bb02syb   bb time 02 as known in locus syb Mesopotamian civilization 
bb06yiyagm  bb time 06 according to theory yiyagm Aristotelism 
bb01rabpU  bb time 01 as known in epoch rabpU Middle Ages  
bb06yisdc  bb time 06 according to theory yisdc classical mechanics 
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bb06yisdt   bb time 06 according to theory yisdt general relativity 
bb0yase   bb time 0 as for yase common sense 
Note that the ILC allows several ways of shortening complex notations for a more economical 
use but the examples presented in this study are primarily intended to demonstrate the basic 
idea of combining notational elements and, therefore, it will be refrained from introducing 
further details (Gnoli 2020a). The decisive point is that KOSs based on such basic concepts do 
not present a neutral scheme but one that privileges the mainstream view of today. The mere 
fact that in the arrangement of the ILC the class bb time presents a subclass of the main class b 
spacetime shows exemplarily the topical and time-bound character of the underlying frame of 
reference that appears to be inappropriate for more traditional notions of time. But this hardly 
avoidable conceptual ambiguity needs to be acknowledged and intentionally applied by any 
phenomenon-based approach (Kleineberg 2013a). It should be noted, however, that the 
challenge of conceptual ambiguity also applies to domain-specific KOSs since even demarcated 
epistemic communities have to deal with different authorial perspectives and, therefore, 
incommensurable concepts that need to be represented in relation to the privileged domain-
specific frame of reference. A revised concept of phenomenon that acknowledges the 
inextricably intertwined relation between the ontological dimension and the epistemological 
dimension helps to better understand the limitations of any phenomenon-based KOS that seeks 
to integrate multiple perspectives. 
The second issue, the model of integrative levels, refers to the organizing principle of levels 
as a structural component of the ILC scheme and its role for context representation. As discussed 
in Chapter Three, the architecture of level models depends on the strategy to deal with 
categorically orthogonal realms, such as material, mental, and social phenomena. Since the ILC 
prefers a linear sequence of main classes, the integrative character of levels cannot be 
maintained and the notion of levels of integration needs to be replaced by the less qualified 
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notion of levels of organization (Kleineberg 2017). For the latter, higher levels depend 
chronologically and logically on lower levels but they do not need to include hierarchically the 
structures and properties of their predecessors. This means that while the principle of 
consecutiveness (dependence relation) still holds, the principles of gradation by specialty 
(genus-species relation) and successive parthood (part-whole relation) are abandoned 
(Kleineberg 2017). For this reason, the ILC is forced to introduce a distinction between types as 
genus-species relations and levels as dependence relations. An alternative strategy is offered, for 
example, by Wilber’s AQAL framework that gives up the strict linearity and presents a model of 
integrative levels in the proper sense based on the co-evolution of four sequences of levels that 
distinguish subjective, objective, intersubjective, and interobjective phenomena (Kleineberg 
2016a). One advantage of such non-linear level models is that they are able to avoid the 
“individual/collective inconsistency” (Kleineberg 2017, 358) that violates the condition of 
asymmetry for strict order relations inherent in level hierarchies. For example, the sequence of 
the main classes of the ILC presents a linear order in which “q language is placed at the  beginning 
of cultural phenomena, as it emerges from human mind p” (Gnoli 2020a, no pagination). In other 
words, the level of mind (individual phenomena) precedes the level of culture (collective 
phenomena). Note that in Nicolai Hartmann’s (1940) original level model that is taken as an 
explicit reference for the ILC project the personal spirit (i.e., mind) and the objective spirit or 
objectivated spirit (i.e., culture) are considered to build a tripartite stratum or level in which all 
of them have the same structural height because they are interdependent (Kleineberg 2016a). 
Accordingly, culture depends on mind, but mind depends on culture as well. The decisive point 
is that such mutual dependence relations cannot be expressed in a linear order without violating 
the asymmetry of level hierarchies as strict orders stating if 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑦𝑦 then 𝑦𝑦 < 𝑥𝑥 does not hold 
(Kleineberg 2017). Consequently, dependence relations of the ILC do not necessarily follow the 
principles of later-in-time, later-in-evolution, and increasing complexity. As Gnoli (2020a, no 
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pagination) admits, “dependence of a level on another is a kind of associative relationship,” 
which means for documentary languages that such levels do not present hierarchical relations 
in the proper sense but merely less expressive association relations.  
While it appears to be rather unlikely that the ILC will be restructured according to a non-
linear model of integrative levels, it would be a major improvement of the ILC if there was an 
indication, such as entries in scope notes of the corresponding superordinate class, in which 
cases sibling classes are related by levels of integration, by levels of organization, or by no levels 
at all. As shown in the previous section, the sibling subclasses of moral consciousness are 
arranged according to genuine integrative levels, while the sibling subclasses of organisms and 
the succeeding sibling subclasses of animals are arranged according to levels of organization 
following the phylogenetic principle of later-in-evolution, whereas the sibling subclasses of 
consciousness or the succeeding sibling subclasses of cognition are arranged without 
recognizable organizing principles. These distinctions become crucial for a context 
representation in terms of Integrative Levels of Knowing since one of its strengths can be found 
in its multiple inherent order relations that offer an informational added value, as outlined in 
Chapter Three.  
In short, a systematic context representation should be based on comprehensive and 
informationally rich organizing principles. The proposed cognitive-developmental approach to 
knowledge organization offers two of them, one for a classification of methods or methodologies 
and another one for a classification of viewpoints or perspectives. The remainder of this case 
study demonstrates how the organizing principles of Integral Methodological Pluralism and 
Integrative Levels of Knowing could help to improve the expressiveness of context representation 
in the ILC. 
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6.2 Organizing Principles for the Classification of Epistemic Contexts 
6.2.1 Method Classification: Integral Methodological Pluralism 
This section is concerned with a comprehensive and systematic classification of methods and 
thus with a particular kind of “authorial perspective” (Szostak 2015, 64) or context feature of 
documents. It will be shown to what extent the ILC’s representation of methods can benefit from 
the organizing principle of Integral Methodological Pluralism.  
Currently, methods or methodologies can be expressed by means of the ILC’s perspective 
facet 03 as studied by method and its subcategories (see Table 6.5). 
Table 6.5 Method facets and foci of the Integrative Levels Classification (2nd edition). 
Facet Focus 
0 as for, relating to perspective, aspect, bias, viewpoint, 
phase relationship, dimension γ 
  
03      as studied by method   
031           as studied through step   
032           as studied in environment yak study environments 
033           as studied using source ys34w artifacts 
037           using tool ab individuals 
038           taking example, study case, sample, specimen   
039           as studied by research method yam research methods, approaches 
Source: Excerpted from ISKO Italia (2019). 
Since the ILC notation of facets is based on the decimal principle, there would be room for nine 
subcategories of the general method facet but for the time being only six of them are defined. 
The most important subcategory for this study is the facet 039 as studied by research method. 
As can be seen in Table 6.5, some of the facets are linked to defined foci as already existing 
classes of phenomena and its subclasses. For example, the facet 032 as studied in 
environment is linked to the class yak study environments and its subclasses, namely, yakf 
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the field, yaki captivity, yakl laboratory, and yaks desk, office. Likewise, the facet 039 
as studied by research method is linked to the class yam research methods, approaches 
and its numerous subclasses and even sub-subclasses. Table 6.6 offers an overview of all research 
methods that are currently defined in the ILC scheme, partly oriented on Szostak’s (2004) listing 
of research methods, as a scope note reports. 
Table 6.6 Representation of research methods in the Integrative Levels Classification (2nd edition). 
Class  
yam research methods, approaches yamhp           playback 
yamb      observation yami      case study 
yambd           discrete observation yamj      interview 
yambp           participant observation yamk      survey, questionnaire 
yamc      experience, intuition yaml      review of bibliographical sources 
yamd      examination of physical tracks yamlt           textual analysis 
yame      sensing, detection, measurement yamm      mathematical analysis, processing 
yamea           censusing, counting yamn      probability estimation 
yames           satillite imagery yamo      statistical analysis 
yamet           telemetry, remote sensing yamod           descriptive statistics 
yamett                acoustic telemetry yamoi           inferential statistics 
yametu                ultrasonic telemetry yams      modeling, simulation 
yamf      recording yamsg           game theoretic models 
yamfa           taking notes yamu      mapmaking 
yamfc           taking pictures yamv      comparison, comparative method 
yamfn           sound recording yamx      classification, systematics, taxonomy 
yamfv           filming yamxn           numerical taxonomy, phenetic 
yamg      marking, labeling, tagging yamxp           evolutionary analysis, phylogenetic 
yamh      experimentation, stimulation yamxq           cladistic analysis 
Source: Excerpted from ISKO Italia (2019). 
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This classification of research methods covers a broad range of common research practices and 
techniques and offers a comparatively rich vocabulary that can be used for the context 
representation of authorial perspectives. From a systematic point of view, however, this 
classification also appears to be limited in several ways since the strategies of collocation and 
subordination are only applied to a rather initial extent. For example, the first hierarchy level of 
subclasses of yam research methods (e.g., yamb observation, yamc experience, intuition, 
yamd examination of physical tracks, yamj interview, yamo statistical analysis, yamu 
mapmaking, yamv comparison, comparative method) present a mere listing without 
recognizable organizing principles, neither systematically nor alphabetically. Note that the 
strictly succeeding alphabetical order is occasionally replaced by a mnemonic technique in which 
single letters from the verbal caption are used for the notation (e.g., yambd discrete 
observation; yambp participant observation).  
For the user, it is not obvious why the currently defined research methods are arranged in 
that particular order, if and how research methods that are collocated next to each other are 
thematically related, and whether or not this listing of research methods is supposed to be 
comprehensive or merely an exemplary collection. The same questions arise for the next 
hierarchy level of sub-subclasses (e.g., yamod descriptive statistics, yamoi inferential 
statistics), although these specifications or types clearly present the strategy of 
subordination. In other words, the ILC’s representation of research methods presents itself in 
the form of a term list added by a few hierarchical relations that indicate specifications of given 
research methods. But in contrast to a systematic and comprehensive classification deduced 
from basic principles of organization, this listing appears to be inductively derived and open for 
further complements and specifications. These methodological limitations can be described in 
the terminology introduced in Chapter Three as an empirical-pragmatic approach that might 
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benefit from a complementary formal-pragmatic approach concerned with more general 
patterns of epistemic contexts (Kleineberg 2016c).  
In the following, such a formal-pragmatic approach will be outlined in the form of Ken 
Wilber’s (2006) Integral Methodological Pluralism derived from his AQAL framework. As initial 
orientation, a conceptual differentiation between methods in the narrower sense and 
methodologies in the broader sense may be helpful. As noted by Dervin (2003), the notion of 
methodology is often reduced to method, although it refers rather to the theoretical analysis of 
methods. For this reason, Hjørland (2000) argues for a clear-cut distinction between methods as 
applied research techniques and methodologies that are concerned with problems of 
epistemology or the philosophy of science. Furthermore, Cibangu (2010) emphasizes that both 
methods and methodologies as sets of such methods are grounded in foundational paradigms. 
But while methodologies and paradigms by themselves can be very numerous and dynamic, the 
IMP seeks to identify some major “methodological families” (Esbjörn-Hargens 2006, 84) that are 
limited in number and stable over time. In this regard, the AQAL framework offers a typology of 




The typology of the IMP is closely related to Habermas’s (2003a) typologies of perspectives (i.e., 
first person, second person, third person) and world relations (i.e., subjective, social, objective) 
and its underlying formal-pragmatic distinctions reflect important methodological distinctions 
commonly labeled as qualitative methodologies vs. quantitative methodologies (Hjørland 2000; 
Dervin 2003; Ma 2012; Chu 2015), methodological individualism vs. methodological collectivism 
(Hjørland 1997; Ritzer 2001), and inside views vs. outside views (Ma 2012). In Figure 6.1, the first 
two distinctions are depicted by the borderlines that demarcate the four quadrants, while the 
third distinction is depicted by a dotted circle within each quadrant.  
In more detail, the qualitative/quantitative distinction refers first and foremost to the kind 
of phenomenon or object under investigation, that is, interior phenomena (e.g., perceptions, 
emotions, thoughts, cultural worldviews, historical horizons) or exterior phenomena (e.g., 
Figure 6.1  Methodological zones of the AQAL framework (based on  
Wilber 2006, 36, 39: Figures 1.2, 1.4). 
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chemical substances, cellular networks, organismic behavior, human bodies, technical 
infrastructures). While quantitative methodologies are characteristic for the natural sciences 
using the so-called scientific method based on empirical or positivist epistemologies, the social 
sciences and humanities concerned with human-related phenomena can apply both quantitative 
and qualitative methods or a mix of them. This depends on the given research focus on interior 
aspects that require interpretation and qualitative analysis or exterior aspects that can be 
measured and quantified in numbers. But as emphasized by Olson (2013), there is often a lack 
of coherent definitions of qualitative and quantitative research since to some extent qualitatively 
gathered data can also be quantified and quantitatively gathered data are also open to 
interpretation. Furthermore, Olson (2013) argues that the quantitative/qualitative distinction is 
less a matter of chosen methods but more related to the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions of researchers, such as positivist or objectivist paradigms in contrast to interpretive 
or subjectivist paradigms. Therefore, it is important to note that the IMP’s 
qualitative/quantitative distinction is defined in a narrower sense restricted to interior-related 
and exterior-related methodologies with the advantage to present a clear-cut distinction. 
The individual/collective distinction refers to the singular or plural form of the investigated 
phenomenon. In the social sciences, the common distinction between methodological 
individualism and methodological collectivism or holism refers to the focus of explanation as 
either related to the subjective world of an individual or to the social world of groups, cultures, 
and institutions (Ritzer 2001). More generally, the IMP’s individual/collective distinction applies 
not exclusively to human-related phenomena but to micro-level explanations (e.g., parts, 
elements, individuals) and macro-level explanations (e.g., wholes, systems, groups) in a broader 
sense. 
Finally, the inside/outside distinction refers to the direct or indirect view of a researcher in 
relation to the phenomenon under investigation. For example, the study of subjective 
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phenomena like human consciousness can be approached either from an inside view when a 
researcher observes directly the own consciousness to which she or he has privileged first-hand 
access or from an outside view when a researcher observes indirectly the consciousness of other 
persons by means of psychometric tests, interviews, or other second-hand experiences. For the 
study of intersubjective phenomena like human culture, Ma (2012, 1864) describes the 
inside/outside distinction in a very similar terminology: 
To attain an insider, participant view and an intersubjective understanding of the culture, 
the researcher must take a position (including the first-, second-, and third-person 
positions) with the cultural group, for observing as an “outsider” or a “neutral researcher” 
(i.e., maintaining a third-person position without taking a first- or second-person position) 
implies a subject-object relationship with the cultural group. 
Likewise, the study of objective phenomena like the exterior aspects of an organism can be 
approached either from an inside view that investigates how an organism like a frog or a bat is 
able to register its environment through its own materiality (e.g., sensory organs, neural 
impulses) or from an outside view that also takes aspects into account that cannot be registered 
by the investigated organism itself (cp. Maturana and Varela 1987). In a similar way, 
interobjective phenomena like the exterior aspects of social systems can be approached either 
from an inside view that investigates how a social system like the economic system or the law 
system interacts with its environment or from an outside view that also takes aspects into 
account that are not part of the reality of the investigated social system (cp. Luhmann 1986). 
The main advantage of these three formal-pragmatic distinctions is that they present 
general patterns that apply to any epistemic context in which methods or methodologies are 
used, such as scientific disciplines or epistemic communities. This means that the deduced eight 
methodological zones of the IMP present a systematic order of basic methodological approaches 
that are limited in number, stable over time, and comprehensive in coverage (see Table 6.7). 
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Table 6.7 Methodological zones according to the Integral Methodological Pluralism. 
Formal-pragmatic distinctions Methodological 
zone 
Representative methodology 
Qualitative Individual Inside #1 Phenomenological analysis (e.g., Husserl) 
Outside #2 Cognitive analysis (e.g., Piaget) 
Collective Inside #3 Hermeneutic analysis (e.g., Gadamer) 
Outside #4 Structuralist analysis (e.g., Lévi-Strauss) 
Quantitative Individual Inside #5 Autopoietic analysis (e.g., Maturana and Varela) 
Outside #6 Behavioral analysis (e.g., Skinner) 
Collective Inside #7 Autopoietic social systems analysis (e.g., Luhmann) 
Outside #8 Social systems analysis (e.g., Bertalanffy) 
Source: Based on Kleineberg (2016c, 137: Table 2). 
As an organizing principle for KOSs, the IMP also supports the collocation of thematically related 
methods or methodologies. In this regard, the qualitative/quantitative distinction appears to be 
the most common point of departure followed by the distinctions between methodological 
individualism and methodological collectivism, as well as inside views and outside views. Since 
the IMP emphasizes both the methodological pluralism and the complementary character of 
methodological zones, this organizing principle seems to be well suited to guide interdisciplinary 
and multi-methods research. First, it helps to disambiguate mixed-methods approaches by 
differentiating techniques and research practices according to methodological zones. Second, it 
helps to visualize the complementary character of these methodological zones by locating the 
counterparts of a given zone within the AQAL framework. Third, it helps to identify potential 
methodological reductionism of given research projects by revealing neglected methodological 
zones. And fourth, it helps to explicate the often only implicitly applied methods or 
methodologies from the research literature or other documents in terms of methodological 
zones by asking three simple questions (Kleineberg 2016c):  
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1. Is it a qualitative or quantitative approach?  
2. Is the focus on an individual or collective?  
3. Is it an inside or outside view?  
In this way, the inductively derived and rather randomly selected research methods that are 
currently represented in the ILC can be related to the more systematic organization of 
methodological zones in order to gain a more expressive or informationally more rich 
documentary language that allows to identify overlapping methods, to collocate similar 
methods, and to detect missing method. For example, the method yamh experimentation 
should be disambiguated into quantitative approaches (e.g., chemical experiments) and 
qualitative approaches (e.g., psychological experiments). Furthermore, the family of qualitative 
methods including yambp participant observation, yamj interview, or yamlt textual 
analysis should be collocated next to each other or within a common superordinate class. 
Finally, representative methods of apparently neglected methodological zones, such as zone #5 
(e.g., autopoietic analysis) and zone #7 (e.g., social autopoietic analysis) should be added to the 
ILC’s representation of research methods. 
In principle, such an IMP-based analysis can be applied to any domain of inquiry. For 
example, Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman (2009) use the IMP for the domain of ecology, 
environmental studies, and ecological thought by analyzing and indexing the underlying 
authorial perspectives of documents in terms of methodological zones. Table 6.8 presents a 
small sample from their study that covers more than 200 different approaches within this highly 





Table 6.8 Examples of method analysis and indexing based on Integral Methodological Pluralism. 
Document Approach  Perspective on nature (within the domain of 
ecology and environmental studies) 
Methodological 
zone 
Cybernetics. Or the 
Control and 
Communication in the 
Animal and the 
Machine by Norbert 
Wiener, 1961 
Cybernetics Cybernetics is the study of communication, 
information exchange, and feedback loops 
within organisms, machines, and social 
systems. 
#7, #8 
The Selfish Gene by 




Neo-Darwinism has come to be associated 
with the modern evolutionary synthesis, 





Realization of the Living 
by Humberto Maturana 
and Francisco Varela, 
1980 
Autopoiesis theory Autopoiesis theory describes how 
organisms, which are self-organizing, 
cognize and react to their environment. 
#5, #6 
Neuroethology by Jörg-
Peter Ewert, 1980 
Neuroethology Neuroethology is the study of the 
neurological aspects of natural animal 
behavior. 
#6 
Dwelling, Place, and 
Environment. Towards a 
Phenomenology of 
Person and World, 





Ecological phenomenology utilizes the 
methodologies of phenomenological inquiry 
to “resee” ecological and natural 
phenomena freed from our habitual ways of 
conceiving and experiencing, thereby 
opening up new horizons of perception and 
action. 
#1, #3 
Cultural Ecology by 
Robert Netting, 1986  
Cultural ecology Cultural ecology draws ideas from 
evolutionary biology (e.g., “adaptation” and 
“niche”) to study the ways that the natural 
environment contributes to cultural and 
social realities in tribal and rural contexts. 
#3, #4, #8 
Development and 
Evolution. Complexity 
and Change in Biology 
by Stan Salthe, 1993 
Developmental 
systems dynamics 
Developmental systems ecology is the study 
of how ecological systems store increasing 
amounts of information as they develop. 
#1, #2, #3, #4 
5#, #6, 7#, #8 
Comparative 
Psychology. A 




Comparative psychology is the comparison 
of behaviors between species as a means of 
gaining insight into their structures of 
psychology, cognitive processes, and 
learning capacity. 
#2, #5, #6 
Cybersemiotics. Why 
Information Is Not 
Enough by Søren Brier, 
2008 
Cybersemiotics Cybersemiotics is a transdisciplinary 
nonreductionist approach to cognition and 
communication that studies the exchange 
of information and meaning in organisms. 
#1, #3, 5#, #7 
Source: Excerpted from Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman (2009, 489-530: Appendix). 
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For an integration of the IMP to the Integrative Levels Classification, it seems to be fruitful to 
define a further subcategory of the perspective facet 03 as studied by method, for example, 
034 as studied by methodological zone with an entry in the scope note that these zones are 
defined according to Wilber’s (2006) Integral Methodological Pluralism. Likewise, there should 
be a suggested link to the defined foci, that is, a class of phenomena located as a sibling class to 
yam research methods, such as yan methodological zones. The simplest way to represent the 
methodological zones in the ILC would be to define sibling subclasses of yan methodological 
zones notated in alphabetical order as follows: 
yanb   qualitative, individual, inside methodology (zone #1) 
yanc  qualitative, individual, outside methodology (zone #2) 
yand  qualitative, collective, inside methodology (zone #3) 
yane  qualitative, collective, outside methodology (zone #4) 
yanf  quantitative, individual, inside methodology (zone #5) 
yang  quantitative, individual, outside methodology (zone #6) 
yanh  quantitative, collective, inside methodology (zone #7) 
yani  quantitative, collective, outside methodology (zone #8) 
A more sophisticated way of classifying methodological zones would be to apply the strategy of 
subordination by using formal-pragmatic features that are inherited in hierarchical relations. In 
this case the strictly succeeding alphabetical order should be replaced by the commonly applied 
mnemonic technique of the ILC in which single letters from the verbal caption are used for the 
notation: 
yanl   qualitative methodology 
yanlb   qualitative methodological individualism 
yanlbi  inside view (zone #1) 
yanlbo  outside view (zone #2) 
yanlc   qualitative methodological collectivism 
yanlci  inside view (zone #3) 
yanlco  outside view (zone #4) 
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yann   quantitative methodology 
yannb   quantitative methodological individualism 
yannbi  inside view (zone #5) 
yannbo  outside view (zone #6) 
yannc   quantitative methodological collectivism 
yannci  inside view (zone #7) 
yannco  outside view (zone #8) 
This way of classifying methodological zones has the additional advantage that not all formal-
pragmatic distinctions need to be specified since thematically related zones are collocated to 
some extent. A document can be indexed without qualifying the inside/outside distinction (e.g., 
yanlb qualitative methodological individualism) or even the individual/collective 
distinction (e.g., yann quantitative methodology). Thus, these strategies of subordination and 
collocation provide a better support for users searching for similar or complementing research 
methods or methodologies.  
Finally, an ILC notation of authorial perspectives in terms of methodological zones needs 
to combine a class of phenomena as the document’s subject matter and a facet with a focus as 
the author’s epistemic context. Taking Jörg-Peter Ewert’s Neuroethology from the previous table 
as an exemplary document, its complex ILC notation could be expressed as mqaon034yannbo (i.e., 
mqaon animal nervous system 034 as studied by methodological zone yannbo 
quantitative methodological individualism, outside view (zone #6)).  
 
6.2.2 Viewpoint Classification: Integrative Levels of Knowing 
This section is concerned with a comprehensive and systematic classification of viewpoints and 
thus with another kind of “authorial perspective” (Szostak 2015, 64) or context feature of 
documents. It will be shown to what extent the ILC’s representation of viewpoints can benefit 
from the organizing principle of Integrative Levels of Knowing.  
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Currently, viewpoints in the broadest sense can be expressed by means of the ILC’s facet 
0 perspective and its numerous subcategories, as listed in Table 6.3. At least three of its 
subcategories also provide suggested links to classes of phenomena as defined foci, namely, the 
subcategory 06 according to theory refers to the class ye theories, the subcategory 07 
studied in discipline, field refers to the class yi disciplines, and the subcategory 08 
illustrated by story, modality refers to the class yaq veracity. But the ILC’s classification 
scheme offers many more classes of phenomena that may function as foci for the facet of 
perspective. First and foremost, the main class y knowledge and its subclasses cover a broad 
range of further kinds of viewpoints, such as y95 by knowledge process, yas style of 
thought, yasw world views, or yev paradigms. Additionally, there are many other classes that 
appear to be useful in combination with the facet of perspective like p consciousness, po 
cognition, qaq communicative functions, r rituals (e.g., tradition, mores, spirituality, 
religion), st people (e.g., nations, ethnic groups, ethnicities), and sy civilizations. In other 
words, the Integrative Levels Classification already provides an extraordinary rich vocabulary for 
the representation of epistemic contexts in terms of viewpoint.  
From a systematic point of view, however, most of these attempts to classify authorial 
perspectives appear to be limited in several ways. On one hand, particular typologies or listings 
for different kinds of viewpoints like disciplines or worldviews often present only exemplary 
collections that are not even intended to be general in scope. On the other hand, the strategies 
of collocation and subordination are only applied to a rather initial extent due to a lack of 
adequate principles of organization. For example, the subclasses of yas styles of thought and 
yasw world views are apparently neither comprehensively nor systematically organized but 
represent rather flat term lists (see Table 6.9). 
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Table 6.9 Representation of styles of thought in the Integrative Levels Classification (2nd edition). 
Class 
yas styles of thought 
yase      common sense, popular knowledge 
yasm      magic thought 
yass      scientific thought, rational enquiry 
yasw      world views, Weltanschauungs, lifestances, general beliefs 
yaswb           spiritualism 
yaswd           vitalism 
yaswg           mechanism 
yaswm           emergentism 
yaswn           general systems theory 
yasws           cognitivism 
yaswu           hermeneutics 
Source: Excerpted from ISKO Italia (2019). 
Similar to the open questions regarding the ILC’s representation of research methods discussed 
in the previous section, it is not obvious for users why the currently defined styles of thought are 
arranged in that particular order, if and how styles of thought that are collocated next to each 
other are thematically related, and whether or not this listing of styles of thought is supposed to 
be comprehensive or merely an exemplary collection.  
Again, these methodological limitations seem to be related to an empirical-pragmatic 
approach that might benefit from a complementary formal-pragmatic approach concerned with 
more general patterns of epistemic contexts (Kleineberg 2018; 2020). In the following, such a 
formal-pragmatic approach will be outlined in the form of the organizing principle of Integrative 
Levels of Knowing. According the Habermas’s (2001a; 2003) hermeneutic reconstructionism, 
both principles of organization, the IMP and the ILK, can be related to different dimensions of 
rational reconstructions of communicative actions. While the Integral Methodological Pluralism 
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refers to the synchronic or horizontal dimension that reconstructs formal-pragmatic distinctions 
(e.g., world relations, types of action, modes of communication, basic attitudes, validity claims) 
in relation to communicative competence (see Table 3.2), the Integrative Levels of Knowing refer 
to the diachronic or vertical dimension that reconstructs how this competence develops over 
time (see Table 3.3). Taking the AQAL framework as a point of reference, the former is related to 
the quadrants (see Figure 3.4), while the latter is related to the levels (see Figure 3.5). Since the 
present study proposing the cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge organization has 
already discussed conceptions and models of ILK at length, this section will focus on its 
application to the Integrative Levels Classification. 
The basic idea is to organize the epistemological dimension of human knowledge in the 
same way as the traditional principle of integrative levels organizes the ontological dimension of 
human knowledge. Like the plethora of world phenomena can be classified according to different 
integrative levels or levels of being from the most fundamental to the most complex, the plethora 
of world perspectives can be classified according to different integrative levels or levels of 
knowing from the most fundamental to the most complex. The main advantages of such a 
principle of organization is to be comprehensive or general in scope, to provide hierarchical 
relations or the strategy of subordination, as well as thematic or associative relations or the 
strategy of collocation. 
An important finding of the present study is that the notion of Integrative Levels of 
Knowing needs to be qualified in several ways. First, ILK can be found in both individual 
development and collective development but without showing a direct parallelism, which is why 
these different kinds of development need to be treated separately. Second, there is no all-
embracing development of an individual or a collective but an uneven distribution of domain-
specific skills or competences, which is why different developmental lines need to be treated 
separately. And third, although there already exists a broad range of ILK models, such rational 
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reconstructions of the implicit know-how of communicative actors are in principle fallible and 
open to modification, which is why different models of a given developmental line need to be 
treated separately. 
For an application of Integrative Levels of Knowing to the Integrative Levels Classification, 
the first distinction between individual and collective development can be addressed by 
differently defined foci or classes of phenomena that qualify a facet of perspective. For example, 
ILK models of individual development should refer to the main class p consciousness and its 
subclasses that represent the individual mind or Nicolai Hartmann’s (1940) personal spirit, 
whereas ILK models of collective development should refer to the subsequent main classes that 
represent the collective counterpart in terms of culture and society or Nicolai Hartmann’s (1940) 
objective spirit or objectivated spirit. From these subsequent main classes only the main classes 
q language, r rituals, and y knowledge seem to be concerned significantly with interior 
aspects of collective phenomena. Among them, the main class y knowledge appears to be the 
most suitable for an application of ILK in the sense of collectively shared forms of knowing, for it 
already covers the fairly similar class yas style of thought and its subclasses.  
Note that Integrative Levels of Knowing function thus as both perspective facets and 
phenomena classes. Just as research methods are defined by the ILC as both the perspective 
facet 039 as studied by research method and the phenomena class yam research methods, 
levels of knowing should be defined as both too. Unfortunately, the decimal principle restricts 
the subcategories of the perspective facet 0 to a number of nine and all of them are already 
defined by other kinds of viewpoints that appear to be inappropriate to include ILK (see Table 
6.3). This problem could be solved either by finding a kind of auxiliary mean for the notation of 
further subcategories, in analogy to the letter z as an “emptying digit” (Park, Gnoli, and Morelli 
2020, 41) that allows to define additional subclasses of phenomena beyond the limited number 
of 24 letters, or by subdividing an existing subcategory (e.g., 06 according to theory) into two 
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or several sub-subcategories that also include one concerned with levels of knowing. Since such 
a decision should be made by the ILC project, this study will assume a hypothetical notation for 
Integrative Levels of Knowing within the β dimension of perspectives: 06 as for level of 
knowing). Additionally, there should be a scope note that refers to the conception of ILK 
proposed by the present study (see also Kleineberg 2014; 2020).  
For the γ dimension of phenomena, there are several options to define ILK as foci. Since 
Kohlberg’s ILK model of moral consciousness in individual development is already defined as a 
subclass of cognition (i.e., pou moral consciousness) and its subclasses that define the 
particular moral stages or levels of knowing (e.g., poud punishment and obedience 
orientation, poum law and order orientation), one option would be to add other ILK models 
of individual development as sibling classes to pou moral consciousness (e.g., poq aesthetic 
experience, pos religious judgment). But this might produce confusion to some extent for 
two main reasons. First, there already exist sibling classes of pou moral consciousness that do 
not present ILK models but refer to more general fields of cognition, such as pod attention, poe 
memory, poi imagination. And second, there are other subclasses of p consciousness or po 
cognition that use a similar terminology as some ILK models, such as ps self or por reason. 
Therefore, it will be argued that all domain-specific ILK models of individual development (see 
Table 4.3) should be collocated in one place within the class po cognition, such as in a newly 
defined attribute class poal levels of knowing. Again, there should be a scope note that refers 
to the conception of ILK models of individual development, as proposed by the present study. 
Note that this option would imply to reclassify pou moral consciousness as a subclass of poal 
levels of knowing, for example, as poalm moral development.  
Likewise, domain-specific ILK models of collective development (see Table 4.4) should also 
be collocated in one place. As argued above, the most suitable class to represent collectively 
shared forms of knowing or ways of thinking seems to be yas style of thought. Accordingly, 
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there could be a newly defined subclass like yasl levels of knowing with a scope note entry 
that refers to the conception of ILK models of collective development, as proposed by the 
present study. 
The second distinction that qualifies the notion of Integrative Levels of Knowing are 
different domain-specific lines of development. These can be addressed by specifying the class 
poal levels of knowing for individual development and the class yasl levels of knowing 
for collective development by adding a range of subclasses representing particular ILK models. 
For individual development, these may include ILK models that are exemplarily described in 
Chapter Four (see also Appendix B): 
poal   levels of knowing 
poale   ego-identity development 
poalf   faith development 
poali   interpersonal development 
poall   logico-mathematical development 
poalm   moral development 
poaln   intellectual and ethical development 
poals   skill development 
poalt   task development 
Likewise, exemplary ILK models for the collective dimension may include (see also Appendix C): 
yasl   levels of knowing 
yasla   artistic development 
yaslc   cognitive-cultural development 
yaslr   religious development 
yasls   scientific and religious development 
yaslw   worldview development 
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The level sequence of each ILK model can be represented by sibling subclasses that are organized 
according to the principle of integrative levels indicated by a strictly alphabetical order, as 
illustrated by the following three examples: 
poal   levels of knowing 
poall   logico-mathematical development 
  poallb  sensorimotor  
poallc  preoperational 
poalld  concrete operations 
poalle  formal operations 
poalm   moral development 
  poalmb  punishment and obedience orientation  
poalmc  instrumental exchange 
poalmd  pleasing expectations 
poalme  law and order orientation 
poalmf  youthful protest 
poalmg  utilitarian orientation 
poalmh  universal ethical principle orientation 
yasl   levels of knowing 
 yasls   scientific and religious development 
  yaslsb  primitive 
yaslsc  archaic 
yaslsd  classical 
yaslse  empirical-critical 
Finally, the third distinction that qualifies the notion of Integrative Levels of Knowing is related 
to differences of ILK models concerned with the same developmental line. These models might 
differ because they are rationally reconstructed either by different researchers or at different 
times by the same researcher. This issue can be addressed by a scope note entry that refers to 
the specific ILK model on which this part of the classification is based. For example, the original 
ILK model of logico-mathematical development reconstructed by Jean Piaget (1999) has been 
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expanded by the so-called Neo-Piagetian research in order to include also postformal forms of 
thinking in terms of one or several higher levels of knowing (Benack 1984; Sinnott 1998; Young 
2011; see also Appendix B: Table B.5, Appendix D: Tables D.13-28). 
In general, the representation of viewpoints in terms of levels of knowing requires a 
complex ILC notation that combines a class of phenomena as the document’s subject matter and 
a facet with a focus as the author’s epistemic context. In Appendix E, the Table E.1 presents 
already existing examples of viewpoint analysis and indexing based on various models of 
Integrative Levels of Knowing. By taking one selected document from this table, it will be 
demonstrated how to create the corresponding ILC notation. The ancient Chinese anthology 
Mozi, also known as the Mohist canon, from the period of the Warring States (c. 453-221) is 
attributed to the philosopher Mozi or Mo Di, the founder of the school of Mohism, but written 
and compiled by his followers. The Mozi is concerned with many branches of knowledge but the 
most significant subject matters can be found in the so-called dialectical chapters treating 
philosophical topics like logic and ethics. These subject matters can be written in ILC notations 
as yiyg philosophical logic and yiyr moral philosophy.  
The authorial perspectives or levels of knowing manifested in the Mozi can be identified 
as early forms of the level of formal-operational cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development (Barnes 2000), the level of social contract or utility and individual 
rights (postconventional moral judgement) according to Kohlberg’s model of moral development 
(Roetz 1993), and the level of classical or axial culture according to Barnes’s model of scientific 
and religious development (Barnes 2000). These epistemic contexts in terms of viewpoints or 
levels of knowing can be written in ILC notations by means of the perspective facet 06 as for 
level of knowing using the foci poalle formal operations, poalmg utilitarian 
orientation, and yaslsd classical.  
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The combination of subject matter and epistemic context could be written in ILC notation 
in this way: yiyg06poalle (i.e., yiyg philosophical logic 06 as for level of knowing 
poalle formal operations) and yiyr06poalmg (i.e., yiyr moral philosophy 06 as for 
level of knowing poalmg utilitarian orientation). Since the third perspective facet 
06yaslsd (i.e., 06 as for level of knowing yaslsd classical) is related to both themes 
yiyg philosophical logic and yiyr moral philosophy, their combination could be expressed 
by means of the special class WA together with that functions as a conjunction symbol: 
yiygWAyiyr06yaslsd (i.e., yiyg philosophical logic WA together with yiyr moral 
philosophy 06 as for level of knowing yaslsd classical). In order to express several 
themes and their underlying viewpoints, the notation elements mentioned above need to be 
separated by blank space and may also use the special class WA together with but this time for 
the foci: yiyg06poalleWAyaslsd yiyr06poalmgWAyaslsd. 
 
6.3 Summary 
The case study on the interdisciplinary knowledge organization system Integrative Levels 
Classification demonstrates a methodological contribution of the cognitive-developmental 
approach to knowledge organization. The premise of multi-perspective knowledge organization 
that implicit authorial perspectives of documents should be made explicit by means of context 
representation is shared with the prevailing context-aware approaches to document indexing, 
such as Claudio Gnoli’s phenomenon-based facet-analytical approach, exemplified by his 
Integrative Levels Classification. But in its current state, the ILC project appears to be mainly 
concerned with the differentiation of epistemic contexts by providing largely unstructured 
listings of terms as documentary language. According to Habermas, such a basically inductive 
approach to authorial perspectives can be related to empirical pragmatics in opposition to formal 
pragmatics that is much more interested in general patterns and thus principles of organization 
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that allow a basically deductive approach to authorial perspectives. In order to improve the 
expressiveness of the ILC’s context representation, the proposed cognitive-developmental 
approach based on formal-pragmatic distinctions offers two novel organizing principles for a 
more systematic organization that meets Bliss’s principle of maximal efficiency based on the 
strategies of subordination and collocation.  
The main finding is that both principles of organization, the Integral Methodological 
Pluralism for method classification and the Integrative Levels of Knowing for viewpoint 
classification, are comprehensive in scope and offer informationally rich conceptual relations like 
hierarchical relations and thematic or associative relations. Thus, the epistemic pluralism 
presented by the multiplicity of authorial perspectives in terms of methods and viewpoints can 
be organized according to a non-relativistic framework and without falling prey to disorder and 
dispersion. In other words, the organizing principles of IMP and ILK offers a broader view to see 
the big picture, or, to invoke the metaphor from the introduction, the daylight for the blind men 




7.1 Beyond Absolutism and Relativism 
The present study is concerned with the challenge of epistemic pluralism in the field of 
knowledge organization. This challenge has been illustrated with the parable The Blind Men and 
the Elephant and its passed down wisdom that human knowledge is derived from multiple 
perspectives and that a single vantage point should not be overgeneralized. Philosopher Jürgen 
Habermas (1984, 135) summarizes the strategies to deal with this challenge as follows: 
Only a systematic history of rationality would keep us from falling into sheer relativism or 
naively positing our own standards as absolute. 
It is worth noting that for some reason the English translation misses the original parenthesis 
“von der wir weit entfernt sind” (from which we are far away) (Habermas 1981, 194) after the 
word rationality. Thus, one should keep in mind that for the time being the task to establish a 
comprehensive and systematic organization of the epistemological dimension of human 
knowledge that goes beyond both a naive epistemic absolutism and a self-refuting epistemic 
relativism is still an open one and probably a mission that will never be accomplished completely.  
Nevertheless, the proposed cognitive-developmental approach to knowledge 
organization based on Habermas’s Theory of Communicative Action takes a first step by 
introducing the notion of Integrative Levels of Knowing to the field of knowledge organization. 
The basic idea is that complexity can be reduced by relating the empirical diversity of 
perspectives to a manageable amount of forms of knowing which, in turn, present distinct 
developmental stages or levels of knowing within an overarching learning process following a 
developmental logic. The very fact that such structural learning processes take place shows that 
the comparison and evaluation of different frames of references are possible in principle and 
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thus undermines the view that standards or criteria of rationality can only be valid within a single 
frame of reference. This does not mean that there exist some absolute standards but rather 
developmental or “self-reflective standards” (Habermas 2001b, 148) in that each newer or 
higher level of learning ability can be considered to be a reflective abstraction of the previous 
level and a more advanced level of justification that allows to analyze and overcome the 
limitations and inadequacies of previous frames of references. Such a long-term process of 
rationalization, however, should not be conflated with a naive progressivism that does neither 
acknowledge the context-dependent dynamics of development nor the dialectic of progress that 
always includes the possibilities of new forms of pathologies or inadequacies. 
Regarding human knowledge recorded in documents or information resources, the 
challenge of epistemic pluralism has been considered along two analytical dimensions that are 
concerned with both the context of mediation or the information professionals’s perspectives 
and the context of production or the authorial perspectives. The first dimension, knowledge 
organization in context or the analysis of the epistemological foundations of given KOSs within 
their cognitive, cultural, and historical environments, can benefit from the notion of Integrative 
Levels of Knowing as a tool for comparison and evaluation. This has been shown exemplarily for 
the ancient Chinese library classification Seven Epitomes. The main finding is that the supposedly 
culture-specific difference between correlative and analytic approaches to classification can be 
related to distinct levels within a transcultural developmental-logical sequence of classificatory 
cognition. This helps to reduce the complexity of epistemic pluralism, to compare seemingly 
unrelated cultural or historical contexts, and to evaluate the validity of knowledge claims not 
merely by standards of a single given frame of reference but according to different levels of 
justification, that is, standards that themselves develop from one frame of reference to another 
by differentiating from but also integrating the previous ones. 
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The second dimension, context in knowledge organization or the analysis of authorial 
perspectives and their representation in KOSs, can benefit from the notion of Integrative Levels 
of Knowing as a novel organizing principle. This has been shown exemplarily for the Integrative 
Levels Classification. The main finding is that the expressiveness of context representation can 
be improved by providing a comprehensive and systematic organization of fundamental forms 
of knowing based on the strategies of subordination and collocation. This too helps to cope with 
the challenge of epistemic pluralism and to avoid a fragmentation of knowledge that 
unstructured term lists as indexing languages seem to suggest. 
Additionally, the notion of Integrative Levels of Knowing may also shed new light on the 
different epistemological or metatheoretical perspectives that underlie KO research, including 
the present study. Most importantly, the three philosophical positions of epistemic absolutism, 
epistemic relativism, and the third alternative proposed by the cognitive-developmental 
approach should be considered in the light of distinct levels of justification. In KO discourse, the 
stereotypically opposed positions of epistemic absolutism and epistemic relativism can be found 
to a more or lesser degree, for example, in the confronting approaches of classification-as-
ontology versus classification-as-epistemology (Mai 2011), or modern contextualism versus 
postmodern contextualism (Dervin 2003). According to some cognitive-developmental models, 
these positions can be related to succeeding levels within a given sequence, for example, from 
dualism to relativism (Benack 1984; Perry 1968; Blanchard-Fields 1989; see also Appendix B: 
Tables B.5, B.6, B.35), from conscientious to individualist (Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman 
2009; Cook-Greuter 2010a; see also Appendix B: Tables B. 10, B.15), from individuative-reflective 
to conjunctive (Fowler and Dell 2006; DiPerna 2018; see also Appendix B: Tables B.14, B.17), from 
static systems to dynamic relativism (Kramer 1989; see also Appendix B: Table B.28), from 
formal-operational to early forms of postformal or vision-logic (Wilber 2000; see also Appendix 
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B: Table B.46), or from modern to postmodern (De Witt and Hedlund 2017; see also Appendix C: 
Table C.4). 
Such a developmental perspective suggests that the frame of reference underlying 
epistemic relativism indeed presents a more advanced level of justification compared to the one 
underlying epistemic absolutism. But most of these models also suggest that this much more 
context-aware frame of reference presents by no means the highest or most advanced stage of 
development since some inherent problems or cognitive dissonances, such as its apparently 
performative self-contradiction, seem to require even more advanced levels of knowing to be 
solved. For example, in Deidre A. Kramer’s (1989; see also Appendix B: Table 27) model of social 
cognition the level of dynamic relativism is followed by the level of dynamic dialecticism that is 
characterized by an integration of cultural and historical contexts into evolving social structures. 
Likewise, in Suzanne R. Cook-Greuter’s (2010a; see als Appendix B: Table B.10) or Sean Esbjörn-
Hargen’s and Michael E. Zimmerman’s (2009; see also Appendix B: Table B. 15) models of ego-
identity or self-development the individualist level is followed by the autonomous level that is 
characterized by an understanding and appreciation of conflicting views and a commitment to 
organize and integrate the multiplicity of perspectives in order to overcome the pitfalls of various 
kinds of relativism. In fact, this level is described as the first one in self-development at which 
knowing subjects “recognize the value of all previous levels as necessary for healthy human 
development” (Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman 2009, 137). From such a developmental 
perspective, the three philosophical positions can also be related to what Wilber (2000, IX 
[emphases in original]) calls universal formalism, pluralistic relativism, and universal integralism:  
But once consciousness evolves from formal to postformal—and thus evolves from 
universal formalism to pluralistic relativism—these multiple contexts and pluralistic 
tapestries come jumping to the fore, and postmodernism has spent much of the last two 
decades attempting to deconstruct the rigid hierarchies, formalisms, and oppressive 
schemes that are inherent in preformal-to-formal stages of consciousness evolution. But 
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pluralistic relativism is not itself the highest stage of development [...]. Pluralistic 
relativism gives way to universal integralism. Where pluralism frees the many different 
voices and multiple contexts, universal integralism begins to bring them together into a 
harmonized chorus.  
 
7.2 Limitations and Future Work 
Admittedly, such an ambitious attempt presented by any kind of a universal integralism that 
seeks to overcome relativistic stances faces serious theoretical, methodological, and practical 
challenges that restricts its own range. This also means that the cognitive-developmental 
approach to knowledge organization proposed by this study is limited in several ways. In general, 
critical reflections on its limitations can be related to two different functional aspects. One aspect 
refers to the conception and modeling of Integrative Levels of Knowing and the other aspect 
refers to its application to the field of knowledge organization. 
Limitations regarding the aspect of conception and modeling are related to already existing 
rational reconstructions of Integrative Levels of Knowing that can be found outside the field of 
knowledge organization or the discipline of library and information science in general. Its most 
important limitations can be summarized as follows. First, there are several research traditions 
and disciplinary approaches involved in theorizing on developmental-logical conceptions of 
cognitive growth. This often implies a divergent use of terminology based on different theoretical 
or metatheoretical foundations, which may limit the interoperability or connectivity of these 
conceptions to one another. Second, all rational reconstructions or ILK models, like other types 
of knowledge, have only hypothetical status since they might rest on a non-representational 
choice of examples or they might overgeneralize individual cases (Habermas 1990). Thus, 
rational reconstructions need further corroboration and tend to witness some modifications or 
differentiations over time, as is the case for Kohlberg’s (1976; Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983) 
model on moral development and Cook-Greuter’s (2010a) model on self-development, among 
308 
others. Third, even though rational reconstructions are not directly derived from empirical data 
they need to be tested against empirical evidence but the ILK models presented in this study 
have very different degrees of such an empirical backup. For example, while models on logico-
mathematical development (Dasen and Ribaupierre 1987; Molitor and Hui-Chin Hsu 2011; 
Lourenço 2015), moral development (Kohlberg, Levine, and Hewer 1983; Gibbs et al. 2007), or 
ego-identity development (Cook-Greuter 2010a) are empirically well tested, models of faith 
development (Fowler and Dell 2006) or aesthetic development (Parsons 1987) are based on 
much weaker grounds. This limitation of empirical data may call into question the cross-cultural 
and differential (e.g., across sexes, ages, tasks) validity of these models. Fourth, models of 
collective development are much harder to test empirically and often need to be guided by 
models of individual development. This may lead to premature assumptions of a supposed 
parallelism or to incorrect applications of ontogenetic stage descriptions to historiogenetic 
developments. For example, Gablik’s (1979; see also Appendix C: Table C.8) model of spatial 
representation in pictorial arts misleadingly describes the increasing image-based iconic 
competence in art history in terms of individual development beginning at the stage of action-
based sensorimotor or enactive representation. The other way around, Wynn’s (1985; see also 
Appendix C: Table: C.21) model of spatial cognition in stone-tool technology misleadingly 
describes the increasing sensorimotor competence during the shift from Oldowan culture to 
Acheulean culture in terms of the individual development from preoperational to operational 
concepts of space (cp. Klix 1993). Fifth, the possibility to correlate ILK models across domains is 
limited to some extent since there is no one-to-one relation, even though there may exist 
structural isomorphisms based on some domain-general competences like Selman’s (1980) 
capacity of perspective-taking. For this reason, some correlations of ILK models in Appendix D 
might be slightly different, such as the treatment of Commons’s cross-paradigmatic stage in 
relation to Loevinger’s or Cook-Greuter’s stages of ego-identity development (see Appendix D: 
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Tables D.3, D.12, D.16, D.20). And sixth, rational reconstructions in the proper sense are limited 
in that they cannot be applied to so-called postrational, postrepresentational, or transpersonal 
stages that are thus often contested among researchers. From a methodological point of view, it 
is worth noting that researchers by themselves think according to certain levels of knowing, 
which implies a kind of “double hermeneutic” (Korthals 1997, 56). This means that the 
interpretation of a given level of knowing as manifested in documents or communicative actions 
depends itself on the interpreter’s underlying frame of reference or level of knowing (Stein 2010; 
cp. Appendix B: Table B.41). For the present study, this implies that the status of postrational, 
postrepresentational, or transpersonal stages cannot be adequately evaluated since the author 
of this dissertation freely admits that these level descriptions do not consonant significantly with 
personal experiences. This may indicate that such frames of reference indeed present higher 
levels of knowing or more advanced levels of justification compared to that underlying this 
investigation and thus remain largely incomprehensible yet. 
Limitations regarding the aspect of application are related to the use of models of 
Integrative Levels of Knowing as tools for knowledge organization and its most important 
restrictions can be summarized as follows. First, for the comparison and evaluation of different 
KOSs in their cognitive, cultural, and historical environments, ILK models provide rather basic 
analytical distinctions. These may be too poor in detail for in-depth analyses that are more 
interested in the peculiarities of different epistemic contexts which are often related to the same 
level of knowing. Second, as an organizing principle for KOSs, ILK models simply offer one way 
besides many others to classify perspectives and their emphasis on long-term developmental 
stages may often be less significant for the purpose of a given multi-perspective KOS. Third, the 
application of ILK models in KO practice requires a deep understanding of the significant features 
of distinct stages or levels of knowing and probably more background knowledge than can be 
provided by summarized descriptions in tables as presented in Appendix B and Appendix C. 
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Consequently, the application of ILK models in document indexing demands a rather high 
training effort for classificationists or indexers. Fourth, the analysis and indexing of authorial 
perspectives in terms of Integrative Levels of Knowing is for practical reasons alone limited to 
small document collections and it appears to be rather unlikely that this becomes a significant 
part of common KO practice. And fifth, the hierarchical structure of ILK models may lead to 
reservations within the KO discourse community due to potential misconceptions that may 
assume a value ranking and a pejorative use of language in that lower levels are connotated as 
being less valuable. 
Keeping these limitations in mind, the proposed cognitive-developmental approach to 
knowledge organization contributes to KO research in the form of a novel theoretical and 
methodological foundation that offers additional analytical tools and principles of organization. 
Two of the most promising fields of application are addressed by the present study, namely, the 
cross-cultural comparison of knowledge organization systems and the classification of authorial 
perspectives for document indexing. Beyond the presented case studies, there are further 
promising fields of application that can be addressed in future. For example, the organizing 
principles of Integral Methodological Pluralism and Integrative Levels of Knowing can be applied 
to other existing classifications or to other kinds of documentary languages, particularly, to 
formal ontologies that contribute to the semantic web. Furthermore, classifications of epistemic 
contexts based on IMP and ILK may not only function as means for information retrieval but also 
as general orienting guides that appear to be particular relevant for domains like education (Stein 
2019), business organization (Laloux 2014), politics (McIntosh 2020), and religious studies 
(DiPerna 2018), among others. A promising point of departure can be the visualization of 
“epistemological profiles” (Bachelard 1968, 39) or “conceptual profiles” (Mortimer et al. 2014, 
3) of the multiple perspectives that are involved in social discourses and personal thinking. For 
memory institutions, it might be worth to explore to what extent the notion of Integrative Levels 
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of Knowing can be used for chronological or, more precisely, developmental-logical 
presentations of cultural heritage artifacts or documents in analogy, for example, to the 
influential three-age system of Stone Age—Bronze Age—Iron Age invented by Christian J. 
Thomsen in the 19th century for the later National Museum of Denmark (Smith 2019). In this 
regard, Wilber (2006, 260) proposes the idea to create a kind of dictionary or “GigaGlossary” 
that lists known phenomena or concepts according to the particular levels of knowing that are 
required to see or adequately understand them. This may also help to identify the multi-leveled 
structure of historical works, such as the Rig Veda, the Homeric epics, or the Christian Bible 
(Barnes 2000; Bammé 2011; see also Appendix E: Table E.1). Regarding information systems in 
general, the consideration of the epistemological dimension should not be limited to the context 
of production or the author’s perspectives and the context of mediation or the information 
professionals’s perspectives but also include the context of consumption or the users’s 
perspectives in terms of levels of interpretation and understanding (Kreft 1977). For example, 
Jihee Beak (2014) uses cognitive-developmental models for the analysis of particular user 
groups, such as children of different ages in order to establish a more user-centric indexing 
language and a customized presentation of library collections. This can be related to Gnoli’s 
(2020, 29) proposal of an additional dimension of knowledge organization, the θ dimension of 
cognition, concerned with human skills like browsing abilities that affect “the way people express 
their needs and interact with collections.” For library and information science, the notion of 
Integrative Levels of Knowing may also help to better understand some dysfunctional aspects of 
knowledge exchange or information interaction, such as “’cross-level’ miscommunications” 
(Wilber 2013, 11) and misinformation due to the raise of inadequate validity claims. Finally, the 
present study may encourage future attempts to cope with the challenge of a multi-perspective 
knowledge organization by demonstrating the possibility that even contexts can be 
contextualized in a systematic way. 
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Note for the Appendix: 
 
The samples of conceptions and models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (ILK) are limited to approaches presenting a developmental-logical conception of cognitive 
growth and to a historical period starting with the 20th century. The quotations in Appendix A are presented in chronological order of the dates of the first 
publication, while the tables in Appendices B–D are presented in alphabetical order of the names of the authors.  
The term level is used interchangeably with other notions from the original sources, such as stage, structure, mode, form, order, wave, and altitude. The level 
sequences present reconstructions of the context-independent logic of development regardless of the context-dependent dynamics of development. This means 
that all temporal specifications in terms of individual ages or historical periods are only approximate indicators for the typical but not necessary appearance of a 
particular level of knowing.  
The numberings of levels are my addition and may differ from those in the original sources. A level number, however, indicates only the relative status of a level 
within the sequence of a given model and cannot be compared with level numbers of other models, except in Appendix D where level numbers serve as reference 
points for the correlation of ILK models. All emphases in italics are taken over from the original sources but underlines are my additions, M.K. 
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Baldwin, James M. (1906, 38): 
“If both the logical and the pre-logical are 
modes or stages of cognition, then the 
transition from one to the other is in its 
nature but the development of a continuous 
function. Whatever new-seeming factors and 
elements may appear whereby we finally 
identify a process or a result as logical, we 
may still say that the continuity of the larger 
movement, in virtue of which both the before 
and the after-stages are cognitive, is 
unbroken, and the new factors and elements 
are to be constructed as determining 
conditions or ingredients in the constitution 
of the end-states which it is the function of 
cognition to realize.” 
Dilthey, Wilhelm ([1910] 2002, 149): 
“Knowledge constitutes a hierarchy of 
functions: the given is explicated in 
elementary logical functions, it is reproduced 
in mental representations, and it is logically 
represented in discursive thought—the given 
is thus subjected to various kinds of re-
presentation.” 
Wundt, Wilhelm ([1912] 1916, 513): 
“Thus, that which is in a high degree 
characteristic of world religion is true also of 
world history. Within the conscious horizon 
of each individual very different levels of 
historical consciousness are represented, 
even in the case of the cultural peoples who 
participate more or less actively in the course 
of world history. Here, as in world religion, we 
find that what was developed in a sequence 
during the course of ages continues to 
remain, at any rate roughly speaking, in 
juxtaposition.” 
Cassirer, Ernst ([1923] 1955a, 303): 
“For epistemological inquiry an unbroken 
path leads from sensation to intuition, from 
intuition to conceptual thought, and thence 
to logical judgment. Yet in following this path, 
the epistemologist is aware that sharply as its 
phases must be distinguished in reflection, 
they must never be regarded as independent 
data of consciousness, existing separately 
from one another. On the contrary, every 
more complex factor here includes the 
simpler ones, and every ‘later’ one the 
‘earlier’, while conversely the latter contains 
within it the seeds of the former.” 
Lloyd Morgan, Conwy (1923, 17): 
“The evolutionary genesis of contemplative 
thought involves that which has already been 
developed at the lower level of naive 
perception; and the genesis of such 
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perception involves, as historically prior, 
sensory presentation.” 
Scheler, Max ([1924] 2013, 39, 195n10): 
“The developmental phase-law, on the other 
hand, is an essential law of the transition 
from stage to stage, in such a way that the 
peculiar factual beginning and ending of the 
development remains variable. It controls all 
possible factual development. [...] [T]he 
actual ‘situations’, the ‘statics’, present 
themselves as the result, as the relative 
momentary representation, of the dynamics, 
that is, as stratification of older and newer 
power-effects (every concrete culture is 
stratification).” 
Mannheim, Karl ([1924/25] 1982, 264): 
“Although the encroaching civilizational way 
of knowing increasingly drives these mythical 
and magical elements out of everyday 
practical knowledge, mythical and magical 
components do nevertheless survive in our 
everyday knowledge of life even today. [...] 
The consciousness of the individual, then, 
may be likened to a petrification of past ages 
in the history of consciousness, and just as 
geology can reconstruct the history of the 
earth’ crust, so the career of consciousness is 
preserved in stratified layers in the make-up 
of the individual consciousness of the 
present.” 
Vygotsky, Lev S. ([1934] 1986, 140): 
“It would be erroneous, however, to imagine 
that this transition from complexes to 
concepts is a mechanical process in which the 
higher developmental stage completely 
supersedes the lower one. The 
developmental scene turns out to be much 
more complex. Different genetic forms 
coexist in thinking, just as different rock 
formations coexists in the earth’s crust.”  
Needham, Joseph (1937, 49): 
“Every transition from the unconscious to the 
conscious implies a step from bondage to 
freedom, from lower to higher level of 
organization. All early agriculture and storage 
of food-products necessitated more 
conscious control than before. Increases in 
the efficiency of mechanisms of transport 
from horse to the aeroplane widened men’s 
conscious horizon.” 
Bachelard, Gaston ([1940] 1968, 17, 117): 
“There is no end to the dispute about moral 
progress, social progress, poetic progress or 
the progress of happiness, but there is one 
form of progress which is beyond argument 
and that is scientific progress, as soon as it 
comes to be judged in the hierarchy of 
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knowledge and in its specifically intellectual 
aspects. We are therefore going to take the 
direction of this progress as the axis of our 
philosophic study and if, on the abscissa of its 
development, philosophical systems place 
themselves regularly in an order constant for 
all notions, an order which moves from 
animism to surrationalism (via realism, 
positivism and simple rationalism) we shall 
be somewhat justified in speaking of a 
philosophical progress of scientific notions. 
[...] Indeed, the whole impetus of scientific 
thought for a century now stems from 
dialectical generalizations of this sort, which 
embrace what has been denied.” 
Hartmann, Nicolai ([1942] 1953, 46): 
“Thereby consciousness liberates itself from 
subservience to vitality and becomes a 
spiritual consciousness. It thus enters into a 
certain contrast with that primary 
consciousness which is determined by 
instinctive life and harnessed to its service. 
The latter may be called ‘spiritless 
consciousness.’ It is not extinguished in the 
fully developed human being but persists in 
the background of his spiritual 
consciousness. Occasionally it may break 
forth all of a sudden, perverting the objective 
order of the spirit. In the young child this 
spiritless consciousness is the dominant one, 
just as it is in the higher animals, and there is 
little doubt that through long periods of 
man's prehistoric development his 
consciousness was predominantly a spiritless 
one.” 
Dewey, John and Bentley, Arthur F. (1949, 107): 
“With this much of introductory display let us 
now set down in broad outlines three levels 
of the organization and presentation of 
inquiry in the order of their historical 
appearance, understanding, however, as is 
the way with evolutions generally, that 
something of the old and often much of it, 
survives within or alongside the new. We 
name these three levels, those of Self-Action, 
Interaction, and Transaction. These levels are 
all human behaviors in and with respect to 
the world, and they are all presentations of 
the world itself as men report it.” 
Gebser, Jean ([1949] 1985, 42): 
“In order to achieve the requisite basis for 
transformation to which we have alluded, we 
wish to present as a working hypothesis the 
four, respectively five, structures we have 
designated as the archaic, magical, mythical, 
mental, and integral. We must first of all 
remain cognizant that these structures are 
not merely past, but are in fact still present in 
more or less latent and acute form in each 
one of us.” 
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Piaget, Jean ([1955] 1977, 815): 
“The integrative character of stages: the 
structures constructed at a given age become 
an integral part of the structures of the 
following age. For example, the permanent 
object that is constructed at the 
sensorimotor level will be an integral element 
in notions of conservation formed later 
(when there will be conservation of an 
ensemble, or of a collection, or of an object 
undergoing deformation in its spatial 
appearance). In the same way, the operations 
that we call concrete will constitute an 
integral part of formal operation, in the sense 
that the latter will constitute a new structure 
but resting on the former, which are thus 
treated as their contents (formal operations 
thus constituting operations effectuated 
upon other operations).” 
Steward, Julian H. ([1955] 1972, 51): 
“The utility of distinguishing levels of 
sociocultural integration as well as categories 
of phenomena can be strikingly illustrated in 
studies of cultural change and acculturation. 
In the growth continuum of any culture, there 
is a succession of organizational types which 
are not only increasingly complex but which 
represent new emergent forms. The concept 
is fairly similar to that of organizational levels 
in biology. In culture, simple forms, such as 
those represented by the family or band, do 
not wholly disappear when a more complex 
stage of development is reached, nor do they 
merely survive fossil-like, as the concepts of 
folkways and mores formerly assumed. They 
gradually become modified as specialized, 
dependent parts of new kinds of total 
configurations.” 
Werner, Heinz and Kaplan, Bernard (1956, 866): 
“The developmental psychology of cognition 
postulates one regulative principle of 
development, the following orthogenetic 
principle: wherever development occurs, it 
proceeds from a state of relative lack of 
differentiation to a state of increasing 
differentiation, articulation, and hierarchic 
integration.” 
Sahlin, Marshall D. and Service, Elman R. ([1960] 
1988, 35–36): 
“As in life, thermodynamic achievement has 
its organizational counterpart, higher levels 
of integration. Cultures that transform more 
energy have more parts and subsystems, 
more specializations of parts, and more 
effective means of integration of the whole. 
Organizational symptoms of general progress 
include the proliferation of material 
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elements, geographic increase in the division 
of labor, multiplication of social groups and 
subgroups, and the emergence of special 
means of integration: political, such as 
chieftainship and the state, and 
philosophical, such as universal ethical 
religions and science.” 
Perry, William G. (1968, 2): 
“A person moving from the assumptions of 
student A to those of student B to those of 
student C may therefore be said to be 
involved in a development, not simply 
because his assumptions become ‘better’ or 
more ‘true’—which is another question—but 
because the forms of his later assumptions 
subtend those of his earlier assumptions in a 
coherent manner, as cannot be said in 
reverse.” 
Lorenz, Konrad ([1973] 1978, 245): 
“There are in my view definite signs that a 
self-recognition of all cultural humanity, a 
collective self-knowledge derived from 
natural science, is beginning to spring up. If, 
as is entirely possible, this movement grows, 
the intellectual aspirations and energies of 
mankind will be raised to a higher level of 
integration, as in the distant past the ‘creative 
flash’ or reflection and meditation raised 
man’s power of understanding to a new and 
higher level.” 
Luria, Alexander R. ([1974] 1976, 161–62): 
“Our investigations, which were conducted 
under unique and non-replicable conditions 
involving a transition to collectivized forms of 
labor and cultural revolution, showed that, as 
the basic forms of activity change, as literacy 
is mastered, and a new stage of social and 
historical practice is reached, major shifts 
occur in human mental activity. These are not 
limited simply to an expanding of man’s 
horizons, but involve the creation of new 
motives for action and radically affect the 
structure of cognitive processes. [...] In 
addition to elementary graphic-functional 
motives, we see the creation of new motives 
that take shape in the process of collectivized 
labor, the joint planning of labor activity, and 
basic schooling.” 
Bruner, Jerome S. (1974, 327–28): 
“I shall call the three modes of representation 
mentioned earlier enactive representation, 
iconic representation, and symbolic 
representation. Their appearance in the life 
of the child is in that order, each depending 
upon the previous one for its development, 
yet all of them remaining more or less intact 
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throughout life—barring such early accidents 
as blindness or deafness or cortical injury.” 
Habermas, Jürgen ([1976] 1979, 184–85): 
“Thus, by levels of justification I mean formal 
conditions for the acceptability of grounds or 
reasons, conditions that lend to legitimations 
their efficacy, their power to produce 
consensus and shape motives. These levels 
can be ordered hierarchically. The 
legitimations of a superseded stage, no 
matter what their content, are depreciated 
with the transition to the next higher stage; it 
is not this or that reason which is no longer 
convincing but the kind of reason. Such 
depreciation of the legitimation potential of 
entire blocks of tradition occurred in 
civilizations with the retrenchment of 
mythological thought, and in modern times 
with the retrenchment of cosmological, 
religious, and ontological modes of thought.” 
Kohlberg, Lawrence and Hersh, Richard H. (1977, 
54): 
“1. Stages are ‘structured wholes,’ or 
organized systems of thought. This means 
individuals are consistent in their level of 
moral judgment.  
2. Stages form an invariant sequence. Under 
all conditions except extreme trauma, 
movement is always forward, never 
backward. Individuals never skip stages, and 
movement is always to the next stage up. This 
is true in all cultures.  
3. Stages are ‘hierarchical integrations.’ 
Thinking at a higher stage includes or 
comprehends within it lower stage thinking. 
There is a tendency to function at or prefer 
the highest stage available.” 
Leontiev, Aleksei N. ([1977] 2009, 190–91): 
“If, in the initial steps of the child’s 
psychological development, his biological 
adaptations (which make a decisive 
contribution to establishing his perceptions 
and emotions) appear at the first plane, then 
subsequently these adaptations are 
transformed. This of course does not mean 
that they simply stop functioning; it means 
something else, specifically that they begin to 
realize another higher level of activity on 
which the amount they contribute at each 
given stage of development depends.” 
Apel, Karl-Otto (1978, 10): 
“Thus my conception of a revolutionary 
succession of different paradigms of thought 
differs from that of Th. Kuhn in that it implies 
some sort of a Hegelian idea of possible 
progress in the history of human thought. 
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Properly speaking, it does not imply any claim 
of a causally explicable and hence predictable 
necessity of progress. Rather, it implies the 
claim that the three paradigms of First 
Philosophy make up a hierarchical order of 
levels of critical reflection and also make up 
an order of necessary succession in the 
teleological sense without providing any 
guarantee of its being realized in advance of 
the facts of history.” 
Gablik, Suzi (1979, 71): 
“The fact that all these levels are conserved 
at the same time as they are superseded is 
what gives history its integrative character 
and its continuity. A content that has been 
used on one level with respect to a certain 
kind of structure can be transposed onto 
another, by being reconstructed in a new way 
of thinking. The resulting pattern appears as 
a succession of repeated differentiations, 
specializations and reintegrations, with a 
distinct progression from simple intuition to 
more complex logical and rational 
structures.” 
Jantsch, Erich ([1979] 1980, 296): 
“The conclusion may be drawn that it is not 
individual levels which impart depth or 
height (both terms seem to express the same 
notion here!), but the multilevel vibrations of 
many levels of consciousness. A new level 
does not mean an ‘ascent’ but an enrichment 
of the ensemble of possibilities of expression 
and the dimensions of its autonomy.” 
Fischer, Kurt (1980, 485): 
“The skills at each level are characterized by 
a structure that indicates the kinds of 
behaviors that the person can control at that 
level. Also, at each level, the skills include all 
the lower levels.” 
Selman, Robert L. (1980, 36): 
“We tried to construct the levels such that 
they both described and were defined by 
genuine universal development in both the 
hierarchical sense, in which higher levels are 
built on lower ones, and the structural or 
reorganizational sense, in which at each 
higher level a new operational principle takes 
command. Out of this process emerged a 
system of five levels of social perspective 
taking or coordination.” 
Döbert, Rainer (1981, 77): 
“The very possibility of regressing to a former 
mode of thinking arises from the medium of 
information transmission itself. It is an 
essential characteristic of meaning that the 
fixation of a given meaning does not destroy 
other meaningful possibilities. A given 
meaning is always embedded in a horizon of 
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more and possibly different meanings. And to 
this horizon belong even former levels of the 
socio-cultural tradition. Usually we do not 
think any more in terms of a teleological 
world view, but we can very well understand 
and think in terms of such an orientation 
system, under specific conditions we may 
‘regress’ to such a mode of thinking. We may 
believe that this way of thinking is wrong, but 
it is for us not totally inaccessible.” 
Fowler, James W. (1981, 99–100): 
“Moreover, we believe that faith stages meet 
the structural-developmental criteria for 
stages. They provide generalizable, formal 
descriptions of integrated sets of operations 
of knowing and valuing. These stagelike 
positions are related in a sequence we 
believe to be invariant. Each new stage 
integrates and carries forward the operations 
of all the previous stages.” 
Zwilgmeyer, Franz (1981, 31 [my translation, 
M.K.]): 
“If today's human being is ready to put aside 
his possible sharp ego control in favor of 
sinking into a feeling-relevant image, he 
experiences that for him magic is quite 
possible again since the fundamental 
psychological structures are still alive in him 
and merely overlaid.” 
Gilligan, Carol (1982, 105): 
“This construction was traced through a 
sequence of three perspectives, each 
perspective presenting a more complex 
understanding of the relationship between 
self and other and each transition involving a 
critical reinterpretation of the conflict 
between selfishness and responsibility. The 
sequence of women’s moral judgment 
proceeds from an initial concern with survival 
to a focus on goodness and finally to a 
reflective understanding of care as the most 
adequate guide to the resolution of conflicts 
in human relationships.” 
Kegan, Robert (1982, 85 [quoted without 
references, M.K.]): 
“It has been called a process of decentration, 
emergence from embeddedness, the 
recurring triumph over egocentrism; it has 
been referred to as a process in which the 
whole becomes a part to a new whole; in 
which what was structure becomes content 
on behalf of a new structure; in which what 
was ultimate becomes preliminary on behalf 
of a new ultimacy; in which what was 
immediate gets mediate to a new immediacy. 
All these descriptions speak to the same 
process, which is essentially that of 
adaptation, a differentiation from that which 
was the very subject of my personal 
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organization and which becomes thereby the 
object of a new organization on behalf of a 
new subjectivity that coordinates it.” 
Turiel, Elliot (1983, 19): 
“Development is continually directed toward 
increasing equilibrium, so that each stage is a 
more equilibrated state than the previous 
one. Equilibrium, however, does not simply 
mean adjustment of conformity to external 
pressures. There are two interrelated aspects 
to structural equilibrium. One refers to the 
equilibrium or coherence of a system of 
thinking. The second refers to an 
understanding of the environment in the 
most powerful, comprehensive, and effective 
way. That is, each stage of development 
represents a more equilibrated means of 
understanding the environment than the 
previous stage.” 
Armon, Cheryl (1984, 362): 
“Hierarchical integration: Theoretical 
analysis should reveal that each stage of the 
Good includes the one before it, not by 
adding new content, but by transforming the 
previous stage into a more highly integrated 
and differentiated structure.” 
Basseches, Michael A. (1984, 256): 
“The context-free strategies of postformal 
reasoning may be hierarchically more 
sophisticated than those of formal reasoning, 
which they also include. For example, 
postformal reasoning may involve the ability 
to form third-order relationships. Third-order 
relationships may be necessary to establish 
isomorphisms between one context-specific 
research program and another.” 
Koplowitz, Herb (1984, 276): 
“Formal operations are considered to succeed 
concrete operations for several reasons. First, 
formal-operational thinking appears later in 
an individual’s development than does 
concrete-operational thought. Second, a 
person capable of formal-operational thought 
is also capable of concrete-operational 
thought. In addition, the transition to formal 
operations follows two trends that are 
apparent throughout development. First, later 
concepts are more flexible than earlier ones, 
that is, they can be usefully applied in a 
greater variety of situations. Second, earlier 
cognitive structures are special cases or 
simplified versions of the structures that 
replace them.” 
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Labouvie-Vief, Gisela (1984, 170 [quoted without 
symbol notation in parantheses, M.K.]): 
“From level to level, the individual not only 
functions at the new, stage-appropriate 
mode, but also previous modes (sensori-
motor, symbolic, and so on) become more 
structurally reorganized. At the first level, the 
equilibrated ‘self’ is defined as sensori-motor 
regulations. At the second level, the ‘self’ is 
defined by symbolic regulations that 
superordinate (for example, selectively 
facilitate and inhibit) reflected sensori-motor 
ones. In the same fashion, intrasystematic, 
intersystematic, and autonomous regulations 
come to eventually superordinate previous 
modes of functioning.” 
Stern, Daniel N. ([1985] 1998, 32): 
“In fact, each successive organizing subjective 
perspective requires the preceding one as a 
precursor. Once formed, the domains remain 
forever as distinct forms of experiencing 
social life and self. None are lost to adult 
experience. Each simply gets more 
elaborated.” 
Campbell, Robert L. and Bickhard, Mark H. (1986, 
XI–XII): 
“The potentialities of properties which may 
implicitly present at one level of knowing 
becoming explicitly known from the next 
higher level iterates unboundedly, generating 
the primary knowing levels hierarchy. This 
hierarchy, in turn, generates the 
corresponding knowing levels developmental 
stage model: no system at a given knowing 
level can be constructed, can develop, unless 
there are already existing systems at all lower 
knowing levels supporting it. Development 
through the knowing levels, then, must 
proceed in a strict stage sequence.” 
Kilga, Bernhard (1986, 12–13 [my translation from 
German, M.K.]): 
“In the outlined view of historical and social 
events, a deep history of a kind of archeology 
and geology of mental processes is designed, 
which uncovers and examines the strata of 
psychological human conditions that lie 
beneath the surface of the general history of 
events. [...] The individual strata, however, 
are not to be understood as separate from 
each other and independently. Rather, they 
form a unity in human experience.“ 
Elias, Norbert ([1987] 2001, 103): 
“[P]eople are in a position to know that they 
know; they are able to think about their own 
thinking and to observe themselves 
observing. Under certain circumstances they 
can climb further and become aware of 
themselves as knowing that they are aware of 
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themselves knowing. In other words, they are 
able to climb the spiral staircase of 
consciousness from one floor with its specific 
view to a higher floor with its view and, 
looking down, to see themselves standing at 
the same time on other levels of the 
staircase. Moreover, the perspective 
characteristic of these other levels is 
assimilated into their own in one form or 
another, although its characteristics are not 
the same for people who take it for granted 
as for those who are able to view it with a 
certain detachment from a higher level of 
consciousness. How far up or down one 
climbs this staircase depends not only on the 
talent, personality structure or intelligence of 
individual people, but on the state of 
development and the total situation of the 
society to which they belong.” 
Parsons, Michael J. (1987, 20–21): 
“There are two ways in which one may think 
of a stage as being more adequate than the 
previous one. The first is aesthetic. Each stage 
understands paintings more adequately than 
before. The account of changing 
understandings of each topic is therefore also 
an account of their increasing adequacy, 
stage by stage. [...] The second kind of 
adequacy is psychological. The stages rest on 
our increasing ability to take the perspective 
of others, the common dimension of 
cognitive developmental schemes.” 
Damon, William and Hart, Daniel (1988, 57–58): 
“It is important to note that, in a hierarchical 
model such as this one, the earlier levels 
become part of the later ones, though in 
somewhat new form. Thus, for example, self-
understanding of the ‘me’ is always 
categorical, as at Level 1; but later levels 
employ the categorical mode for new 
purposes. Thus, earlier forms of self-
understanding neither disappear nor are 
retained per se. Rather they continue to 
function in transformed state as part of later 
forms.” 
Kramer, Deidre A. (1989, 156–57): 
“The major principle of cognitive change in 
the present model is that of the orthogenetic 
principle, that is, that all development 
proceeds from a state of relative 
undifferentiation toward that of 
differentiation, and finally hierarchical 
integration. [...] Such a model allows for a 
unified conception of life-span development, 
where thought is reconstructed at each level, 
with each new level providing greater 
inclusiveness and (at the integrated level) 
coherence than the previous level.” 
Appendix A Conceptions of Integrative Levels of Knowing 358 
LePan, Don (1989, 20–21): 
“Once again, what distinguishes the 
characteristic mode of thought of modern 
developed societies from those of primitive 
societies is not the absence of primitive 
processes in the Western mind, but the 
presence of additional modes of causal, 
temporal and logical thought.” 
Alexander, Charles et al. (1990, 294): 
“We propose that these levels of the mind 
form a natural hierarchy of ‘processes of 
knowing,’ with the forms (patterns) of 
thought and action strongly influenced and 
delimited by the most abstract structure of 
knowing functionally available to conscious 
awareness during each period. […] our model 
is hierarchical, since, in an invariant 
sequence, increasingly abstract (subtle) 
levels serve as the primary locus of 
awareness and coordinate the less refined 
levels.” 
Oser, Fritz and Gmünder, Paul (1991, 63):  
“The religious development of persons does 
not happen slowly and steadily, but in steps. 
The passage from one step to the next is 
complicated and constitutes, in any case, a 
discontinuity. This sort of movement is 
usually designed as phases or stages. The 
formal qualities which describe the individual 
stages are: qualitative differentiation, 
sequentiality, holism, and the incorporation 
of lower stages into higher ones.” 
Biggs, John B. (1992, 35):  
“The way the same task is handled at various 
periods reveals qualitative differences, or 
discontinuities, between stages. [...] The later 
developing, more abstract modes do not 
replace earlier ones but coexist with them. 
The latest to develop simple represent a 
current ceiling to abstraction, not a standard 
to which all current performances must 
conform.” 
Elgin, Duane (1993, 26): 
“Said another way, each new dimension 
provides a unique ‘opportunity space’ or 
learning context for people and societies to 
fill out with their actions. The dimensional 
nature of reality is like a nested set of Chinese 
boxes: Each new dimension embodies an 
enlarged frame of reference within which are 
nested all previous dimensions.” 
King, Patricia M. and Kitchener, Karen S. (1994, 
13): 
“This developmental progression in 
reasoning is described by seven distinct sets 
of assumptions about knowledge and how 
knowledge is acquired. Each set of 
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assumptions has its own logical coherency 
and is called a stage. Each successive stage is 
posited to represent a more complex and 
effective form of justification, providing more 
inclusive and better integrated assumptions 
for evaluating and defending a point of view.” 
Schlagel, Richard H. (1995, 1): 
“Seen from this point of view, the growth of 
scientific knowledge represents a gradual, if 
at times interrupted and irregular, 
progression toward a more objective and 
comprehensive understanding of the 
universe. But while this position is commonly 
accepted, little afford has been made to 
justify it in terms of an actual study of the 
growth of a higher level of abstract thought, 
that of scientific rationalism, from an earlier 
form of concrete objectivity. [...] What is still 
lacking, however, is an interpretation of these 
various segments from the perspective of an 
overall continuity, viewing them as a gradual 
process of intellectual growth (including 
normal progressions, lapses, crises and 
revolutions), rather than as separate, 
independent stages.” 
Wilber, Ken ([1995] 2000, 118–19): 
“The important point, for now, is simply that 
each new and emergent interior holon 
transcends but includes, and thus operates 
upon, the information presented by its junior 
holons, and thus it fashions something novel 
in the ongoing cognitive or interior stream. 
Hence, each new growth in consciousness is 
not just a ‘discovery’ of more of a pregiven 
world, but the co-creation of new worlds 
themselves, what Popper calls a ‘making and 
matching’ of new epistemological domains, a 
discovery/creation of higher and wider 
worlds.” 
Beck, Don E. and Cowan, Christopher C. (1996, 40, 
62): 
“A vMEME [value meme, M.K.] transposes 
itself into a world view, a value system, a level 
of psychological existence, a believe 
structure, organizing principle, a way of 
thinking, and a mode of living. [...] Although 
each new vMEME builds on the foundation of 
those which came before and adds new 
factors of complexity, the pattern of vMEMEs’ 
emergence does not blindly follow a 
predetermined script in a mechanistic, step-
by-step fashion.” 
Thompson, William I. (1996, 38): 
“If we look back at this evolutionary process 
of emergent states in the movement from 
forms, feelings, perceptions, and 
dispositional attitudes to consciousness, we 
should be able to construct a dynamical 
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model or phase-portrait for the geometry of 
behavior. We could construct a five-
dimensional model for consciousness with 
each channel of information coming in 
defined as a dimension or axis.”  
Wade, Jenny (1996, 267–68): 
“Higher stages of consciousness comprehend 
lower stages but the reverse is not true. [...] 
[P]eople operating at lower stages have no 
way to judge higher stages except by 
comparison with lower stages because they 
cannot comprehend higher-stage dynamics. 
They tend to equate them with more 
regressive stages, not more progressive ones. 
Deacon, Terrance (1997, 449): 
“If consciousness is inevitably representa-
tional, then it follows that a change in the 
nature of the way information gets 
represented inevitably constitutes a change 
in consciousness. Consciousness of iconic 
representations should differ from 
consciousness of indexical representations, 
and this in turn should differ from 
consciousness of symbolic representations. 
Moreover, since these modes of 
representation are not alternatives at the 
same level but hierarchically and 
componentially related to one another, this 
must also be true of these modes of 
consciousness as well. They form a nested 
hierarchy, where certain conditions in the 
lower levels of consciousness are 
prerequisite to the emergence of 
consciousness at each higher level.” 
Egan, Kieran (1997, 4): 
“My primary aim in this book is to unravel 
some of the major strands or layers of our 
typically polysemous understanding. I try to 
separate out a set of general and distinctive 
kinds of understanding and characterize each 
of them in detail; I distinguish five, which I call 
Somatic, Mythic, Romantic, Philosophic, and 
Ironic. I try to show, furthermore, that these 
kinds of understanding have developed in 
evolution and cultural history in a particular 
sequence, coalescing to a large extent (but 
not completely) as each successive kind has 
emerged. The modern mind thus is 
represented as a composite.” 
Commons, Michael et al. (1998, 240): 
“The General Model of Hierarchical 
Complexity uses the hierarchical complexity 
of tasks as the basis for the definition of 
stage. An action is at a given stage when it 
successfully completes a task of a given 
hierarchical order of complexity. Roughly, 
hierarchical complexity refers to the number 
of nonrepeating recursions that the 
coordinating actions must perform on a set of 
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primary elements. Actions at a higher order 
of hierarchical complexity: (a) are defined in 
terms of the actions at the next lower order 
of hierarchical complexity; (b) organize and 
transform the lower order actions; (c) 
produce organizations of lower order actions 
that are new and not arbitrary and cannot be 
accomplished by those lower order actions 
alone.” 
Loevinger, Jane (1998, 37): 
“A final line of evidence for sequentiality is 
asymmetry of comprehension, that is, people 
can understand thinking at their own level or 
at levels below their own, but not at levels 
above their own.” 
Sinnott, Jan D. (1998, 62–63): 
“One important characteristic of the idea 
presented here is that any social or 
interpersonal behavior can be filtered or 
encoded in terms of any level of thought. An 
event can be assimilated at any level of 
knowing. But at each increasingly 
sophisticated level of knowing, more complex 
aspects of the event can be organized and 
handled by the knower.” 
Cook-Greuter, Susanne R. ([1999] 2010, 19–20): 
“On the whole, developmental stage theories 
based on Piaget’s ideas describe human 
development as a sequence of increasingly 
complex and integrated stages or coherent 
systems of meaning making. Each stage 
constitutes a different way of how people 
know reality, in other words, a different 
epistemology, or a different world-view. 
Central to this model is the claim that the 
stage sequence is unidirectional and that the 
stages constitute hierarchical integrations. 
[...] A new stage integrates the material or 
content of the previous one as a special case, 
that is, as an element into its more inclusive 
meaning system. Each stage is thus a 
part/whole. It is a whole in its own right, as 
well as part of a bigger, more expansive 
system of understanding.” 
Damerow, Peter (1999, 20–21): 
“The execution of symbolic actions with the 
symbols of the abstract concept, instead of 
only mentally performing the operations (for 
example, working with an arithmetic 
algorithm), objectifies the mental activity and 
so again initiates the construction of meta-
cognitive operations in the same way as the 
original first-order representation initiated 
the construction of the abstract concept, 
which is now embodied by the second-order 
representation. Any process of development 
of the logico-mathematical thought may thus 
be interpreted as an iteration and 
recombination of such reflective abstractions 
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that are initiated by culturally transmitted 
representations.” 
Parker, Sue T. and McKinney, Michael L. (1999, 
VII): 
“This analysis shows that the stages of human 
cognitive development recapitulate the 
stages of cognitive evolution in a series of 
ancestors, who evolved new stages of 
cognitive development through terminal 
extension of previous stages, a form of 
heterochrony known as peramorphosis or 
adultification.” 
Barnes, Michael H. (2000, 45): 
“Piaget’s description of stages helps to 
categorize thought styles more clearly. His 
theory also helps to recognize the particular 
sequence in which stages of thought appear 
in cultural history. In cultures as in 
individuals, the easier modes of thought 
appear first and continue to be used even 
when more difficult modes of thought are 
added.” 
Dux, Günter ([2000] 2011, 118): 
“The more clearly the development of all 
history comes into view, the greater the 
contrasts that become evident between past 
societies and ours, the more urgent the 
question why people acted and thought in 
early societies differently from their 
counterparts in later societies, and why these 
later societies were able to develop out of 
earlier ones. [...] The most encompassing 
condition of development of each and every 
society, however, is the structure of the 
society that precedes it, out of which the new 
one has developed.” 
Donald, Merlin (2001, 262): 
“Thus modern culture contains within it a 
trace of each of our previous stages of 
cognitive evolution. It still rests on the same 
old primate brain capacity for episodic or 
event knowledge. But it has three additional, 
uniquely human layers: a mimetic layer, an 
oral-linguistic layer, and an external-symbolic 
layer. The minds of individuals reflect these 
three ways of representing reality.” 
Torbert, Bill R. et al. (2003, 68): 
“First, each successive action-logic we 
describe includes all the possibilities of the 
prior action-logics and a whole new set of 
alternatives as well. Thus, at each later 
action-logic we have more degrees of 
freedom about which action-logic we use 
when.” 
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Robinson, R J. (2004, 253–54): 
“It is certainly the case that there are stages 
in the development of intelligence, each 
revealing a different kind of reasoning. [...] 
The relationship between stages is that each 
is equivalent to its predecessors, but 
operates on a higher level [...]. As such, a new 
stage does essentially the same things as its 
predecessors, but does them on a higher 
plane. In particular, each new stage both 
overcomes the omissions, conflicts and 
contradictions to which previous stages were 
subject and opens up new potential of which 
all previous stages were oblivious.” 
Overton, Willis F. (2006, 25–26): 
“All nonlinear dynamic systems, including the 
human psyche, undergo transformational 
change. Transformational change results in 
the emergence of novelty. As forms change, 
they become increasingly complex. This 
increased complexity is a complexity of 
pattern rather than a linear additive 
complexity of elements.” 
Hallpike, Christopher R. (2008, 123–24): 
“The human mind is not like an empty bucket 
that is gradually filled with information by 
adults, or by passively observing the world 
around one; each individual has actively to 
construct his understanding of the world, of 
things and of people, by interacting and 
experimenting with himself. [...] Some ways 
of thinking are more elementary than others, 
and provide the foundation on which the 
more advanced and complex types of 
thought can be constructed, when the social 
conditions are right.” 
Combs, Allan (2009, 89): 
“If we stand back and view the stages of 
growth charted there from infancy to 
adulthood, we see that one important theme 
that runs throughout development is a 
persistent increase in internal complexity 
which lies inside and powers the growth of 
the mind. This complexity presents itself in 
the form of increasingly sophisticated 
schemas and patterns of schemas all of which 
constitute a person’s mind.” 
Esbjörn-Hargens, Sean and Zimmerman, Michael 
E. (2009, 145): 
“All shifts from one level of development to 
the next involve a crisis of the self. The self is 
letting go of old ways of interpreting and 
seeing the world. It is a death of an old self 
and a birth of a new, more inclusive self.” 
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Bellah, Robert N. (2011, 117): 
“I offered a typology of religious 
representation—unitive, enactive, symbolic, 
and conceptual—to describe the way in 
which religions have understood reality. The 
concepts of enactive, symbolic, and 
conceptual representation were adapted 
from the work of Jerome Bruner on child 
development. [...] I argued that religion 
draws on all these forms of representation: 
just as the child continuous to use enactive 
and symbolic representations, even after 
becoming conceptually sophisticated, so do 
religions.” 
Laloux, Frederic (2014, 38 [square brackets 
added, M.K.]): 
“Every paradigm includes and transcends the 
previous. So if we have learned to operate 
from, say, Achievement-Orange [level 3], we 
still have the ability, when appropriate, to 
also react from Conformist-Amber [level 2] or 
Impulsive-Red [level 1]. Even the opposite is 
true to some extent: were we to be 
surrounded by people operating from a later 
stage, for example, Pluralistic-Green [level 4], 
we could temporarily display Green 
behaviors, even though we wouldn’t yet have 
integrated this stage.” 
Mortimer, Eduardo F. et al. (2014, 23): 
“The development of new forms of activity 
gives rise to new types of thinking. 
Nevertheless, since earlier forms of activity 
continue to fulfill some role in culture, the old 
types of thinking employed in these earlier 
forms are preserved and continued to 
function well in their appropriate contexts.” 
Rochat, Philippe (2015, 123–24): 
“The model proposes that in development, 
layers of awareness are added in a 
cumulative fashion. This accumulation 
increases the experiential range of the child, 
constantly navigating through these layers 
while awake and conscious. [...] However, 
contrary to the constructionist, stage-like 
view á la Piaget, a new added layer does not 
change or re-structure other already existing 
layers.” 
Lourenço, Orlando M. (2016, 123): 
“In a strong conception of development, 
developmental stages are characterized by 
the following criteria: (a) Hierarchy: stages 
appear in an invariant, hierarchical order; (b) 
integration: a given stage integrates, albeit 
overcomes or transcends its predecessor; (c) 
consolidation: before all features that define 
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a certain stage are present, there is a phase 
of preparation wherein the stage still 
presents some features of the previous one; 
(d) structuration: a stage is organized by what 
Piaget called structures d’ ensemble or 
overarching structures, that is, a way of 
thinking/knowing which has some formal 
and logical properties and is applied to 
different contents; and (e) equilibrium: if an 
individual is capable of performing according 
to the criteria of a given stage, then s/he is at 
a certain degree of (unstable) equilibrium, 
and is not cognitively ‘perturbed’ when s/he 
has to solve problems whose solution does 
not require competencies that go beyond the 
competences linked to the stage at hand.” 
Pisula, Wojciech (2016, 56 [quoted without 
reference, M.K.]): 
“[T]he evolutionary processes that gave rise 
to consciousness phenomena started as long 
as 500 million years ago, with the emergence 
of vertebrates possessing midbrain. This 
shows that our thoughtless anthropo-
centrism is detrimental to our understanding 
of the world also with regard to 
consciousness. Due to limitations of space, 
the present proposal omits the ontogenetic 
perspective. However, there are reasons to 
believe that its inclusion would change little 
in the proposed construct, although it is very 
likely that higher integrative levels of 
consciousness would see further subdivision 
into constituent sublevels. It seems that the 
theory of integrative levels can still serve as a 
useful tool for advancing our understanding 
of complex phenomena. This paper presents 
an attempt to employ it in the analysis of the 
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Table B.1 Integrative levels of consciousness according to Vedic psychology (Charles N. Alexander et al.). 
Level Characteristics 
Prerepresentation 
1. Action and senses  
(sensorimotor) 
The “I” or ego (knower) during this period acts on or senses (dominant process of knowing) nonpermanent objects of immediate sensation and action 
(known). Throughout most of this period, there is not a well-developed internal capacity to represent objects symbolically as permanent and as separate 
from other objects—be it a representation of the self (the “me”) or any other object in the environment. Thus, the self as known is not yet clearly 





As the “I” or ego (knower) increasingly functions through simple representational processes, it comes to monitor objectively the domain of action and 
immediate sensation in which it was previously embedded. Actions and sensations are now internally organized through more stable perceptual-mental 
representations and desires, which can also be outwardly expressed in the form of speech (verbal representation). At this level, the child can represent both 
himself and others as permanent objects of attentions and desire (the known). 
3. Mind 
(concrete thinking) 
Emergence of the deeper, comparative aspect of the thinking mind typically occurs during the five- to seven-year shift. During this shift, the primary 
association of the “I” (knower) shifts from desires and simple representations to the comparative thinking level of mind (dominant process of knowing), 
which generates classes and relations in terms of which the known is increasingly organized. Maharishi holds that the active thinking mind is responsible for 
apprehending, remembering, comparing, and conceptually organizing the multiplicity of perceptions to plan speech and action to fulfill desires. We suggest 
that during this period awareness “steps back” out of the simple representational screen of the mind and can now actively coordinate over time and space 
perceptions and concrete representations. As thought becomes more fully differentiated from sensory impressions and desire, egocentric behaviors 
resulting from confusion between these two domains naturally subside. The accompanying capacity to entertain and compare viewpoints further 
contributes to the reduction of egocentrism. 
(continued) 
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Table B.1 Integrative levels of consciousness according to Vedic psychology (Charles N. Alexander et al.). 
Level Characteristics 
4. Intellect  
(abstract reasoning) 
The role of intellect, according to Vedic psychology, is to discriminate, logically evaluate, and decide, bringing direction and order (and hence understanding) 
to the diverse and more outwardly oriented activity of the thinking mind. It is only when internal mental states start to be reflected upon that the question 
“Who am I?” can arise as something more than simply distinguishing oneself by name or external characteristics from others. From the viewpoint of Vedic 
psychology, the primary constraint of this period is that while the intellect enables symbolic, reflective thought, it still does not permit direct awareness of 
Self (self-referral). The “I” can only know itself indirectly through a series of intellectual constructions or representations about itself as the “me”. This 
“dualism” is a universal design feature of language and symbolic representation of any kind. The symbol always stands in for or refers to something else (the 
referent). The limits of the intellect are further reflected in the methods of conventional science, which, while making enormous progress in gaining equal 
understanding and mastery over subjective existence (though with limited success)), rather than directly address it, and hence does not really answer the 
question, “Who am I?” which is essentially a subjective issue. 
5. Feeling and 
intuition 
According to Vedic psychology, feelings in the broad sense operate at and interconnect all levels of mind. However, they are particularly evident in the 
interface between mind and senses, and between the intellect and ego. In our model, during the early representational period, they function primarily as 
extrinsically motivated desires. At a more mature level of development, feelings function as delicate carriers of information, linking the intellect back to the 
intrinsic evolutionary motivation of the ego and ultimately to the inner Self. Feelings become more self-validating, and less dependent on validation through 
conscious intellectual analysis. Maharishi describes feeling as a more “relaxed” state of the intellect. It is flexible and relational (hence more sensitive to 
context and change) and involves a subtler, more rapid, holistic, intuitive mode of functioning. Mature feelings and intuition provide an internal ground for 
guiding the reflective intellect—increasing the likelihood of creative insight in both the sciences and humanities. 
6. Ego Vedic psychology locates the ego or bounded “I” at the subtlest level of individual functioning, closest to the silent, transcendental value of the unbounded 
Self. The individual ego constitutes the interface between unbounded pure consciousness—the ultimate nature of the knower—and the current process of 
knowing. As the active knower, the ego functions through these processes of knowing, integrating the aspects of the known into a coherent whole. Our 
model suggests that to the degree such personal growth occurs in adulthood, it would result from increasing differentiation or development of the ego 
resulting in enhanced synthesizing capacity. On this basis, information provided through all other levels of mind could be more objectively appreciated and 
integrated. However, even in this relatively mature state, the ego still can only know itself indirectly through feelings (and the other levels of mind) and 
hence remains localized and constrained by the limits of that information. According to Vedic psychology, until the unbounded value of the Self, at the basis 
of the ego, is realized, the individual will always remain, to some extent, unfulfilled. 
(continued) 
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According to Vedic psychology, when awareness no longer alternates between identification with the bounded ego and the underlying Self and instead 
becomes permanently established in the experience of pure consciousness, the first stable, higher stage of consciousness is gained. The unbounded Self, in 
cosmic consciousness, is classically described as “nonattached,” not in the sense of being withdrawn, but because it is no longer identified with or 
overshadowed by the boundaries of the changing values of thought, perception, and action. When even the finest level of mind is completely transcended, 
consciousness assumes a unified field character allowing direct Self awareness. Thus, the primary constraint of the prior representational periods is 
overcome in that the question, “Who am I?” has been fully resolved. Self knowledge may now be said to be direct and complete. Knower, known, and 
process of knowing are unified in the unbroken, self-referral experience of pure consciousness. In terms of our life-span model, this process of differentiation 
of the Self culminates in what could be termed self permanence—stable experience of the nonchanging Self as opposed to changing representations of the 
bounded self. 
8. Refined cosmic 
consciousness 
Just as the process of complete differentiation of the knower or Self took place in phases, Vedic psychology posits that subsequent unification of knower and 
the object known occurs through stepwise development. The first major stage in integrating Self and non-Self is said to involve a profound refinement in 
perceptual appreciation of the subtlest values of objective reality—and hence is referred to as refined cosmic consciousness. In refined cosmic 
consciousness, the finest relative level is directly perceived and found to be fundamentally the same in all objects, mental or physical. Further, its essential 
nature is conserved even as it is expressed or transformed into specific manifestations of mind of physical creation. Perception of finer values of an object 
(animate or inanimate) gives rise to greater joy in and love for the object, which in turn facilitates still deeper appreciation of the object. Refined cosmic 
consciousness also has been referred to by Maharishi as “God consciousness,” because in this state, one is said to directly perceive and intimately appreciate 
not only the full grandeur of all levels of creation, but also the ongoing process of creation occurring at the junction point between manifest existence and 
its unmanifest origin. 
(continued) 
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According to Vedic psychology, at the highest stage of unity consciousness, “The Self, which held its identity as separate from all activity in the state of 
cosmic consciousness, finds everything in itself” (Maharishi). At this level, even the process of experiencing the world is said to become fully self-referral: All 
levels of mind and objective reality are experienced in terms of the Self. Even within unity consciousness, there is said to be a sequence of substages 
whereby first the primary object of attention, and then objects of secondary, tertiary, and further levels of attention, are gradually appreciated in terms of 
the Self until a fully mature state of unity consciousness, referred to as “Brahman consciousness,” is established. In this ultimate state of wholeness, the 
Bhagavad Gita says that one “sees the Self in all beings, and all beings in the Self” (Maharishi). 
Source: Excerpted from Alexander et al. (1990, 293, 301–24). 
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Table B.2 Integrative levels of ethical reasoning (Cheryl Armon). 
Level The Good Good work 
Preconventional 
1. Radical egoism The Good revolves around the gratification of desires and the realization of fantasy. The 
Good is that which provides the individual with actual or fantasized physical experience. 
Doing good is undifferentiated from having a good experience. 
For children at stage 1, good work is undifferentiated from 
fantasized or experienced pleasurable activities or roles. 
There is an absence of a conception of the instrumental 
value of work to provide for the self’s material needs. 
2. Instrumental egoism The Good is that which serves the individual’s interest, including emotional, as well as 
physical desires. There is a consistent conception of the Good that differs markedly from 
stage 1 in that it includes the individual’s motives and intentions and the contemplation of 
actual consequences. There is a strong desire to be praised and liked by others and to 
satisfy material wants. The Good that is achieved through praising and approving can be 
immediate (self-other), general (stereotypical socially approved roles), or symbolic 
(sufficient material reward). The Good is that which results in “happiness.” 
At stage 2, the recognition of the reciprocal relation 
between working and its consequences of serving the 
self’s needs is clear. Doing good work is seen not only as a 
source of material reward, but also as a source of 
satisfaction, particularly through praise from others. Same-
sex, socially approved work roles are consistently 
mentioned. However, there is an absence of a sense of 
what the actual role requirements might be. Good work is 
often seen as equivalent to hard work. 
(continued) 
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Table B.2 Integrative levels of ethical reasoning (Cheryl Armon). 
Level The Good Good work 
Conventional 
3. Affective mutuality Good is an affective sense of happiness or fulfillment, a result of positive interpersonal 
experience. Good is determined by what feels good. There is a distinct sense that good can 
be determined by the absence of bad. A major component of what is good is that which 
helps the self and others to feel good (be happier, more successful, etc.) and promotes 
mutuality between self and others in the immediate social environment.  
At stage 3, good work is identified with socially beneficial 
work roles that promote mutuality between self and other 
in one’s immediate work environment. Self-satisfaction is a 
result of the interactions involved in serving others—
interactions that provide positive affective experiences. 
 
4. Individuality Good is the expression of the individual’s self-chosen interests and values. A central theme 
is “meaning.” Whatever one does in life, it must be considered valuable and meaningful in 
a personal sense. The emphasis on individuality, however, is coupled with the awareness 
of the necessary adherence to moral and societal norms for the maintenance of one’s 
good life. 
Good work at stage 4 becomes relativized to include any 
self-chosen activity that provides personal satisfaction or 
enjoyment, financial security, and something useful in 





The Good stands outside moral and societal norms and is a subjective-relative conception 
dependent on each individual’s psychological reaction to particular activities, events, 
persons, etc. Good is that which an individual feels or believes to be good within the 
constraints of individual rights and justice. 
At transitional stage 4/5, good or bad work is subjective 
and a relative conception. Within the constraints of 
individual’s basic rights it is dependent solely on the 
perceived effect of the work on the worker. 
(continued) 
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Table B.2 Integrative levels of ethical reasoning (Cheryl Armon). 
Level The Good Good work 
5. Autonomy The Good is the result of a consistent ethical philosophy that views the individual as an 
autonomous agent. The Good is manifested in productive, meaningful activities that not 
only draw upon the individual’s higher level capabilities, but that are also consistent with 
an individual’s general philosophy. There is the need to broaden the evaluation of the 
Good beyond the self to include a societal perspective. This is achieved through a 
“balancing” of responsibility to society or humanity of which the individual sees 
him/herself as a part. 
At stage 5, good work represents meaningful, productive 
activities which draw on the individual’s higher level 
capabilities. Such activities enhance intellectual and/or 
psychological self-development and/or creativity, and 
require a personal commitment. Some social commitment 
is also required, and one must “balance” between 
responsibility to self and responsibility to society. 
6. Universal holism The Good for the self and the Good for the society or humanity becomes integrated under 
a larger conception of “humanity” or “nature.” The Good is universalized in that Good for 
the self is Good for society, because “society” is made up of many similar selves. Category 
conflicts between the Good and the Right are resolved because what is good must 
conform to universal moral principles of justice and respect for persons. 
At stage 6, good work is embodied in the exercising of fully 
realized human interests and capabilities for all persons in 
the context of a just society. Good work has intrinsic value 
and thereby results in qualitative impact on both society or 
humanity and the individual simultaneously. 
Source: Based on Armon (1984, 365–66: Tables 17.2,17.3). 
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Table B.3 Integrative levels of value (Don E. Beck and Christopher C. Cowan). 




Uses instincts and habits just to survive. Distinct self is barely awakened 
or sustained. Food, Water, Warmth, Sex, and Safety have priority. Forms 
into survival bands to perpetuate life. 
The first people, newborn infants, senile elderly, late-stage Alzheimer’s victims, 
mentally ill street people, starving masses, bad drug trips, and “shell shock;” 
described in anthropological fiction like Jean Auel’s Clan of the Cave Bear. 
2. Magical 
(purple) 
Obey the desires of spirit beings and mystical signs. Show allegiance to 
chief, elders, ancestors and the clan. Preserve sacred objects, places, 
events, and memories. Observe rites of passage, seasonal cycles, and 
tribal customs. 
Belief in guardian angles and Voodoo-like curses, blood oath, ancient grudges, 
chanting and trance dancing, good luck charms, family rituals, and mystic ethnic 
beliefs and superstitions; strong in Third-World settings, gangs, athletic teams, 
and corporate “tribes.” 
3. Impulsive 
(red) 
The world is a jungle full of threats and predators. Breaks free from any 
domination or constraint to please self as self desires. Stands tall, expects 
attention, demands respect, and calls the shots. Enjoys self to the fullest 
right now without guilt or remorse. Conquers, out-foxes, and dominates 
other aggressive characters. 
The “Terrible Twos,” rebellious youth, frontier mentalities, feudal kingdoms, 
James Bond villains, epic heroes, soldiers of fortune, “Papa” Picasso, wild rock 




One sacrifices self to the transcendent Cause, Truth, or righteous 
Pathway. The Order enforces a code of conduct based on eternal, 
absolute principles. Righteous living produces stability now and 
guarantees future reward. Impulsivity is controlled through guilt; 
everybody has their proper place. Laws, regulations, and discipline build 
character and moral fiber. 
Rev. Billy Graham, Frank Capra’s It’s a Wonderful Life, Puritan America, Confucian 
China, Hassidic Judaism, Dickensian England, Singapore discipline, codes of 
chivalry and honor, charitable good deeds, the Salvation Army, Islamic 
fundamentalism, Garrison Keillor’s Lake Wobegon, Boy and Girl Scouts, 
patriotism. 
(continued) 
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Table B.3 Integrative levels of value (Don E. Beck and Christopher C. Cowan). 
Level Characteristic beliefs and actions Representatives 
5. Achievist 
(orange) 
Change and advancement are inherent within the scheme of things. 
Progress by learning nature's secrets and seeking out best solutions. 
Manipulate Earth's resources to create and spread the abundant good 
life. Optimistic, risk-taking, and self-reliant people deserve their success. 
Societies prosper through strategy, technology, and competitiveness. 
The Enlightenment, “success” ministries, Ayn Rand’s Atlas Shrugged, Wall Street, 
Rodeo Drive, The Riviera, emerging middle classes, the cosmetics industry, trophy 
hunting, Chambers of Commerce, colonialism, TV infomercials, the Cold War, 
DeBeers diamond cartel, breast implants, fashion, J.R. Ewing and Dallas. 
6. Communitarian 
(green) 
The human spirit must be freed from greed, dogma, and divisiveness. 
Feelings, sensitivity, and caring supersede cold rationality. Spread the 
Earth's resources and opportunities equally among all. Reach decisions 
through reconciliation and consensus processes. Refresh spirituality, 
bring harmony, and enrich human development. 
John Lennon’s music, Netherland’s idealism, Rogerian counseling, liberation 
theology, Doctors without Borders, Canadian health care, ACLU, World Council of 
Churches, sensitivity training, Boulder (Colorado), Green Peace, Jimmy Carter, 
Dustin Hoffman in The Graduate, animal rights, deep ecology, Minneapolis-St Paul 




Life is a kaleidoscope of natural hierarchies, systems, and forms. The 
magnificence of existence is valued over material possessions. Flexibility, 
spontaneity, and functionality have the highest priority. Knowledge and 
competency should supersede rank, power, status. Differences can be 
integrated into interdependent, natural flows. 
Carl Sagan’s astronomy, Peter Senge’s organizations, Stephen Hawking’s Brief 
History of Time, W. Edwards Deming’s objectives, Paul Newman’s version of 
stardom, chaos theory, appropriate technology, eco-industrial parks (using each 
other’s outflows as raw material), early episodes of TV’s Northern Exposure, Fel-
Pro, Inc., Fred Alan Wolf’s “new physics,” Deepak Chopra’s Ageless Body. 
8. Holistic 
(turquoise) 
The world is a single, dynamic organism with its own collective mind. Self 
is both distinct and a blended part of a larger, compassionate whole. 
Everything connects to everything else in ecological alignments. Energy 
and information permeate the Earth's total environment. Holistic, 
intuitive thinking and cooperative actions are to be expected. 
Theories of David Bohm, McLuhan's “global village,” Gregory Stock's Metaman, 
Rupert Sheldrake and morphic fields, Gandhi's ideas of pluralistic harmony, Ken 
Wilber's “Spectrum of Consciousness,” James Lovelock's “Gaia hypothesis,” Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin's “noosphere.” 
Source: Excerpted from Beck and Cowan (1996, 45–47). 
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Table B.4 Integrative levels of religious representation (Robert N. Bellah). 
Level Characteristics  
1. Unitive 
 
So in developing a typology of religious representations, we must start with the null category of unitive representation—that is, representations that attempt to 
point to the unitive event of experience. There is a certain affinity between unitive experience and what Piaget, borrowing from J.M. Baldwin, calls “adualism” of 
the child. Piaget says that in this adualism of the early months of life, “there does not yet exist any consciousness of self; that is, any boundary between the internal 
or experienced world and the world of external realities.” I do not mean to imply that unitive experiences are in any simple sense a “return” to early infantile 
experience, but it may be that possibilities existing then, as in other kinds of early experiences, are never lost but can be reappropriated in much more complex 
form later on. 
2. Enactive 
 
The second mode of religious representation is what I shall call enactive representation, adapting from what Jerome Bruner sees as the earliest form of true 
representation in the child. Religious enactive representation is the bodily acting out of religious meaning, as in bowing, kneeling, eating, dancing. It may be a 
simple gesture, almost unconscious, like crossing oneself for those for whom that gesture has become second nature. The gesture is the meaning—it enacts it—it 
doesn’t, or doesn’t necessarily, point to anything else. 
3. Symbolic 
 
Symbols, in the sense of material or verbal representations, more obviously “stand for“ something else than do unitive events or bodily gestures, though unitive 
events and bodily gestures can be both symbolic and symbolized. But symbols can also be consciously created in drawings, statues, even buildings, in sounds and, of 
course, in words. When symbols are primarily visual in their appeal we can speak of iconic symbolization; when they involve sound, they are or verge upon musical 
symbolization; when they involve words, we can speak of poetic symbolization. A critically important mode of verbal symbolization is narrative, the story of myth 
(we should remember that mythos is simply the Greek for “story”), which is important in almost all kinds of religion. 
4. Conceptual 
 
Finally, we can speak of the conceptual mode of representation, a form of abstract verbal reflection and argument that follows on and criticizes primary religious 
actions and representations. Conceptual representation is present in all religions to some degree but becomes particularly significant in the axial religions, where 
theory, though still related to ritual and narrative, has to some degree become disembedded. Jean Piaget has perhaps done more than anyone else to show how the 
child moves from symbol to concept in making sense of the world. It is also at this time that the child becomes adept at what Piaget calls “formal operations”—
logical thought and mathematics. 
Source: Excerpted from Bellah (2011, 13–14, 37). 
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Table B.5 Integrative levels of epistemology (Susanne Benack). 
Level Characteristics Theory of knowledge Theory of truth/value 
1. Dualism  Formal-operational 
For the dualist, the world is bifurcated into right and wrong, we and they. Truth and right are absolute, 
objective givens, guaranteed by infallible authorities (God, parents, reason) or simply existent (Platonic 
forms, facts). Knowledge comes in isolated units (beliefs, propositions) whose truth is ascertained by 
comparing them to standards that exist apart from the knower. The dualist understands experience as the 
imprinting of the nature of the object upon the passive subject. The dualist recognizes that subjective 
factors can play a role in determining experience and that there is a distinction between “experience” and 
“reality.” Even a ten-year-old child realizes that people may have different experiences of a common 
situation, depending on subjective factors. Prior to the development of relativistic thought, however, such 
differences are understood as deviations from a common reality that they all approximate. Yet, the 
function of the subject is to reproduce external reality. The veridicality of experience can be evaluated 
only in reference to the object. The nature of the subject is irrelevant to truth. The dualist perceives truth 
in binary terms, if one position on a question is right, the others must be wrong. When confronted with 
someone whose moral position contradicts his or her own, the dualist cannot admit the legitimacy of the 
other’s position without violating his or her dualism. Empathizing with the experience of someone who is 
seen holding wrong, or immoral, beliefs and feelings present a double edged threat to the dualist. He or 
she will either experience the anxiety and discomfort associated with having an incorrect belief or an 
immoral feeling, or he or she will take on the other’s standards and see his or her own beliefs and feelings 
as wrong. 
Objectivity: sees character of 
knowledge/experience as 
determined by the nature of 
the object of knowledge 
(“the known,” “reality”). 
Doesn’t recognize existence 
of different subjective 
perspectives; expects people 
to have similar experiences 
of common situations. Is 
unable to assume other’s 
perspectives; doesn’t 
comprehend the task of 
monitoring and manipulating 
one’s perspective on an 
event. 
Single standard of 
truth or rightness; 
correspondence to the 
“real”. Only one 
interpretation of 
events is correct; 
others must be false, 
distorted. Is unwilling 
to assume other’s 
perspective; feels 
moral opposition to 
adopting “false” 
beliefs or “wrong” 
feelings as though 
they were “true/right”. 
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Table B.5 Integrative levels of epistemology (Susanne Benack). 
Level Characteristics Theory of knowledge Theory of truth/value 
2. Relativism  Postformal 
With the development of relativistic thought the notion of objective reality, independent of the subjects 
disappears, or at least becomes subordinate, a hypothesis, impossible to confirm and not essential to the 
notion of the truth. The nature of experience is seen as dependent upon the nature of the subject, which 
is now understood to contribute actively to the creation of knowledge. Understanding the nature of the 
subjective systems that determine experience, such as intellectual paradigms, species-specific categories 
of thought, and cultural interpretive systems, becomes the focus of epistemological inquiry. The move 
from dualism to relativism, then, fundamentally transforms one’s vision of the world. The dualist sees 
people as living together in a common “outside” world that they all perceive similarly. The relativist sees a 
world in which there is no single “given” reality. Multiple “worlds of experience” are generated by 
multiple epistemological subjects. Each species, each culture, each individual is seen as the center of a 
private world, experiencing a “reality” that may or may not overlap that of his fellows. In the relativist 
world-view, then, there is no “reality” without a simultaneous awareness of the subjective vantage point 
from which it is seen. There is no object without an implied subject. The relativist has the ability to take 
multiple perspectives on any question without denying the partial values and limitations of each position. 
Differences in opinion are not seen as negating one’s own, but as the expectable result of the different 
subjective “lenses” through which people view reality. The relativist is less threatened by identifying with, 
or taking the role of, others whose values are perceived as different. In a relativistic world-view, the 
differentness between people’s perspectives is made prominent. With the onset of relativism, one 
becomes both more aware of people’s differences and less bothered by them. 
Subjectivity: sees character 
of knowledge/experience as 
determined by the subjective 
perspective of the knower. 
Recognizes existence of 
different perspectives from 
which people view events, 
and the different experiences 
they generate; differentiates 
own/other’s perspectives; 
expects people’s experience 
of common situations to 
differ. Is able to monitor and 
manipulate own perspective; 
can put aside one 
perspective and assume 
another; can understand 
other’s perspective as well as 
content of other’s experience 
Knowledge-claims 
evaluated by multiple 
criteria of truth or 
value; multiple 
“truths” generated by 
different subjective 
perspectives, all 
having partial validity. 
Different 
interpretations of an 
event can be seen as 
containing “their own 
truth;” validity 
accorded to other’s 
experience as well as 
one’s own. Is willing to 
assume other’s 
perspectives, put 
aside own beliefs, 
values, assumptions. 
Source: Excerpted from Benack (1984, 341–48). 
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Table B.6 Integrative levels of interpersonal reasoning (Fredda Blanchard-Fields). 
Level Characteristics 
1. Responses at this level are characterized by a dualistic conception of reality where only one account of the event is acknowledged. An absolutistic conception of reality is 
demonstrated through the assertion that only one account holds the “correct” answer. With only one perspective recognized, interpretation of the event and the event 
itself remain fused. Thus, there is no verbal differentiation between the event and its interpretation. Finally, subjective biases inherent in interpretation as well as 
psychological factors are totally ignored in describing and/or explaining the accounts. 
2. At this level, there still remains a strict reliance on dualistic, right versus wrong, reasoning with the presentation of one account. Although differing perspectives are not 
totally ignored at this level, no attempt to deal with them is evidenced. Perceived discrepancies either are not acknowledged as interpretive discrepancies or they are 
deemed inconsequential because of incomplete information. This, again, fuses interpretation and the event. Subjectivity is still disallowed in the analysis; thus, the 
individual still searches for absolutes, objective answers. As in level 1, subjective biases and psychological causality are ignored in responses. 
3. At this level, dualistic reasoning begins to give way to an acknowledgement of multiple outcomes. Yet, all outcomes are not considered valid in their own right. There still 
remains the search for absolute truth that is perceived as external to the individual. Thus, there is a strong reliance on factual evidence, such as that found in a neutral third 
party. This is much like Selman’s notion of an idealized objective third party. An event is differentiated from its interpretation; therefore, discrepancies are clearly 
acknowledged in terms of differing perspectives. Finally, no judgment nor evaluations based on subjective criteria are incorporated into the analysis. Instead, ambiguity, in 
the form of factual contradiction, is deemed resolvable by “sticking to the facts.” 
4. This level is distinguished by a first attempt to integrate dualisms by proposing a reconciliation of differences in the form of a neutral account, devoid of personal bias. 
However, an underlying dualism between what is objective and what is subjective remains. Thus, the search for absolute truth remains and is accomplished be referring 
only to the underlying “objective” event structure. Both accounts can be right to the degree that they both agree on the underlying facts. Responses indicate that the 
individual clearly recognizes interpretive discrepancies in accounts. Finally, there is a considerable lack of evaluation based on psychological criteria (for example, subjective 
or self vs. other differences) other than those related explicitly to the text. 
(continued) 
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Table B.6 Integrative levels of interpersonal reasoning (Fredda Blanchard-Fields). 
Level Characteristics 
5. At this level, each perspective is seen to represent a valid, unique, and irreconcilable frame of reference, relinquishing the dualism of right versus wrong. An absolutistic 
construction of reality gives way to a conception of truth relegated to an interpersonal context of differing points of view. A clear differentiation between events and 
interpretation is depicted in these responses with emphatic acceptance of contradiction. Finally, alternative explanations and evaluation responses (that is, going beyond 
the information given, motivational factors, emotional contingencies, developmental histories) are given for what influences the process of interpretive discrepancies. Yet, 
as seen in the example, a nonreciprocal differentiation between a rational or objective point of view and one that is emotional is adopted. Subjectivity is seen to 
subordinate objectivity; therefore, a dilemma is created with no effective way of dealing with the conflict. 
6. Multiple perspectives resulting from different interpretive frameworks are clearly defined at this level. The individual as interpreter is explicitly acknowledged and 
incorporated in any conclusions drawn. The individual recognizes the need to weigh these discrepant sources of information in order to arrive at the “best” answer for the 
particular situation. At this level, there is no evidence of dualistic or absolutistic thinking. Responsibility for one’s thinking is related back to the self and other in the form of 
interpersonal mutuality and respect. 
Source: Excerpted from Blanchard-Fields (1989, 79–81). 
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Table B.7 Integrative levels of natural philosophy (John M. Broughton). 




Self-evident, bodily self. Not 




distinction. Visible and 
invisible not differentiated. 
Mind and body mutually 
permeable. 
Animistic 
Living and nonliving only 
partly distinguished. People 
distinguished from things 
only along quantitative 
physical dimensions. 
Objective 
Reality presumed. Simple 
and immediate existence of 




Thought and its objects 
undifferentiated. Direct, 
automatic knowing. Single 
extrinsic truth, known and handed 




Self is specific person, me or 
you. Perceiving, acting person. 
Source or agent. 
Organic 
Mind differentiated from 
body as brainlike organ 
controlling rest of body. 
Discrete, nonvisible mental 
contents. 
Subjective 
People distinguished as 
conscious, sentient, or as 
self-active individuals. Body 
is (subordinate) part of 
person. 
Native realist 
Certainty of reality directly 
sensed. Appearance is the 
way something "looks" and 
this is reality. Real 
differentiated from 
imaginary as persistent. 
Empirical 
Partial differentiation of knower 
from known. Experience directly 
caused by object. Subjective not 
opposed to objective. Truth is 
absolute fact, is opposed to lie, 





Self is mind (mental self) more 
than body (physical self). 
Unique subjective traits, 
opinions, beliefs, or values. 
Authentic inner self 
differentiated from false outer 
appearance (social personality 




concrete physical as a fluid 
and invisible medium. 
Mental and physical as 
shared classes with 
interdependence (overlap). 
Interpersonal 
People have personality and 
show themselves to other 
people. Body is appearance, 





realistic, but mind may add 
personal distortion (opinion 
or value). Mental is belief 
rather than reality. 
Social 
Concrete facts known by 
individuals. Truth as interpersonal 
demonstration and plausibility 
(overlap). Nascent skepticism. 
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Table B.7 Integrative levels of natural philosophy (John M. Broughton). 




Self as system: soul, intellect, 
logic, identity, or "cogito" (self-
control). Self has mental and 
physical attributes. Self-
concept, or "me," rather than 
"I." Generalized self or 
perspective. 
Cartesian 
Dualism between objective 
mechanistic system of 
scientific cause/effect, and 
subjective or spiritual world 





Social as system of abstract 
individuals. People as 
spiritual, self-regulating, and 
purposeful (vitalist), 
instances of the general 
rule. Body now estranged as 
part of material world 
(mechanist).  
Dualist 
Reality assumed. Noumenon 
differentiated from 
phenomenon. Substantial 




Knowledge is inductive 
generalization of observation, 
constructive copy of world. Truth, 
which subordinates reality, is 
replicable and is achieved through 
social-conventional testing of 
models. Impartial "generalized 





Self as flux of experience, or 
process of self-realization. 
Breakdown of substantial soul 
or identity. Everything has self. 
Reductionist 
Monistic materialism. Mind 
as epiphenomenon. 
Anarchist 
Fusion of natural and social. 
(Either reduction of social to 
biological or panpsychism.) 
Dialectic of organization and 
anarchic chaos. 
Subjectivist 
All reality phenomenal. Full 
determinism at level of data. 
Relativist 
All knowledge is subjective, or 
arbitrary convention. Opposition 





Self as transcendental ego, or 
function of universal self-
consciousness. Self-conceiver 
or subject-self differentiated 
from empirical or object-self. 
Parallelist 
Functional "mental" and 
"physical," psychology 
versus physiology, as 
ideational systems of 
explanatory constructs. 
Rational 
Social as rational democratic 
organization, versus natural 
as nonrational but 
systematic sphere. Natural 
law. Physical and social 
sciences. 
Perspectivist 
Reality presupposed. Reality 
defined by coherence and 
utility of system within which 
it is interpreted. 
Methodological 
Objective relativism. Knowledge 
and truth defined by 
intersubjective use of paradigm, 
such as idealism, behaviorism, etc. 
Logical level distinguished from 
empirical. 
(continued) 
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Table B.7 Integrative levels of natural philosophy (John M. Broughton). 





Self as trans-individual subject 





Nature and culture 
penetrate each other 
through human activity 
(work). 
Dialectical 
Natural world transformed 
into cultural, or alienated 
from it through domination.  
Materialist 
Objective material reality 
dynamically evolving and 
appearing through human 
activity. 
Social 
Knowledge as active, social 
transformation of reality through 
man-made, historical categories. 
Source: Based on Broughton (1978, 80–81: Table 1). 
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Table B.8 Integrative levels of representation (Jerome S. Bruner). 
Level Characteristics System for processing information Example 
1. Enactive By enactive representation I mean a mode of representing past events through appropriate 
motor response. We cannot, for example, give an adequate description of familiar sidewalks 
or floors over which we habitually walk, nor do we have much of an image of what they are 
like. Yet we get about them without tripping or even looking much.  
Action  
(knowing something through doing it) 
Bicycle riding, tying knots, 
aspects of driving 
2. Iconic Iconic representation summarizes events by the selective organization of percepts and of 
images, by the spatial, temporal, and qualitative structures of the perceptual field and their 
transformed images. Images stand for perceptual events in the close but conventionally 
selective way that a picture stands for the object pictured. 
Imagery 
(knowing something through a picture 
or image of it) 
An image of a knot can 
provide a schema around 
which action can be 
sequentially organized. 
3. Symbolic Finally, a symbol system represents things by design features that include remoteness and 
arbitrariness. A word neither points directly to its referent here and now, nor does it 
resemble it as a picture. The other property of language that is crucial is its productiveness 
in combination, far beyond what can be done with images or acts. 
Language 
(knowing something through some 
such symbolic means as language) 
The lexem Philadelphia looks 
no more like the city so 
designated than does a 
nonsense syllable. 
Source: Excerpted from Bruner (1974, 316, 325, 328). 
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Table B.9 Integrative levels of tasks (Michael L. Commons). 
Level Characteristics Example 
0. Calculatory Exact without generalization. Simple machine arithmetic on 0𝑠𝑠, 1𝑠𝑠. 
1. Sensory or motor Discriminate in a rote fashion, stimuli generalization, move; move limbs, lips, eyes, head; 
view objects and movement. Discriminative and conditioned stimuli. 
Either see circles, squares, etc., or instead, touch 
them.  
○ □  
2. Circular sensory-motor Form open-ended classes; reach, touch, grab, shake objects, babble; Open ended classes, 
phonemes. 
Reach and grasp a circle or square.  
○ □ 
3. Sensory-motor Form concepts; respond to stimuli in a class successfully. Morphemes, concepts. A class of open squares may be formed.  
□ □ □ □ □ 
4. Nominal Find relations among concepts. Use names; use names and other words as successful 
commands. Single words may be ejaculatory and exclamatory, and include verbs, nouns, 
numbers’ names, letters’ names. 
That class may be named, “Squares.” 
5. Sentential Imitate and acquire sequences; follow short sequential acts; generalize match-dependent 
task actions; chain words together. Use pronouns. 
The numbers, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 may be said in order. 
6. Pre-operational Make simple deductions; follow lists of sequential acts; tell stories. Count random events and 
objects; combine numbers and simple propositions. Use connectives: as, when, then, why, 
before; products of simple operations.  
The objects in a row of 5 may be counted; last count 
called 5, five, cinco, etc.  
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗   □ □ □ □ □   ○ ○ ○ ○ ○   □/"} Q 
7. Primary  Simple logical deduction and empirical rules involving time sequence. Simple arithmetic. Can 
add, subtract, multiply, divide, count, prove, do series of tasks on own. Times, places, counts 
acts, actors, arithmetic outcome from calculation.  
There are behaviors that act on such classes that we 
call simple arithmetic operations.  
1 +  3 =  4;  5 +  15 =  20; 5(4)  =  20; 5(3)  =
 15 
(continued) 
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Table B.9 Integrative levels of tasks (Michael L. Commons). 
Level Characteristics Example 
8. Concrete  Carry out full arithmetic, form cliques, plan deals. Do long division, follow complex social 
rules, take and coordinate perspective of other and self. Use variables of interrelations, social 
events, what happened among others, reasonable deals. 
There are behaviors that order the simple arithmetic 
behaviors when multiplying a sum by a number. Such 
distributive behaviors require the simple arithmetic 
behavior as a prerequisite, not just a precursor.  
5(1 +  3)  =  5(1)  +  5(3)  =  5 +  15 =  20 
9. Abstract Discriminate variables such as stereotypes; use logical quantification; form variables out of 
finite classes based on an abstract feature. Make and quantify propositions; use variable 
time, place, act, actor, state, type; uses quantifiers (all, none, some); make categorical 
assertions (e.g., “We all die.”). 
All the forms of five in the five rows in the example 
are equivalent in value. 
𝑥𝑥 =  5. 
10. Formal Argue using empirical or logical evidence; logic is linear, one-dimensional; use Boolean logic’s 
connectives (not, and, or, if, if and only if); solve problems with one unknown using algebra, 
logic, and empiricism; form relationships out of variables; use terms such as if . . . then, thus, 
therefore, because; favor correct scientific solutions. 
The general left hand distributive relation is  
𝑥𝑥 ∗  (𝑦𝑦 +  𝑧𝑧)  =  (𝑥𝑥 ∗  𝑦𝑦)  +  (𝑥𝑥 ∗  𝑧𝑧) 
11. Systematic  Construct multivariate systems and matrices, coordinate more than one variable as input; 
situate events and ideas in a larger context, that is, considers relationships in contexts; form 
or conceive systems out of relations: legal, societal, corporate, economic, national. 
The right hand distribution law is not true for 
numbers but is true for proportions and sets.  
𝑥𝑥 +  (𝑦𝑦 ∗  𝑧𝑧)  =  (𝑥𝑥 ∗  𝑦𝑦)  +  (𝑥𝑥 ∗  𝑧𝑧);  
𝑥𝑥 ∪  (𝑦𝑦 ∩  𝑧𝑧)  =  (𝑥𝑥 ∩  𝑦𝑦)  ∪  (𝑥𝑥 ∩  𝑧𝑧)  
 
Symbols:  
∪ = union (total elements) 
∩ = intersection (elements in common) 
(continued) 
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Table B.9 Integrative levels of tasks (Michael L. Commons). 
Level Characteristics Example 
12. Metasystematic Integrate systems to construct multisystems or metasystems out of disparate systems; 
compare systems and perspectives in a systematic way (across multiple domains); reflect on 
systems, that is, is metalogical, meta-analytic; name properties of systems (e.g., 
homomorphic, isomorphic, complete, consistent, commensurable). 
The system of propositional logic and elementary set 
theory are isomorphic.  
𝑥𝑥 & (𝑦𝑦 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑧𝑧)  =  (𝑥𝑥 & 𝑦𝑦) or (𝑥𝑥 & 𝑧𝑧) Logic; 
𝑥𝑥 ∩  (𝑦𝑦 ∪  𝑧𝑧)  =  (𝑥𝑥 ∩  𝑦𝑦)  ∪  (𝑥𝑥 ∩  𝑧𝑧) Sets; 
T(False) ⇔ ∅ Empty set;  
T(True) ⇔ Ω Universal set  
 
Symbols:  
& = and  
⇔ = is equivalent to  
T = Transformation of 
13. Paradigmatic Discriminate how to fit, and fit, metasystems together to form new paradigms. Includes 
ability to show that there are no ways to fit together any set of metasystems. 
Ω1 ° Ω2 = ψa 
 
Symbols: 
Ωn = e.g., Algebraic Metasystems 
Ωn = e.g., Geometric Metasystems 
ψa = Analytic Geometry as a paradigm 
14. Cross-paradigmatic Fit paradigms together to form new fields. Only by crossing paradigms can the new fields be 
conceived and formed; it requires the coordination of multiple paradigms to form genuinely 
new fields. 
 
Source: Based on Commons (2008, 311–12: Table 1). 
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Table B.10 Integrative levels of ego identity (Susanne R. Cook-Greuter). 
Level Characteristics Self-definition Perspective 




Describes adults who are unaware of themselves as separate individuals. They may be nonverbal, driven by 
basic needs and fundamentally helpless with others. 
Confused, confounded 
2. Impulsive Describes individuals who show signs of beginning use of language simultaneously with the ego as reflected in 
such statements as “I want” and “mine”. They are concerned with safety and the gratification of basic needs. 
Rudimentary, physical self-
labeling, crude dichotomies 
First- 
person 
3. Self-protective Describes people who see the world only from the perspective of their own wants and needs. To get what they 
want, they need to control others and safeguard their interests. It is the first stage of beginning purposeful 
social interaction. “Opportunists” see the world from an “I win/you lose” perspective. Power is used where 
useful: “Might makes right.” 
Basic dichotomies, single 
concrete feature, minimal 
self-description in terms of 
desires 
4. Rule-oriented Describes individuals who are discovering the second-person perspective. They have a vacillating point of view. 
Sometimes the question is: “How do I look to others?” and at other times: “How do they look to me?” 
Comparing is restricted to concrete and external aspects of self and others. Interest in being part of groups 
(greater power) and following rules. 
Primary actions:  
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Table B.10 Integrative levels of ego identity (Susanne R. Cook-Greuter). 
Level Characteristics Self-definition Perspective 
Conventional Typical age (in modern Western societies): 12+ years (approximately 80% of American adults)   
5. Conformist Describes persons with an early adolescent frame of mind. They identify themselves mostly as members of 
familiar groups. The boundaries between self and others are confused. But unlike people at the Self-protective 
stage, there is real concern for the well-being of others. One takes responsibility for others. Dependency needs 
are high. Fear of rejection leads Conformists to be overly and nice and to repress negative feelings. There is 
unquestioned acceptance of the Family and in-groups (such as peer groups, family values, club, church) and 
loyalty is important. The unfamiliar (out-groups) is rejected and easily maligned. External social status and 
material goods are important as indices of one’s value. 
Concrete operations:  
Several external features; 
vital statistics, rudimentary 




Characterizes people who are able to step back and look at themselves as objects for the first time. Generally, 
however, the focus is directed outside the self, on others. Conventional morality and self-righteousness strong. 
Stage 6 people often assert and express their newly discovered personhood albeit in traditional terms. They try 
to differentiate themselves from the previous familiar context. Persons on this stage begin to recognize that 
others have different selves and thoughts, and that they can look at you as an object as well. Believe in 
Authority and the Truth are strong. Self-aware persons are concerned with duty, responsibility, right action. 
Technicians and bureaucrats often inhabit this frame of mind with excellent results for society. 
Abstract operations:  
Clusters of external 
attributes, simple traits, 
beginning introspection; 
beginning sense of separate 




7. Conscientious Adds the concept of linear time (sequentiality) as a conscious object to the third-person perspective and 
expands the meaningful social context to others within the same society with similar ideologies and 
aspirations. At stage 7 one starts to explore the nature of oneself in terms of traits through more ongoing 
introspection. Stage 7 individuals are interested in reasons, causes, goals, costs, consequences, and the 
effective use of time. Because of the expanded view, the Conscientious person plans, prioritizes, and optimizes 
procedures to achieve goals. Quintessential conventional scientific-rational frame of mind.  
Formal operations:  
Self as system of roles and 
clusters of traits; prototype 
personality; individual self-
agency; aware of recent 
past and future, and 
causality 
(continued) 
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Table B.10 Integrative levels of ego identity (Susanne R. Cook-Greuter). 
Level Characteristics Self-definition Perspective 
Postconventional (Approximately 10% of the worldwide adult population)   
8. Individualist  The fourth perspective allows one to look at one self as changing over time and reacting differently in different 
contexts. Initial discovery that people interpret experience, that is, bring their own “meaning” to the same 
event. The same thing means different things to different people. Self and context (object) form an 
interdependent system. There are as many truths as there are individuals. No truth can therefore be better 
than any other. Everything seems relative, undecidable, context dependent. Discovery of cultural and personal 
“assumptions” and own tendency towards defensive moves. Individualists realize that reality is not out there, 
separate from the viewer as previously felt, but connected to the person who experience it. Increasing ability 
to see how things are related and influence each other in non-linear ways. 
Systematic operations:  
Systems theory concepts 




9. Autonomous Persons at the Autonomous stage realize that they may notice different conflicting aspects of themselves at 
different times but, unlike persons at stage 8 who may despair about ever knowing who they really are, 
Autonomous individuals become able to “own” more of the contradictory parts of themselves. They can 
integrate previously compartmentalized sub-identities of the self into a coherent new whole or core identity. 
They are convinced that higher development is better and closer to truth. Higher is believed to be better 
because the more differentiated and the more autonomous persons become, the more they can claim that 
they have a nondisturbed (true) and realistic view of themselves and the world. 
Autonomous, multiple 
roles; self-generated core-
identity; aware of many 
defenses and expressions 
of inner conflict; sense of 
self-esteem, empowerment 
(continued) 
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Table B.10 Integrative levels of ego identity (Susanne R. Cook-Greuter). 
Level Characteristics Self-definition Perspective 
Postautonomous    
10. Construct aware 
(ego-aware) 
 
Construct-aware adults seem to realize that their self-identity is always and only a temporary construct. Hence, 
they become less invested in the idea of an individual ego that serves the unconscious function of creating a 
stable self-identity. They see through the mental habits of analyzing, comparing, measuring, and labeling as 
means to reify and map experience. They understand the need for a different approach to knowing, one that 
responds to the immediate, unfiltered experience of what is. This new way of knowing requires an attitude of 
complex openness: One that is free from wishing for any particular outcome, and free from the automatic 
habits of representational thought. Paradoxically, the very desire for freedom from any particular idea of how 
the world should be, keeps one fettered within that frame of reference.  
Complex matrix of self-
identifications, at the same 
time questioning their 
adequacy; description of 
self in stages 
(approximations) and 




11. Unitive The self-sense of the Unitive stage is fluid, “undulating,” based on people’s trust in the intrinsic value and 
processes of life. At the unitive stage, a whole logical/psycho-logical system (the rational, representational 
domain in human development) has become the content—an element or object in a higher-order, 
postrepresentational integration. In the Unitive self-experience, individuals see through the function of the ego 
to objectify and reify the self by defining (delimiting) it. They experience the self in its moment to moment 
transformation and therefore consciously decline to satisfy the implicit demand for objective self-
identification. It is important to realize that from a Unitive point of view higher stages are not better than 
lower ones because all are necessary parts of interconnected reality and an overall evolutionary process where 
everything is and will be just the way it is. 
Description of self as in 
constant flux and 
transformation; 
transcendent awareness; I 
am no(-)body, no(-)thing 
Source: Excerpted from Cook-Greuter (2010a, 57–66, 197–203). 
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Table B.11 Integrative levels of thought (Andreas Demetriou et al.). 
Level Characteristics 
1. Episodic representations (0–2 years) 
2. Realistic mental 
representations 
Representations at 2–3 years of age are reduced mental projections of episodic representations with a component of implicit awareness.  
Children at 3.5 years implicitly differentiate between correctly remembered (e.g., objects observed carefully) and not remembered items (e.g., objects 
seeing only for a little), suggesting an awareness of representations stored earlier in memory. Also, toddlers are aware that when one saw an object 
one knows about it. This makes Theory of Mind possible, enabling toddlers to understand that one’s actions relate to one’s representations. 
By the age of 4–5 years executive control is guided by a “focus-recognize-respond” program allowing toddlers to set-up action plans requiring shifting 
between actions according to a probe. For instance, “Sort according to color when a red tag is on and according to shape when a square tag is on.” This 
task involves awareness of representations one may focus on and choose from, organizing action beforehand. By this age, reasoning ascents from 
reciting or reading episodic blocks forward to pragmatic deals: “You said I can play outside if I eat my food; I ate my food; I go to play outside.” This 
sequence, is basically an inference locking two representations (“A occurs” and “B occurs”) together into an inductive sequence (i.e., When A occurs, B 
also occurs). 
3. Generic rules organizing 
representations 
At 6–8 years, children are explicitly aware of mental representations and their relations with their own actions. For instance, they differentiate 
between easy and difficult memorization tasks, suggesting awareness of the relation between complexities of representations and learning. However, 
at this age, children do not yet explicitly differentiate between mental functions, such as memory and reasoning, nor do they explicitly associate each 
with specific processes (rehearsal vs. inference). This is possible at 8–10 years, when there is an explosion of awareness of the mental world. Children 
in this phase master second-order Theory of Mind (e.g., “I know that George knows that Mary knows that …”) recognize that gaps in knowledge may 
be compensated by inference (e.g., He sorted by color, so blue objects would be in the blue box). 
(continued) 
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Table B.11 Integrative levels of thought (Andreas Demetriou et al.). 
Level Characteristics 
 In the next phase, at 8–9 years, awareness of different mental processes allows children to shift flexibly between them (e.g., to remember you need to 
observe carefully and rehearse; to sort you need to follow a sorting rule). Thus, in this phase, executive control is upgraded into a conceptual fluency 
program allowing children to shift between mental processes (e.g., memory vs. inference) or conceptual domains (e.g., they recall words belonging to 
different categories—fruits, animals, furniture—following a probe). Compared to the previous “focus-recognize-respond” executive program, the 
current program involves analytic representations of conceptual spaces. Also, they implicitly use rules specifying how different types of inference are 
interrelated. For instance, if accepted that “A implies B” then two possibilities are necessarily true: When A occurs then B occurs too and when B does 
not occur then A did not occur either. Therefore, awareness of underlying relations allows moving across conceptual spaces and rules that they may 
then guide executive control and reasoning. Grasp of logical necessity in this phase is a strong sign of this awareness (e.g., All balls in the box are red, 
so the next to be drawn out MUST be red). 
4. Overarching principles 
integrating rules 
At 11–13 years, adolescents form accurate maps of mental functions and of their own strengths and weaknesses. Thus, they cognize the constraints of 
different inferential processes and they can ground inference on truth and validity rules. That is, they explicitly understand that accepting certain 
conditions (e.g., birds fly; elephants are birds) imposes constraints on inference (i.e., elephants fly) even if a statement is admittedly wrong (elephants 
are not birds). This achievement allows consistency in reasoning.  
By the age of 13–14 years, “reasoners have a meta-representation of logical validity that can be used to inform them of the accuracy of their logical 
deductions, at least when reasoning about abstract materials.” This protects them from drawing false conclusions. Specifically, they understand that 
accepting that “If A then B” does not allow drawing any conclusion about A if only knowing that B occurred or drawing any conclusion about B if only 
knowing that A did not occur because B may be caused by causes other than A. Therefore, the inferential relevance mastery program explicitly places 
truth weights on the various alternative choices that may be deduced from a logical argument. Executive control in this cycle is very different from the 
previous cycles. It is based on a suppositional-generative program enabling adolescents to co-activate conceptual spaces and evaluate them against 
each other. 
Source: Excerpted from Demetriou et al. (2017, 2–4). 
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Table B.12 Integrative levels of naming and knowing (John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley). 
Level Characteristics Examples 
1. Self-action Things are viewed as acting under their own powers. Aristotle’s physics; animistic personifications; magic; personalizations of the world and its 
phenomena (it took Jupiter Pluvius to produce a rainstorm for the early Romans); eternal 
circular movement of stars under their own powers; biological “vital principle”; vocabulary 
of metaphysics (e.g., “substance,” “entity,” “reality,” “actor,” “creator,” or “cause”) 
2. Interaction Thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection. Galileo’s inertia (a mass once in motion continues in motion in a straight line, if not 
interfered with by other moving masses); Newtonian mechanics; concept of heat as a 
substance; space and time as absolute and fixed, omitted from the process itself; biological 
“cell theory;” interactional systems (e.g., “particles,” “principle,” “law”) 
3. Transaction Systems of description and naming are employed to deal with 
aspects and phases of action, without final attribution to 
“elements” or other presumptively detachable or independent 
“entities,” “essences,” or “realities,” and without isolation of 
presumptively detachable “relations” from such detachable 
“elements.” 
Einstein’s physics (brought space and time into the investigation as among the events 
investigated); concept of heat as configuration in molecular ranges; ecology as full system 
of growth or change 
Source: Excerpted from Dewey and Bentley (1949, 131–34). 
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Table B.13 Integrative levels of understanding experiences of beauty (Rhett Diessner et al.). 
Level Characteristics 
1. Prettiness Preoperational 
This is a preoperational stage in which the subject has representational thought but cannot coordinate two variables and, thus, does not understand 
cause and effect. Due to lack of cause-and-effect reasoning, subjects at this stage are not able to answer probes logically, questions such as “Why is 
that beautiful?” It is an egocentric perspective, one that does not take the perspective of others into account. Children at this stage are subject to 
their perceptions and have “likes”; that is, they can name what they like and dislike, but seldom can offer reasons for their beliefs that make logical 
sense. Thus, a very common reason for naming something as beautiful is that they like it. 
2. Beauty is big and amazing Concrete-operational 
This is a concrete operational stage in which subjects can coordinate two aspects of a beauty experience in their explanation. However, as they do 
not have abstract thought, their reasons for something being beautiful will always, and only, involve the physical aspects of beauty stimuli. They have 
concrete empathy and can take a perspective on the outer behavior of others but do not take an abstract, inner perspective on others. They do not 
describe “inner” feelings in regard to a beauty experience. They can state, “I like it,” as a reason for finding something beautiful, similar to stage one, 
but, when probed, they will have a concrete and logical reason for why they like it, which differentiates them from persons at stage one. They are 
subject to their needs and interests and do not take a perspective on those—those needs and interests are givens. 
 
3. Beauty is emotionally 
moving 
Early formal-operational 
Subjects at this stage are in Piaget’s early formal operational stage and can think abstractly. They can thus imagine the inner states of artists and 
others and often define beauty in terms of their own emotional response to beauty stimuli. They are able to have abstract empathy and true 
“golden-rule” perspectives on others. They are subject to interpersonal relations and experience mutuality; they are also conformist and often talk 
about beauty experiences in terms of clichéd language and the typical norms of beauty in their culture. They are highly influenced by significant 
persons in their environment and often uncritically accept the views on beauty of their teachers, professors, friends, and parents. 
(continued) 
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Table B.13 Integrative levels of understanding experiences of beauty (Rhett Diessner et al.). 
Level Characteristics 
3./4. Subjective relativity  
(eye of the beholder) 
When a person develops beyond the constraints of stage three but her mind has not fully transitioned to the systems view of stage four, she may 
enter a form of subjective relativity and recognize that everyone has his or her own viewpoint and that none of those viewpoints is objectively 
“right” but is right for the person who holds that viewpoint. This is the first cognitive organization of the mind in which subjects reject the possibility 
of objective beauty. Subjects at stage three may mention that the concept of “beauty is in the eye of the beholder,” but they do so as a trite 
conformist clichéd viewpoint. At transitional stage three/four, subjects have rejected conformist viewpoints and hold a theory about beauty being 
subjective. 
 
4. Beauty is a system 
Consolidated formal-operational  
Stage four is based on Piaget’s consolidated formal operations. Subjects are able to take a systems perspective and can define and describe beauty in 
terms of an organized hierarchy or web-like interconnections. They can understand that culture is a system that organizes the mind’s responses to 
beauty. They are able to talk about beauty in terms of a perspective on their own identity as a person. They may have an articulated theory of beauty 
but will not have a perspective that “their own” theory is a reflection of the culture in which they are immersed, despite knowing that culture is an 
influence. They are subject to ideology, as Kegan asserts, and are conscientious in their thought patterns, being concerned about any contradictions 
or inconsistencies in their own logic of understanding beauty. 
4./5. Systemic relativity  
(eye of the culture) 
At stage 4/5, subjects recognize the relativity of all systems and reject the possibility that any cultural view of beauty is “right” or “objective.” Their 
mind realizes that cultural systems create the canon of beauty and “brainwash” everyone in that culture into adopting those canons. Therefore, all 
sense of beauty is relative to a cultural system, and one cannot say one culture or one canon is better than another. Note that, at stage 3/4, there is a 
subjective relativity based on individuals’ subjective views; however, stage 4/5 is a more sophisticated relativity, in which the person can take the 
perspective of a whole culture and “look” outside those ideological constraints. However, the individual does not yet have a universal principled 
perspective, which comes with stage five and which allows the mind to see principles of beauty that undergird all cultures due to our common 
humanity. 
(continued) 
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Table B.13 Integrative levels of understanding experiences of beauty (Rhett Diessner et al.). 
Level Characteristics 
5. Principled beauty Postformal 
At this postformal operations stage, people can take the perspective of multiple systems and see principles that underlie disparate systems. They 
understand interindividuality, according to Kegan, and the interpenetration of systems. They are autonomous thinkers, who understand that 
everything they do is influenced by the interpenetrating systems of genes and culture, yet are able to take some kind of perspective that transcends 
the programming of their genes and culture. In terms of beauty, they recognize fundamental universal principles of beauty. For example, one such 
principle is perfection. 
Source: Excerpted from Diessner et al. (2016, 29–32). 
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The first altitude of religious orientation shows signs, expressions, and behaviors related to intuitive-projective and mythical-literal faith development. 
An individual here leans toward literal interpretation of sacred texts, often focusing on one or two verses of scripture in particular. The individual at 
this stage tends to be overly concerned with power and is often distracted with the supernatural elements of faith. Magic individuals value rites and 
rituals, and may be extremely superstitious. Other signs to look for at this level of religious expression are selfprotective tendencies in ego 
development. One may see an individual here with a primary focus of avoiding existential punishment and seeking eternal reward. Same individuals 
at this level have a tendency to place responsibility and blame outside of themselves. The individual at this red altitude may show signs of pre-
conventional morality or perhaps the beginning stages of conventional morality. At this level of religious orientation many individuals act without 
much consideration for others. If lower stages of moral development are present, right and wrong are constituted by impulse rather than authority or 
reason. Fear of wrathful deities (or a single God) often keep people at this stage in line. 
2. Mythic-membership 
(absolutist/amber) 
An amber altitude of religious orientation corresponds to Fowler's synthetic-conventional stage of faith. At this stage an individual's ultimate concern 
begins to shift away from self-gratification and ego-centered drives toward an emphasis on role and identity. Often an individual at a mythic-religious 
orientation still maintains somewhat literal interpretations of scriptures. The individual at this stage often develops the desire for a personal 
relationship with God. In Islam, this period allows a deepening of one's submission to Allah. Christians, during this time, feel a drive for true 
companionship with Jesus. Hindus may be drawn more toward Bhakti Yoga, a practice involving love and devotion to God. At this Stage, one's 
personal faith or set of beliefs provide deep meaning and courage for living. Other important signs to look for that may point to this level of 
development are values that focus on an absolute "truth" and a puritanical sense of right and wrong. The individual at this stage may show signs that 
indicate a preference for hierarchical structure and order even if such structure tends to be oppressive or abuse its power. Usually, an individual at this 
stage of development is willing to control impulses in exchange for deferred fulfillment. The individual with mythic religious orientation often shows 
indications that approval of his or her group is of the utmost importance. He or she is often kept in order through feelings of guilt. In many cases, the 
individual's own identity extends to that of his or her own group, family, or religious community, while seeing the views of those outside the group as 
either wrong, un-religious, or out of line with the one straight path. Cognitive development at this stage most often demonstrates Piaget's concrete-
operational thinking. The individual has the capacity to think in logical progressions, but in most cases does not "reflect about thinking" or consider 
whether their own belief systems are in themselves a coherent and logical system. Similarly, one might notice actions and demonstrations of Kegan's 
third-order "traditional" consciousness. The person expressing mythic stage tendencies in a given context lacks a definite capability to think entirely as 
an autonomous individual so morals and a sense of right and wrong often come from an external conventional authority (i.e., one's group, society, the 
Church, the Qur'an, the Vedas, dharma, or duty). 
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Orange altitude correlates to Fowler's scale at the individuative-reflective level of faith development. Individuals at this level of development begin to 
question and examine all of their existing beliefs. They begin to scrutinize the myths they believed without hesitation at the previous stage, in order to 
find deeper meaning. For the first time individuals recognize the ability to have their own opinions outside the restrictions allowed by the group or 
scripture. Due to the pragmatic and reflective nature of this stage, individuals may become agnostic or atheist; both of which represent healthy 
expressions of religious orientation at this stage of development. Sometimes an extreme rational orientation, taking an atheistic stance, may try to rid 
the world of all lower levels of religious expression, declaring that they are immature and even childish. Looking at the secondary indicators of orange 
altitude, Graves' values meter may show signs of a strive-drive capacity. The individual at this stage is likely to place a strong emphasis on autonomy, 
independence, and success. He or she is usually emphatic about embracing the value of the scientific method, evidence, and tried-and-true 
experience. Piaget's formal operational stage and Kegan's fourth order of consciousness propel individuals to reflect upon their own thoughts and 
beliefs. This means that one will move beyond blind belief in particular religious ideologies, to now operate on them to improve them consciously and 
critically. Although it is important to remember that an analysis usually gives the most weight to signs of faith development, a religious adherent with 
a center of gravity near an orange altitude may show secondary indicators of particular relevance. An individual at this stage may show signs that 
demonstrate Loevinger and Cook-Greuter's individualist and Kohlberg's post-conventional moral development. This stage on Kohlberg's scale is usually 
noticed when the moral compass begins to develop within. A post-conventional shift allows one to see the deeper principles that rest behind laws 
and written scriptures. The inward gaze also results in individuals resting on their own prowess for answers through personal experience and direct 
knowledge. An orange level of religious orientation is usually marked by the fact that the person's sphere of care and compassion expands to embrace 
the entire world. This worldcentric awareness induces a deep notion of universal tolerance. As one scholar points out, "tolerance begins when we no 
longer see a group as other but as a concrete human community with real and ancient values. This cognitive leap is a difficult one, especially when 
the cultural other happens to be a religious other." lt is at this stage that rather than identifying with others because of race, religion, culture, or a 
belief system, the individual begins to see the underlying common connection that we all have as human beings. With this understanding comes the 
birth of and care for universal human rights. 
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Signs or tests that demonstrate Fowler's conjunctive level of faith most often indicate a pluralistic level of religious orientation. The individual at this 
stage begins to realize that life's issues don't have to be black and white. The individual becomes comfortable with and may even enjoy the embrace 
of paradox. Pluralistic individuals recognize the deep truth that all traditions are simply different perspectives of the one Ultimate Reality. The 
religious pluralism expressed from this stage goes beyond the tolerance expressed in the rational stage to now actually take on a full embrace of other 
religious traditions. Individuals at this pluralistic level begin to recognize the cultural embeddedness of their own religious beliefs. As a result, they 
begin to search out other spiritual systems. They search not with a desire to convert those of other faiths but in order to take other perspectives, to 
find out how another's view may be able to supplement their own. They begin to ask questions: What areas of knowledge are missing in my own 
religious system? Do I have any blind spots? Just as red-colored spectacles make the viewer unable to see red, the conjunctive individual begins to 
examine other traditions to see what his particular set of spectacles may be preventing him or her from seeing. For the first time in development, 
religious experience is cross-referenced with those experiences described in other world traditions in a serious fashion that actually gives value to the 
experience of the other. The pluralistic individual begins to see that the deep structures of these experiences are similar (e.g., esoteric nondual 
realizations), despite the fact that surface features might appear different (merging with Christian God vs. merging with the Buddhist Dharmakaya). 
The individual at green altitude will show actions and behaviors that demonstrate a deep value for connection with other people. They find great 
significance not only in community but in the unity and equality of all people. With sensitivity to the needs of others, this stage begins to recognize 
that majority rule and democracy alone (if left unchecked) can end up imposing a tyranny of the majority on the minority. As a result this level values 
that everyone has an opportunity to speak and be heard. To decisions are made until all have come to some form of consensus. A feeling of 
interconnectedness often results in social activism in the world. Harvard professor Paul Hanson's "hermeneutic of engagement" or what he describes 
as the "interpretive method that ties study with worship and reflection with action in the world,” although present at times in lower levels, becomes a 
necessity at a pluralistic level of development and beyond. All those concerned with social justice and global goodwill interpret their tradition in new 
ways so as to ensure positive social action in the world. Individuals at this stage, with their nuanced sensitivity to culture, identity, time, and place, 
tend to despise the broad universals and hierarchy that they often embraced in earlier mythic and rational stages. They often stand against such 
notions noting how dominating and repressive they can be. From this viewpoint, stages of development are disenchanting. There is a sense that "it is 
not right to value one level more than any other." lt is in this stage that we see a clear confusion between dominating and healthy hierarchies. There is 
tendency at this stage to abandon hierarchies altogether. Through testing or observation one might see signs of ego development that exhibit 
individualistic or autonomous features. As individuals begin to reach these higher stages of ego development, they develop the desire to go beyond 
the limits of their own individuated self. 
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At the integral stage of religious orientation one will likely notice signs of Fowler's universalizing stage of faith. Having taken the perspectives of other 
religious traditions, supplemented one's beliefs, and uprooted one's own worldview from the limiting perspectives of his or her own culture (to 
whatever degree possible), the individual at turquoise altitude begins to find a vast and sophisticated mental resting place. With the universalizing 
level of the primary indicator (faith) lit up, integral religious adherents have found a center within themselves with regard to their own personal 
beliefs. The search to find individual truth that began with ferociousness in the inquiry of the rational/orange stage, now starts to settle as the 
individual actually learns how to rest in and as truth itself. God (or Ultimate Reality) is seen as both immanent and transcendent, as Self and other. 
God is recognized from first-, second-, and third-person points of view. God/Godhead is seen, at least in part, as the causal ground from which all form 
and knowledge originally arise. The integral stage recognizes the importance and value of all preceding levels. For example, an integral level sees that 
green altitude served as a filter to neutralize all dominating tendencies. Passing through the pluralistic level ensures oppressive tendencies do not 
resurface when healthy, natural hierarchy returns at the integral stage. Beyond the primary indicator offered through faith development, secondary 
indicators may help to indirectly predict the orientation of an individual at this level of complexity. Through observation, one might look for actions or 
behaviors that demonstrate flex-flow and holistic/global values. With a clearer picture of the universe, the individual at this level of religious 
orientation will likely begin to demand more integrative open systems and forms of decision making by consent rather than majority rule or the time-
consuming process of consensus. Religious adherents at this stage will likely agree to employ decisions quickly upon suggestion, unless there are 
substantial objections. The flex-flow nature of this level allows decisions to be implemented at an astonishing speed, because individuals are aware 
that course corrections can be made along the way. Integral religious orientation recognizes the importance of both equality and value distinctions. 
One has a deep desire to make sense of the world, to order it, and to organize the fields of knowledge that previously seemed disconnected. The 
individual is thirsty for knowledge and the experience of other religions, not only to supplement their own understanding, as in the pluralistic stage, 
but now to organize and help draw clear maps for other travelers to follow. Spirituality is no longer something that can be valued as an object, it is 
entirely embedded into every moment, making it impossible to avoid. Integral religious orientation is unique in that the individual now has a 
developmental perspective sensitive enough to implement hierarchy without domination or abuse. This perspective allows the individual to embrace 
all the levels of orientation that have come before it, from magic to mythic to rational to pluralistic. Integral religious orientation understands that the 
preceding levels serve as the vital foundational elements that support the higher stages. Without the lower levels of development, integral levels 
would not be possible. Trying to jettison lower levels of orientation would be like committing a slow but certain suicide. In fact, not only should lower 
levels not be destroyed, they should be embraced in agape, nurtured, and each stage made as healthy as possible. lt is by way of these levels that the 
integral thinkers of tomorrow will blossom. 
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Table B.14 Integrative levels of religious orientation (Dustin DiPerna). 
Level* Characteristics 
 At turquoise altitude one may see signs of a moral development that has reached to the further limits of Kohlberg's post-conventional stages. One 
may notice that an individual at this level makes moral judgments in a more sophisticated way than those of the previous pluralistic stage wherein 
decisions are made considering the greatest good for the greatest number. At an integral level, decisions are made based on the greatest good for the 
greatest span and the greatest depth. Here, depth represents the degree of and potential for the highest levels of complexity and care (e.g., human 
beings all have greater capacity for complexity and care than an ant or a fish). A religious adherent with an integral level of awareness takes both span 
and depth into consideration when making ethical decisions. Because cognitive development is necessary but not sufficient for faith development to 
mature to the integral level, cognitive intelligence has expanded to Wilber's vision logic and Kegan's fifth order of consciousness. All perspectives are 
taken into consideration without privileging any single viewpoint. This allows a clearer picture of the whole to emerge, both within and outside of 
religious contexts. Signs may be observed at this stage that point to a level of ego development that Cook-Greuter dubs "unitive" or "ego-aware." In 
this stage, the religious adherent might show behavior and actions that demonstrate that the individual is no longer restricted to their own individual 
ego. There is a spaciousness that allows them to effortlessly glide between multiple perspectives and states of consciousness. 
Source: Excerpted from DiPerna (2018, 78–84). 
 
* Color code adopted from Wilber (2006), M.K. 
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Table B.15 Integrative levels of the self (Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael E. Zimmerman). 
Level* Characteristics 
First tier 
1. Symbiotic  
(infrared) 
The symbiotic self is an individual who focuses entirely on surviving in an incomprehensible world. This level mainly pertains to infants, but perhaps 
also to some people who, in extreme situations, revert to this early level. People at this level are nonverbal and heavily dependent on others for care. 
The main task for the individual of this first stage is to construct a stable world of objects so as to separate from their surroundings. 
2. Impulsive 
(magenta) 
The impulsive self balances dichotomous forces such as good and evil. Mostly children and some adolescents occupy this level. Relatively few 
contemporary adults remain at this level of development. People at this level or altitude have a strong concern for creating safety and satisfying basic 
needs. They also have a sense of unlimited power combined with superstitious and magical notions. Their activity is often highly repetitive. 
Moreover, they view other people primarily as a source of self-gratification, and feel confused and made anxious by the complexity of the world. This 
is the beginning of the 1st-person perspective. At this altitude, the individual’s impulses and needs are most important, and those needs are deeply 
influenced by their communities’ time-honored rituals, taboos, superstitions, folkways, and lore. Mean magenta is the dark side of magenta, when 
blood oaths, ancient grudges, strong ethnic identification, and an impulsive readiness for violence (although often ritualized) prevail. Projection and 
introjection are their common defenses. Furthermore, few if any contemporary groups function primarily at this level. 
3. Self-protective 
(red) 
The self-protective self is impulsive, but impulsivity is now placed in the service of supporting an incipient self-structure, and not just to satisfy 
immediate needs and wants. Red individuals typically identify themselves in terms of will, ideas, and wishes. They project all their feelings and 
cannot yet self-reflect. Hence, overgeneralization is rampant. Seeing others as competitors for space, goods, and dominance, people operating at red 
have little capacity for explicit insight into self and others. Because they experience the world as a dangerous place filled with perilous risk, they 
often cross others’ boundaries in a crusade of low trust and hypervigilance. At red, self-assertive individuals break free from constraint placed on 
them by group rituals and codes. Red selves vent their desires, demand respect and attention, hate being dissed, and experience no guilt or remorse 
for their actions. Examples include a child’s temper tantrum, mercenaries, some epic heroes, warlords, the shipwrecked students depicted in Lord of 
the Flies, test pilots, and in some cases America’s rugged individualistic mentality. People riding the red wave also possess the growing capacity to 
see the world more “realistically,” that is, with fewer projected spirit forces and with greater distinction between self and other, including totem 
animals, and to direct their impulses into longer-term goals. Mean red dominate one’s opponents, and make friends so long as they are useful. The 
consciousness associated with this altitude can be atavistic and gang-oriented, as it is in some urban areas where both amber and orange authority 
has broken down. 
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The conformist self is traditional, rule-oriented, and concerned with group membership. People whose center of gravity is at this level define 
themselves through others. They have no stable and clear boundaries between the self and the group. Displacement, reaction formation, and 
suppression are common defenses. They suppress negative feelings and overemphasize positive ones. They have a strong need to be accepted and to 
reject those who do not conform to group norms. They tend to view their world through a concrete-literal lens that includes concrete beliefs in many 
mythic realities. Clare Graves called this level “absolutistic.” Despite such limitations, amber marks the beginning of a 2nd-person perspective in that 
the individual’s own perspective (red) becomes subordinate to the groups perspective. Perhaps in reaction to the havoc wreaked by power-craving 
individuals, this level seeks to establish overarching values and truths that all must obey. At this stage people rely on sacred scripture, prophets, and 
similar inspired authority to discover meaning, purpose, and direction in life. Coercive social power enforces codes of conduct based on eternal, 
absolute principles. By controlling personal impulses and living righteously, people are guaranteed a future reward. Everyone must assume their 
proper place in the social hierarchy, at the top of which is an external authority whose commands must be obeyed. This authority can be God, the 
president, the king or queen, the czar, the leader, or the boss. Respect for the law and exercise of discipline are needed to build character and moral 
fiber. Examples of amber-mythic cultures include contemporary Singapore (Confucian culture in modern garb), Hasidic Judaism, the European Middle 
Ages, and contemporary evangelical Christian groups. As a premodern center of gravity, amber-mythic culture remains ethnocentric, even though 




The conscientious self emphasizes linear causality and objective thinking in the service of a newly emerging separate self-identity, which competes 
for autonomy, wealth, power, and status. People at orange have great independence and confidence. Although interested in their emotional life, they 
emphasize rationality. They associate with others who are also drawn to achieve through concision, efficiency, and efficacy. Still, they have a genuine 
interest in others, independent of their own needs and values. They experience the world as predictable and measurable. At this level, people 
develop the capacity to hold 3rd-person perspectives. That is, they can disidentify with their 1st-person (personal) perspective and with the 2nd-
person (cultural) views, thereby gaining the ability to examine both self and culture from a 3rd-person, objective, “scientific” standpoint. At this stage 
of development culture moves from premodern to modern. The orange altitude advocates that people should act in their own self-interest. Liberal 
capitalism is the major sociopolitical expression of orange. Typically risk takers, optimistic, and self-reliant, orange moderns use strategy, technology, 
and competition to win. Despite their strong competitive streak, orange moderns are at least in principle worldcentric, as they demand that 
everyone be granted the same legal protections and access to markets. By positing universal human rights, orange took a giant step forward, even 
though centuries later not all humans have acquired such rights. 
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The individualistic self emphasizes connectivity between people especially by sharing experiences, acknowledging contextual aspects of relationships 
(e.g., gender, class, race), and systemic dynamics of reality. Paradoxically, because they are so sensitive to individual feelings they become strong 
advocates of community and egalitarianism. Also, because they are aware of the conditioning dynamics of culture and context, and because they 
take into account multiple viewpoints, those at the green level empathize with others and are willing to entertain alternative truth claims. Although 
they appreciate objectivity and logic, they tend to emphasize subjective and more holistic and organismic approaches to meaning-making. They 
value feelings and their expression. People operating at green condemn the greed and unhealthy materialism of orange individualism that can 
legitimate environmental destruction and social injustice. However, their hyperfocus on orange leaves them blind to the oftentimes worse injustices 
committed by red and amber, and when they do register these injustices they often mistakenly attribute them to orange. Greens promote an 
egalitarian agenda of justice, equity, and participation by all. Affirming consensus and eschewing hierarchy of all kinds, greens explore alternative 
forms of spirituality and more community-oriented lifestyles. Green egalitarianism leads to multiculturalism, which celebrates diversity, including the 
unique contributions, values, and beliefs of all cultures. Because of their worldcentrism, greens seem to complete what Habermas called the 
incomplete project of the Enlightenment, which defines modernity. In fact, however, greens are antimodern in some respects. Like all first-tier 
altitudes, green usually regards itself as the possessor of the truth and believes that other memes are deeply misguided. Hence, green often dislikes 
modern orange, thereby undercutting legitimate economic development. Green also frequently ignores or looks down upon traditional amber, 
thereby undermining the conventional foundations necessary for individual development and the communal solidarity important for many members 
of culture. Depth is a form of hierarchy, but green regards all hierarchy with suspicion. In its suspicion, it tends toward an egalitarianism that often 
tries to eliminate cultural depth in a way that mimics how natural science ignores nature’s interior depth. This suspicion of hierarchy can lead green 
to uniquely unsupportable assertions, such as that there are no developmental levels, no evolution, and no progress. According to this philosophy, 
there is no better or worse (yet they hold their view as better than others and are thus trapped in a performative contradiction). 
(continued) 
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The autonomous self welcomes chaos and multiple variables in the service of self-development. At this altitude, individuals understand that the self 
is embedded in many contexts and dimensions. They accept many aspects of self and integrate shadow material. They tolerate others in spite of 
their negative traits and differences of opinions or values. They experience their world as multidimensional with overlapping contexts and systems. 
Teal-holistic is the first stage of second tier. Here, people recognize the value of all previous levels as necessary for healthy human development. 
Respecting and seeking to integrate prior centers of gravity, rather than dissociate from them, teal is prepared to listen to everyone, to forge strategic 
alliances whenever possible, and to speak in ways that sincerely respect others. In Spiral Dynamics, Don Beck and Chris Cowan use the term “spiral 
wizard” to describe an individual at this level, as they are capable of interacting effectively with individuals and groups operating at different centers 
of gravity. Teal-holistic is committed to transdisciplinarity, to organize multiple perspectives in order to characterize and propose innovative solutions 
for complex problems. They display unusual leadership qualities. They neither seek nor shun the limelight, and take great satisfaction in service, 
especially in facilitating effective outcomes to which many different kinds of people have lent support. Individuals who operate at teal seek to 
reintegrate body and mind, emotion and reason, sense and soul, Descent and Ascent. Hence, teal-holistic is also called the centauric wave of 
development, involving a more integrated personhood. People at teal operate with vision-logic or “holistic aperspectivalism,” a mode of 
consciousness that lets people understand, appreciate, and consider how things appear from several different, even conflicting perspectives. 
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Evolving to the integrated self wave helps alleviate teal’s existential anxiety. At turquoise, the heart opens and increases the individual’s awareness of 
the widespread suffering around the planet. The capacity for tolerating such suffering without being overwhelmed by it is a crucial aspect of the 
compassion that arises with the turquoise wave. Comprehending the extraordinary interpenetration of energy throughout all levels and domains of 
the Kosmos invites Ascent to nondual integralism. Here there is a marriage of wisdom and compassion, which allows turquoise-integral to apprehend 
that nothing needs to be done, because everything is already perfect, which in turn paradoxically serves as the basis for a profound commitment to 
action. Turquoise is connected to the Divinity penetrating all beings at all levels in all quadrants. Hence, people at turquoise remain centered and at 
ease, even while engaged in frequent and demanding acts. The despair that threatens teal-holistic is replaced by a profound, experientially based 
conviction that Eternity has always already interpenetrated the Finite. Recognizing that no manifestation, emanation, or creature endures forever, 
people at turquoise appreciate each moment for what it is, without clinging to ideas about how things ought to be. Turquoise-integral celebrates joy 
and shows compassion for suffering. Clearly, this developmental wave has not been fully stabilized on any wide cultural basis. 
Source: Excerpted from Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman (2009, 130–40, 236). 
 
* Color code adopted from Wilber (2006), M.K. 
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Table B.16 Integrative levels of ecological identity (Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael E. Zimmerman). 
Level* Characteristics Examples 
1. Eco-Guardian 
(magenta) 
The Eco-Guardian is an impulsive self who connects with the cosmos by balancing good forces against evil dynamics. 
This self focuses on creating safety and satisfying basic needs. It has a sense of unbridled power mixed with 
superstitious and magical belief. Eco-Guardians view other people in light of self-gratification. The complexity of the 
world makes them uneasy. Very few adults have this exclusive identity, though many approaches to the environment, 
especially New Age and Romantic schools, make use of the content of this structure of identity. When applied to the 
natural environment, this self often focuses on returning to a lost ecological paradise. Sometimes the “Fall” from 
ecological grace is associated with horticulture (some deep ecologists), agriculture (some ecofeminists), or 
industrialization (some social ecologists). Eco-Guardians often emphasize magic or unseen forces. This approach is very 
“tribal” in that they place importance on ancestral ways; they hold naive animistic beliefs and maintain customs such as 
ceremonial rituals and rites of passage as important and a way to connect with the natural world. They appeal to the 
mystery of nature, especially through signs and omens. They respect councils, especially of elders, and lineage 
connections. Leadership is often based on age. Shamans and witches are seen as the gatekeepers of the world of Spirit. 
Aspects of earth goddess groups; 
nature worship; totemism; eco-
rituals; wicca; paradise lost 
perspectives; the cultural 
appropriation of indigenous 
practices; and some forms of deep 
ecology and ecofeminism. 
2. Eco-Warrior 
(red) 
Eco-Warriors are self-protective and self-serving. Their impulsive nature is now placed in service of supporting an idea 
of the self, rather than just the self’s immediate needs and wants. People operating at this altitude often perform heroic 
acts, which serve to magnify their own status. They identify the self in terms of effort and preferences. Self-preservation 
is central. Their feelings are guarded and inaccessible. Overgeneralization is very common, with many judgments and 
simple ideas. They see others as competitors for space, goods, and dominance, and have little capacity for insight into 
self and others. Due to their lack of trust of others they are hypervigilant and bullying. For them the world is a risky 
game that can be quite dangerous. As such Eco-Warriors take a heroic approach to the environment. They focus on the 
assertion of the self over the system or nature. They are driven by impulsivity and immediate reward. Leaders establish 
themselves through power and strength. They often have a “to hell with others” attitude. They emphasize obtaining 
power and not being constrained. They desire respect and have an appreciation for the “law of the jungle” and “nature 
red in tooth and claw.” They have a macho quality that feeds a heroic image of themselves as one person against 
everything. They highlight toughness and their groups are often ganglike. They value “hands on,” “survival,” and 
“street” skills. Various types of turf-wars are common for Eco-Warriors, and they experience minimal guilt. 
Aspects of EarthFirst!; monkey 
wrenching; ecotage; ecoterrorism; 
the stoic mountain climber; extreme 
sports such as mountain biking, river 
kayaking, rock climbing; trophy and 
sports hunting; frontier mentalities; 
survival skills; off-the-grid housing; 
social Darwinism; and Warwick Fox’s 
“desiring-impulsive self.” 
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Table B.16 Integrative levels of ecological identity (Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael E. Zimmerman). 
Level* Characteristics Examples 
3. Eco-Manager 
(amber) 
The Eco-Manager is a conformist self who is rule-oriented and concerned with group membership. Eco-Managers get 
their self-identity from others. It is hard for them to differentiate between themselves and the group. Projection and 
introjection are common defenses. Positive feelings are used to suppress negative ones. “Us” versus “them” drives their 
sense of group belonging. Their world is based on concrete-literal interpretations. Thus Eco-Managers take a 
stewardship approach to the environment. They focus on maintaining order and following the law, either the divine 
order or the laws of the state. They believe that order must be maintained to keep harmony and stability. They manage 
nature now so the future will hold nature’s bounty. People follow a higher authority (God, the law, a political or religious 
leader) and comply with rules and regulations to avoid punishment. Leaders are those who have seniority or those who 
are in the rightful position. Honor and obedience are prized attributes. Justice and fairness are provided to those who 
follow the rules. 
Examples of the Eco-Manager can 
include aspects of the Earth viewed 
as Garden of Eden; Puritan ethos; 
Boy and Girl Scouts; Environmental 
Protection Agency; environmental 
legislation; fish and game wardens; 
national and state parks; wildlife 
management; Endangered Species 




The Eco-Strategist is a conscientious self who is defined by an orientation toward scientific empiricism. This approach is 
placed in service of a newly emerging separate self-identity, which competes for wealth, influence, and social standing. 
This eco-self values independence and confidence. Eco-Strategists lead with rationality but are interested in their 
emotions. They emphasize efficiency and efficacy as a means for success. The world is viewed as being measurable and 
predictable. They value others for their own sake (e.g., supporting universal rights). The Eco-Strategist employs a 
rational approach to the environment. They use technology to enhance the standard of living. They emphasize progress 
and seek the “good life.” They value autonomy and independence. Life is a game to be played and won. They measure 
success by financial achievement. There is a desire to make things better and to use competition to accomplish this. 
They highly value science and universal rights for humans, and embrace an opportunistic vision of the future. They 
respect the invisible hand of the economy. 
Examples of the Eco-Strategist can 
include aspects of natural capitalism; 
conservationism; resourcism; the 
Lockean worldview; the science of 
ecology; deontological ethics; urban 
planning; utilitarian perspectives; 
environmental pragmatism; 
environmental psychology; 
behavioral approaches; industrial 
agriculture; and Warwick Fox’s 
“rationalizing deciding self.” 
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Table B.16 Integrative levels of ecological identity (Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael E. Zimmerman). 
Level* Characteristics Examples 
5. Eco-Radical 
(green) 
The Eco-Radical is an individualistic self who highlights how we are all connected through similar experiences, shared 
contexts such as race or gender, and various systems (e.g., political and ecological). Eco-Radicals are sensitive to 
people’s experiences and are willing to consider contradictory truth claims. They supplement objectivity and logic with 
subjective and more holistic approaches. They value personal experience and express feelings easily. Eco-Radicals take a 
postmodernist approach to the environment. They focus on the liberation of humans and animals from greed and 
domination. They promote community, unity, and sharing resources across class, gender, and racial divisions. They make 
an effort to explore the interiority of other people and beings and to connect with Spirit. They prize consensus as a way 
of making decisions and avoiding hurt feelings. They highlight participation and teamwork. They expect social 
responsibility, political correctness, sensitivity, and tolerance. Often the community comes before the individual. Socially 
engaged activism is used to overcome oppressive hierarchies and power structures. 
Aspects of deep ecology; 
ecofeminism; social ecology; animal 
rights; biocentrism; ecocentrism; 
ecopsychology; environmental 
justice; green politics; David Abram’s 
eco-phenomenology; the analysis of 
historical concepts; bioregionalism; 
various doomsayers and apocalyptic 
approaches; and the social 
construction of nature. 
6. Eco-Holist 
(teal) 
The Eco-Holist is an autonomous self who is comfortable amidst complexity. Eco-Holists recognize that individuals 
occupy multiple contexts. They embrace the many layers of self (including shadow material) through a complex 
psychology. They see the importance of various, even contradictory, values and perspectives and have a high tolerance 
of others’ “negative” traits. Their world is multidimensional and dynamic. Eco-Holists approach the environment from a 
holistic-complex perspective. They focus on the dynamic systems that overlap in any given situation. They are capable of 
holding conflicting truths. The Eco-Holist demands a flexible, open system that allows for the full range of reality to 
express itself. There is an existential emphasis on being and personal responsibility. Hierarchies are replaced with 
holarchies. They grant leadership to those who can hold a multiplicity of perspectives. The diversities of people and 
perspectives are celebrated on their own terms. Eco-Holists see partial value in all perspectives. They use skillful means 
to meet people where they are. They understand complex systemic interactions. Chaos and complexity are valued and 
paradoxes are embraced. Nonlinear capacities are cultivated. Transparency becomes important. 
Aspects of Félix Guattari’s three 
ecologies; the new cosmology; 
Teilhard de Chardin’s noosphere; the 
Gaia hypothesis; Gregory Bateson’s 
ecology of mind; the system sciences 
of chaos and complexity; Charlene 
Spretnak’s ecological post-
modernism; Aldo Leopold’s land 
ethic; sustainable development; 
Edgar Morin’s complex thought; 
biodynamic agriculture. 
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Table B.16 Integrative levels of ecological identity (Sean Esbjörn-Hargens and Michael E. Zimmerman). 
Level* Characteristics Examples 
7. Eco-Integralist 
(turquoise) 
The Eco-Integralist wave addresses the existential anxiety of meaning associated with the Eco-Holist. For the Eco-
Integralist the heart opens and increases the individual’s capacity to feel the widespread suffering around the planet. 
This capacity for remaining open to such suffering without being consumed by it is an important quality of the 
compassion that emerges with this Eco-Self. Wilber has captured this paradox with the phrase “hurts more, bothers you 
less.” The Eco-Integralist is deeply committed to the integration of transcendence and innocence. This is a marriage of 
wisdom and compassion, which recognizes that nothing needs to be done, because everything is always already perfect. 
The Eco-Integralist perceives the luminous nature of all life forms and manifestations. Thus, individuals at this altitude 
have the capacity to stay open and relaxed even while involved in arduous tasks. This eco-self has ongoing access to the 
experiential insight that the manifest realm is Divinized. The Eco-Integralist recognizes that no ecological reality lasts 
forever, thus they appreciate each phenomenon, without clinging to a view of how it should be but working hard to 
change things for the better. 
Aspects of Bhutan’s “Middle Path” to 
development; Brian N. Tissot’s work 
with marine fisheries in Hawai’i; 
Michael Zimmerman’s 
environmental philosophy; Darcy 
Riddell’s ecoactivism in Canada’s 
Great Bear Rainforest; Brian Eddy’s 
Integral Geography; Cameron 




This level of development is rarely stably reached (less than 1% of the U.S. population). This level corresponds to both 
Susanne Cook-Greuter’s ego-aware self, and the unitive self. The Eco-Sage is an ego-aware self who integrates 
multimodal and multidimensional elements across contexts in the service of humanity. Eco-Sages are aware of the 
subtle ways the ego filters experience. They recognize paradox and the limits of “mapping.” They desire to work through 
their own limits and blind spots and increase their capacity to witness themselves in the moment. They understand 
others in developmental terms and encounter them without judgment. They have a profound understanding of others’ 
complex and dynamic personalities. They experience the world as a place full of potential and paradox. At this stage the 
environmental identity becomes even more of a transparent manifestation of Being, completely spontaneous and open. 
They have stable access to transpersonal realities such as the capacity to witness their experience and keep their 
boundaries open. They view others as manifestations of Being-Spirit.  
Aspects of transcendentalism; J. W. 
Goethe’s Urpflanze; St. Francis of 
Assisi’s Canticle of Brother Sun; Ken 
Wilber’s Eco-Noetic Self; Joanna 
Macy’s ecological self; Chris Bache’s 
species mind; some neo-pagans; 
nondual spiritual activism; 
McClellan’s nondual ecology; and 
Warwick Fox’s “transpersonal-
ecological self.”  
Source: Excerpted from Esbjörn-Hargens and Zimmerman (2009, 227–37). 
 
* Color code adopted from Wilber (2006), M.K. 
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Table B.17 Integrative levels of faith (James W. Fowler and Mary L. Dell). 
Level Characteristics 
1. Primal Infancy to age 2 
In this first stage a prelanguage disposition of trust forms in the mutuality of one’s relationships with parents and other caregivers. This sense of trust 
offsets the inevitable anxiety and mistrust that result from the succession of cognitive and emotional experiences of separation and self-differentiation, 
which occur during infant development. Experiences combining to form this trusting disposition include body contact and care; vocal and visual interplay; 
ritualized interactions associated with early play, feeding, and tending; and the development of interpersonal affective attunement in the infant’s relations 
with caregivers. Factors such as these others, for forming bonds of attachment with them, and for shaping a disposition to trust the larger value and 
meaning commitments conveyed in parental care. Anxiety and mistrust have their own developmental pattern of emergence that caregivers’ consistency 
and dependability help to offset activate prepotentiated capacities for finding coherence and reliability in self and primal others, for forming bonds of 
attachment with them, and for shaping a disposition to trust the larger value and meaning commitments conveyed in parental care. Anxiety and mistrust 
have their own developmental pattern of emergence that caregivers’ consistency and dependability help to offset. 
2. Intuitive-projective Toddlerhood and early childhood 
Children attempt to form images that can hold and order the mixture of feelings and impressions evoked by their encounters with the newness of both 
everyday reality and the penumbra of mystery that surrounds and pervades it. Death becomes a conscious focus as a source of danger and mystery. 
Experiences of power and powerlessness orient children to a frequently deep existential concern about questions of security, safety, and the power of 
those on whom they rely for protection. Owing to naive cognitive egocentrism, children do not consistently differentiate their perspectives from those of 
others. Lacking simple perspective taking and the ability to reverse operations, young children may not understand cause-and-effect relations well. They 
construct and reconstruct events in episodic fashion. Fantasy and makebelieve are not distinguished from factuality. Constructions of faith are drawn to 
symbols and images of visible power and size. Stories that represent the powers of good and evil in unambiguous fashion are prized; they make it possible 
for children to symbolize and acknowledge the threatening urges and impulses that both fascinate and disturb them, while providing an identification with 
the vicarious triumphs of good over evil that such stories as fairy tales can provide. There is in this stage the possibility of aligning powerful religious 
symbols and images with deep feelings of terror and guilt, as well as of love and companionship. Such possibilities give this stage the potential for forming 
deep and long-lasting emotional and imaginal orientations—both for good and for ill. 
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Table B.17 Integrative levels of faith (James W. Fowler and Mary L. Dell). 
Level Characteristics 
3. Mythic-literal Middle childhood and beyond 
In the mythic-literal stage, the child, adolescent, or adult does not yet construct the interiority—the feelings, attitudes, and internal guiding processes—of 
the self or others. That is to say, 10-year-olds do not yet reliably have their feelings. They are involved in the process of learning to recognize, interpret, and 
manage strong feelings and impulses. Similarly, they do not construct God in particularly personal terms, or attribute to God highly differentiated internal 
emotions and interpersonal sensitivities. In making sense of the larger order of things, therefore, this stage typically structures the ultimate environment—
the cosmic pattern of God’s rule or control of the universe—along the lines of simple fairness and moral reciprocity. God is often constructed on the model 
of a consistent and caring, but just, ruler or parent. In this stage one often sees a sense of cosmic fairness at work: The child believes that goodness is 
rewarded and badness is punished. In shaping meanings the mythic-literal child primarily employs narrative. In this respect, this stage provides a 
permanent contribution to meaning making. Stories are as close as the mythic-literal stage comes to reflective synthesis. Neither children nor adolescents 
(or adults) of this stage carry out extensive analytic or synthetic reflection on their stories. They offer narratives from the middle of the flowing streams of 
their lives. They do not “step out on the banks” to reflect on where the streams have come from, where they are going, or on what larger meanings might 
give connection and integrated intelligibility to their collection of experiences and stories. In this stage the use of symbols and concepts remains largely 
concrete and literal. The mythic-literal stage begins to wane with the discovery that ours is not a “quick-payoff universe”; that is, evil or bad persons do not 
necessarily suffer for their transgressions, at least in the short run. And often, “bad things happen to good people.” We have coined the term “11-year-old 
atheists” for children who, in having this latter experience, temporarily or permanently give up belief in a God built along the lines of simple cosmic moral 
retribution.  
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Adolescence and beyond 
Personality, both as style and substance, becomes a conscious issue. From within this stage youth construct the ultimate environment in terms of the 
personal. God representations can be populated with personal qualities of accepting love, understanding, loyalty, and support during times of crisis. During 
this stage youths develop attachments to beliefs, values, and elements of personal style that link them in con-forming (forming with) relations with the 
most significant others among their peers, family, and other nonfamily adults. Identity, beliefs, and values are strongly felt, even when they contain 
contradictory elements. They tend, however, to be espoused in tacit, rather than explicit, formulations. At this stage one’s ideology or worldview is lived 
and asserted; only gradually does it become a matter of critical and reflective articulation. Where earlier deficits in the self and in one’s patterns of object 
relations have not been worked through and healed, they become factors that can inhibit the use of cognitive abilities in the tasks of identity and ideology 
construction in adolescence. Frequently we see splits between the emotional and cognitive functioning of adolescents or adults that are directly 
attributable to such unresolved issues and relations from early childhood. Sometimes the potential of God as a constructive self-object must be jettisoned 
because God can only be emotionally populated with the shaming or narcissistic qualities growing out of our experiences with our earliest and most 
salient object relations. One decisive limit of the synthetic-conventional stage is its lack yet of third-person perspective taking—a lack of the capacity to 
construct and work from a perspective that holds both self and other in the same frame, and provides a basis for growing objectivity regarding 
interpersonal relationships. This means that in its dependence on significant others for confirmation and clarity about one’s identity and meaning to them, 
the synthetic-conventional self does not yet have a third-person perspective from which it can see and evaluate self–other relations from a viewpoint 
outside themselves. In the synthetic-conventional stage the young person or adult can remain trapped in the “Tyranny of the They”—that is, an 
overdependence on the mirroring and evaluations of influential significant others. 
5. Individuative-
reflective 
Two significant indicators mark the individuative-reflective stage. First, one must develop the ability to reflect critically on the values, beliefs, and 
commitments one subscribed to as part of constructing the previous stage, the synthetic-conventional. This reexamination of deeply held beliefs can be a 
painful process. Second, one must struggle with developing a self-identity and self-worth capable of independent judgment in relation to the individuals, 
institutions, and worldview that anchored one’s sense of being up until that time. Questions representative of this stage include: Who am I when I am not 
defined primarily as someone’s daughter, son, or spouse? Who am I apart from my educational, occupational, or professional identity? Who am I beyond 
my circle of friends or familiar community? In constructing the individuative-reflective position, inherited or familiar symbols, creeds, beliefs, traditions, 
and religious trappings are scrutinized, and those of other faiths and traditions may be evaluated for what they might have to offer. This testing applies, as 
well, to secular value systems, worldviews, and the circles that espouse them. In the end, the familiar and traditional beliefs and practices may not be 
rejected or discarded, but if they are retained, they are held with more self-aware clarity and intentional choice. 
(continued) 
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Table B.17 Integrative levels of faith (James W. Fowler and Mary L. Dell). 
Level Characteristics 
6. Conjunctive The conjunctive stage is characteristic of a reflective adult thinker who recognizes that truths of all kinds can be approached from multiple perspectives 
and that faith must balance and maintain the tensions between those multiple perspectives. This stage makes sense out of paradoxes. In Christianity, for 
instance, God is seen as all-powerful and yet God limits the divine expression of power in granting humans agency and freedom. And though the sovereign 
of history, God took on the humble and lowly form of a human man who permitted himself to be put to death at the hands of other humans. This 
knowledge and faith build on necessary paradox and tensional, complex trust and commitment. Individuals in the conjunctive stage express a principled 
interest in and openness to truths of other cultural and religious traditions, and believe that dialogue with those different others may lead to deepened 
understandings and new insights into their own traditions and beliefs. Other paradoxes that are dealt with in this stage include the realities that one is 
both old and young, with both masculine and feminine qualities, conscious and unconscious, and intentionally constructive and well-meaning while at the 
same time being unintentionally destructive in some aspects of life and community membership. One is both singular and individuated, yet has an 
increased awareness of being dependent on and in interdependent solidarity with both friends and strangers. This results in the desire for new ways to 
relate to God, others, and self. 
7. Universalizing In this review of faith stages, we note that the circle of “people who count” has in each stage expanded, so that by the time one reaches the universalizing 
stage, one is concerned about creation and being as a whole, regardless of nationality, social class, gender, age, race, political ideology, and religious 
tradition. In this ultimate stage of faith, the self is drawn out of its own self-limits into a groundedness and participation in one’s understanding of the Holy. 
Those once seen as enemies may be understood also to be children of God and deserving of unconditional love. Evil of all kinds is opposed nonviolently, 
leading to activism that attempts to change adverse social conditions as an expression of that universal regard for all life that emanates from God’s love 
and justice. While persons of universalizing faith continue to be human, with common shortcomings and inconsistencies, they are exceptional in the 
strength of their passion that all creation should manifest God’s goodness and that all humanity be one in peace. In their boldness to live out the 
convictions of their faith, they are both freeing and threatening to the rest of us. Relatively few individuals claim this level of vision and faith-related 
action. Among those exceptional figures most would agree manifested or manifest the universalizing stage are Mohandas Gandhi, Mother Teresa, the 
Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and, perhaps some would say, former U.S. president Jimmy Carter, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, and anti–death penalty 
activist Sister Helen Prejean. 
Source: Excerpted from Fowler and Dell (2006, 36–42). 
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Table B.18 Integrative levels of communicative action (Jürgen Habermas). 


















Understand and follow 
behavioral expectations 
Express and fulfill action 
intentions (wishes) 
Perceive concrete 
















“ought” and “want” 
(duty/inclination) 
Distinguish between 
actions and norms, 




















particular and general 
norms, individuality 
and ego in general 
Source: Based on Habermas (1979, 83: Schema 3). 
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Table B.19 Integrative levels of interactive competence and moral consciousness (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Role competence Moral consciousness 
Communication Reciprocity 
requirement 
Idea of the good life Domain of validity Philosophical reconstruction 







Maximization of pleasure—avoidance of 
pain through obedience 





Maximization of pleasure—avoidance of 
pain through exchange of equivalents 
Naive hedonism 




Concrete morality of primary groups Group of primary reference 
persons 
4. Systems of 
norms 
(concrete duties) Concrete morality of secondary groups Members of political 
community 
Concrete thought in terms 
of a specific order 




Civil liberties, public welfare All legal associates Rational natural law 
6. Universalized duties Moral freedom All humans as private 
persons 
Formalistic ethics 
7. Universalized need 
interpretations 
Moral and political freedom All as members of fictive 
world society 
Universal ethics of speech 
Source: Based on Habermas (1979, 89: Schema 4). 
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Table B.20 Integrative levels of ego identity (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Characteristics 
1. Symbiotic During the first year of life we can find no clear indicators for a subjective separation between subject and object. Apparently in this phase the child cannot 
perceive its own corporeal substance as a body, as a boundary-maintaining system. The symbiosis between child, reference person, and physical environment is 
so intimate that we cannot meaningfully speak of a demarcation of subjectivity in the strict sense. 
2. Egocentric In the next segment of life, which corresponds with Piaget’s sensory-motor and preoperative phases of development, the child succeeds in differentiating 
between self and environment. It learns to perceive permanent objects in its environment, but without yet clearly differentiating the environment into physical 
and social domains. Moreover, the demarcation (of the self) in relation to the environment is not yet objective. This can be seen in manifestations of cognitive 




With the onset of the stage of concrete operations the child takes the decisive step toward constructing a system of demarcations; it now differentiates between 
perceptible and manipulable things and events, on the one hand, and understandable action-subjects and their utterances, on the other; and it no longer 
confuses linguistic signs with the reference and meaning of symbols. In becoming aware of the perspectival character of its own standpoint, it learns to 
demarcate its subjectivity in relation to external nature and society. With the seventh year, more or less, pseudo-lying ceases—an indication that distinctions are 
made between fantasies and perceptions, impulses and obligations. At close of this phase, cognitive development has led to an objectivation of external nature, 
linguistic-communicative development to the mastery of a system of speech acts, and interactive development to the complementary connection of generalized 
expectations of behavior. 
4. Universalistic Only with adolescence can the youth succeed in progressively freeing himself from the dogmatism of the preceding phase of development. With the ability to 
think hypothetically and to conduct discourses, the system of ego-demarcations becomes reflective. Until then the epistemic ego, bound to concrete operations, 
confronted an objectivated nature; and the practical ego, immersed in group perspectives, was dissolved in quasi-natural systems of norms. But when the youth 
no longer naively accepts the validity claims contained in assertions and norms, he can transcend the objectivism of a given nature and, in the light of 
hypotheses, explain the given from contingent boundary conditions; and he can burst the sociocentrism of a traditional order and, in the light of principles, 
understand (and if necessary criticize) existing norms as mere conventions. To the extent that the dogmatism of the given and the existing is broken, the pre-
scientifically constituted object domains can be relativized in relation to the system of ego-demarcations so that theories can be traced back to the cognitive 
accomplishments of investigating subjects and norm systems to the will-formation of subjects living together. 
Source: Excerpted from Habermas (1979, 100–102). 
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Table B.21 Integrative levels of interaction, social perspective, and moral judgment (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Type of action Cognitive structures 
Perspective 
structure 


































































generalization of roles: 
system of norms 
Internalized 






systems’s point of 
view) 
Conformity to the 
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Table B.21 Integrative levels of interaction, social perspective, and moral judgment (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Type of action Cognitive structures 
Perspective 
structure 


















Rules for testing norms: 
principles 








principles of justice 
Stage 5 
Rules for testing 
principles: a procedure 








Source: Based on Habermas (1990, 166: Table 4). 
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Table B.22 Integrative levels of leadership agility (Bill Joiner). 




Tactical, problem-solving orientation. 
Believes that leaders are respected 
and followed by others because of 
their authority and expertise. 
Style is either to strongly assert opinions 
or hold back to accommodate others. 
May swing from one style to the other 
for different situations and 
relationships. Tends to avoid giving or 
requesting feedback. 
More of a supervisor than a 
manager. Creates a group of 
individuals rather than a team. Work 
with direct reports is primarily one-
on-one. Too caught up in the details 
of own work to lead in a strategic 
manner. 
Organizational initiatives focus 
primarily on incremental improvements 
inside unit boundaries with little 
attention to stakeholders. 
2. Achiever 
(ca. 35%) 
Strategic, outcome orientation. 
Believes that leaders motivate others 
by making it challenging and satisfying 
to contribute to larger objectives. 
Primarily assertive or accommodative 
with some ability to compensate with 
the less preferred style. Will accept or 
even initiate feedback, if helpful in 
achieving desired outcomes. 
Operates like a full- fledged 
manager. Meetings to discuss 
important strategic or organizational 
issues are often orchestrated to gain 
buy-in to own views. 
Organizational initiatives include 
analysis of external environment. 
Strategies to gain stakeholder buy-in 
range from one-way communication to 




Visionary, facilitative orientation. 
Believes that leaders articulate an 
innovative, inspiring vision and bring 
together the right people to transform 
the vision into reality. Leaders 
empower others and actively facilitate 
their development.  
Adept at balancing assertive and 
accommodative style as needed in 
particular situations. Likely to articulate 
and question underlying assumptions. 
Genuinely interested in learning from 
diverse viewpoints. Proactive in seeking 
and utilizing feedback. 
Intent upon creating a highly 
participative team. Acts as a team 
leader and facilitator. Models and 
seeks open exchange of views on 
difficult issues. Empowers direct 
reports. Uses team development as 
a vehicle for leadership 
development. 
Organizational initiatives often include 
development of a culture that 
promotes teamwork, participation, and 
empowerment. Proactive engagement 
with diverse stakeholders reflects a 
belief that input increases the quality of 
decisions, not just buy-in. 
(continued) 
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Table B.22 Integrative levels of leadership agility (Bill Joiner). 




Oriented toward shared purpose and 
collaboration. Believes leadership is 
ultimately a service to others. Leaders 
collaborate with other leaders to 
develop a shared vision that each 
experiences as deeply purposeful. 
Integrates his/her assertive and 
accommodative sides in pivotal 
conversations and is agile in using both 
styles. Able to process and seriously 
consider negative feedback even when 
highly charged emotionally. 
Develops a collaborative leadership 
team, where members feel full 
responsibility not only for their own 
areas but also for the 
unit/organization they collectively 
manage. Practical preference for 
consensus decision making but 
doesn’t hesitate to use authority as 
needed. 
Develops key stakeholder relationships 
characterized by deep levels of mutual 
influence and genuine dedication to 
the common good. May create 
companies or organizational units 
where corporate responsibility and 




Holistic orientation. Experiences 
leadership as participation in a 
palpable life purpose that benefits 
others while serving as a vehicle for 
personal transformation. 
Centered within his/her assertive and 
accommodative energies, expressed 
appropriately to the situation. Cultivates 
a present-centered awareness that 
augments external feedback and 
supports a strong, subtle connection 
with others, even during challenging 
conversations. 
Capable of moving fluidly between 
various team leadership styles 
uniquely suited to the situation at 
hand. Can shape or amplify the 
energy dynamics affecting team 
performance to bring about mutually 
beneficial results. 
Develops and maintains a deep, 
empathetic awareness of conflicting 
stakeholder interests, including his/her 
own. Able to access synergistic 
intuitions that transform seemingly 
intractable conflicts into solutions 
beneficial for all parties involved. 
Source: Based on Joiner (2011, 136-138: Table 9.2). 
 
* Estimated percentage of managers currently capable of operating at each ability level. 
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Table B.23 Integrative levels of self (Robert Kegan). 
Level Characteristics 
0. Incorporative Piagetian and psychoanalytic psychologies share a conception of the newborn’s state. Both consider the newborn to live in an objectless world, a world in 
which everything sensed is taken to be an extension of the infant, where out of sight (or touch or taste or hearing or smell) can mean out of existence. Taken 
at a general level, the notion of “orality” is consistent with the Piagetian conception of the all-assimilative, incorporative newborn. Both perspectives see the 
central psychological achievement of the first eighteen months in terms of an end to this objectless world and the dawn of object relations. 
1. Impulse In disembedding herself from her reflexes the two-year-old comes to have reflexes rather than be them, and the new self is embedded in that which 
coordinates the reflexes, namely, the “perceptions” and the “impulses.” The tremendous lability, cognitive and emotional, of the preschool child is suggested 
to be a function of this new embeddedness. This child is able to recognize objects separate from herself, but those objects are subject to the child’s perception 
of them (this is, I suggest, the underlying structure of Piaget’s preoperational stage). If the child’s perception of an object changes, the object itself has 
changed, in the child’s experience. 
2. Imperial One way of characterizing the new subject-object relation is in terms of the construction of the role. This is true whether we are speaking of the social-
cognitive capacity to take the role of another person, or the affective differentiation within the impulse life of the family, which permits me to take my 
appropriate role as a “child” in relation to a “parent” rather than being my impulse life bound up with another. With the constitution of the enduring 
disposition (the “needs”), there comes as well the emergence of a self-concept. With the capacity to take command of one’s impulses (to have them, rather 
than being them) can come a new sense of freedom, power, independence—agency, above all. When you are the object of my stage 2 balance you are subject 
to my projecting onto you my own embeddedness in my needs. I constitute you as that by which I either do, or not, meet my needs, fulfill my wishes, pursue 
my interests. Instead of seeing my needs I see through my needs. 
3. Interpersonal In the interpersonal balance the feelings the self gives rise to are, a priori, shared; somebody else is in there from the beginning. The self becomes 
conversational. To say that the self is located in the interpersonal matrix is to say tat it embodies a plurality of voices. Its strength lies in its capacity to be 
conversational, freeing itself of the prior balance’s frenzy-making constant charge to find out what the voice will say on the other end. But its limit lies in its 
inability to consult itself about that shared reality. It cannot because it is that shared reality. My stage 3 ambivalence or personal conflicts are not really 
conflicts between what I want and what someone else wants. When looked into they regularly turn out to be conflicts between what I want to do as a part of 
this shared reality and what I want to do as part of that shared reality. To ask someone in this evolutionary balance to resolve such a conflict by bringing both 
shared realities before herself is to name precisely the limits of this way of meaning making. “Bringing before oneself” means not being subject to it, being 
able to take it as an object, just what this balance cannot do. 
(continued) 
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Table B.23 Integrative levels of self (Robert Kegan). 
Level Characteristics 
4. Institutional In separating itself from the context of interpersonalism, meaning-evolution authors a self which maintains a coherence across a shared psychological space 
and so achieves an identity. This authority—sense of self, self-dependence, self-ownership—is its hallmark. In moving from “I am my relationships” to “I have 
relationships,” there is now somebody who is doing this having, the new I, who, in coordinating or reflecting upon mutuality, brings into being a kind of 
psychic institution (in + statuere: to set up; statutum: law, regulation; as in “statute” and “state”). A strength of this is the person’s new capacity for 
independence, to own herself, rather than having all the pieces of herself owned by various shared contexts; the sympathies which arise out of one’s shared 
space are no longer determinative of the “self,” but taken as preliminary, mediated by the self-system. But in this very strength lies a limit. The “self” is 
identified with the organization it is trying to run smoothly; it is this organization. The “self” at ego stage 4 is an administrator in the narrow sense of the word, 
a person whose meanings are derived out of the organization, rather than deriving the organization out of her meaning/principles/purposes/reality. Stage 4 
has no “self,” no source,” no “truth” before which it can bring the operational constraints of the organization, because its “self,” its “source,” its “truth” is 
invested within these operational constraints. In this sense, ego stage 4 is inevitably ideological (as Erikson recognized must be the case for identity formation), 
a truth for a faction, a class, a group. 
5. Interindividual The rebalancing that characterizes ego stage 5 separates the self from the institution and creates, thus, the “individual,” that self who can reflect upon, or take 
as object, the regulations and purposes of a psychic administration which formerly was the subject of one’s attentions. “Moving over” the institutional from 
subject to object frees the self from that displacement of value whereby the maintenance of the institution has become the end in itself; there is now a self 
who runs the organization, where before there was a self who was the organization; there is now a source before which the institutional can be brought, by 
which it is directed, where before the institution was the source. The capacity to coordinate the institutional permits one now to join others not as fellow-
instrumentalists (ego stage 2) nor as partners in fusion (ego stage 3), nor as loyalists (ego stage 4), but as individuals—people who are known ultimately in 
relation to their actual or potential recognition of themselves and others as value-originating, system-generating, history-making individuals. The community is 
for the first time a “universal” one in that all persons, by virtue of their being persons, are eligible for membership. 
Source: Excerpted from Kegan (1982, 78–104). 
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Table B.24 Integrative levels of consciousness and curricular complexity in history (Robert Kegan). 
Level Underlying structure Cognitive Interpersonal Intrapersonal Curricular form (history) Appropriate audience 
1. Order Independent elements Perceptions (fantasy) Social perceptions Impulses   




Point of view 
Role-concept, simple 





The story of history 
The concrete facts and the 
narrative line (e.g., the “story” 
of “settling the West” or “how 
the world went to war”) 
School children 





















How history is written; its 
dependence on the 
perspective of the historian; 
the themes and values 
expressed in “a history” of 
given events 
Adolescents 
Junior high students (a 
stretch), high school 
students (elaborating 
an emerging capacity) 
4. Order 
(modernism) 
















The discipline’s system or 
systems for creating historical 
knowledge, generating, 
regarding, evaluating, and 
relating inferences 
Adults 
Any higher education 
setting (a stretch for 
many) 
(continued) 
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Table B.24 Integrative levels of consciousness and curricular complexity in history (Robert Kegan). 



















Critical reflection on the 
discipline itself; subjecting its 
prevailing theories to analysis 
not just from the perspective 
of another contending theory 
but from a perspective 
“outside” ideology 
Adults 
Any higher education 
setting (a stretch for 
most); graduate 
programs in history 
profession itself (a 
stretch for many) 
Source: Based on Kegan (1994, 291, 314–15: Tables 8.1, 9.1). 
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Table B.25 Integrative levels of reflective judgment (Patricia M. King and Karen S. Kitchener). 
Level View of knowledge Concept of justification Typical expression 
Pre-reflective thinking 
1. Knowledge is assumed to exist absolutely and concretely; it 
is not understood as an abstraction. It can be obtained with 
certainty by direct observation. 
Beliefs need no justification since there is assumed to be an 
absolute correspondence between what is believed and what is 
true. Alternate beliefs are not perceived. 
“I know what I have seen.” 
2. Knowledge is assumed to be absolutely certain but not 
immediately available. Knowledge can be obtained directly 
through the senses (as in direct observation) or via 
authority figures. 
Beliefs are unexamined and unjustified or justified by their 
correspondence with the beliefs of an authority figure (such as a 
teacher or parent). Most issues are assumed to have a right 
answer, so there is little or no conflict in making decisions about 
disputed issues. 
“If it is on the news, it has to be true.” 
3. Knowledge is assumed to be absolutely certain or 
temporarily uncertain. In areas of temporary uncertainty, 
only personal beliefs can be known until absolute 
knowledge is obtained. In areas of absolute certainty, 
knowledge is obtained from authorities. 
In areas in which certain answers exist, beliefs are justified by 
reference to authorities‘ views. In areas in which answers do not 
exist, beliefs are defended as personal opinion since the link 
between evidence and believes is unclear. 
“When there is evidence that people 
can give to convince everybody one way 
or another, then it will be knowledge; 
until then, it’s just a guess.” 
Quasi-reflective thinking 
4. Knowledge is uncertain and knowledge claims are 
idiosyncratic to the individual since situational variables 
(such as incorrect reporting of data, data lost over time, or 
disparities in access to information) dictate that knowing 
always involves an element of ambiguity. 
Beliefs are justified by giving reasons and using evidence, but the 
argument and choice of evidence are idiosyncratic (for example, 
choosing evidence that fits an established belief). 
“I’d be more inclined to believe 
evolution if they had proof. It’s just like 
the pyramids: I don’t think we’ll ever 
know. Who are you going to ask? No 
one was there.” 
(continued) 
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Table B.25 Integrative levels of reflective judgment (Patricia M. King and Karen S. Kitchener). 
Level View of knowledge Concept of justification Typical expression 
5. Knowledge is contextual and subjective since it is filtered 
through a person’s perceptions and criteria for judgment. 
Only interpretations of evidence, events, or issues may be 
known. 
Beliefs are justified within a particular context by means of rules 
of inquiry for that context and by context-specific interpretations 
of evidence. Specific beliefs are assumed to be context specific or 
balanced against other interpretations, which complicates (and 
sometimes delays) conclusions. 
“People think differently and so they 
attack the problem differently. Other 
theories could be as true as my own, 
but based on different evidence.” 
Reflective thinking 
6. Knowledge is constructed into individual conclusions about 
ill-structured problems on the basis of information from a 
variety of sources. Interpretations that are based on 
evaluations of evidence across contexts and on evaluated 
opinions or reputable others can be known. 
Beliefs are justified by comparing evidence and opinion from 
different perspectives on an issue or across different contexts and 
by constructing solutions that are evaluated by criteria such as 
the weight of the evidence, the utility of the solution, or the 
pragmatic need of action. 
“It’s very difficult in this life to be sure. 
There are degrees of sureness. You 
come to a point at which you are sure 
enough for a personal stance on the 
issue.” 
7. Knowledge is the outcome of a process of reasonable 
inquiry in which solutions to ill-structured problems are 
constructed. The adequacy of those solutions is evaluated 
in terms of what is most reasonable or probable according 
to the current evidence, and it is reevaluated when relevant 
new evidence, perspectives, or tools of inquiry become 
available. 
Beliefs are justified probabilistically on the basis of a variety of 
interpretative considerations, such as the weight of the evidence, 
the explanatory value of the interpretation, the risk of erroneous 
conclusions, consequences of alternative judgments, and the 
interrelationships of these factors. Conclusions are defended as 
representing the most complete, plausible, or compelling 
understanding of an issue on the basis of the available evidence. 
“One can judge an argument by how 
well thought-out the position are, what 
kind of reasoning and evidence are used 
to support it, and how consistent the 
way one argues on this topic is as 
compared with other topics.” 
Source: Based on King and Kitchener (1994, 14–16: Exhibit 1.1). 
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Table B.26 Integrative levels of moral judgment (Lawrence Kohlberg). 




To avoid breaking rules backed by punishment, 
obedience for its own sake, and avoiding 
physical damage to persons and property. 
Avoidance of punishment, and the superior power 
of authorities. 
Egocentric point of view 
Doesn’t consider the interests of others or 
recognize that they differ from the actor’s; doesn’t 
relate two points of view. Actions are considered 
physically rather than in terms of psychological 
interests of others. Confusion of authority’s 




Following rules when it is to someone’s 
immediate interest: acting to meet one’s own 
interests and needs and letting others do the 
same. Right is also what’s fair, what’s an equal 
exchange, a deal, an agreement. 
To serve one’s own needs or interests in a world 
where you have to recognize that other people 
have their interests, too. 
Concrete individualistic perspective 
Aware that everybody has his own interest to 
pursue and these conflict, so that right is relative 








Living up to what is expected by people close to 
you or what people generally expect of people 
in your role as son, brother, friend, etc. “Being 
good” is important and means having good 
motives, showing concern about others. It also 
means keeping mutual relationships, such as 
trust, loyalty, respect, and gratitude. 
The need to be a good person in your own eyes 
and those of others. Your caring for others. Belief 
in the Golden Rule. Desire to maintain rules and 
authority which support stereotypical good 
behavior. 
Perspective of the individual in relationship with 
other individuals 
Aware of shared feelings, agreements, and 
expectations which take primary over individual 
interests. Relates points of view through the 
concrete Golden Rule, putting yourself in the 
other persons’ shoes. Does not yet consider 
generalized system perspective. 
(continued) 
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Table B.26 Integrative levels of moral judgment (Lawrence Kohlberg). 
Level What is right? Reasons for doing right Social perspective 
4. Social system and 
conscience 
Fulfilling the actual duties to which you have 
agreed. Laws are to be upheld except in extreme 
cases where they conflict with other fixed social 
duties. Right is also contributing to society, the 
group, or institution. 
To keep the institution going as a whole, to avoid 
the breakdown in the system “if everyone did it,” 
or the imperative of conscience to meet one’s 
defined obligations (easily confused with stage 3 
belief in rules and authority). 
Differentiates societal point of view from 
interpersonal agreement or motives 
Takes the point of view of the system that defines 
roles and rules. Considers individual relations in 
terms of place in the system. 
III. Postconventional, or principled 
5. Social contract or 
utility and individual 
rights 
Being aware that people hold a variety of values 
and opinions, that most values and rules are 
relative to your group. These relative rules 
should usually be upheld, however, in the 
interest of impartiality and because they are the 
social contract. Some nonrelative values and 
rights like life and liberty, however, must be 
upheld in any society and regardless of majority 
opinion. 
A sense of obligations to law because of one’s 
social contract to make and abide by laws for the 
welfare of all and for the protection of all people’s 
rights. A feeling of contractual commitment, 
freely entered upon, to family, friendship, trust, 
and work obligations. Concern that laws and 
duties be based on rational calculation of overall 
utility, “the greatest good for the greatest 
number.” 
Prior to society perspective 
Perspective of a rational individual aware of values 
and rights prior to social attachments and 
contracts. Integrates perspectives by formal 
mechanisms of agreement, contract, objective 
impartiality, and due process. Considers moral and 
legal points of view: recognizes that they 
sometimes conflict and finds it difficult to 
integrate them. 
6. Universal ethical 
principles 
Following self-chosen ethical principles. 
Particular laws or social agreements are usually 
valid because they rest on such principles. When 
laws violate these principles, one acts in 
accordance with the principle. Principles are 
universal principles of justice: the equality of 
human rights and respect for the dignity of 
human beings as individual persons. 
The belief as a rational person in the validity of 
universal moral principles, and a sense of personal 
commitment to them. 
Perspective of a moral point of view 
from which social arrangements derive. 
Perspective is that of any rational individual 
recognizing the nature of morality or the fact that 
persons are ends in themselves and must be 
treated as such. 
Source: Kohlberg (1976, 174–76: Table 2.1). 
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Table B.27 Integrative levels of cognition (Herb Koplowitz). 
Level Causation Relation among variables Boundaries Permanent objects 
1. Formal operations Linear 
The formal-operational concept of 
causality is a linear one. An event is 
conceived of as being the result of a 
previous event. The previous event 
may itself be thought of as resulting 
from a previous or string of events. 
The linearity of the formal-operational 
concept of causality is also revealed in 
questions commonly asked about 
events. “Who started it?” “Whose 
fault is it?” “How did it begin?” These 
questions imply a causal chain that has 
a beginning and while they are 
typically not asked by persons in 
postformal stages of development, 
they are often asked by formal 
thinkers. 
Independent 
Inhelder and Piaget describe the 
strategy of “separation of variables” 
and the schema “all other things 
being equal” as being important 
aspects of formal-operational 
thinking and problem-solving. A 
preformal thinker might compare 
the flexibility of a short, thick, 
wooden rod with that of a long, thin, 
iron rod. Formal operations are 
identified by systematic testing of 
various rods differing only in length 
in order to prove that a longer rod is 
more flexible than a shorter one, “all 
other things being equal.” Implicit 
here is a view that length operates 
independently of all other variables. 
Closed 
In formal operations, events, 
objects, and the systems to 
which they belong are thought 
of as having closed boundaries. 
The closed-boundary concept 
affects problem solving. In 
formal-operational thinking, 
attempts to understand what is 
contained within a boundary 
are made by examining only 
what is inside the boundary 
without regard for what is on 
the outside, that is, the context 
in which the event, object, or 
variable operates. 
Basic 
A permanent object is a physical 
entity thought of as existing 
whether or not it is perceived or 
known. Throughout the 
development of formal 
operations, one believes that a 
permanent object, such as a chair, 
closely resembles one’s 
knowledge of it and that the 
nature and existence of the object 
are independent of the knower. 
The permanent object is the 
major building block of the 
formal-opertional view of reality. 
(continued) 
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Table B.27 Integrative levels of cognition (Herb Koplowitz). 
Level Causation Relation among variables Boundaries Permanent objects 
2. General system 
concepts 
Cyclical 
The general systems concept of 
causality is cyclical. This cyclical view 
of causality is less concrete and more 
abstract than the linear formal-
operational concept. The formal-
operational view is contained within 
the general system view. Any causal 
cycle can be broken at any point to 
produce a linear causal pattern. Any 
aspect of a system’s dynamics is part 
of a cyclical causal pattern, whether 
that pattern is a simple pair of 
mutually causative events (the 
simplest causal cycle) or a more 
complex causal network. 
Interdependent 
The general system thinker conceives 
of variables as acting 
interdependently rather than 
independently as the formal-
operational thinker does. This results 
in a different analysis of any 
situation in which variables interact. 
According to general system 
reasoning, we cannot describe the 
husband’s contribution to the family 
situation, “ all other things being 
equal,” because the husband will 
make a different contribution 
depending on how other family 
members act. Operations in general 
system are made at the level of the 
system rather than at the level of the 
variable. 
Open 
The boundaries drawn by 
general system thinkers are 
open. An open boundary 
around a system is one that 
allows a flow of energy and 
information between the 
system and its environment. A 
boundary is also said to be 
open if it does not clearly and 
completely separate what is on 
its inside from what is on its 
outside. A family may consist 
of a husband, a wife, and two 
children, but examinations of 
the family and interventions in 
it take into account the other 
relatives, the neighbors, the 
school, and the work 
environment that affect the 
family system. 
Basic, but meaning is constructed 
The general system concept of the 
permenent object is very like the 
formal-operational one. The 
object exists as known 
independently of the knower and 
the permanent object is still the 
major building block of reality. 
However, [one] will be aware that 
the meanings that objects carry 
are constructed by the knower. 
Perry calls this recognition of 
different frames of reference and 
different value systems 
“relativism.” He notes that a 
major aspect of cognitive 
development is an increase of the 
areas in which one is able to 
operate in a relativistic manner. 
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Table B.27 Integrative levels of cognition (Herb Koplowitz). 
Level Causation Relation among variables Boundaries Permanent objects 
3. Unitary concepts Pervades space-time 
The unitary concept of causality is 
radically different from less developed 
concepts of causality, and this is due to 
differences between the unitary 
concept and preunitary structures of 
two other concepts: time and space. In 
unitary thought, time and space are 
thought of as part of a four-
dimensional space-time continuum 
rather than as existing independently 
as one temporal dimension and three 
spatial dimensions as in general 
systems and previous stages. The 
division of experience into spatial and 
temporal dimensions is thought of as 
an action taken by the knower (like the 
division of a map into east-west and 
north-south dimensions) rather than 
as an intrinsic aspect of reality. This is 
a fundamental aspect of relativity 
theory. Time and space are both seen 
as constructs, artifacts of the knower’s 
attempt to make sense of his/her 
experience. 
Unity 
According to the unitary view, there 
is an essential unity among variables. 
Space, for example, is not considered 
to exist separate from space-time, 
and it is only by being measured that 
a length comes to be two meters and 
hence comes to exist as a length. 
Thus, measurement is more a 
process of construction than one of 
observation. Variables do not exist 
separately in reality, but, rather, it is 
in the nature of reality that it allows 
us the opportunity to construct 
variables and to separate them from 
the unity in which they are 
enmeshed. The Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle, therefore, 
indicates that the physicist is not 
studying an external world when 
measuring properties of particles, 
but, rather, the physicist’s 
interactions with the external world. 
Constructed 
The unitary concept of 
boundaries is that they are 
constructed by the knower to 
help in making sense of 
experience. The universe is 
conceived of as an 
undifferentiated mass, and any 
division of it into one object 
separated from others, one 
event separated from others, 
or one variable separated from 
others is a division made, not 
discovered, by the knower. This 
is a natural extension of the 
unitary conception of variables 
as constructs. 
Constructed 
The unitary concept of the 
permanent object, like the unitary 
concept of variables and 
boundaries, is that objects are 
constructed by the knower to 
make sense of perceptual data 
and that objects are not an aspect 
of reality waiting, as it were, to be 
noticed by an observer. This is a 
difficult notion for most adults to 
assimilate as they experience 
objects as existing in a world 
external to themselves. In unitary 
thought, unlike in preunitary 
thought, the permanent object is 
not the fundamental building 
block of reality. 
Source: Excerpted from Koplowitz (1984, 273–91). 
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Table B.28 Integrative levels of social cognition (Deirdre A. Kramer). 
Level Characteristics 
1. Undifferentiation No differentiation of perspectives or contexts 
2. Preformism Differentiation of physical, behavioral and demographic characteristics with no integration 
3. Formism/mechanism Integration into psychological traits or causes-effect sequences 
To summarize briefly, this level is defined as the endorsement of a static, trait-oriented approach to understanding the world resulting in gross 
generalizations. 
4. Static relativism Awareness of inconsistencies in traits and behaviors 
Following the formistic/mechanistic level is what the author refers to as the static contextual level, which construes human behavior as essentially 
contradictory and random, with no attempt at integration or explanation of the contradiction. It is referred to as static because there is no explicit 
emphasis on the dynamic nature of behavior and institutions, or on the continually changing cultural and historical context. However, it presents a 
rejection of form, suggesting some relativistic features. 
5. Static systems Integration of consistencies and inconsistencies into systems 
The level following static relativism is one that the author refers to as static systems. At this level the adolescent constructs systems of self, other, and 
interpersonal relationships that subsume apparent contradictions into more integrated, coherent structures, providing a deeper insight into the apparent 
contradiction. While the concepts may feature holism, they are generally static—they do not stress the dynamic, changing, actively constructed nature of 
such systems. 
6. Dynamic relativism Differentiation of systems into culturally and historically defined contexts 
The dynamic relativism level of thought would be characterized by an awareness that social-cognitive systems are culturally and historically bound. 
However, at this level, there is no way to predict in what direction such systems will change, and there is no relationship among different systems or 
contexts, either cross-culturally or over time. 
(continued) 
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Table B.28 Integrative levels of social cognition (Deirdre A. Kramer). 
Level Characteristics 
7. Dynamic dialecticism Dialectical integration of cultural and historical systems into evolving social structures 
At the dynamical dialectical level, perfect prediction is also impossible, because of the emergent quality of evolving structures. However, there is 
nevertheless a direction to such change, and a relationship among contrasting systems, especially historical ones, as they evolve out of, in opposition to, 
and are constrained by, previous systems. 
Source: Excerpted from Kramer (1989, 153–55). 
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Table B.29 Integrative levels of self-representation (Gisela Labouvie-Vief et al.). 
Level Description Example 
0. Concrete-
presystemic 
The language used is simple and concrete. Characteristics and physical traits are seen as 
global. Events are detailed in simple seriation. Action-oriented behaviors describe 
activities. No references to goals or psychological processes occur. 
An engineer. 
Physically-robust-strong 6 ft 280 Ibs. 
I am nice. 
I'm tall. 
I am pretty. 
I have two sisters. 
1. Interpersonal-
protosystemic 
Simple evaluations are made that reflect the values of the immediate social group. Traits 
described are nondifferentiated. Individuals are described in terms of relationships 
(simple descriptors) and social networks. Emphasis is on features of the self or others 
that make for ingroup acceptance. 
I like to fool around and make my friends laugh. 
I am outgoing and friendly. 
I love my family. 
I am fun to be with. 
I have lots of friends. 
I am involved in many clubs at school. 
2. Institutional-
intrasystemic 
Interpersonal descriptors indicate a clearer sense of the individual within the social 
group. Traits at this level indicate a more self-directed and goal-directed individual 
whose evaluations are guided by achievement-oriented and conventional goals, values, 
and roles. Achievement of these goals and values is a frequent theme. 
I am family-oriented and active in my community. 
Effective as a mother. 
I am an empathic and committed friend. 
I have not been successful in my life. 
I work hard to support my children and really love them. 
Have tried with some success, to develop the patience of my father 
and devotion of my mother. 
(continued) 
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Table B.29 Integrative levels of self-representation (Gisela Labouvie-Vief et al.). 
Level Description Example 
3. Contextual-
intersystemic 
Descriptions are critical of convention, involve an awareness of how traits change, and 
give a sense of individuals with their own value system. Institutional goals are 
reexamined and put into historical or psychological perspective. Descriptions involve 
references to processes and contrasts over time. 
I am a singer, an actress, and a writer and want to use these talents 
more creatively than I do now. 
I get along well with all people, but need to develop more insight 
as to what motivates other people. 
Relearning who I am. 
I am adding new dimensions to my life in as many ways as possible. 
4. Dynamic-
intersubjective 
Roles and traits are described at a complex psychological level and reflect awareness of 
underlying, often unconscious, motivation and reciprocal interaction. Activities and goals 
are seen as subject to continual revision as one gains knowledge of oneself and others. 
Reference is to multiple dimensions of life history and an emphasis on process, 
becoming, and emergence. 
I struggle with the concept of who I am and have been identified 
(all giving mother, self sufficient, religious) and I think, feeling the 
need to be more individualized woman with specific needs and 
desires. 
I work for profit now rather than for satisfaction, partly because of 
my (guilty) need to continue to support my family. 
At this point in my life and my parents lives, they are becoming 
dependent and I find myself reliving the above tensions of 
struggling to remain my adult self but getting pulled back to my 
"younger" self as I have spent more time with them. 
Source: Labouvie-Vief et al. (1995, 407: Table 1). 
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Table B.30 Integrative levels of knowing (Michael Lewis). 
Level Description 
1. I know 
This level prevails from birth until the beginning of the second year of life and is likely to be driven by basic processes common to other mammals. It is based on adaptive 
evolved complex action patterns and involves little or no language; it is not supported by the mental state of the idea of me or consciousness. For example, there is now 
evidence using eye gaze to indicate that young infants can anticipate an intention of another by selectively looking at one consequence over another. Many organisms share 
in this level of knowledge. For example, when an object in the visual field rapidly expands, infants, as well as adults and animals, show surprise and discomfort. This 
response is simply built into the core features of perceptual-motor knowledge or action patterns. Likewise, a rat running toward a wall perceptually knows it’s a wall and 
does not run into it. In the past 30 years there has been an expanded test of infant competencies, which reflect such a knowledge level. Infants’ competencies however, are 
not the same as understanding and the distinction between competence and understanding is necessary in order not to confuse this level of knowledge from the others. 
2. I know I know 
This level involves a reflected consciousness as measured by self-referential action. It is based on the mental state of me, and allows for the capacity to reflect on one’s self 
and to reflect on what one knows. This mental state is a metarepresentation. It is similar to a memory of a memory. Whereas a child at the first level may have a memory, it 
is at the second level that metamemory is possible. Here the child remembers that she remembers. As we have shown, this capacity emerges somewhere in the middle of 
the second year of life. 
3. I know you know 
This form of knowing takes into account the mental state that not only do I know something, but I believe others know it as well; it is the ability and basis of shared 
meaning. This does not imply shared attention which belongs to Level 1, although with the emergence of Level 2 this action pattern can become a thought. This 
representation, that you know what I know, does not need to be accurate. Adults know more than children know; thus, the child may not really know what the adult knows. 
The child is likely to make errors, something called egocentric errors. That is, she assumes that what she knows is what the other knows. At this level, children know, they 
know they know, and they also know you know. What they cannot yet do is place themselves in opposition to what they know. This level, in combination with the earlier 
ones, accounts in part for the early ability to deceive. A 2 ½-year-old child who deceives knows that he knows and he knows that you know; thus, deception is possible. It is 
also the reason why children are likely to make the traditional false belief error. 
(continued) 
Appendix B  Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in Individual Development 439 
Table B.30 Integrative levels of knowing (Michael Lewis). 
Level Description 
4. I know you know I know 
It addresses the coactive and recursive nature of cognition. It is characterized as I know you know I know or recursive knowledge. At this level, not only are there two actors, 
as at Level 3, but each actor has a perspective. These perspectives can be different. It is when there are two perspectives that one has the ability to recognize false belief. 
Only when one has reached the level of knowing that “they know I know” can one’s knowledge about what they know be corrected, because you can check their knowledge 
of what they know about you against what you know. That is, once a child knows that she can be the subject and also the object of the knowledge of another, she is capable 
of recognizing the difference in perspectives between individuals. It is at this final level of perspective-taking that mature meta-knowledge can emerge.  
Source: Excerpted from Lewis (2015, 438–39). 
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Table B.31 Integrative levels of ego identity (Jane Loevinger and Lê Xuân Hy). 
Level Characteristics 
1. [Presocial] One of the newborn's earliest tasks is to construct for him or herself a stable world of objects. Constructing the world of objects and constructing the self are 
correlative. Many authors, especially many psychoanalytic theorists, refer to this period alone as ego development, but that leaves no distinctive term for the 
remaining stages that are the topic of our inquiry. This stage of ego formation is called the first stage and is acknowledged for theoretical completeness. It is 
beyond the scope of our work. 
2. Impulsive Impulse control: Impulsive. Interpersonal mode: Egocentric, dependent. Conscious preoccupations: Bodily feelings. 
The lowest stage that is accessible by our methods of study is the Impulsive stage. The child at this stage is a creature of physical needs and impulses, dependent 
on others for control. Deep and dependent attachment to caretakers is colored by physical needs. Other people are understood in terms of the simplest 
dichotomies, good and bad, clean and dirty. Good guys give to me, mean ones do not. The growing sense of self is affirmed by the word “No.” There is little sense 
of causation. Punishment is arbitrary or retaliatory. Rules are poorly understood. Lacking the ability to conceptualize inner life, the child cannot distinguish 
physical from emotional malaise. This is normal behavior for the very young child; by school age, children optimally have advanced beyond it, but those who do 
not may be diagnosed as “impulsive personalities.” 
3. Self-
protective 
Impulse control: Opportunistic. Interpersonal mode: Manipulative, wary. Conscious preoccupations: “Trouble,” control. 
The Self-protective stage, the first step toward control of impulses and hence of character development, occurs when the child becomes capable of delay for 
immediate advantage. Children at this stage appreciate rules and know it is to their advantage to play by them. They are creatures of more or less opportunistic 
hedonism; they lack long-term goals and ideals. They want immediate gratification and, if they can, will exploit others for their ends. Seeing interpersonal 
relationships as exploitative, they are themselves wary and self-protective. If they “get in trouble,” it is because they were with the “wrong people.” Thus, blame 
is understood but assigned to others, to circumstances, or sometimes to a part of themselves for which they do not feel responsible (“my eyes”). In small children 
passing through this stage in normal time, rituals and traditions tend to be prominent, a kind of embodiment of rules and controls. Older children and adults who 
remain at this stage see life as a zero-sum game; they may become hostile, opportunistic, or even psychopathic. However, most adults go beyond this stage, and 
probably most Self-protective persons find a place in normal society and may even be successful, given good luck, good looks, intellectual brilliance, or inherited 
wealth. 
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Table B.31 Integrative levels of ego identity (Jane Loevinger and Lê Xuân Hy). 
Level Characteristics 
4. Conformist Impulse control: Respect for rules. Interpersonal mode: Cooperative, loyal. Conscious preoccupations: Appearances, behavior. 
In normal development, at school age or somewhere in the school years, the child negotiates the transition from the egocentric Self-protective stage to the 
group-centered Conformist stage. More psychologists and philosophers have described Conformity than any other stage. At this stage, the child identifies self 
with the group or its authority—be it parents, teachers, or peers. Rules are accepted just because they are the rules. This is the period of greatest cognitive 
simplicity: There is a right way and a wrong way, and it is the same for everyone all the time, or at least for broad classes of people described in demographic 
terms. What is conventional and socially approved is right. That is usually true with respect to conventional gender roles. However, a person who rigidly conforms 
to some unconventional gender norms is still a Conformist. Friendliness and social niceness are highly valued; disapproval is a potent sanction. The person is 
preoccupied with appearance, material things, reputation, and social acceptance and belonging. Inner states are perceived in the simplest language (sad, happy, 
glad, angry, love, and understanding), contrasting with an almost physical version of inner life at lower levels (sick, upset, mad, excited) and a richly differentiated 
inner life at higher levels. People, including the self, are perceived in terms of stereotypes based on social groups rather than in terms of individual differences. 
The way people are and the way they ought to be are not sharply differentiated. People at this stage usually describe themselves and others of their in-group in 
socially acceptable terms. Interpersonal interaction is seen primarily in terms of actions, not feelings, and the prototypic action is talking. Group pressure can 
presumably encourage transition from the Self-protective to the Conformist stage. But what impels the transition out of pure conformity? Possibly, the young 
person during the primary school and secondary school years finds him or herself a member of different groups that demand conformity to somewhat disparate 
standards. One woman, for example, said that her mother punished her for some infraction by forbidding her to go to mass. She feared punishment in the 
Hereafter, but her mother was the clear and present danger. An individual can hardly endure such a dilemma without abandoning his or her absolute faith in at 
least one of the competing authorities. 
5. Self-aware Impulse control: Exceptions allowable. Interpersonal mode: Helpful, self-aware. Conscious preoccupations: Feelings, problems, adjustment. 
By whatever means, the person at the Self-aware stage has become aware that not everyone, including his or her own self, conforms perfectly all the time to the 
characteristics that stereotypes seem to demand. Once “what I am” is untied from “what I ought to be,” the way is open to begin examination of self. The ability 
to conceptualize inner life expands; interpersonal relationships are described not merely as actions but also in terms of feelings. In many people at this stage, 
there is an acute sense of the distinction between self and group; emotions such as self-consciousness and loneliness are described. At the same time, the person 
perceives that there may be alternative possibilities in many situations that for the Conformist are covered by absolute rules or statements. Qualifications and 
contingencies are allowed, although they still tend to be stated in broadly demographic terms rather than in terms of individual differences: For example, some 
activity is okay if you are an adult, or if you are a boy, rather than if you are personally qualified or have a deep desire for it. Such modification of absolute rules 
may apply to anything from sexual mores to a woman having a career. The Self-aware stage is still basically a version of Conformity. 
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Table B.31 Integrative levels of ego identity (Jane Loevinger and Lê Xuân Hy). 
Level Characteristics 
6. Conscientious Impulse control: Self-evaluated standards, self-critical. Interpersonal mode: Intense, responsible. Conscious preoccupations: Motives, traits, achievements. 
Growth to the Conscientious stage is another major and mysterious shift, for, as Freud pointed out, so long as sanctions for misdeeds come from outside oneself, 
they can be escaped, but a bad conscience is ineluctable punishment. How are people induced to make that shift? The psychoanalytic answer is by identification 
with others admired, loved, or even feared; the social learning answer is that in the long run a person without conscience is punished or socially disapproved. The 
social learning answer seems more adequate to account for growth to Conformity than to growth past that stage, and intuitively conscience seems to be less 
calculating than is implied by social learning theory. However, research has no clear answers. The distinctive mark of the Conscientious stage is self-evaluated 
standards: I approve or disapprove of a given conduct not just because my family or my schoolmates or the authorities do, but because that is what I personally 
feel. Of course, most people at this level do choose to adopt conformity as an everyday rule, so the difference between this stage and the Conformist and Self-
aware stages is not the behavior itself. At this stage, one is guilty not primarily, or not only, when one has broken a rule, but rather when one has hurt another 
person. Motives and consequences are more important than rules per se; ought is differentiated from is. Inner states and individual differences are described in 
vivid and differentiated terms. Long-term goals and ideals are characteristic. The Conscientious person is reflective; self and others are described in terms of 
reflexive traits. The only reflexive traits that regularly appear at a lower level are self-consciousness and self-confidence. The Conscientious person is self-critical 
but not totally rejecting of self, as are some persons at the lowest levels (as well as depressed people of any level). The recognition of multiple possibilities in 
situations leads to a sense of choice; decisions are made for reasons. The person strives for goals, tries to live up to ideals, and to improve the self. The moral 
imperative remains, but it is not just a matter of doing right and avoiding wrong; priorities and appropriateness are considered. Moral issues are separated from 
conventional rules and from esthetic standards or preferences. To make such distinctions entails greater conceptual complexity than at the Conformist level or 
lower. Achievement is highly valued, not only in terms of competition or social approval (which always retain some importance), but in terms of one's own 
standards. Work, rather than being purely onerous, is an opportunity for achievement, so long as it is not dull or boring. People at this level are more likely than 
those at lower levels to think beyond their own personal concerns to those of society. The conscientious character has the negative aspect that the person may 
feel excessive responsibility for others. 
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Table B.31 Integrative levels of ego identity (Jane Loevinger and Lê Xuân Hy). 
Level Characteristics 
7. Individualistic Impulse control: Tolerant. Interpersonal mode: Mutual. Conscious preoccupations: Individuality, development, roles. 
Where the Conscientious person has a vivid sense of individual differences, the person at the next stage (Individualistic) has a sense of individuality, of the 
personality as a whole or the style of life. There is a greater tolerance for individual differences than at earlier stages. The inner self and the outer self are often 
differentiated, a distinction anticipated at the Conscientious level in concern about deceptive behavior. Although a concern for the problems of dependence and 
independence is a recurrent one, at this stage the person distinguishes physical, financial, and emotional dependence; there is particular concern for emotional 
dependence. Relationships with other people, which have been becoming deeper and more intensive as the person grew from the Conformist to the 
Conscientious stage, are recognized as being partly antagonistic to the striving for achievement and the sometimes excessive moralism and responsibility for 
others at the Conscientious level. There are other new elements at the Individualistic level, more fully developed at the Autonomous stage. These ideas include 
psychological causation and psychological development. Below the Conscientious stage, almost no one ever mentions spontaneously the development of 
personality or of traits. Another new element is a concept of people as having and being different in different roles. The prime example of role differentiation—
that a modern woman is expected to serve as wife, mother, housekeeper, lover, working woman, and so on—has become such a staple topic of women's 
magazines that it turns up at lower levels too. It illustrates the fact that not all clichés are Conformist. 
8. Autonomous Impulse control: Coping with conflict. Interpersonal mode: Interdependent. Conscious preoccupations: Self-fulfillment, psychological causation. 
Autonomy is a need that recurs throughout life in different forms. Erikson used the term autonomous for the stage here designated as Self-protective. The young 
child, even in the Impulsive stage, asserts him or herself by demanding to “do it by self.” Here the term autonomy is reserved for a stage at the other end of the 
scale. Its chief characteristic is the recognition of other people's need for autonomy. There is also some freeing of the person from the excessive striving and 
sense of responsibility characteristic of the Conscientious stage. Moral dichotomies are no longer typical. They are replaced by a feeling for the complexity and 
multifaceted character of real people and real situations. There is a deepened respect for other people and their need to find their own way and even make their 
own mistakes. Crucial instances are members of one's own family, particularly one's children. Conflicts between needs and desires are recognized and often 
acknowledged as part of the human condition, and thus they are not totally solvable. There is a high toleration for ambiguity and recognition of paradoxes. 
Humor is not hostile but tends instead to be existential, touching on the droll aspects of the nature of things. The Conscientious person's striving for achievement 
is transmuted into a search for self-fulfillment. 
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Table B.31 Integrative levels of ego identity (Jane Loevinger and Lê Xuân Hy). 
Level Characteristics 
9. Integrated Interpersonal mode: Cherishing individuality. Conscious preoccupations: Identity. 
Only a few individuals, probably less than 1% of an urban population in the United States, for example, reach the theoretical highest point, the Integrated stage. 
Data at present do not suffice to describe fully this theoretical high point. Maslow probably provides what is the best description of the self-actualizing person. 
Because this stage is rare in most samples and there are major differences among qualified raters both as to the description of this level and application of the 
description in particular cases, under most circumstances it is best combined with the Autonomous stage.  
Source: Excerpted from Hy and Loevinger (1996, 19–27). 
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Table B.32 Integrative levels of counting, story-telling, and drawing (Michael F. Mascolo and Kurt W. Fischer). 
Level Age Number Narrative Drawings (art) 





Begins to count objects, slowly 
developing one-to-one 
correspondence, sequencing, and idea 
that last number counted represents 
total items. 
Global description and shift of focus 
Simple descriptions of individual events 
(e.g., “we went to the zoo”) without links 
to other elements. Adults move narrative 
forward (shift focus) using questions. 
Scribbles and post-hoc labeling 
Scribbling and primate figures; child 
labels figure after rather than before 
completion. 
2. Representational mappings 3.5–4 years Mental counting line 
Representation of relations between 
numbers; comparison of more vs. less. 
Causal-temporal action sequences 
Child relates multiple actions/events in 
time or cause-effect relation (e.g., “We 
went to the zoo and then we got a hot 
doc”). 
Identifiable objects and figures 
Able to draw barely articulated figure or 
object (e.g., person), often hovering over 
bottom of page. 
3. Representational systems 6–7 years Mental number line 
Understanding relations between 
numbers on a “mental” number line; 
capacity for addition and subtraction. 
By 8–9 years, multiplication and 
division. 
Intentional story line 
Temporal-causal plot lines involving 
characters with mental states and motives 
(e.g., “We went to the zoo, but then I got 
hungry so we took the train to go buy 
some yummy hot dogs”). 
Mental reference line 
Child can draw identifiable persons and 
objects placed within a particular location 
or scene (e.g., person and a house; flower 
under the sun), often with lines indicating 
ground or sky. 
4. Single abstractions 10–11 years Simple algebraic representation 
Incipient representation of single 
abstract variables representing 
quantity (e.g., 2x = 4). 
Conflict-driven multi-lined narrative 
Complex stories involving characters with 
mental states, motives, organized plots, 
and subplots driven by conflicts and 
attempts to resolve conflicts. 
Three dimensional scene 
Draws scenes with fore-, middle-, and 
background in continuous space; realistic 
details; use of visual metaphor (drawing a 
teacher as a “witch”). 
(continued) 
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Table B.32 Integrative levels of counting, story-telling, and drawing (Michael F. Mascolo and Kurt W. Fischer). 
Level Age Number Narrative Drawings (art) 
5. Abstract mappings 14–15 years Transformation of algebraic 
relationships 
Capacity to coordinate the relation 
between two abstract variables (e.g., f 
= m *a; a² +b² = c²). 
Dialectic relations among stable 
characters 
Complex narratives involving characters 
with inner states and continuity over time. 
Conflicts derive from relations among 
characters or events. 
Visual-conceptual integration 
Intentional use of variation in form, 
content, or technique in the service of 
conceptual goal (use of distortion, color 
variations to represent emotional 
themes); abstract themes. 
6. Abstract systems 18–21 years Higher-order mathematical relations 
Capacity to manipulate abstract 
relations involving change (e.g., 
calculus as an integration of algebra, 
geometry, and arithmetic); capacity to 
solve two simultaneous abstract 
relations; abstract algebraic proofs. 
Narratives structured by integrative 
relations 
Complex interweaving narratives 
organized by relations among multiple 
qualities of characters and events; 
integrative use of higher-order literary 
devices (e.g., anachrony, embedded 
narrative, higher-order tropes). 
Higher-order visual-conceptual 
integrations 
Manipulation of multiple visual, 
conventional, and/or methodological 
means to represent intangible, 
emotional, or abstract content. 
Modification of convention to express 
abstract, emotional, and other visual 
content. 
7. Single principles 25+ years  Manipulation of higher-order 
mathematical structures and objects 
Relations among abstract structures of 
mathematical operations (e.g., 
detecting structural isomorphisms 
between groups of mathematical 
operations in disparate areas). 
Principled integration of literary forms and 
genres 
Principled articulation and integration of 
relations among multiple literary genres, 
methods, styles, etc. into a stable and 
consolidated style or narrative system that 
organizes a given narrative. 
Principled consolidation of style 
Visual expression organized in terms of 
systematic principles that organize 
multiple dimensions of visual, expressive, 
methodological, conventional forms, and 
content. 
Source: Based on Mascolo and Fischer (2010, 162: Table 6.1). 
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Table B.33 Integrative levels of religious judgment (Fritz Oser and Paul Gmünder). 
Level Summary Characteristics 
0 . The perspective of the dichotomy between interior 
and exterior 
Children are incapable of distinguishing different forces outside of themselves. They only know that they are being 
influenced from the outside. They can differentiate between doing something themselves and being influenced by or 
being dependent upon others. (When parents speak of God, God can, on one occasion, be something indeterminable 
and, on another occasion, an uncle or an unknown guest. From a cognitive point of view, this is a prereligious attitude. 
1. The perspective of Deus ex Machina 
The Ultimate interferes actively and unmediated in 
the world. Persons merely react. Pressure of 
expectation. Artificialism. Punctiliousness. 
Children assume that everything is guided, led, and steered by external forces. Yet, for the first time, they clearly 
separate the forces of the Ultimate from the influences of adults and educators. The Ultimate is active, humans are 
reactive. This reactive posture is perceived as a pressure of expectation. The great advance from stage 0 to stage 1 
consists in the children transferring those patterned behaviors, which they have learned from parents and educators, 
onto the still undetermined Ultimate and its effects. 
2. The perspective of “Do Ut Des” 
The Ultimate is still viewed as external and 
omnipotent, capable of punishing or rewarding. 
However, now the Ultimate can be influenced. 
Humans can undertake preventive actions. Limited 
autonomy. First form of rationalization. 
The advance over stage 1 consists mainly in the fact that persons can now objectify consequences and thereby are 
able to coordinate them with the power of an Ultimate Being outside of them. Now there are means available for 
influencing the transcendent Absolute (Fate, spirits, God). This influence can be of various sorts: It can reduce 
punishment, it can achieve favors, or have a preventively calming character. (Seafarers during the Graeco-Roman 
period made sacrifices to the gods in order to obtain favorable winds.) Religious or animistic actions motivated by fear 
serve primarily for obtaining favors (wealth, health, a long life). Obviously, incidents of bad luck are viewed as actions 
by the Ultimate in direct correspondence with the quality of sacrifices, renunciations, and prayers, etc.  
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Table B.33 Integrative levels of religious judgment (Fritz Oser and Paul Gmünder). 
Level Summary Characteristics 
3. The perspective of absolute autonomy and deism 
The Ultimate is being pushed out of the world, 
transcendence and immanence are separated. 
Persons are solipsistically autonomous, 
responsible for the world and their own lives. 
Frequent rejection of religious and ecclesial 
authority: “Here I stand, I can do no other!” 
Formulation of ego-identity, distancing from 
parental and educational forces. 
Persons at stage 3 are able to separate completely the domain of the Ultimate from their own. They attribute to 
themselves a great deal of responsibility for planning and decision-making activities. Yet, they fully separate out the 
Ultimate (Fate, Absolute Being, Spirit, God) and relegate it to an independent sphere of influence. This results in 
something akin to a “two kingdom theory.” Now it is possible either to postulate consciously an atheistic worldview or 
to profess an extreme religious conviction. To the degree that the self of the person at stage 3 becomes 
“interpersonal” it becomes possible to distinguish between the domains of one’s own competence and domains 
attributed to a Higher Entity (this is evident in a strong awareness of the distinction between God and humans, the 
sacred vs. the profane). At this stage, the person is a decision-making, responsible, determined self, just as the 
Ultimate is its own domain of decision-making solipsistic ego-structure. Influencing the Ultimate is no longer 
important, because it has its own sphere of responsibility. 
4. The perspective of religious autonomy and the 
plan of salvation  
The Ultimate is mediated again via immanence, 
either as constitutive grounds of possibility or as a 
cypher for the “self”. Manifold forms of nature-
worship, contemplation, social activism to make 
God real. However, subjects reject the claim of 
being able to accomplish all things on their own, 
they surrender again to an Ultimate. “Images of 
God” exist, if at all, as symbols only, otherwise as 
universal principles. 
The essence of judgment at stage 4 consists in a new possibility of mediating between the decision-making autonomy 
of the subject and of an assumed Ultimate. Although imagined as transcendent, the Ultimate becomes immanent in 
the sense that it is identified as the condition for all decision-making and actions. The world is no longer determined 
by the Ultimate, in the sense of stage 1. Rather the earthly is seen as the “likeness” of the Divine, in the sense that it 
becomes the guarantor for the possibility of human accomplishments. One possible expression of this concept is to 
say that the Ultimate appears symbolically in nature, culture, and human capacities for love. (Or, put in the language 
of the philosophy of religion: God does not actively intervene in history: rather, as the ground of the world and of 
human existence God constitutes the condition for human action.) Persons begin to assemble a new semiotics for 
perceiving the preconditions which make possible human communication. (Wonderment about new-born life, for 
example, is always also an inquiring wonderment about the possibility of life in general.) The advance over stage 3 
consists in the fact that persons now have a decision-making self which they can bring into a correlationally mediated 
relation with the Ultimate. 
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Table B.33 Integrative levels of religious judgment (Fritz Oser and Paul Gmünder). 
Level Summary Characteristics 
5. The perspective of religious autonomy by means of 
intersubjectivity 
Complete mediation of Being and world. 
Universality. Unconditional religiosity. Subject 
occupies a totally religious standpoint, feel no 
need to be grounded in a plan of salvation or a 
religious community, etc. Rather subjects 
experience unconditional and proleptic 
acceptance. Various forms: unconditional 
intersubjectivity, unio mystica, boddhi, divine 
illumination, etc. 
At this stage, the relation between the self and the Ultimate is perceived as being mediated intersubjectively. Like 
stage 4, the question “why does something exist?” leads to the assumption that an Ultimate constitutes the possibility 
for human action. But now it is no longer possible to tie the ground of life and of the world to a predetermined plan 
without coupling this plan with human freedom and self-determination. The relation between the Ultimate and the 
human being is no longer directed by some sort of positive law (plan of salvation, the will of God), but the locus of the 
Ultimate is transferred of salvation or damnation is now tied back to an intersubjective basis, i.e., it is interpreted as 
loyalty or disloyalty to that Ultimate dimension in interactive actions. In the context of real, practical, and 
transcendental freedom, this sort of cognitive model defines the human essence of the person strictly as freedom. 
The Ultimate is viewed as absolute freedom which makes possible and meaningfully warrants finite freedom.  
6. 
 
Remarks about stage 6 
We attempted initially to construct such a highest 
stage deductively from theological and 
philosophical models. However, the subsequent 
empirical studies yielded no data that 
corresponded to this highest schema of 
consciousness. However, after we had fashioned 
and reformulated a possible stage 6 based on the 
immanent developmental logic underlying the first 
five stages. Until this stage can be verified 
empirically, its character is suggestive and 
theoretical. 
Globally speaking one could say the stage 6 orientation tends toward universal communication and solidarity. What 
was valid for stage 5 must be decisively qualified. At the center of the reasoning structure of stage 6 rests a 
communicative praxis with claim to universal validity, intending universal solidarity (communicative praxis with the 
Ultimate, mediated through interindividual actions). Again, one’s own autonomous freedom is viewed as constituted 
intersubjectively, though always from the perspective of universal communication and solidarity and, makes possible 
this freedom. At stage 5 there exists the possibility of interpreting the unconditional freedom of others legalistically; 
this, however, finally results in an aporia. The highest possible mediation is achieved only when one can presuppose a 
promise which makes it possible to let guilt, injustice, death, suffering, etc., take their course while totally trusting in 
the acceptance by the Ultimate—also, and particularly, in failure and pain. 
Source: Oser and Gmünder (1991, 68–81). 
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Table B.34 Integrative levels of aesthetic experience (Michael J. Parsons). 
Level Characteristics Psychological aspects Aesthetical aspects 
Preconventional 
1. Favoritism The primary characteristics of stage one are an intuitive delight in most 
paintings, a strong attraction to color, and a freewheeling associative response to 
subject matter. Young children rarely find fault with paintings, no matter what 
their subject or style. They relish color, the more the better. They are often 
aware of the subject of a painting, i.e., what it represents; but they allow 
associations and memories freely to enter their response. The common 
characteristic is the happy acceptance of whatever comes to mind, not 
distinguishing between what is and is not relevant. 
Psychologically, this is the 
stage where there is little 
awareness of the point of 
view of others. All that is 
occurs in experience; there is 
nothing else, and nothing to 
compare it with. 
Aesthetically, paintings are a stimulus to 
pleasant experience. It does not matter 
what they represent or whether they 
are nonrepresentational. Liking a 
painting is identical with judging it, and 
it is hard to imagine a bad one. There 
are no distinctions of relevance nor 
questions about objectivity. 
2. Beauty and 
realism 
The dominant idea of stage two is that of the subject. Stage two is organized 
around the idea of representation. The basic purpose of painting is to represent 
something. It is true that some paintings are nonrepresentational, but they are 
not really meaningful. A painting is better if subject is attractive and if the 
representation is realistic. Emotion is something to be represented, as in smile or 
a gesture; and style is appreciated only as realism. Skill, patience, care are 
admirable. Beauty, realism, and skill are objective grounds for judgments. 
Psychologically, is an advance 
because it implicitly 
acknowledges the viewpoint 
of other people. The notion 
of representation requires 
the distinction between what 
anyone can see and what 
one is merely reminded of. 
To stick to what is pictured is 
to understand that what one 
associates with the painting 
is not necessarily what 
others see. 
Aesthetically, stage two is an advance 
because it enables the viewer to 
distinguish some aspects of experience 
as aesthetically relevant (those having 
to do with what is pictured) from some 
that are not (those not having to do 
with what is pictured). For example, the 
Renoir may be judged good because it 
pictures a dog, and dogs are nice. But 
this latter has become a fact about the 
dog, and not about the viewer’s tastes, 
as with stage one. Similarly, the color of 
the Klee is good; and this is a fact about 
the color, not about personal favorites. 
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Table B.34 Integrative levels of aesthetic experience (Michael J. Parsons). 
Level Characteristics Psychological aspects Aesthetical aspects 
Conventional 
3. Expressiveness The organizing insight of stage three has to do with expressiveness. We look at 
paintings for the quality of the experience they can produce, and the more 
intense and interesting the experience the better the painting. Intensity and 
interest guarantee that experience is genuine, i.e., really felt. The feeling or 
thought expressed may be the artist’s or the viewer’s, or both. It is always what 
is inwardly grasped by an individual person. This insight affects most of one’s 
ideas of art. The purpose of art is to express someone’s experience. The beauty 
of subject matter becomes secondary to what is expressed, and may actually get 
in the way of expression. Similarly realism of style and skill are not ends in 
themselves but means to expressing something, and may not be better than 
their contraries. There is skepticism about the value of talking about painting, 
and about the possibility of objective judgments, because the important 
criterion remains the quality of some individually felt experience. 
Psychologically, stage three is 
an advance because it rests 
on a new awareness of the 
interiority of the experience 
of others, and a new ability 
to grasp their particular 
thoughts and feelings. There 
is also a corresponding 
awareness of one’s own 
experience as something 
inward and unique. 
Aesthetically, stage three is an advance 
because it enables one to see the 
irrelevance of the beauty of the subject, 
the realism of the style, and the skill of 
the artist. It opens one to a wider range 
of works and a better grasp of 
expressive qualities. An example is the 
difference between finding the Albright 
[his painting Into the World Came a Soul 
Called Ida, M.K.] ugly and distasteful, 
and finding it powerfully expressive of 
empathy with Ida. 
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Table B.34 Integrative levels of aesthetic experience (Michael J. Parsons). 
Level Characteristics Psychological aspects Aesthetical aspects 
4. Style and form The new insight here is that the significance of a painting is a social rather than 
an individual achievement. It exists within a tradition, which is composed by a 
number of people looking over time at a number of works and talking about 
them. As they talk, they find some things more meaningful and others less so. 
They help each other to see perceptively. The work exists in public space; aspects 
of its medium, form, and style can be pointed to in an intersubjective way; in this 
way interpretation can be corrected and improved. There are relationships 
between different works—styles—and a history to their interpretation. All these 
aspects of a work are public and may have a bearing on its meaning. Its meaning 
is constituted by what can be discursively said by the group about it, and this is 
more than what is grasped inwardly by an individual at one time. The insight 
affects ideas about paintings. It places the emphasis on the way the medium 
itself is handled, on texture, color, form, space, because these are what are 
publicly there to see; and on style and stylistic relations, because these are how 
a work relates to the tradition. What is expressed in art is reinterpreted in terms 
of form and style, and is a public idea rather than a private state of mind. 
Psychologically, the advance 
here is in the ability to take 
the perspective of the 
tradition as a whole. This is 
cognitively more complex 
than grasping the state of 
mind of one individual. An 
example is when one reads 
several interpretations of a 
work, and sees how each 
makes sense in its own terms 
and yet is part of the same 
tradition. 
Aesthetically, this is an advance 
because it finds significance in the 
medium, form, and style, and 
distinguishes between the literary 
appeal of the subject and sentiment 
and what is achieved in the work itself. 
It finds significance in the stylistic and 
historical relationships of paintings, and 
it expands the kinds of meaning that 
can be expressed. It enables one to find 
art criticism useful as a guide to 
perception and to see aesthetic 
judgment as reasonable and capable of 
objectivity. 
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Table B.34 Integrative levels of aesthetic experience (Michael J. Parsons). 
Level Characteristics Psychological aspects Aesthetical aspects 
Postconventional 
5. Autonomy The central insight here is that the individual must judge the concepts and values 
with which the tradition constructs the meanings of works of art. These values 
change with history, and must be continually readjusted to fit contemporary 
circumstances. Judgment is felt as both more personal and more fundamentally 
social. On the one hand the responsibility for judgment lies inevitable with the 
self. One’s own experience is in the end the only possible testing ground for 
judgment, and one can affirm or amend accepted views only in light of one’s 
best understanding of one’ own response. The result is an alert awareness of the 
character of one’s own experience, a questioning of the influences upon it, a 
wondering whether one really sees what one thinks one sees. In the same way 
the values that underlie our judgments are our own responsibility. Though they 
come from the tradition, they can be affirmed or amended only in light of our 
own sense of their value. If they fit us, we affirm them; if they do not, we must 
amend them. On the other hand, while one is individually responsible, the 
responsibility is toward others. The reexamination of accepted views is an 
attempt to fashion a more appropriate judgment in light of the common 
situation, and it is meant as valid for anyone in that situation. It is important 
therefore to talk with others about works of art and the common situation. One 
cannot question one’s own experience without dialog, without considering the 
response of the others to the same works. Dialog provides the only leverage one 
has to question the tendencies of one’s own experience and to understand their 
significance. In sum, while judgment is accepted as an individual responsibility, 
there is also a clear sense of the need for discussion and intersubjective 
understanding, and of responsibility to the community of truth. 
Psychologically, this is an 
advance because it requires 
one to transcend the point of 
view of the culture. It 
requires the ability to raise 
questions about established 
views and to understand the 
self as capable of answering 
them. This implies a 
perspective on the culture 
itself. 
Aesthetically, it is an advance because it 
enables one to make subtler responses, 
and to be aware that traditional 
expectations may be misleading. One 
also understands the practice of art, 
both its creation and appreciation, 
more adequately as the constant 
reexamination and adjustment of self in 
a common situation, as the exploration 
of values in changing historical 
circumstances. 
Source: Excerpted from Parsons (1987, 22–26, 121–22). 
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Table B.35 Integrative levels of intelligence and ethics (William G. Perry). 
Level Characteristics 
Dualism 
1. Basic Duality 
Assumption of dualistic structure of world taken for granted, unexamined. Right vs. wrong, we vs. others, good vs. bad, what they want vs. what they don’t want. All 
problems soluble by adherence: obedience, conformity to the right and what they want. Will power and work should bring congruence of action and reward. Multiplicity 
not perceived. Self defined primarily by membership in the right and traditional. 
2. Multiplicity pre-legitimate 
Multiplicity perceived, but only as alien or unreal. As alien it assimilates easily to error and otherness: “Others are wrong and confused (multiplicity).” Assimilated to 
authority, it leads to opposition: “I am right; they (authority) are needlessly confused (multiplicity). As unreal, multiplicity is a mere appearance, e.g.: “They want us to work 
on these things (multiplicity) to learn how to find the answer.” Here opposition sees authority not as wrong but simply as failing in its mediational role. In either case 
multiplicity is perceived but not as a signal of legitimate, epistemological uncertainty. 
3. Multiplicity subordinate 
Multiplicity perceived with some of its implications. Authority may not have the answers yet in view. But trust in authority, at least in the ideal, is not threatened. Exercises 
in multiplicity may be enjoyed (authority) or disliked (adherence); authority is presumed to evaluate them on skill of presentation (not on structural properties). Adherence 
may fear they are judged on glibness, influence, or pull. Opposition here: “They judge all wrong.” Self defined over against authority and in similar structural terms. 
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Table B.35 Integrative levels of intelligence and ethics (William G. Perry). 
Level Characteristics 
Relativism 
4. Multiplicity correlate or relativism subordinate 
Dualism restructured in complex terms; right-wrong vs. multiplicity. Absolutes may be doubted in multiplicity area or considered so inaccessible as to be impossible to bring 
to bear on human affairs in any reasonably foreseeable future. In multiplicity, therefore, “anyone has a right to his own opinions.” Multiplicity is acknowledged as relevant 




Relativism perceived in multiplicity and assimilated to authority. That is: Authority can make judgments in multiplicity on discernible relations of propositions to each other 
(coherence) or to data (congruence). However, this is still “how they want us to think,” rather than a consequence of the nature of all knowledge. 
5.  
 
Relativism correlate, competing, or diffuse 
Relativism perceived as way of perceiving, analyzing and evaluating, not because “they want us to think this way,” but intrinsically. Authority perceived as authority in 
relativism. In relativism correlate, world divided into those areas where authority has the answers (e.g., physics or morals) and those in which relativism must be used (e.g., 
English paper). In relativism competing, relativism perceived as applying to whole world (with binary answers a sub-class), but this world alternates with a previous one. In 
relativism diffuse, the most fully developed of these structures, relativism is accepted generally but without implications for commitment. 
6. Commitment foreseen 
Relativism accepted for all secular purposes including binary judgment and action. Commitment may be perceived as a logical necessity for action in a relativism world 
and/or “felt” as needed (with or without explicit statement of a logical necessity). The realization may bring various reactions: eagerness, ambivalence, dismay, sturdiness, 
turmoil, simple acceptance. 
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Table B.35 Integrative levels of intelligence and ethics (William G. Perry). 
Level Characteristics 
Commitment in relativism 
7. Initial commitment 
First commitment(s) or affirmation(s). Acceptance of their origins in self’s experience and choices, some intimations of implications. 
Note on religion: In commitment involving a religious faith in an absolute, the same distinctions re commitment apply (cf. theological distinction between belief and faith). 
The structural solutions for relating an absolute and relativism are varied and not outlined here. In all of them the crucial criterion for the integrity of the relativism 
orientation is the attitude toward people with other absolutes. 
8. Orientation in implications of commitment 
Some implications of commitment realized: tensions between feelings of tentativeness and finality, expansion and narrowing, freedom and constraint, action and reflection. 
Prospect of (or even experience of) membership with authority in areas of commitment (values, address to others, occupation, etc.). Identity sensed in both content of 
commitment and in personal style of address to commitment. 
9. Developing commitment(s) 
Commitments expended or remade in new terms as growth. Balances are developing in the tensions of qualitative polarities of style, especially alternation of reflection and 
action. Acceptance of changes of mood and outlook within continuity of identity. Sense of being “in” one’s life. 
Source: Perry (1968, 257: folded Chart). 
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Table B.36 Integrative levels of logico-mathematical reasoning (Jean Piaget). 
Level Key features Characteristics 
1. Sensorimotor 
(0–2 years) 
Sensori-motor schemata (assimilate schemata of 
perception, habit) 
Object permanence 
Empirical groupings (bodily movements) 
Sensori-motor intelligence introduces reversals and detours; it has access to objects outside the 
perceptual field and habitual routes and so it goes beyond original distances in space and time but 





Imaginal schemata (assimilate sensori-motor schemata) 
Symbolic function (e.g., language) 
Preconcepts (unable to distinguish “all” and “some”) 
Participations (between distinct and distant objects) 
Transduction (reasoning by direct analogies) 
With the beginning of representative thought and especially with the growth of intuitive thought, 
intelligence becomes capable of evoking absent objects, and consequently of being applied to 
invisible realities in the past and partly even in the future. But it still proceeds by way of more or 
less static figures—half individual, half-generic images in the case of the pre-concept, complex 
representative configurations, which are still better articulated, in the intuitive period—but they 
are nevertheless figures, i.e. “stills” of moving reality, which represent only some states of 




Intuitive schemata (co-ordination and differentiation of 
imaginal schemata) 
Practical groupings (no genuine classes or relations) 
Intuitive thought thus provides a map of reality (which sensori-motor intelligence, bound up with 
immediate reality, could not do), but is still imaginal, with many blank spaces and without 




Concrete schemata (grouping of intuitive schemata) 
Conservation (e.g., weight) 
Classification, qualitative seriation, system of numbers 
Logical groupings (e.g., transitivity, reversibility) 
 
When groupings of concrete operations appear, these forms are dissolved or blended into the all-
embracing plan and decisive progress is made towards the overcoming of distances and the 
differentiation of routes; thought no longer masters only fixed states or pathways but even deals 
with changes, so that one can always pass from one point to another and vice versa. Thus, the 




Formal schemata (second-degree operations) 
Formal logic (hypothetico-deductive)  
Grouping operating on concrete groupings 
With formal operations there is even more than reality involved, since the world of the possible 
becomes available for constructions and since thought becomes free from the real world. 
Mathematical creativity is an illustration of this new power. 
Source: Excerpted from Piaget (1999, 126–27, 146–52). 
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Table B.37 Integrative levels of classification (Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder). 
Level Characteristics 




Pre-classificatory or para-classificatory (sub-logical) 
Graphic collection as complex object or figure (pattern or representative image) 
Relation of component item and collection spatial or partitive 
Unable to differentiate between relations of similarity and those of belonging 
     Intension not exhausted by relations of similarity and difference, as in the case of logical classes 
     Intension includes relations of affinity or of belonging 
Lack of differentiation between extension and intension 
     Extension sometimes determined by intension (‘the same’ elements) 
     Intension sometimes determined by extension (collection depends on its shape as a whole) 
No implication of a hierarchical structure of class-inclusion 
2. Non-graphic collection 
Preoperational 
Quasi-classificatory (pre-logical) 
Collections are non-graphic  
     Partitive membership (element x is only spatial part or ‘piece’ of continuous whole)  
     Schematic membership (based on previous perceptual experiences) 
Increasing differentiation of intension and extension 
     Objects assigned to collection on the basis of similarity 
     Extension based on spatial or temporal proximity 
     Lack of co-ordination of intension and extension  
     Incorrect use of quantifiers ‘all’ and ‘some’ 
     Lack of understanding of a singular class or empty class 
Distinction between subdivision of collection and class-inclusion in the strict sense 
     Sub-collections united in the form 𝐴𝐴 +  𝐴𝐴’ =  𝐵𝐵, but there is no inverse operation 𝐴𝐴 =  𝐵𝐵 –  𝐴𝐴’  
     Incapable of grasping that ‘all’ the 𝐴𝐴 are ‘some’ of the 𝐵𝐵  
     No implication of a hierarchical structure of class-inclusion 
(continued) 
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Complete classificatory (logical) 
 
Concrete reasoning applying to objects (elementary ‘groupings’ of classes and relations) 
     Class membership 
     Class defined by genus and specific difference 
     Co-ordination of intention and extension 
     Correct use of quantifiers ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘a’, and ‘none’ 
Characteristics of classification based on logical operations: 
(1) There are no isolated elements, i.e. elements not belonging to a class. This amounts to saying that all the elements must be classified and that, 
if an element (𝑥𝑥) is the only one of its kind, it must give rise to its own specific (but singular) class: (𝑥𝑥) 𝜀𝜀 (𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥).  
(2) There are no isolated classes, i.e. every specific class 𝐴𝐴 characterized by the property a implies its complement 𝐴𝐴′ (characterized by 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 − 𝑎𝑎) 
within the closest genus 𝐵𝐵 (𝐴𝐴 +  𝐴𝐴′ =  𝐵𝐵).  
(3) A class 𝐴𝐴 includes all the individuals having the property 𝑎𝑎. 
(4) A class 𝐴𝐴 includes only individuals having the property 𝑎𝑎. 
(5) All classes of the same rank are disjoint: 𝐴𝐴 𝑥𝑥 𝐴𝐴′ =  0 or 𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =  0. 
(6) A complementary class 𝐴𝐴′ has its own characteristics 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 (thus 𝐴𝐴‘ =  𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥), which are not possessed by its complement 𝐴𝐴: the individuals having 
the property 𝑎𝑎 are thus 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 − 𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥, just as individuals having the property 𝑎𝑎𝑥𝑥 are 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 − 𝑎𝑎.  
(7) A class 𝐴𝐴 (or 𝐴𝐴′) is included in every higher ranking class which contains all its elements, starting with the closest, 𝐵𝐵: 𝐴𝐴 =  𝐵𝐵 −  𝐴𝐴′ (or 𝐴𝐴′ =
 𝐵𝐵 −  𝐴𝐴) and 𝐴𝐴 𝑥𝑥 𝐵𝐵 = 𝐴𝐴, which amounts to saying that 'all' 𝐴𝐴 are 'some' 𝐵𝐵. 
(8) Extensional simplicity: the inclusions in (7) are reduced to the minimum compatible with the intensional properties.  
(9) Intensional simplicity: similar criteria (e.g. colours) distinguish classes of the same rank. 
(10) Symmetrical subdivision: if a class 𝐵𝐵1 is subdivided into 𝐴𝐴1 and 𝐴𝐴′1 and the same criterion is applicable to 𝐵𝐵2, then 𝐵𝐵2 must likewise be 
subdivided into 𝐴𝐴2 and 𝐴𝐴′2. 
Incomplete logic of classes and logic of propositions  
     Incomplete INRC group [i.e., logical transformations of identity, negation, reciprocity, and correlation, M.K.] 
     No understanding of empty class 
(continued) 
Appendix B  Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in Individual Development 460 
Table B.37 Integrative levels of classification (Jean Piaget and Bärbel Inhelder). 
Level Characteristics 
Formal operations Formal reasoning applying to verbal statements (propositions) 
Complete logic of classes and logic of propositions  
     INRC group [i.e., logical transformations of identity, negation, reciprocity, and correlation, M.K.] 
     Empty class (𝐴𝐴 =  0) 
     Negative class (𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 − 𝐴𝐴)  
     Law of duality as synthesis of inversion or negation and reciprocity (if 𝐴𝐴 <  𝐵𝐵 then 𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 − 𝐴𝐴 >  𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑜𝑛𝑛 𝐵𝐵) 
Source: Excerpted from Inhelder and Piaget (1964, 17–150). 
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Table B.38 Integrative levels of social perspective-taking (Robert L. Selman). 
Level Concepts of persons Concepts of relations 
0. Undifferentiated 
At this level, young children do not clearly differentiate physical and 
psychological characteristics of persons. Feelings and thoughts can be 
observed and recognized, but the confusion between the subjective-
psychological and the objective-physical leads to confusion between acts 
and feelings or between intentional and unintentional behavior. 
Egocentric 
Selves and others are clearly differentiated only as physical entities, not psychological entities. 
Thus subjective perspectives are undifferentiated and that another may interpret the same 
situation differently is not recognized. Concepts of relations of perspectives are limited by 
inability to differentiate clearly and by concomitant reduction of differences in perspectives to 
merely differences in perceptual perspectives. 
1. Differentiated 
At Level 1, the key conceptual advance is the clear differentiation of 
physical and psychological characteristics of persons. As a result, 
intentional and unintentional acts are differentiated and new awareness 
is generated that each person has a unique subjective covert 
psychological life. Thought, opinion, or feeling states within an individual, 
however, are seen as unitary, not mixed. 
Subjective 
The subjective perspectives of self and other are clearly differentiated and recognized as 
potentially different. However, another’s subjective state is still thought to be legible by simple 
physical observation. Relating of perspectives is conceived of in one-way, unilateral terms, in 
terms of the perspective of and impact on one actor. For example, in this simple one-way 
conception of relating of perspectives and interpersonal causality, a gift makes someone happy. 
Where there is any understanding of two-way reciprocity, it is limited to the physical–the hit 
child hits back. Individuals are seen to respond to action with like action. 
(continued) 
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Table B.38 Integrative levels of social perspective-taking (Robert L. Selman). 
Level Concepts of persons Concepts of relations 
2. Self-reflective / second-person 
Key conceptual advances at Level 2 are the growing child’s ability to step 
mentally outside himself or herself and take a self-reflective or second-
person perspective on his or her own thoughts and actions and on the 
realization that others can do so as well. Persons‘ thought or feeling 
states are seen as potentially multiple, for example, curious, frightened, 
and happy, but still as grouping of mutually isolated and sequential or 
weighted aspects, for example, mostly curious and happy and a little 
scared. Both selves and others are thereby understood to be capable of 
doing things (overt actions) they may not want (intend) to do. And 
persons are understood to have a dual, layered social orientation: visible 
appearance, possibly put on for show, and the truer hidden reality. 
Reciprocal 
Differences among perspectives are seen relativistically because of the Level 2 child’s 
recognition of the uniqueness of each person’s ordered set of values and purposes. A new two-
way reciprocity is the hallmark of Level 2 concepts of relations. It is a reciprocity of thoughts 
and feelings, not merely actions. The child puts himself of herself in another’s shoes and 
realizes the other will do the same. In strictly mechanical-logical terms, the child now sees the 
infinite regress possibility of perspective taking (I know that she knows that I know that she 
knows ... etc.). The child also recognizes that the outer appearance—inner reality distinction 
means selves can deceive others as to their inner states, which places accuracy limits on taking 
another’s inner perspective. In essence, the two-way reciprocity of this level has the practical 
result of detente, wherein both parties are satisfied, but not the relationship system between 
them. 
3. Third-person 
Persons are seen by the young adolescent thinking at Level 3 as systems 
of attitudes and values fairly consistent over the long haul, as opposed to 
randomly changeable assortments of states as at Level 2. The critical 
conceptual advance is toward ability to take a true third-person 
perspective, to step outside not only one’s own immediate perspective, 
but outside the self as a system, a totality. There are generated notions of 
what we might call an “observing ego,” such that adolescents do (and 
perceive other persons to) simultaneously see themselves as both actors 
and objects, simultaneously acting and reflecting upon the effects of 
action on themselves, reflecting upon the self in interaction with the self. 
Mutual 
The third-person perspective permits more than the taking of another’s perspective on the self; 
the truly third-person perspective on relations which is characteristic of Level 3 simultaneously 
includes and coordinates the perspectives of self and other(s), and thus the system or situation 
and all parties are seen from the third-person or generalized other perspective. Whereas at 
Level 2, the logic of infinite regress, chaining back and forth, was indeed apparent, its 
implications were not. At Level 3, the limitations and ultimate futility of attempts to understand 
interactions on the basis of the infinite regress model become apparent and the third-person 
perspective of this level allows the adolescent to abstractly step outside an interpersonal 
interaction and simultaneously and mutually coordinate and consider the perspective (and 
their interactions) of self and other(s). Subjects thinking at this level see the need to coordinate 
reciprocal perspectives, and believe social satisfaction, understanding, or resolution must be 
mutual and coordinated to be genuine and effective. Relations are viewed more as ongoing 
systems in which thoughts and experiences are mutually shared. 
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Table B.38 Integrative levels of social perspective-taking (Robert L. Selman). 
Level Concepts of persons Concepts of relations 
4. In-depth 
Two new notions are characteristic of Level 4 conceptions of persons. 
First, actions, thoughts, motives, or feelings are understood to be 
psychologically determined, but not necessarily self-reflectively 
understood. In this view, there are more complicated interactions within 
a person that cannot always be comprehended by the “observing ego” of 
Level 3. Thus, we see, whether or not it is so named, the generation of a 
notion of the unconscious in individuals. Persons are thereby seen to be 
capable of doing things not that they “don’t want” to do, as at Level 2, 
but that they don’t understand why they don’t. Second, there emerges at 
Level 4 a new notion of personality as a product of traits, beliefs, values, 
and attitudes, a system with its own developmental history.  
Societal-symbolic 
The individual now conceptualizes subjective perspectives of persons toward each other 
(mutuality) as existing not only on the plane of common expectations or awareness, but also 
simultaneously at multidimensional or deeper levels of communication. For example, in a dyad, 
perspectives can be shared at the level of superficial information, of common interests, or of 
deeper unverbalized feelings and communication. At this level, the adolescent or young adult 
can abstract multiple mutual (generalized other) perspectives to a societal, conventional, legal, 
or moral perspective in which all individuals can share. Each self is believed to consider this 
shared point of view of the generalized other or social system in order to facilitate accurate 
communication and understanding. 
Source: Excerpted from Selman (1980, 37–40). 
  
Appendix B  Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in Individual Development 464 
Table B.39 Integrative levels of social perspective-taking and interpersonal action (Robert L. Selman). 
Level Age Social perspective-taking Interpersonal action 
Characteristics Perspective Shared experience (relatedness aspect) Negotiation strategy (autonomy aspect) 
0. Physicalistic 3–5 years To understand my own perspective 
(egocentric) 
First-person Unreflected imitation or enmeshment; 
lack of differentiation 
Physical force:  
impulsive fight or flight or freeze 
1. Subjective 6–7 years To understand your perspective, 
distinct from mine 
Unreflected sharing of expressive 
enthusiasm 
One-way, unilateral power:  
orders or obedience 
2. Reciprocal 8–11 years To understand your view of my 
(subjective) perspective 
Second-person Reflective sharing of similar 
perceptions and experiences 
Cooperative exchange reciprocity: 
persuasion or deference 
3. Mutual 12–14 years To understand her or his view of us 
(our perspective) 
Third-person Empathic sharing of beliefs and values Mutual compromise 
4. Generalized other 15–18 years To understand my own perspective in 
the context of multiple perspectives 
Interdependent sharing of 
vulnerabilities and self-identities 
Collaborative integration of relationship 
dynamics (commitment) 
Source: Based on Selman (2003, 21, 31: Tables 2.1, 3.1). 
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2. Sensory & motor 







 In the following it will be demonstrated how the wave equation is derived by coordinating more and more complex building blocks 
9. Concrete 
  
At the concrete order a particle’s or fluid element’s state can be given in terms of actual numbers that represent 
Displacement 𝑢𝑢1, 𝑢𝑢2, 𝑢𝑢3, … 
Particle velocity 𝑣𝑣1, 𝑣𝑣2, 𝑣𝑣3, … 
Particle acceleration 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2, 𝑎𝑎3, … 
Pressure 𝑝𝑝1, 𝑝𝑝2, 𝑝𝑝3, … 
Density 𝜌𝜌1, 𝜌𝜌2, 𝜌𝜌3, … 
The respective state can be given at different certain times 𝑛𝑛1, 𝑛𝑛2, 𝑛𝑛3, … and at a certain positions 𝑥𝑥1, 𝑥𝑥2, 𝑥𝑥3, …. The subscripts indicate that these variable 
values are actually specific instances. In logic, they are called specified variable and therefore are concrete. 
(continued) 
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Table B.40 Integrative levels of tasks in physics (Kristian Stålne, Michael L. Commons, and Eva Yujia Li). 
Level Characteristics 
10. Abstract Abstract variables are created by coordinating every possible outcome of the concrete instances, specific times or specific positions. The abstract state 
variables, or field variables as they are referred to, are used that coordinates every possible displacement 𝑢𝑢, velocity 𝑣𝑣, acceleration 𝑎𝑎, pressure 𝑝𝑝 and 
density 𝜌𝜌 (rho). At the abstract order, time and position are expressed as variables 𝑛𝑛 and 𝑥𝑥. At the abstract order, the equation for pressure is provided. 
Even though the equation is from the systematic order, the variables themselves can be viewed as just variables. The equation is given and all a 
participant has to do is to put in the correct values for the derivatives. The definition provided for change force 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 per change in unit area 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 is 
𝑝𝑝 =
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑   
The definition provided for density 𝜌𝜌 (rho) is change in mass 𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴 per change in unit volume 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 
𝜌𝜌 =
𝑑𝑑𝐴𝐴
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑   
11. Formal At the formal order, field variables are expressed as single variable functions or deduced by derivation with respect to one variable. The very notion of a 
function, a mapping relating two variables, input and output, is always formal. At a fixed location 𝑥𝑥 =  𝑥𝑥0, 
𝑢𝑢 =  𝑢𝑢 (𝑛𝑛)  =  𝑢𝑢�  cos (𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛) 
𝑣𝑣 =  𝑣𝑣 (𝑛𝑛)  =  𝑣𝑣� cos (𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛) 
𝑎𝑎 =  𝑎𝑎 (𝑛𝑛)  =  𝑎𝑎� cos (𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛) 
𝑝𝑝 =  𝑝𝑝 (𝑛𝑛)  =  ?̂?𝑝 cos (𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛) 
𝜌𝜌 =  𝜌𝜌 (𝑛𝑛)  =  𝜌𝜌� cos (𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛) 
A letter such as 𝑢𝑢 with the symbol is read “u hat”. 𝑢𝑢� , 𝑣𝑣�, 𝑎𝑎�, ?̂?𝑝, and 𝜌𝜌� are the constant amplitudes and 𝜔𝜔 (omega) is the angular velocity which relates to 
the period time 𝑇𝑇 according to 𝜔𝜔 =  2𝜋𝜋 ⁄ 𝑇𝑇. At a fixed time 𝑛𝑛 =  𝑛𝑛0  the pressure in one dimension is 
𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝 (𝑥𝑥) = ?̂?𝑝 cos (𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥)  
This corresponds to a snapshot of the pressure of a one dimensional travelling wave in a duct, such as an air shaft, as a function of the position 𝑥𝑥. 𝑘𝑘 is 
the constant wave number, which can be seen as a spatial angular frequency with is related to the wavelength 𝜆𝜆 (lambda) according to 𝑘𝑘 =  2𝜋𝜋 ⁄ 𝜆𝜆. 
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Table B.40 Integrative levels of tasks in physics (Kristian Stålne, Michael L. Commons, and Eva Yujia Li). 
Level Characteristics 
12. Systematic  At the systematic order, the field variables are expressed as functions of more than one abstract variable. Here the field variables 𝑢𝑢,𝑝𝑝,𝜌𝜌, etc are 
expressed as functions of both time and location, according to,  
𝑢𝑢 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛)  =  𝑢𝑢�  sin (𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥 − 𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛) 
𝑝𝑝 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛)  =  ?̂?𝑝 cos (𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥 − 𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛) 
𝜌𝜌 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛)  =  𝜌𝜌� sin (𝑘𝑘𝑥𝑥 − 𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛) 
Kinematics describes the movement of particles expressed in particle displacement, velocity and acceleration. Velocity and acceleration are defined as 
the derivatives of displacement and velocity, respectively, with respect to time according to  
𝑣𝑣 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛)  =   
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛  �𝑢𝑢 
(𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛)� 
𝑎𝑎 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛)  =   
𝜕𝜕
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛
 �𝑣𝑣 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛)�  
The field variables, which are functions at the systematic order, can be grouped into the three categories of kinematics – expressed in displacement, 
velocity or acceleration, force - expressed in pressure, and mass - expressed in density. 
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Table B.40 Integrative levels of tasks in physics (Kristian Stålne, Michael L. Commons, and Eva Yujia Li). 
Level Characteristics 
13. Metasystematic The metasystematic order is characterized by coordination of two or more systems at the systematic order. Kinetics is achieved by means of Newton’s 
law of motion in rigid body dynamics, which is the coordination of kinematics and force. The derivation of Newton’s law of motion for a fluid is 
therefore a coordination at the metasystematic order, since it successfully coordinates the system of force through the pressure 𝑝𝑝 =  𝑝𝑝 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛) with the 
system of kinematics through the acceleration 𝑎𝑎 =  𝑎𝑎 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛). Using pressure 𝑝𝑝 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛) and particle velocity 𝑣𝑣 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛), Newton’s law of motion for a fluid in 
one dimension can be expressed as, 
𝜌𝜌0
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛  =  −
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 
where 𝜌𝜌0 is the mean density of the fluid. Another example of a metasystematic coordination is the Continuity Equation, which is based on the principle 
of indestructibility of mass. It is a mathematical formulation of the relationship between changes in density 𝜌𝜌 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛) and changes in volume of an 
element, which can be expressed with the particle velocity of the element 𝑣𝑣 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛), as a function of time and position according to  
𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌
𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛  =  −𝜌𝜌0
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 
A third example of a metasystematic coordination is the Ideal Gas Law, which gives a relationship between the pressure 𝑝𝑝 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛) and the density 𝜌𝜌 (𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛). 
From the ideal gas law the following equation can be derived, where the right hand side only contains constants. 
𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝜌𝜌  =  𝑘𝑘
𝜕𝜕𝑣𝑣
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥 
It can be noted that these three examples of relationships at a metasystematic level coordinates the variables that reflects different aspects of the 
phenomenon, or categories, a wave motion studied as a propagation of force, displacement and mass. 
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Table B.40 Integrative levels of tasks in physics (Kristian Stålne, Michael L. Commons, and Eva Yujia Li). 
Level Characteristics 
14. Paradigmatic At the paradigmatic order, the wave equation is derived by coordinating the three metasystematic relations presented above: 
Newton’s law of motion 
The Continuity Equation (Conservation of Mass) 
The Ideal Gas Law 
The coordination is performed by employing the three Metasystematic relationships to eliminate two of the field variables, usually velocity and density, 
to achieve the final result, the wave equation expressed in pressure 𝑝𝑝(𝑥𝑥, 𝑛𝑛) as a field variable, 
𝜕𝜕2𝑝𝑝
𝜕𝜕𝑥𝑥2  −  
1𝜕𝜕2𝑝𝑝
𝑐𝑐2𝜕𝜕𝑛𝑛2  =  0 
The wave equation also shows up in quantum mechanics. The time-independent Schrödinger Equation is a decoordination of classical wave equation 
and the conservation of energy, Total Energy. 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 =  𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 +  𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇, where 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇 = potential energy, 𝐾𝐾𝑇𝑇 = kinetic energy. The coordination is at the 
paradigmatic stage because the conservation of energy is at the metasystematic stage. The coordination of an action at the paradigmatic stage and an 
action of metasystematic stage completes a task at the paradigmatic stage. The following equation is a one-dimensional, time-independent Schrödinger 
Equation for a particle of mass m, commonly known as the Time-Independent Schrödinger Equation. 
15. Cross-paradigmatic At the cross-paradigmatic order, the field of quantum mechanics is reconciled with the theory of general relativity. Einstein realized that to accept the 
speed of light as being constant regardless of the position and speed of the observer is to establish a new space-time model of the universe. He derived 
the theory of special relativity by keeping the speed of light constant and making time and space flexible. Later, the theory of special relativity was 
expanded to the theory of general relativity. It made it possible for Einstein to explain gravity and its equivalence to momentum. The four dimensional 
space equations are described below. The reasons that the coordination is at the cross paradigmatic order 15 is that the relativity theories coordinated 
two paradigms at order 14. The first paradigm is the model of light waves propagating at a constant speed in vacuum. The second paradigm is the old 
paradigm of Newton’s laws of mechanics positing a gravitational field within Euclidean geometry and founding mathematical physics. These two 
paradigms had intrinsic conflict with each other concerning the speed of light. Einstein reconciled the two by constructing a new cross-paradigmatic 
theory in which time, distance, an even mass, are all transformed by showing that all of them are a function of their relative speed with respect to the 
speed of light. The extension to the general relativity theory, integrates space-time with inertia and gravity. Because mass in their as in 𝑇𝑇 =  𝐴𝐴𝑐𝑐2, this 
integrates a new physics, geometry. 
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Table B.40 Integrative levels of tasks in physics (Kristian Stålne, Michael L. Commons, and Eva Yujia Li). 
Level Characteristics 
16.  At order 16, the action required in the transition is to reflect on order 15 tasks. Scoring order 15 tasks is, but not completely, an order 16 task. It is in 
transition because one has to be at a higher stage in order to score the lower stages. An order 16 tasks requires a reflection on a stage 15 task and what 
is missing from it. The reason that it is transitional is that there is not a positive description of the order and how it coordinates two or more cross-
paradigmatic order tasks. The order sequence presumably is infinite, but because of human limitations, we have created only 15 and possibly 16 orders. 
Source: Excerpted from Stålne, Commons, and Li (2014, 63–66). 
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Table B.41 Integrative levels of reasoning about the AQAL framework (Zachary Stein)*. 
Level Reasoning about the Quadrants Reasoning about the Levels 
1. Abstract mappings At this level, the quadrants are treated as simple categories into which 
different objects or events can be placed. Classic dichotomies are 
established in terms of the quadrants: Science is on right, Religion is on 
the left; Reason on the right, Feeling on the left; Body on the right, 
Mind on the left, etc. Generally the quadrants are taken as 
representing the existence of different kinds of stuff (i.e., they are read 
as an ontology). And Integral Theory is taken as a comprehensive map 
of what there is. 
At this level, developmental levels are treated like simple stereotypes. Whole 
persons are classed as being at a level, which is typically understood in terms of 
a single developmental model (e.g., Spiral Dynamics). Development is 
understood as a kind of simple “growth to goodness,” with ignorance at the 
bottom, science in the middle, and spirituality at the top. Particular levels gain 
more attention than others and function as more or less entrenched 
stereotypes, expressing preferences that are not necessarily developmental 
(e.g., “you are so green”). 
2. Abstract systems At this level, reasoning about the quadrants involves a differentiation 
between their use as simple categories and their use as lenses or 
perspectives (i.e., quadriva). Appeals are made to the theorists, 
methods, and personal pronouns (I, WE, IT) identified with each 
quadrant, which begins a focus on the quadrants as perspectives. 
Attention is typically brought to the practical efficacy of applying the 
quadrants, in personal practice, business, and academia. Creative 
application is common. Also, the complex ways in which the quadrants 
frame other core elements of Integral Theory are elaborated; the 
internal consistency of Integral Theory as a whole is treated as a given. 
At this level, reasoning about levels involves giving some primacy to the 
construct of altitude, which frames and organizes a variety of developmental 
models. Persons are understood in terms of their relative development in 
various lines, which are identified with the different developmental models and 
theorists. The concept of a center of gravity supplements this differentiated 
view and justifies whole person assessments. The relation between levels and 
other aspects of Integral Theory becomes explicit; the relation between states 
and levels complicates the simple notion that spirituality is “at the top.” 
Generally, there are elaborate ideas about how developmental levels are 
implicated in all kinds of issues (politics, religion, ecology, etc.). 
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Table B.41 Integrative levels of reasoning about the AQAL framework (Zachary Stein)*. 
Level Reasoning about the Quadrants Reasoning about the Levels 
3. Single principles At this level, reasoning about the quadrants involves an emphasis on 
their world-disclosing and epistemological significance. They are taken 
as representing deep-seated aspects of human thought and practice. 
Explicit appeals are made to various comparable frameworks and the 
quadrants are thus understood in terms of a broad historical and 
evolutionary context. Thus Integral Theory is seen as the leading edge 
of a socio-cultural movement emphasizing comprehensive approaches 
to pressing problems and the integration of science and religion. 
At this level, reasoning about levels involves explicit ideas about the limits and 
the affordances of different developmental methods and models, which are 
framed in terms of arguments about the conditions enabling their valid use (i.e., 
scoring systems, interview procedures, etc.). The idea of “growth to goodness” 
is problematized both by concerns over issues of horizontal health and intra-
personal variability, and by concerns about the accuracy of different 
assessments methods. These complexities of method and application temper 
and complicate speculation on how developmental levels are implicated in a 
broad range of global problems. 
4. Principled mappings At this level, reasoning about the quadrants involves a radical and 
quasi-transcendental multi-perspectivalism, which is made explicit in 
terms of a widely applicable post-metaphysical mode of meta-
theoretical argumentation. In light of this background, attention is 
brought to the provisional nature of all methods and models, especially 
meta-theoretical ones. Integral Theory is broadly construed as a 
polycentric and evolving network of ideas catalyzed by certain highly 
normative principles and practices (e.g., IMP, non-exclusion, enactment, 
enfoldment, etc.). 
At this level, reasoning about levels involves the adoption of a post-
metaphysical stance toward the task of evaluating people. The provisional, 
bounded and multi-perspectival nature of all models and methods is admitted 
and a set of meta-theoretical principles guides a recursive process of continually 
refining developmental models and methods in terms of both theory and 
practice. A broad and explicit philosophical discourse comes to supplement 
evaluate discussions concerning the notion of “growth to goodness,” as the 
human potentials that characterize the highest levels and the future of 
civilization are seen as collective constructions for which we are responsible. 
Source: Based on Stein (2010, 191: Table 7.1)  
 
* As the author admits, this model presents a hypothetical reconstruction without empirical validation, M.K. 
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Table B.42 Integrative levels of personal action-logics (William R. Torbert). 
Level Characteristics 
1. Impulsive Impulses rule behavior 
2. Opportunist 
 
Needs rule impulses 
Short time horizon; focus on concrete things; often good in physical emergencies; deceptive; manipulative; views rules as loss of freedom; views luck as central; 
rejects critical feedback; externalizes blame; distrustful; stereotypes; fragile self-control; hostile humor; flouts unilateral power; sexuality; treats „what can get 
away with“ as legitimate; punishment = „eye for an eye“; positive ethic = even trade; timely action = „I win“ 
3. Diplomat 
 
Norms rule needs 
Committed to routines; observes protocol; avoids inner and outer conflict; conforms; work to group standard; seeks membership, status; often speaks in favorite 
phrases, clichés, prefabricated jokes; face-saving essential; loyalty to immediate group; feels shame if violates norm; sin = hurting others; punishment = 
disapproval; positive ethics = nice, cooperative; timely action = „I’m on time“ 
4. Expert 
 
Craft logic rules norms 
Interested in problem-solving; seeks causes; critical of self/others based on own craft logic; wants to stand out, be unique; perfectionist; chooses efficiency over 
effectiveness; dogmatic; accepts feedback only from objective acknowledged craft masters; values decisions based on technical merit; humor = practical jokes; 
sees contingencies, exceptions; positive ethic = sense of obligation to internally consistent moral order; timely action = fast, efficient 
5. Achiever 
 
System effectiveness rules craft logic 
Long-term goals; future is vivid, inspiring; welcomes behavioral feedback; timely action = juggling time demands to attain effective results; feels like initiator, not 
pawn; seek generalizable reasons for action; seek mutuality, not hierarchy, in relationships; appreciate complexity, systems; feels guilt if does not meet own 
standards; blind to own shadow, to the subjectivity behind objectivity; positive ethic = practical day-to-day improvements based on self-chosen (but not self-
created) ethical system 
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Reflexive awareness rules effectiveness  
Takes a relativistic perspective; focuses more on both present and historical context; often aware of conflicting emotions; experiences time itself as a fluid, 
changeable medium, with piercing, unique moments; interested in own and other’s unique self-expression; seek independent, creative work; attracted by 
difference and change more than by similarity and stability; less inclined to judge or evaluate; influences by listening and finding patterns more than by advocacy; 
may become something of a maverick; starts to notice own shadow (and own negative impact); possible decision paralysis 
7. Strategist 
 
Self-amending principle rules reflexive awareness 
Recognizes importance of principles, contract, theory, and judgment—not just rules, customs, and exceptions—for making and maintaining good decisions; high 
value on timely action inquiry, mutuality, and autonomy; attentive to unique market niches, particular historical moments; interweaves short-term goal-
orientedness with long-term developmental process-orientedness; aware of paradox that what one sees depends on one’s action-logic; creative at conflict 
resolution; enjoys playing a variety of roles; witty, existential humor; aware of and tempted by the dark side of power 
8. Alchemist 
 
Process (interplay of principle/action) rules principles 
Continually exercises own attention, seeking single-, double-, and triple-loop feedback on interplay of intuition, thought, action, and effects on outside world; 
anchors in inclusive present, appreciating light and dark, replication of eternal patterns and emergence of the previously implicit; stands in the tension of 
opposites, seek to blend them; intentionally participates in the work of historical/spiritual transformation; co-creator of mythical events that reframe situations; 
near-death experience, distintegration of ego-identity; treats time and events as symbolic, analogical, metaphorical (not merely linear, digital, literal) 
Source: Excerpted from Torbert (2003, 74, 86, 102, 108, 126–27, 182). 
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Table B.43 Integrative levels of social conventions (Elliot Turiel). 
Level Age Key features Characteristics 
1. Convention as 
descriptive of uniformity  
(affirmation) 
6–7 years Convention viewed as descriptive 
of uniformities in behavior. 
Convention is not conceived as 
part of structure or function of 
social interaction. Conventional 
uniformities are descriptive of 
what is assumed to exist. 
Convention maintained to avoid 
violation of empirical uniformities. 
At the earliest level thus far identified the view of convention is straightforward and restricted. 
Insofar as these subjects are aware of, or assume the existence of, social uniformities, those 
behaviors are regarded as requiring maintenance just because they exist. Subjects at this level 
have not yet formed systematic notions of social organization. They are aware of differences in 
power and status (such as those between teachers and students or doctors and nurses), but 
these differences are not part of a conception of a systematized social organization. In the 
conventional realm it is thought that persons in positions of authority (e.g., a school principal) 
can set policy and tell others what to do. At this level uniformities are not understood to 
coordinate interactions within social systems. The necessity for convention is based on their 
existence; it is their presumed existence that makes uniformities binding. 
2. Convention as 
descriptive of uniformity  
(negation) 
8–9 years Empirical uniformity not a 
sufficient basis for maintaining 
conventions. Conventional acts 
regarded as arbitrary. Convention 
is not conceived as part of 
structure or function of social 
interaction. 
Instability stemming from inconsistencies in level 1 thinking leads to the level 2 negation of 
convention. At level 2 there is a recognition that if people were to engage in acts that do not 
comply with the existing uniformity (such as a boy becoming a nurse), then there would be no 
uniformity. The justification for affirming conventions is thus no longer accepted. At level 2 the 
possibility of variation is used as evidence for the non-necessity of customary associations of acts 
to types of persons. It is reasoned that one form of variation implies the non-necessity of the 
conventional usage. 
3. Convention as related to 
rule and authority system 
(affirmation) 
10–11 years Convention seen as arbitrary and 
changeable. Adherence to 
convention based on concrete 
rules and authoritative 
expectations. Conception of 
conventional acts not coordinated 
with conception of rule. 
The rejection of uniformity as a basis for convention and individual power as a basis for 
authoritative dictates means that level 2 subjects no longer have a conceptual context for 
convention. This leads to a new affirmation that rests on an emerging conception of 
institutionalized forms of convention. Level 3 is characterized by the emergence of a concrete 
conception of social structure, in which an integral role is attributed to rules and authorities. At 
level 3, however, conventions are regarded as nonarbitrary insofar as a rule or authority 
expectation exists, without a coordination of the function of rule or authority in relation to the 
conventional uniformity. 
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Appendix B  Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in Individual Development 476 
Table B.43 Integrative levels of social conventions (Elliot Turiel). 
Level Age Key features Characteristics 
4. Convention as related to 
rule and authority system 
(negation) 
12–13 years Convention now seen as arbitrary 
and changeable regardless of rule. 
Evaluation of rule pertaining to 
conventional act is coordinated 
with evaluation of the act. 
Conventions are “nothing but” 
social expectations. 
At level 4 the shift is to focus on the acts and their relation to rules and authoritative 
expectations. Insofar as rules and expectations pertain to arbitrary acts, there is a negation of the 
necessity of adherence. As can be seen in responses characteristic of this level, there is an 
element of affirmation associated with the negations: If the acts do not have a basis in functions 
served by the rule, then the individual’s choice is affirmed. The change from the third to the 
fourth level in the conception of rules pertaining to conventional acts results in the view that 
conventions are nothing but the expectations of others. At level 4 there is greater awareness than 
at level 3 of the general aims of social systems and of the inadequacy for achieving those aims of 
the belief in adherence to rules for their own sake. Thus, level 4 subjects accept systems of social 
interactions and their aims, but they have no means for coordinating those interactions. 
5. Convention as mediated 
by societal standards 
(affirmation) 
14–16 years The emergence of systematic 
concepts of social structure. 
Convention as normative 
regulation in system with 
uniformity, fixed roles and static 
hierarchical organization. 
At level 5 there is the emergence of an understanding of social interactions as forming an 
organization, in which the individual is considered part of a general collective and cultural system. 
The social system is now defined not mainly by the impositions of rules and authority, but as a 
system of organization that controls or guides the social interactions of its members. Social 
systems are regarded as hierarchically organized, with individuals described in terms of their roles 
and status within the hierarchy. Conventions are affirmed as shared behaviors, regulated and 
institutionalized by the broader system (often referred to by level 5 subjects as “society”), so that 
social acts are judges in relation to a group or social system to which the individual is 
subordinate. It is assumed that the conventional uniformities of a group, particularly at the 
societal level, are necessary for its maintenance. Although participation in a given group may be 
determined by individual choice, adherence to conventions is a necessary accommodation to 
groups in which one participates. Deviation from the uniformity would result in exclusion of the 
individual from the group or, if of a sufficient degree, can imply a breakdown of the social unit. 
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Table B.43 Integrative levels of social conventions (Elliot Turiel). 
Level Age Key features Characteristics 
6. Convention as mediated 
by societal standards 
(negation) 
17–18 years Convention regarded as codified 
societal standards. Uniformity in 
convention is not considered to 
serve the function of maintaining 
social system. Conventions are 
“nothing but” societal standards 
that exist through habitual use. 
At level 6 conventions are regarded as codified standards of the social system, but there is now a 
negation of the necessity of such standards for the functions they are presumed to serve in given 
social tasks. Whereas the previous form of negation (level 4) included the assertation that 
conventions are “nothing but” the expectations of other people, at level 6 conventions are 
regarded as “nothing but” the expectations of “society.” Uniformity, per se, is no longer regarded 
as a necessary condition for the adequate functioning of social systems. It is assumed that 
conventions exist not to serve functions but because they have become habitual and are 
perpetuated by tradition. At this level tradition means the existence of conventions that have 
become unquestioned standard procedures. 




Conventions as uniformities that 
are functional in coordinating 
social interactions. Shared 
knowledge, in the form of 
conventions, among members of 
social groups facilitate interaction 
and operation of the system. 
At level 7 there is a rejection of conventions as societal code or as uniformities associated with 
the defining features of social systems. Instead, conventions are judged to have the function of 
coordinating social interactions and integrating elements of the social system. Conventions are 
thought to be stable and habitual uniformities because they serve to coordinate the interactions 
of people in ongoing organizational systems. In addition, conventions are not viewed as merely 
the means by which those with higher status impose their authority upon subordinates. 
Conventions are shared and agreed-upon modes of behavior that provide the means for mutual 
knowledge. The purpose of coordinating interactions is to facilitate the operation of the social 
system.  
Source: Excerpted from Turiel (1983, 103, 106–12). 
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Table B.44 Integrative levels of concept formation (Lev S. Vygotsky). 
Level Characteristics 
1. Syncretism The young child takes the first step toward concept formation when he puts together a number of objects in an unorganized congeries, or "heap," in 
order to solve a problem that we adults would normally solve by forming a new concept. The heap, consisting of disparate objects grouped together 
without any basis, reveals a diffuse, undirected extension of the meaning of the sign (artificial word) to inherently unrelated objects linked by chance in 
the child's perception. At that stage, word meaning denotes nothing more to the child than a vague syncretic conglomeration of individual objects that 
have somehow or other coalesced into an image in his mind. Because of its syncretic origin, that image is highly unstable. In perception, in thinking, and 
in acting, the child tends to merge the most diverse elements into one unarticulated image on the strength of some chance impression. Claparède gave 
the name "syncretism" to this well-known trait of the child's thought. Pavel Blonsky called it the "incoherent coherence" of the child's thinking. We have 
described the phenomenon elsewhere as the result of a tendency to compensate for the paucity of well-apprehended objective relations by an 
overabundance of subjective connections and to mistake these subjective bonds for real bonds between things. These syncretic relations, and the heaps 
of objects assembled under one word meaning, also reflect objective bonds insofar as the latter coincide with the relations between the child's 
perceptions or impressions. Many words, therefore, have in part the same meaning to the child and to the adult, especially words referring to concrete 
objects in the child's habitual surroundings. The child's and the adult's meanings of a word often "meet," as it were, in the same concrete object, and 
this suffices to ensure mutual understanding.  
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Table B.44 Integrative levels of concept formation (Lev S. Vygotsky). 
Level Characteristics 
2. Thinking in complexes 
(pseudoconcepts) 
The second major phase on the way to concept formation comprises many variations of a type of thinking that we shall call thinking in complexes. In a 
complex, individual objects are united in the child's mind not only by his subjective impressions but also by bonds actually existing between these 
objects. This is a new achievement, an ascent to a much higher level. If the first phase of the child's development is characterized by syncretic images 
playing the role of "concepts," the second phase brings about complexes that have a functional equivalence with real concepts. In place of the 
"incoherent coherence" of syncretic thinking comes the grouping of objects that are actually related to each other. When a child moves up to that level, 
he has partly overcome his egocentrism. He no longer mistakes connections between his own impressions for connections between things—a decisive 
step away from syncretism toward objective thinking. Thought in complexes is already coherent and objective thinking, although it does not reflect the 
relations between things in the same way as real conceptual thinking. The difference between this second phase and the third one, which concludes the 
ontogenesis of concept formation, lies in the peculiarity of complex thinking. Complexes are formed according to rules that differ significantly from the 
rules of real concept formation. Remains of complex thinking persist in the language of adults. Family names are perhaps the best example of this. Any 
family name, "Petrov," let us say, subsumes individuals in a manner closely resembling that of the child’s complexes. The child at that stage of 
development thinks in family names, as it were; the universe of individual objects becomes organized for him by being grouped into separate, mutually 
related "families." In a complex, the bonds between its components are concrete and factual rather than abstract and logical, just as we do not classify a 
person as belonging to the Petrov family because of any logical relation between him and other bearers of the name. The question is settled for us by 
facts. The factual bonds underlying complexes are discovered through direct experience. A complex, therefore, is first and foremost a concrete grouping 
of objects connected by factual bonds. Since a complex is not formed on the plane of abstract logical thinking, the bonds that create it, as well as the 
bonds it helps to create, lack logical unity; they may be of many different kinds. Any factually present connection may lead to the inclusion of a given 
element into a complex. That is the main difference between a complex and a concept. While a concept groups objects according to one attribute, the 
bonds relating the elements of a complex to the whole and to one another may be as diverse as the contacts and relations of the elements are in reality. 
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Table B.44 Integrative levels of concept formation (Lev S. Vygotsky). 
Level Characteristics 
3a. Protoconcepts In reality, the new formations do not necessarily appear only after complex thinking has run the full course of its development. In a rudimentary shape, 
they can be observed long before the child begins to think in pseudoconcepts. Essentially, however, they belong in the third division of our schema of 
concept formation. The principal function of complexes is to establish bonds and relations. Complex thinking begins the unification of scattered 
impressions; by organizing discrete elements of experience into groups, it creates a basis for later generalizations. But the advanced concept 
presupposes more than unification. To form such a concept it is also necessary to abstract, to single out elements, and to view the abstracted elements 
apart from the totality of the concrete experience in which they are embedded. In genuine concept formation, it is equally important to unite and to 
separate: Synthesis and analysis presuppose each other as inhalation presupposes exhalation (Goethe). In our experiment, the first step toward 
abstraction was made when the child grouped together maximally similar objects, e.g., objects that were small and round, or red and flat. Since the test 
material contains no identical objects, even the maximally similar are dissimilar in some respects. It follows that in picking out these "best matches," the 
child must be paying more attention to some traits of an object than to others—giving them preferential treatment, so to speak. An object no longer 
enters a complex in toto, with all its attributes—some are denied admission; if the object is impoverished thereby, the attributes that caused its inclusion 
in the complex acquire a sharper relief in the child's thinking. During the next stage in the development of abstraction, the grouping of objects on the 
basis of maximum similarity is superseded by grouping on the basis of a single attribute—e.g., only round objects or only flat ones. Although the product 
is indistinguishable from the product of a concept, these formations, like pseudoconcepts, are only precursors of true concepts. Following the usage 
introduced by Karl Groos, we shall call such formations potential concepts. Potential concepts, says Groos, can be viewed as a product of habit. In its 
most elementary form, the potential concept is an embodiment of a rule that situations having some features in common will produce similar 
impressions. Potential concepts already play a part in complex thinking, insofar as abstraction occurs also in complex formation. But as long as complex 
thinking predominates, the abstracted trait is unstable, has no privileged position, and easily yields its temporary dominance to other traits. In potential 
concepts proper, a trait once abstracted is not easily lost again among the other traits. The concrete totality of traits has been destroyed through its 
abstraction, and the possibility of unifying the traits on a different basis opens up. 
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Table B.44 Integrative levels of concept formation (Lev S. Vygotsky). 
Level Characteristics 
3b. True concepts Only the mastery of abstraction, combined with advanced complex thinking, enables the child to progress to the formation of genuine concepts. A 
concept emerges only when the abstracted traits are synthesized anew and the resulting abstract synthesis becomes the main instrument of thought. 
The decisive role in this process, as our experiments have shown, is played by the word, deliberately used to direct all the subprocesses of advanced 
concept formation. It must be clear that words also fulfill an important, though different function in the various stages of thinking in complexes. 
Therefore, we consider complex thinking a stage in the development of verbal thinking. At the same time, the role played by the word in complex 
thinking by no means coincides with its role in conceptual thinking. On the contrary, the very difference between the complex and the concept lies in the 
different functional uses of the word. The word is a sign, and as such it may be used in different ways depending on what kind of intellectual operation it 
is involved in. From this difference in the intellectual operations with the word springs the difference between complex thinking and conceptual thinking. 
The transitional character of adolescent thinking becomes especially evident when we observe the actual functioning of the newly acquired concepts. 
Experiments specially devised to study the adolescent's operations with concepts bring out, in the first place, a striking discrepancy between his ability 
to form concepts and his ability to define them. The adolescent will form and use a concept quite correctly in a concrete situation, but will find it 
strangely difficult to express that concept in words, and the verbal definition will, in most cases, be much narrower than might have been expected from 
the way he used the concept. The same discrepancy occurs also in adult thinking, even at very advanced levels. This confirms the assumption that 
concepts evolve in ways differing from deliberate conscious elaboration of experience in logical terms. Analysis of reality with the help of concepts 
precedes analysis of the concepts themselves. 
Source: Excerpted from Vygotsky (1986, 110–13, 135–41). 
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Table B.45 Integrative levels of consciousness (Jenny Wade). 
Level Primary motivation Concept of other Level of abstraction Core assumption 
1. Reactive Cessation of discomfort Adult humans or visual patterns suggesting human 
features responded to differently than other 
environmental features, but at a preconceptual level. 
Abstractions do not exist. Rudimentary or 
universal template for three-dimensional 
spatialization of visual and auditory cues may 
organize perception. Physical objects may appear 
to be bounded spatially and, to a very limited 
extent, temporally. 
I am the world, so 
my needs are met as 
they arise. 
2. Naive Physical security and 
safety at the level of 
sustenance, 
reproduction, and the 
avoidance of pain and 
change 
Merged with other, particularly primary other. People not 
well differentiated from other animate beings in the 
environment. 
Object permanence in space and time. Magical 
thinking. Pre-logical (efficacy and 
phenomenalism). Syncretic. Early preoperational 
or concrete reasoning. Concrete, minimal 
abstraction. Egocentric viewpoint; no social role. 
The leader and I are 
one, therefore I am 
safe. 
3. Egocentric Survival of the mental 
ego as self 
 
Environment, including objects and people, animals, and 
some rudimentary abstractions viewed as Alien Other. 
Other feared as potential threat to the self to be 
overcome by main force or manipulated for own ends. 
Subservient to others perceived to be more powerful. 
Domineering to others perceived to be less powerful. 
Peer relationships do not exist. People are not seen as 
equal to self. 
Preconceptual to concrete operations. Animism 
less ascribed to objects, but now ascribed to 
abstractions. 
If I can be tough 
enough, I will never 
die. 
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Table B.45 Integrative levels of consciousness (Jenny Wade). 
Level Primary motivation Concept of other Level of abstraction Core assumption 
4. Conformist Safety and security 
through predictability 
People are similar in kind to subject, possessing their own 
point of view and interior life which may differ from the 
subject’s. Primarily judged by externals, especially group 
identifications. Authority by virtue of rules and roles 
creates social inequities that are right and just. 
Generalized other (allocentric). Social role. 
Dualistic; intolerant of ambiguity. Concrete to 
formal operations. Logical, complex, detailed, 
organized but ruled by emotion. 
The universe is fair, 
so I can ensure my 
security by being 
good. 










Personal success that is 
socially recognized. 
People are similar in kind to subject, possessing their own 
point of view and interior life of highly variegated 
emotions, but not similar in the ability to achieve. 
Achievers will be rewarded with the good things in life 
(usually defined materially) over the less capable. More 
powerful, successful people are admired. People without 
the measures of success important to the subject are 
discounted. Others may be exploited within socially 
acceptable limits. 
Relativism. Dialectical relationships. Vantage point 
from a dialectic with the system, not entirely 
outside the system. Empiricism and positivism; 
materialism. Formal and post-formal operations. 
Logical, analytical, algorithmic, inferential. 
I can be master of 
my fate through my 
own initiative. 
5. Affiliative Belonging in close, 
harmonious 
relationships. 
People are similar in kind to subject, possessing their own 
point of view and interior life of highly variegated 
emotions. Sharing information about one’s inner life with 
others will lead to a consensus-based community. 
Differences are superficial; everyone is fundamentally 
equal. Differences and conflict are threatening. People 
need to be helped by being in close relationships. 
Relativism of knowledge. Dialectical relationships. 
Vantage point from a dialectic with the system, 
not entirely outside the system. Formal and post-
formal operations, though this is not always 
evident. Holistic, intuitive, spatial, symbolic. 
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Table B.45 Integrative levels of consciousness (Jenny Wade). 
Level Primary motivation Concept of other Level of abstraction Core assumption 
6. Authentic Personal growth for its 
own sake. 
Very little ego-based distortion. True empathy. Respect for 
personal agency, diversity, and autonomy of others. 
Relatively free of enculturation and conformity to social 
expectations. Impatient with people who impede 
subject’s personal progress. 
Postformal operations. Systematic and 
metasystematic thinking perhaps even cross-
paradigmatic. Whole-brain thinking. Highly 
original; thinks outside existing systems. 
Preference for ambiguity, uncertainty and 
paradox. 
I need to be all that I 
can be to fulfill my 
purpose in life. 
7. 
Transcendent 
Transcending the egoic 
self to grasp the 
Absolute. 
Appreciated for their participation in the Ground of All 
Being regardless of outward form. Great compassion for 
and identification with all life forms. 
Holonomic, paradoxical epistemology. Spatial 
boundaries are open. All variables are 
interdependent. Reality is constructed. Reality is 
shaped by certain participants. 
I seek to be one with 
the Ground of All 
Being. 
8. Unity None—merely living in 
the Ground of All Being 
There are no others in the absolute sense. Recognition of 
the bounded selves that exist in the material plane as 
multiplicities of the One. Non-attached appreciation and 
compassion for, and identification with, others who are 
perfect as they are but are also suffering from 
attachment. 
Holonomic. Direct, unmediated apperception of 
all phenomena. Fully integrated Newtonian and 
non-Newtonian realities. 
I am What Is. 
Source: Excerpted from Wade (1996, 74, 95, 110, 128, 134, 143, 155, 169, 190, 218, 263). 
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Table B.46 Integrative levels of mind (Ken Wilber). 
Level Characteristics 
1. Sensorimotor  
(archaic/archaic-magic) 
The human being at conception is a single-celled holon, embracing in itself, as junior holons, organelles, molecules, atoms, and subatomic particles, 
reaching all the way back into those dark shadows that fade into the evolutionary night. By the time of birth, the human being has developed from 
protoplasmic irritability to sensation to perception to impulse to proto-emotion, embracing each as a successive holon in its own compound 
individuality. But none of these functions is yet clearly differentiated (or integrated), and the first years of life are a quick coming-to-terms with the 
physiosphere and the biosphere both within and without, in preparation for the emergence of the noosphere, which begins in earnest around age two 
with the emergence of language. Thus Piaget, for example, in speaking of the first year of life, says that “the self is here material, so to speak.” In the first 
place, the infant cannot easily distinguish between subject and object or self and material environment, but instead lives in a state of “primary 
narcissism” (Freud) or “oceanic adualism” (Arieti) or “pleromatic fusion” (Jung) or primary “indissociation” (Piaget). Sometime between the fourth and 
the ninth month, this archaic indissociation gives way to a physical bodyself differentiated from the physical environment—the “real birth” of the 
individual physical self. Margaret Mahler actually refers to it as “hatching.” The sensorimotor period (0–2 years) is thus predominantly concerned with 
differentiating the physical self from the physical environment, and results, toward the end of the second year, in what Piaget calls physical “object 
permanence,” the capacity of the infant to understand that physical objects exist independently of him or her (i.e., the physical world exists 
independently of one’s egocentric wishes about it). Piaget is at pains to indicate that the process of differentiation/integration between internal and 
external world is a long and slow one. It is not, for example, that magico-animistic beliefs are present at one stage and then completely disappear at the 
next, but rather that cognitions referred to as “magical” become progressively less and less as development proceeds, moving from a “pure magical 
autism” to mental egocentricity to reciprocal and mutual sharing. 
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If all goes relatively well, the infant transcends the early archaic fusion state and emerges or hatches as a grounded physical self. But if the infant’s 
physical body is now separated from the environment, its emotional body is not. The infant’s emotional self still exists in a state of indissociation from 
other emotional objects, in particular the mothering one. But then, around eighteen months or so, the infant learns to differentiate its feelings from the 
feelings of others. Its own biosphere is differentiated from the biosphere of those around it—in other words, it transcends its embeddedness in the 
undifferentiated biosphere. By this time language has begun to emerge, and development in the noosphere begins in earnest. Thus, the intensity of the 
early archaic-magic declines with the differentiation of emotional self and emotional other (24–36 months)—but, according to Piaget, magical cognitions 
continue to dominate the entire early preoperational period (2–4 years), the period I simply call “magic.” In other words, the first major layer of the 
noosphere is magical. During this period, the newly emerging images and symbols do not merely represent objects; they are thought to be concretely 
part of the things they represent, and thus “word magic” abounds. Piaget refers to such magical cognitions as a form of “participation”—that is, the 
subject and the object, and various objects themselves, are “linked” by certain types of adherences, or felt connections, connections that nonetheless 
violate the rich fabric of relations actually constituting the object. This is very much what Freud referred to as the primary process, which is governed by 
two general laws, that of displacement and that of condensation. In displacement, two different objects are equated or “linked” because they share 
similar parts or predicates (a relation of similarity: if one Asian person is bad, all Asians must be bad). In condensation, different objects are related 
because they exist in the same space (a relation of contiguity: a lock of hair of a great warrior “contains” in condensed form the power of the warrior). 
Put simply, such primary process or magical cognition is not yet capable of grasping the notion of a holon. It does not set whole and part in a rich 
network of mutual relationships, but short-circuits the process by merely collapsing or confusing various wholes and parts—what Piaget calls syncretism 
and juxtaposition. As we move from early preoperational (2–4 years; “magic”) to late preoperational (4–7 years; “magic-mythic”), similar types of 
adherences continue to dominate awareness. But one crucial difference comes to the fore: magic proper—the belief that the subject can magically alter 
the object—diminishes rapidly. Continued interaction with the world eventually leads the subject to realize that his or her thoughts do not egocentrically 
control, create, or govern the world. The “hidden linkages” don’t hold up in reality. Magic proper thus diminishes, or rather, the omnipotent magic of the 
individual subject—a magic that no longer “works”—is simply transferred to other subjects. Maybe I can’t order the world around, but Daddy (or God or 
the volcano spirit) can. And thus onto the scene come crashing a hundred gods and goddesses, all capable of doing what I can no longer do: miraculously 
alter the patterns of nature in order to cater to my wants. Whereas in the earlier magical stages proper, the secret of the universe was to learn the right 
type of word magic that would directly alter the world, the focus now is to learn the right rituals and prayers that will make the gods and goddesses 
intervene and alter the world for me. It is from this magic-mythic structure that so many of the world’s classical mythologies seem in large part to issue. 
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3. Concrete operational 
(mythic/mythic-rational) 
Assuming development goes relatively smoothly, then with the first significant differentiation of the mind and body, the mind can transcend its 
embeddedness in a merely bodily orientation—absorbed in itself (egocentric)—and begin to enter the world of other minds. But to do so it must learn to 
take the role of other—a new, emergent, and very difficult task. In other words, the self has gone from a physiocentric identity to a biocentric identity to 
an early noospheric identity, all of which are thoroughly egocentric and anthropocentric. If the sensorimotor and preoperational world is egocentric, the 
concrete operational world is sociocentric (centered not so much on a bodily identity as on a role identity). By far the most significant transformation or 
transcendence occurs in the capacity to take the role of other—not just to realize that others have a different perspective, but to be able to mentally 
reconstruct that perspective, to put oneself in the other’s shoes. As Habermas would put it, a role identity supplements a natural (or bodily) identity (the 
body cannot take the role of other). The child learns his or her role in a society of other roles, and must now learn to differentiate that role from the role 
of others and then integrate that role in the newly emergent worldspace. The fundamental locus of self-identity thus switches from egocentric to 
sociocentric. This unavoidable (and initially necessary) “sociocentric embeddedness” leads to what is variously known as the conventional stages of 
morality (Kohlberg/Gilligan), the belongingness needs (Maslow), the conformist mode (Loevinger). Equally important to the taking of roles is the capacity 
of conop to work with mental rules. We saw that preop works with images (pictorial representation), symbols (nonpictorial representation), and 
concepts (which represent an entire class of things). Rules go one step further and operate upon concrete classes, and thus these rules (like 
multiplication, class inclusion, hierarchization) begin to grasp the incredibly rich relationships between various wholes and parts. That is, concrete 
operational is the first structure that can clearly grasp the nature of a holon, of that which in one relationship is a whole and at the same time in another 
relationship is merely a part (which is why value holarchies start to emerge spontaneously in children at this point; they switch from the rather strong 
“either-or” desires of preop to a continuum of preferences). No longer stuck in the physiosphere, stuck in the biosphere, or stuck in the early 
“egosphere,” the pathological self is here stuck in the sociosphere, embedded in a particular society’s rules and myths and dogmas, with no way to 
transcend that mythic-membership, and thus destined to play out the roles and rules of a particular and isolated society. Mythic-membership is 
sociocentric and thus ethnocentric: one is in the culture (a member of the culture) if one accepts the prevailing mythology, and one is excommunicated 
from the culture if the belief system is not embraced. In this structure, there is no way a global or planetary culture can even be conceived unless it 
involves the imposing of one’s particular mythology on all peoples: which is just what we saw with the mythic-imperialism of the great empires, from the 
Greek and Roman to the Khans and Sargons to the Incas and Aztecs. These great empires all overcame the egocentrism of local and warring tribes by 
subsuming their regimes into that of the empire (thus negating and preserving them in a larger reach or communion), and this was accomplished in part 
by the umbrella of a mythology that unified different tribes, not by blood or kinship (for that is impossible, since each tribe has a different lineage), but 
rather by a common mythological origin that could unite the various roles (as the twelve Tribes of Israel were united by a common Yahweh).  
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4. Formal operational At this point, we are tracing the emergence of a strong rational ego out of its embeddedness in mythic-membership, and this brings us to Piaget’s formal 
operational stage. Formal operational awareness transcends but includes concrete operational thought, and thus formop can operate upon the holons 
that constitute conop—and that, in fact, is the primary definition of formal operational. Where concrete operational uses rules of thought to transcend 
and operate on the concrete world, formal operational uses a new interiority to transcend and operate on the rules of thought themselves. It is a new 
differentiation allowing a new integration (and a deeper and wider identity). First and foremost, formal operational awareness brings with it a new world 
of feelings, of dreams, of wild passions and idealistic strivings. It is true that rationality introduces a new and more abstract understanding of 
mathematics, logic, and philosophy, but those are all quite secondary to the primary and defining mark of reason: reason is a space of possibilities, 
possibilities not tied to the obvious, the given, the mundane, the profane. Reason is the great gateway to the unseen, the beginning of the invisible 
worlds, which is usually the last way people think of rationality. But think of the great mystics such as Plato and Pythagoras, who saw rational Forms or 
Ideas as the grand patterns upon which all of manifestation was based, patterns that were utterly invisible to the eye of flesh and could only be seen 
interiorly, with the eye of mind. Piaget approaches this whole topic by showing that, whereas the concrete operational child can indeed operate upon 
the concrete world, the child at that stage ultimately remains tied to the obvious and the given and the phenomenal, whereas the formal operational 
adolescent will mentally see various and different possible arrangements of the given. In other words, this is a very relational type of awareness: all the 
possible relations that things can have with each other need to be held in awareness—and this is radically new. Formal operational awareness, then, is 
the first truly ecological mode of awareness, in the sense of grasping mutual interrelationships. The capacity to take different perspectives, we saw, 
begins in earnest with conop. But with the emergence of formop, all the various perspectives can be held in mind, however loosely, and thus all of them 
become relative to each other. In addition to formal operational awareness being ecological, relational, and nonanthropocentric, we have already 
mentioned several of its other properties: it is the first structure that is highly reflexive and highly introspective; it is experimental (or hypothetico-
deductive) and relies on evidence to settle issues; it is universal as pluralism or perspectivism; and it is propositional (can understand “what if” and “as 
if” statements). With the coming of formop, the rules and norms of any given society can themselves be reflected upon and judged by more universal 
principles, principles that apply not just to this or that culture, or this or that tribe, but to the multiculturalism of universal perspectivism. Not “My 
country right or wrong,” but “Is my country actually right?” Not concrete moral rules such as the Ten Commandments (“Thou shalt have no other gods 
before me”—intertribal squabbling), but more universal statements, principles of justice and mercy and compassion, of reciprocity and equality, based 
on mutual respect for individuals and the dictates of conscience based on rights (as an autonomous whole) and responsibilities (as a part of a larger 
whole). Thus Kohlberg, Gilligan, and Habermas (to name a few) all refer to this general stage as postconventional. Socrates versus Athens. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., versus segregation. Gandhi versus cultural imperialism. 
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5. Vision-logic The capacity to go within and look at rationality results in a going beyond rationality, and the first stage of that going-beyond is vision-logic. If you are 
aware of being rational, what is the nature of that awareness, since it is now bigger than rationality? To be aware of rationality is no longer to have only 
rationality, yes? Numerous psychologists (Bruner, Flavell, Arieti, Cowan, Kramer, Commons, Basseches, Arlin, etc.) have pointed out that there is much 
evidence for a stage beyond Piaget’s formal operational. It has been called “dialectical,” “integrative,” “creative synthetic,” “integral-aperspectival,” 
“postformal,” and so forth. I, of course, am using the terms vision-logic or network-logic. Because vision-logic transcends but includes formal operational, 
it completes and brings to fruition many of the trends begun with universal rationality itself (which is why many writers refer to vision-logic as “mature 
reason” or “dialectical reason” or “synthetic reason,” and so on). And some theorists simply subdivide formal operational awareness into several 
substages, with the highest of those stages being what we are calling vision-logic. Take Habermas, for example (in Communication and the Evolution of 
Society). Formal operational rationality establishes the postconventional stages of, first, “civil liberties” or “legal freedom” for “all those bound by law,” 
and then, in a more developed stage, it demands not just legal freedom but also “moral freedom” for “all humans as private persons.” But even further, 
mature or communicative reason (our vision-logic) demands both “moral and political freedom” for “all human beings as members of a world society.” 
Thus, where rationality began the worldcentric orientation of universal pluralism, vision-logic brings it to a mature fruition by demanding not just legal 
and moral freedom, but legal and moral and political freedom. In just the same way, ecological and relational awareness, which started to emerge with 
formal operational, comes to a major fruition with vision-logic and the centauric worldview. For, in beginning to differentiate from rationality (look at it, 
operate upon it), vision-logic can, for the first time, integrate reason with its predecessors, including life and matter, all as junior holons in its own 
compound individuality. In other words, and I intend to emphasize this heavily, centauric vision-logic can integrate physiosphere, biosphere, and 
noosphere in its own compound individuality (and this is the next major stage of leading-edge global transformation, even though most of the “work yet 
to be done” is still getting the globe up to decentered universal-rational pluralism in the first place). This overall integration (physiosphere, biosphere, 
and noosphere, or matter, body, mind) is borne out, for example, by the researches of Broughton, Loevinger, Selman, Maslow, and others. This 
integrative stage comes to fruition at Broughton’s last major level (late centauric), where “mind and body are both experiences of an integrated self,” 
which is the phrase I have most often used to define the centauric or bodymind-integrated self. But everything is not sweetness and light with the 
centaur. As always, new and higher capacities bring with them the potential for new and higher pathologies. As vision-logic adds up all the possibilities 
given to the mind’s eye, it eventually reaches a dismal conclusion: personal life is a brief spark in the cosmic void. No matter how wonderful it all might 
be now, we are still going to die: dread, as Heidegger said, is the authentic response of the existential (centauric) being, a dread that calls us back from 
self-forgetting to self-presence, a dread that seizes not this or that part of me (body or persona or ego or mind), but rather the totality of my being-in-
the-world. When I authentically see my life, I see its ending, I see its death; and I see that my “other selves,” my ego, my personas, were all sustained by 
inauthenticity, by an avoidance of the awareness of lonely death. It is a soul that is much too awake. It is a soul on the brink of the transpersonal. 
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6. Transpersonal We have repeatedly seen that the problems of one stage are only “de-fused” at the next stage, and thus the only cure for existential angst is the 
transcendence of the existential condition, that is, the transcendence of the centaur, negating and preserving it in a yet higher and wider awareness. For 
we are here beginning to pass out of the noosphere and into the theosphere, into the transpersonal domains, the domains not just of the self-conscious 
but of the superconscious. A great number of issues need to be clarified as we follow evolution into the higher or deeper forms of transpersonal 
unfolding. First and foremost, if this higher unfolding is to be called “religious” or “spiritual,” it is a very far cry from what is ordinarily meant by those 
terms. We have spent several chapters painstakingly reviewing the earlier developments of the archaic, magic, and mythic structures (which are usually 
associated with the world’s great religions), precisely because those structures are what transpersonal and contemplative development is not. And here 
we can definitely agree with Campbell: if 99.9 percent of people want to call magic and mythic “real religion,” then so be it for them (that is a legitimate 
use); but that is not what the world’s greatest yogis, saints, and sages mean by mystical or “really religious” development, and in any event is not what I 
have in mind. Campbell, however, is quite right that a very, very few individuals, during the magic and mythic and rational eras, were indeed able to go 
beyond magic, beyond mythic, and beyond rational—into the transrational and transpersonal domains. And even if their teachings (such as those of 
Buddha, Christ, Patanjali, Padmasambhava, Rumi, and Chih-i) were snapped up by the masses and translated downward into magic and mythic and egoic 
terms—“the salvation of the individual soul”—that is not what their teachings clearly and even blatantly stated, nor did they intentionally lend any 
support to such endeavors. Their teachings were about the release from individuality, and not about its everlasting perpetuation, a grotesque notion 
that was equated flat-out with hell or samsara. Their teachings, and their contemplative endeavors, were (and are) transrational through and through. 
That is, although all of the contemplative traditions aim at going within and beyond reason, they all start with reason, start with the notion that truth is 
to be established by evidence, that truth is the result of experimental methods, that truth is to be tested in the laboratory of personal experience, that 
these truths are open to all those who wish to try the experiment and thus disclose for themselves the truth or falsity of the spiritual claims—and that 
dogmas or given beliefs are precisely what hinder the emergence of deeper truths and wider visions. Thus, each of these spiritual or transpersonal 
endeavors claims that there exist higher domains of awareness, embrace, love, identity, reality, self, and truth. The evidence, though still preliminary, 
strongly suggests that, at a minimum, there are four general stages of transpersonal development. These four stages I call the psychic, the subtle, the 
causal, and the nondual. I have for this presentation simply chosen four individuals who are especially representative of these stages. They are 
(respectively) Ralph Waldo Emerson, Saint Teresa of Ávila, Meister Eckhart, and Sri Ramana Maharshi. Each also represents the type of mysticism typical 
at each stage: nature mysticism, deity mysticism, formless mysticism, and nondual mysticism. 
Source: Excerpted from Wilber (2000, 218–86). 
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At the para-mind (indigo), the person tends to drop the typical egoic body-mind identification and starts to experience a much broader, wider, vaster sense of 
individuality, reaching out and beyond the mind (or “aside” from the mind, which is what “para” means), sometimes expanding to the entire realm of nature, or 
the entire gross realm (occasionally further). It is at this level that the gross realm must be conjoined with, or fully objectified, if development is to continue (and 
this “conjunction” can occur across the broad spectrum of communion, union, or identity). In any event, knowing and feeling—consciousness and being—are felt 
as deeply interconnected, two aspects of the same Whole event. Because of that, the universe is seen, understood, and felt, not just as a physical realm, but as a 
profoundly psychophysical realm. The very concepts and ideas one uses to frame the world are seen, for the first time, to have a profound impact on how that 
realm appears and is experienced. This is different from the Pluralistic level’s view about the importance of interpretation in unpacking experiences, because the 
latter is simply a view about how a separate epistemology affects, or helps to determine, a separate ontology (which, in its more extreme versions of social 
constructionism, does commit the standard version of the epistemic fallacy—all things are said to be nothing but “social constructions”—the world is entirely 
created by one’s mode of knowing). But this 3rd-tier view is not a recognition of how two separate realms (knowing and being, or epistemology and ontology) 
affect each other but a direct experience of the underlying Whole that unites them both as correlative dimensions of the same Whole event, which can’t be 
separated into two realms in the first place (which all 1st-tier levels do). Compassion, at 3rd tier (and beginning immediately with indigo, with intimations already 
present at turquoise), starts to include not only all humans (“worldcentric”) but all sentient beings as well (“Kosmocentric”). Wholes are readily seen, and 
“thinking” (to the extent that that word has any meaning in 3rd tier) occurs primarily by moving from one prehended whole to the next prehended whole to the 
next. At indigo para-mind, those wholes are delivered primarily by the next cognitive stage up from vision-logic, which is, namely, not vision-logic but pure vision 
(what Aurobindo called “the illumined mind”). Spirituality here, as noted, is often of a “nature mysticism” variety (although higher forms are available), but that 
just means that spiritual intelligence at this level is profoundly psychophysical in its nature, understanding the deeply interwoven (and mutually enactive) 
character of consciousness and Kosmos at all levels. 
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The meta-mind (violet) works primarily with a cognition of feeling-awareness (and felt Wholeness), which is capable of focusing on the timeless Now for certain 
stretches, while also capable of tracking long reaches of historical, or evolutionary, time. Feeling-awareness is particularly a unity of intellect and feelings, 
knowing and being, in an unbroken, seamless conjunction, with epistemology and ontology so tightly bound as to rarely even be distinguished, although the 
distinction is available to the meta-mind. The immediate “touchness” of feeling-awareness is similar to what Aurobindo meant when he called this stage “the 
intuitive stage,” with “intuition” implying the immediate “touchness” that is so characteristic of feeling-awareness (although, “intuitive” is perhaps not the best 
name for this level, since it implies “intuition” is not available at lower levels, which simply isn’t true). Various deep features at this meta-mind stage include rapid 
datascanning capacities; feeling-awareness of “felt Wholes”—where thinking proceeds immediate felt Whole by immediate felt Whole by immediate felt Whole, 
delivering up, at any moment of direct attention, the particular “Wholeness” being discerned at that point in the scan; luminous “visionary” awareness; 
profoundly creative processes; feelings of “shimmering,” “gleaming,” “incandescence,” and “radiance” due to “luminous visionary” components; spirituality felt 
as especially “fecund” and “superabundant”; and a profound sensing of the surrounding environment as being one’s own body, one’s own skin. 





In any event, Overmind is beyond what is typically called “mental” forms of awareness or knowing/being. Large stretches of transcendental dimensions tend to 
open up, and one of the common pathologies here is a tendency to “float” away from earth-bound relations and instead be absorbed in almost infinite stretches 
of love, light, luminosity, insight-awareness, audible illuminations, and structurally upward yearnings. Consciousness can become fascinated with itself and spend 
inordinate stretches absorbed in its own being, drawn to its own Source (the structureless, stateless ultimate Emptiness that can be directly conjoined with this 
structure). Forms of spiritual intelligence with Overmind include ones that are “transcendental” in tone, “luminous,” “radiant vibrations” of consciousness, even 
reaching into the pure “formless mysticism” that can come with the conjoined Emptiness/Witness. But there is a real difference: namely, this is a formless 
“object-less” awareness that, right at its edge, runs into all of the previous levels’ Forms (as structures that are “transcended and included” in the Overmind 
itself), and this allows the Overmind to “oversee” all lower knowledge/being/ideas/feelings, giving a particularly strong sense of “Fullness” as the Overmind 
reaches into all lower levels and infuses them with clarity, consciousness, sublimed feeling, and universal love-bliss. 





Supermind is the radical crossroads where absolute and relative truth are not just exposed to each other, as with the Overmind, but are deeply and intrinsically 
one (or not-two) with each other, a “feature” of the Nondual state itself when joined with all previous structures. It is one of the most difficult nondual 
realizations for human beings to master since it’s not just that “eternity is in love with the productions of time,” but in a deeper, more mysterious fashion, 
eternity and time are the same, or not-two. The possibilities of Supermind are hard to even imagine, given the infinite depth of feeling that it brings, the unending 
horizon of knowing it possesses, the unlimited connectivity it feels with the Kosmos as its own inner Being and Divine Thusness. 
Source: Excerpted from Wilber (2017, 220–45). 
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forms of genuinely 
human culture (e.g., 
tools, clothing, 
humanly constructed 
shelters, fire for 
cooking and warmth, 
formal burial, cave 
drawings, bone 
carvings); language 
had replaced genetic 
programming as the 




(preoperational, early concrete-operational) 
Primitive cultures are oral cultures. They 
portray reality as a collection of people, things, 
and events, sometimes organized into multiple 
categories with many or most things in their 
correct place, though the boundaries of the 
categories are sometimes vague. Tradition and 
commonsense observation dictate what is 
true. It is the tradition of the group, its 
language categories and beliefs, that forms the 
commonsense knowledge of the people and 
tells them what they are observing. 
Animism 
Primitive religion, if the name “religion” is 
appropriate, consists of beliefs and 
practices concerned with invisible beings 
and powers, which we now usually call 
spirits and magic. Primitive peoples 
believe in many spirits but they do not 
worship them. They deal with them as 
with parent figures or as difficult 
neighbors one must learn to get along 
with, but not as being requiring formal 
worship. Whether belief in magic counts 
as religion at all has long been argued. 
Nonetheless, it is safe to say that belief in 
spirits and magic is at least a kind of 
prereligion. Belief in spirits in particular is 
a basis for the later belief in other, much 
larger invisible living beings who can 
influence lives, the gods. 
 
Whether primitive human thought has any 
relation to scientific thinking is disputed. 
On the one hand, it is possible to divide 
primitive from modern culture precisely by 
insisting on the difference between 
mythical superstition and rational science, 
as has so often been done. On the other 
hand, every science must begin with 
information and categorizing. Even the 
most primitive society collects data about 
its world in order to stay alive und 
functioning. Even the most primitive 
society can be exceedingly skilled in 
analyzing specific pieces of information, 
such as the age, condition, and amount of 
droppings of an animal worth hunting, or in 
constructing a hypothesis about fish in a 
river and testing that hypothesis by fishing 
methods. 
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populations in villages 






Eventually literacy was born, including 
bureaucratic record keeping as well as 
organized compilations of myths into lengthy 
hymns or poems. Information and stories could 
now grow more complex. The cognitive skills 
needed by a bureaucracy or priesthood 
became important enough to require a system 
of formal education. 
Polytheism 
Here there is clearly religion: the formal 
worship of the gods in temples dedicated 
to such worship. The official and full-time 
priesthood now offers sacrifices and 
reads omens. Where there were once 
spirits alone, now there are also gods, 
spirits of enormous power, lording it over 
the spirits and humans alike, as kings rule 
erratically over their kingdoms. As a 
culture develops inner social, political, 
and economic organization, so also the 
realm of the invisible beings develops a 
hierarchical system.  
 
In many places the practical information of 
archaic culture is already on its way toward 
a more formal science. The astronomical 
observations of the Babylonians to serve 
astrological purposes, the measuring 
techniques of the Egyptians to settle land 
disputes after the annual floods, and the 
irrigation techniques in various parts of the 
world, represent more complex use of 
information and cognitive methods. 
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including China, India, 




It is the age of the great “classical” civilizations. 
The notion of a single and ultimate unity to all 
reality arose in China, India, Persia, Judea, and 
Greece. In Greece, China, and India, 
philosophers (who were sometimes also what 
we would call both theologians and scientists) 
self-consciously sought the overall structures 
of all things at once. They moved from reliance 
on tradition and commonsense observation to 
reliance on systematically logical explanatory 
theories of universal scope. 
Universalizing belief 
A great shift in religious thought was part 
of the axial change. In the sixth century 
BCE the great universalist religions 
appear. In China traditional notions of yin 
and yang provided the background for 
belief in a universal and ultimate Tao. 
Notions of the transmigration of souls 
and divine power in India produced belief 
in the Ultimate named Brahman or 
Atman while logically systematic 
reflections were transforming traditional 
polytheism into classical forms of 
religion, in some cases subordinating the 
gods to a higher Reality or even ignoring 
the gods. It is in parts of the Rig Veda that 
were written most recently, probably no 
earlier than 800 BCE, that there is 
speculation about the ultimate transcend 
reality. By the time of the Babylonian 
Exile the Judean god, Yaweh, became the 
Creator God of the universe. The Greeks 
proposed candidates for supreme 
divinity, in the form of Plato’s One, or the 
Stoics’ Logos, or Aristotle’s Unmoved 
Mover. 
 
The theoretical speculations of the classical 
age were ambitious (e.g., Parmenides, 
Platon, Aristotle, Hui Shih, Mo-tzu). 
Theorizing far outran the evidence 
available. But out of this search for overall 
logical explanatory coherence came 
reflections on the universal demands of 
justice, or on the ultimate nature of truth 
and truthfulness, or on pure ideals of 
government and public morals, and much 
else that cultures still cherish. Out of these 
speculations came the beginnings of a new 
form of science. Aristotle studied biological 
differences, formulated theories of why the 
sea is salty, and analyzed the movement of 
the stars, all through a comparison of 
various theoretical possibilities in relation 
to available evidence.  
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Table C.1 Integrative levels of scientific and religious thought (Michael H. Barnes). 





Skepticism in Europe, 




To the criterion of logical consistency has been 
added a new emphasis on ongoing and public 
empirical testing, of subjecting every theory, 
no matter how logically appealing, to open-
ended testing against the evidence. This is 
modern “empirical-critical” method in science. 
A defining aspect of empirical-critical thought 
has been the conviction that neither 
commonsense observation and tradition nor 
logical explanatory theorizing is entirely 
reliable, that we must continuously engage in a 
public empirical testing of even our own 
favorite truth-claims, even at the expense of 
our own biases and special interests in making 
those claims. This constitutes a self-reflecting 
(or “reflexive”) awareness that knowledge is 
conditional and tentative; that every 
interpretation of reality, no matter how 
wonderfully coherent or consistent with the 
apparent evidence, is the product of human 
thinking; that it is an interpretation and not the 
simple truth, one interpretation among a range 
of possibilities. 
Reflexive 
Religious thought has been affected by 
the rise of the empirical-critical method, 
though the response of religion is varied, 
from the existential leap of faith to the 
redefinition of religion as emotive-
expressive or cultural-linguistic. As the 
cognitive style of the culture has shifted, 
some religious thought has incorporated 
much of that shift (though other 
contemporary religious thought defines 
itself precisely as a rejection of both 
modern rationalism and skepticism). 
 
While classical or axial revolution appeared 
in what we now call philosophy and 
theology and science all in one, the current 
revolution has been most evident 
specifically in the growth of science. This 
revolution is not quite what the early 
scientists were preparing themselves for. In 
fact, to many of the early scientists the 
empirical-critical approach appeared to be 
a skepticism that was opposed to their 
great project of discovering the real truth 
about the universe. But science has an 
ironic nature. While it has been extremely 
successful in discovering things about this 
universe that had long eluded the most 
insistent questionings of humankind, at the 
same time its continuing successes have 
been dependent on a willingness to doubt 
all observations and theories, to leave 
them open to further testing by any critic, 
to treat them as models for interpreting 
reality rather than as simple truth. Science, 
ironically, knows more by doubting more. 
Source: Excerpted from Barnes (2000, 23–30). 
 
Appendix C  Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in Collective Development 498 
Table C.2 Integrative levels of religion (Robert N. Bellah). 
Level Religious symbol system Religious action Religious organization Social implications 
1. Primitive The religious symbol system at the primitive level is 
characterized by Levy-Bruhl as “le monde mythique,” and 
Stanner directly translates the Australians' own word for it as 
“the Dreaming.” The Dreaming is a time out of time, or in 
Stanner's words, “everywhen,” inhabited by ancestral figures, 
some human, some animal. Though they are often of heroic 
proportions and have capacities beyond those of ordinary men 
as well as being the progenitors and creators of many particular 
things in the world, they are not gods, for they do not control 
the world and are not worshipped. Two main features of this 
mythical world of primitive religion are important for the 
purposes of the present theoretical scheme. The first is the very 
high degree to which the mythical world is related to the 
detailed features of the actual world. Not only is every clan and 
local group defined in terms of the ancestral progenitors and the 
mythical events of settlement, but virtually every mountain, rock 
and tree is explained in terms of the actions of mythical beings. 
The second main feature, not unrelated to the extreme 
particularity of the mythical material, is the fluidity of its 
organization. Lienhardt, though describing a religion of a 
somewhat different type, catches the essentially free-
associational nature of primitive myth when he says, “We meet 
here the typical lack of precise definition of the Dinka when they 
speak of divinities.” 
 
Examples: Dinka religion, Australian Aboriginal religion 
Primitive religious action is 
characterized not, as we have said, by 
worship, nor, as we shall see, by 
sacrifice, but by identification, 
“participation,” acting-out. Just as 
the primitive symbol system is myth 
par excellence, so primitive religious 
action is ritual par excellence. In the 
ritual the participants become 
identified with the mythical beings 
they represent. The mythical beings 
are not addressed or propitiated or 
beseeched. The distance between 
man and mythical being, which was 
at best slight, disappears altogether 
in the moment of ritual when 
everywhen becomes now. There are 
no priests and no congregation, no 
mediating representative roles and 
no spectators. All present are 
involved in the ritual action itself and 
have become one with the myth. 
At the primitive level 
religious organization as a 
separate social structure 
does not exist. Church 
and society are one. 
Religious roles tend to be 
fused with other roles, 
and differentiations along 
lines of age, sex and kin 
group are important. 
As for the social 
implications of primitive 
religion, Durkheim's 
analysis seems still to be 
largely acceptable. The 
ritual life does reinforce 
the solidarity of the society 
and serves to induct the 
young into the norms of 
tribal behavior. The very 
fluidity and flexibility of 
primitive religion is a 
barrier to radical 
innovation. Primitive 
religion gives little leverage 
from which to change the 
world. 
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Table C.2 Integrative levels of religion (Robert N. Bellah). 
Level Religious symbol system Religious action Religious organization Social implications 
2. Archaic The characteristic feature of archaic religion is the emergence of 
true cult with the complex of gods, priests, worship, sacrifice and 
in some cases divine or priestly kingship. In the archaic religious 
symbol system mythical beings are much more definitely 
characterized. Instead of being great paradigmatic figures with 
whom men in ritual identify but with whom they do not really 
interact, the mythical beings are more objectified, conceived as 
actively and sometimes willfully controlling the natural and 
human world, and as beings with whom men must deal in a 
definite and purposive way—in a word they have become gods. 
Relations among the gods are a matter of considerable 
speculation and systematization, so that definite principles of 
organization, especially hierarchies of control, are established. 
Especially where at least craft literacy has been attained, the 
mythical tradition may become the object of critical reflection 
and innovative speculation which can lead to new developments 
beyond the nature of archaic religion. 
 
Examples: Religious systems of much of Africa and Polynesia and 
some of the New World, as well as the earliest religious systems 
of the ancient Middle East, India and China. 
Archaic religious action takes the 
form of cult in which the distinction 
between men as subjects and gods as 
objects is much more definite than in 
primitive religion. Because the 
division is sharper the need for a 
communication system through 
which gods and men can interact is 
much more acute. Worship and 
especially sacrifice are precisely such 
communication systems. The main 
difference is that instead of a 
relatively passive identification in an 
all-encompassing ritual action, the 
sacrificial process, no matter how 
stereotyped, permits the human 
communicants a greater element of 
intentionality and entails more 
uncertainty relative to the divine 
response. Through this more 
differentiated form of religious action 
a new degree of freedom as well, 
perhaps, as an increased burden of 
anxiety enters the relations between 
man and the ultimate conditions of 
his existence. 
Archaic religious 
organization is still by and 
large merged with other 





leads to a multiplication 
of cults, since every group 
in archaic society tends to 
have its cultic aspect. The 
emergence of a two-class 
system, itself related to 
the increasing density of 
population made possible 
by agriculture, has its 
religious aspect. The 
upper-status group, 
which tends to 
monopolize political and 
military power, usually 
claims a superior religious 
status as well. 
The social implications of 
archaic religion are to some 
extent similar to those of 
primitive religion. The 
individual and his society 
are seen as merged in a 
natural-divine cosmos. 
Traditional social structures 
and social practices are 
considered to be grounded 
in the divinely instituted 
cosmic order and there is 
little tension between 
religious demand and 
social conformity. Indeed, 
social conformity is at 
every point reinforced with 
religious sanction.  
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Table C.2 Integrative levels of religion (Robert N. Bellah). 
Level Religious symbol system Religious action Religious organization Social implications 
3. Historic The symbol systems of the historic religions differ greatly among 
themselves but share the element of transcendentalism which 
sets them off from the archaic religions; in this sense they are all 
dualistic. The strong emphasis on hierarchical ordering 
characteristic of archaic religions continues to be stressed in 
most of the historic religions. Not only is the supernatural realm 
"above" this world in terms of both value and control but both 
the supernatural and earthly worlds are themselves organized in 
terms of a religiously legitimated hierarchy. In one sense historic 
religions represent a great "demythologization" relative to 
archaic religions. The notion of the one God who has neither 
court nor relatives, who has no myth himself and who is the sole 
creator and ruler of the universe, the notion of self subsistent 
being, or of release from the cycle of birth and rebirth, are all 
enormous simplifications of the ramified cosmologies of archaic 
religions. Nonetheless, relative to earlier forms the historic 
religions are all universalistic. From the point of view of these 
religions a man is no longer defined chiefly in terms of what 
tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he serves but 
rather as a being capable of salvation. From the point of view of 
these religions a man is no longer defined chiefly in terms of 
what tribe or clan he comes from or what particular god he 
serves but rather as a being capable of salvation. That is to say 
that it is for the first time possible to conceive of man as such. 
 
Examples: Confucianism, Buddhism, Judaism, Hebrew prophets, 
Christianism, Islam 
Religious action in the historic 
religions is thus above all action 
necessary for salvation. Even where 
elements of ritual and sacrifice 
remain prominent they take on a new 
significance. In primitive ritual the 
individual is put in harmony with the 
natural divine cosmos. His mistakes 
are overcome through symbolization 
as part of the total pattern. Through 
sacrifice archaic man can make up for 
his failures to fulfill his obligations to 
men or gods. He can atone for 
particular acts of unfaithfulness. But 
historic religion convicts man of a 
basic flaw far more serious than 
those conceived of by earlier 
religions. The identity diffusion 
characteristic of both primitive and 
archaic religions is radically 
challenged by the historic religious 
symbolization, which leads for the 
first time to a clearly structured 
conception of the self. 
Historic religion is 
associated with the 
emergence of 
differentiated religious 
collectivities as the chief 
characteristic of its 
religious organization. 
The profound dualism 
with respect to the 
conception of reality is 
also expressed in the 
social realm. The single 
religio-political hierarchy 
of archaic society tends to 
split into two at least 
partially independent 
hierarchies, one political 
and one religious. 
Together with the notion 
of a transcendent realm 
beyond the natural 
cosmos comes a new 
religious elite that claims 
direct relation to the 
transmundane world. 
The social implications of 
the historic religions are 
implicit in the remarks on 
religious organization. The 
differentiation of a 
religious elite brought a 
new level of tension and a 
new possibility of conflict 
and change onto the social 
scene. Religion, then, 
provided the ideology and 
social cohesion for many 
rebellions and reform 
movements in the historic 
civilizations, and 
consequently played a 
more dynamic and 
especially a more 
purposive role in social 
change than had previously 
been possible. 
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Table C.2 Integrative levels of religion (Robert N. Bellah). 
Level Religious symbol system Religious action Religious organization Social implications 
4. Early 
modern 
In all previous stages the ideal type was based on a variety of 
actual cases. Now for the first time it derives from a single case 
or at best a congeries of related cases, namely, the Protestant 
Reformation. The defining characteristic of early modern religion 
is the collapse of the hierarchical structuring of both this and the 
other world. Either conformity to religious law, or participation 
in a sacramental system or performance of mystical exercises 
was necessary for salvation. Early modern religious symbolism 
concentrates on the direct relation between the individual and 
transcendent reality. A great deal of the cosmological baggage of 
medieval Christianity is dropped as superstition. The 
fundamentally ritualist interpretation of the sacrament of the 
Eucharist as a re-enactment of the paradigmatic sacrifice is 
replaced with the anti-ritualist interpretation of the Eucharist as 
a commemoration of a once-and-for-all historical event. 
 
Examples: Protestant Reformation, certain tendencies in Islam, 
Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism 
Religious action was now conceived 
to be identical with the whole of life. 
Special ascetic and devotional 
practices were dropped as well as the 
monastic roles that specialized in 
them and instead the service of God 
became a total demand in every walk 
of life. The stress was on faith, an 
internal quality of the person, rather 
than on particular acts clearly marked 
"religious." 
I have already noted that 
early modern religion 
abandoned hierarchy as 
an essential dimension of 
its religious symbol 
system. It did the same in 
its religious organization. 
Not only did it reject 
papal authority, but it 
also rejected the old form 
of the religious distinction 
between two levels of 
relative religious 
perfection. The roles of 
church member and 
citizen were but two 
among several. Both 
church and state had 
their delimited spheres of 
authority, but with the 
full institutionalization of 
the common law neither 
had a right to dominate 
each other or the whole 
of society. 
Whereas in most of the 
historic civilizations religion 
stands as virtually the only 
stable challenger to the 
dominance of the political 
elite, in the emerging early 
modern society religious 
impulses give rise to a 
variety of institutional 
structures, from the 
beginning or very soon 
becoming fully secular, 
which stand beside and to 
some extent compete with 
and limit the state. The 
direct religious response to 
political and moral 
problems does not 
disappear but the impact 
of religious orientations on 
society is also mediated by 
a variety of worldly 
institutions in which 
religious values have been 
expressed. 
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Table C.2 Integrative levels of religion (Robert N. Bellah). 
Level Religious symbol system Religious action Religious organization Social implications 
5. Modern It is difficult to speak of a modern religious symbol system. It is 
indeed an open question whether there can be a religious 
symbol system analogous to any of the preceding ones in the 
modern situation, which is characterized by a deepening analysis 
of the very nature of symbolization itself. At the highest 
intellectual level I would trace the fundamental break with 
traditional historic symbolization to the work of Kant. By 
revealing the problematic nature of the traditional metaphysical 
basis of all the religions and by indicating that it is not so much a 
question of two worlds as it is of as many worlds as there are 
modes of apprehending them, he placed the whole religious 
problem in a new light. The entire modern analysis of religion, 
including much of the most important recent theology, though 
rejecting Kant's narrowly rational ethics, has been forced to 
ground religion in the structure of the human situation itself. In 
this respect the present paper is a symptom of the modern 
religious situation as well as an analysis of it. 
 
Examples: Liberal theology, Paul Tillich’s “ecstatic naturalism,” 
Rudolf Bultmann’s “demythologization”, Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s 
“religionless Christianity,” Uchimura Kanzo’s “non-church 
Christianity,” similar developments in Jodo Shinshu and 
Mahayana Buddhism. 
Religious action in the modern period 
is, I think, clearly a continuation of 
tendencies already evident in the 
early modern stage. Now less than 
ever can man's search for meaning be 
confined to the church. But with the 
collapse of a clearly defined doctrinal 
orthodoxy and a religiously 
supported objective system of moral 
standards, religious action in the 
world becomes more demanding 
than ever. The search for adequate 
standards of action, which is at the 
same time a search for personal 
maturity and social relevance, is in 
itself the heart of the modern quest 
for salvation, if I may divest that word 
of its dualistic associations. 
In the modern situation 
as I have defined it, one 
might almost be tempted 
to see in Thomas Paine's 
"My mind is my church," 
or Thomas Jefferson's "I 
am a sect myself" the 
typical expression of 
religious organization in 
the near future. 
Nonetheless it seems 
unlikely that collective 
symbolization of the great 
inescapabilities of life will 
soon disappear. The 
tendency in more recent 
periods has been to 
continue the basic 
pattern but with a much 
more open and flexible 
pattern of membership. 
Here I can only suggest 
what I take to be the main 
social implication of the 
modern religious situation. 
Early modern society, to a 
considerable degree under 
religious pressure, 
developed, as we have 
seen, the notion of a self-
revising social system in 
the form of a democratic 
society. It is the chief 
characteristic of the more 
recent modern phase that 
culture and personality 
themselves have come to 
be viewed as endlessly 
revisable. 
Source: Excerpted from Bellah (1964, 361–73). 
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Table C.3 Integrative levels of numerical concepts and arithmetic thought (Peter Damerow). 
Level Arithmetic Characteristics Period Date 
1. Pre-arithmetical 
quantification 
No arithmetic activities. All judgments about quantities are based on 
direct comparisons of amounts and sizes. Communication and 
transmission only by transmittable techniques of comparison and by 
comparative expression of language. 
Approximately until the end 
of the Mesolithic period 
Up to 10,000 BCE 
2. Protoarithmetic Quantities are precisely identified by one-to-one correspondences. 
Communication und transmission with the aid of conventionalized 
counting sequences and tallying systems. 
Neolithic period and Early 
Bronze Age 
10,000 – 3,000 BCE 
 
3. Symbol-based arithmetic 
with context-dependent 
symbol systems 
Quantities are structured by metrological systems. Communication and 
transmission of these systems and of the corresponding mental constructs 
through complex symbols and developed techniques for the 
transformation of symbol configurations. 
Period of early city cultures 
(until the invention of the 
sexagesimal place value 
system in the ancient Near 
East) 
3,000 – 2,000 BCE 
4. Symbol-based arithmetic 
with context-independent 
symbol systems 
Quantities are structured by abstract numerical systems with object-
independent arithmetical operations. Communication and transmission of 
these systems by unified, context-independent, but culture-specific 
symbol systems for the representation of arbitrary quantities, including 
abstract “rules of calculation.” Emergence of first forms of “preclassical 
mathematics” that are abstract but dependent on culture-specific symbol 
systems. 
Period of developed city 
cultures (in the ancient Near 
East) 
2,000 – 500 BCE 
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Table C.3 Integrative levels of numerical concepts and arithmetic thought (Peter Damerow). 
Level Arithmetic Characteristics Period Date 
5. Concept-based arithmetic 
with deduction in natural 
language 
Abstract number concept with “a priori” provable properties. 
Communication and transmission with the aid of a written representation 
of “propositions” about abstract numbers and their mathematical 
properties. Propositions are logically ordered and systematically arranged 
by deductive theories according to the model of Euclid’s Elements. 
Classical antiquity, late 
antiquity, Middle Ages, and 
early modern era (until the 
emergence of analytical 
mathematics) 
500 BCE – late 19th century CE 
6. Concept-based arithmetic 
with formal deductions 
Formal understanding of arithmetical structures and expansion of the 
number concept by construction of new arithmetical structures. 
Communication and transmission with the aid of formal language systems. 
The modern mathematical 
tradition 
Since late 19th century CE 
Source: Based on Damerow (1999, 52). 
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Table C.4 Integrative levels of worldviews (Annick De Witt and Nicholas Hedlund). 
Level Ontology Epistemology Axiology Anthropology Societal vision 
1. Traditional Religious/metaphysical monism. 
Reality as singular, transcendent. 
Universe as purposively constructed 
whole. God-created universe ex 
nihilo. Transcendent God/Creator is 
separate from profane world; 
dualism. Nature as embodiment of 
meaningful, imposed order (e.g., 
God’s creation). 
Naïve realism; emphasis on 
concrete-literal 




authority (scripture, divine 
revelation, tradition). Implicit 
methodology. Substantive 
rationality. 
Traditional values (e.g., 
security, tradition, 
conformity, obedience, 




Humanity in managerial 
stewardship role vis-à-vis 
nature. Prime purposes 
determined by larger order 
and social roles. Human being 
as sinful/fallen from grace. 
Dependent on 
religious/metaphysical 
authorities for salvation. 
Ethnocentric identity? 
Traditional societies, 
emphasis on (subsistence) 
farming. Traditional and 
religious authorities and 
values as source of 
solutions to societal and 
environmental problems. 
2. Modern Secular materialism. Reality as 
singular, immanent. Mechanistic 
universe brought about by random 
selection. Material reality devoid of 
meaning, intentionality, 
consciousness; dualism, 
disenchantment. Nature as 
instrumental, devoid of intrinsic 
meaning and purpose. Resource for 
exploitation. 
(Post-)positivism; emphasis 
on reality as objectively 
knowable (empiricism, 
reductionism, scientism). 
Secular authority (science, 












Humanity in promethean 
control over nature. Prime 
purposes of a material, 
hedonistic nature. Human 
being as self-optimizing, 




emphasis on mechanized 
modes of production (e.g. 
industrial/conventional 
agriculture). Technological 
optimism: science and 
technology as solutions to 
societal and environmental 
problems. 
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Table C.4 Integrative levels of worldviews (Annick De Witt and Nicholas Hedlund). 
Level Ontology Epistemology Axiology Anthropology Societal vision 
3. Postmodern Postmaterialism. Reality as pluralistic, 
perspectival, constructed. Multiple 
cosmogonies/cosmogony as social 
construct. Reality as discontinuous 
and fragmented, meaning as social 
construct; antiessentialism. Nature as 
constructed through a plurality of 
cultural values, meanings, and 
interests. 
Social constructivism; 
emphasis on reality as 
constructed (pluralism, 
relativism). Internalization of 
authority (e.g., moral, 






materialist values (e.g., 
openness to change, 
self-direction). 




Humanity in cautious 
relationship to nature. Prime 
purposes are found within, 





emphasis on service 
economy and creative 
industries. Scepticism of 
status quo, idealism: 
mobilization of the public 
through revealing injustices 
as prime solution to 
societal and environmental 
problems. 
4. Integrative Holism/integralism (unity in 
diversity). Reality as transcendent 
and immanent. Universe as evolving, 
creative manifestation of 
source/spirit. Outer and inner reality 
co-arising, interdependent; 
reenchantment. Nature as 
intrinsically valuable. Frequently seen 
as divine force that humanity is part 
and expression of. 
Critical realism, pragmatism; 
emphasis on reality as 
approachable through 
integration of sources of 
knowledge. Triangulation of 
authority (scientific, spiritual/ 
religious/philosophical, and 












Humanity in unity and 
synergy with nature. Prime 
purposes found within, 
serving the larger whole 
(“service through self-
actualization”). Human being 
as evolutionary cocreator, 
with a vast—though generally 
unrealized—potential. 
Planetcentric identity? 






emancipation of the public 
through consciousness 
growth and a synthesis of 
interests and perspectives 
as solutions to societal and 
environmental problems. 
Source: Based on De Witt and Hedlund (2017, 318–19: Table 12.2). 
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Table C.5 Integrative levels of cognition and culture (Merlin Donald). 
Level Representatives Characteristics 
1. Episodic Primates Episodic event perception (self-awareness and event sensitivity) 
Episodic awareness is defined primarily by elaborate event representation. For an episodically competent mind, experience is not normally 
remembered as a confusion of objects, actions, colors, or raw sensations but as a series of events. These events are the givens, the raw data, of 
its memory, which consists of experience that has been segmented into and remembered as a sequence of discrete episodes. All mammals do 
this to some extent. A typical mammalian episode might be eating food in a certain place, or marking a territorial boundary, or battling a rival, or 
being chased by a farmer. Each episode is composed of hundreds of simpler bound percepts, which are batched together into coherent chunks. 
This batching process can be regarded as a kind of metabinding. This memory for specific, coherent, detailed events is the essence of episodic 
cognition.  
2. Mimetic Early hominids Action metaphor (skill, gesture, mime, and imitation) 
The first transition started a little more than two million years ago, when the species Homo first appeared on Earth. The achievements of early 
hominids revolved around a new kind of cognitive capacity, mimetic skill, which was an extension of conscious control into the domain of action. 
It enabled playacting, body language, precise imitation, and gesture. It also acted as a mode of cultural expression and solidified a group 
mentality, creating a cultural style that we can still recognize as typically human. Mimesis enabled early hominids to refine many skills, including 
cutting, throwing, manufacturing tools and making intentional vocal sounds. Although not yet language, these sounds were nevertheless 
expressive. We call such vocal modulations prosody. They include deliberately raising and lowering the voice, and producing imitations of 
emotional sounds. 
(continued) 
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Table C.5 Integrative levels of cognition and culture (Merlin Donald). 
Level Representatives Characteristics 
3. Mythic Sapient humans Language, symbolic representation (oral traditions, mimetic ritual, narrative thought) 
The second transition started with the arrival of archaic Homo sapiens, about half a million years ago. It culminated in the evolution of our 
particular subspecies, Homo sapiens sapiens, about 125,000 years ago. During this time the brain and vocal tract underwent a great change. 
Sapient humans started with the rather primitive material culture they inherited from their predecessor but then began to innovate at a much 
higher rate. They invented a wider range of sophisticated tools and produced beautifully crafted objects, improved shelters and hearths, and 
elaborate graves. Within another 10,000 years, they had started to use several forms of self-adornment and were manufacturing a very large 
variety of multipart objects, including weapons, hafted tools, boats, complex dwellings, ritual quasi-symbolic artifacts, and simple musical 
instruments. They had also migrated over much of the world, using various technologies to adapt to a variety of climates and ecologies. They 
came to dominate the Earth, and spoken language was undoubtedly the special power that favored them over their rivals and predecessors. 
Spoken language produced oral culture, which was the universal form of human culture until very recently. 
4. Theoretic Modern culture External symbolic universe (formalism, large-scale theoretic artifacts, massive external storage) 
The third transition started about forty thousand years ago, and revolved around a revolution in the technology of symbols. Cognition continued 
to evolve, but this time it was mostly driven by technology and culture itself. The main cognitive driving force underlying this transition was the 
externalization of memory. Whereas earlier humans had to depend entirely on their biology—that is, on their brains—to remember, modern 
humans can employ a huge number of powerful external symbolic devices to store and retrieve cultural knowledge. This revolutionized the way 
humans think and the kinds of distributed cognitive systems we could construct. Thus modern culture contains within it a trace of each of our 
previous stages of cognitive evolution. It still rests on the same old primate brain capacity for episodic or event knowledge. But it has three 
additional, uniquely human layers: a mimetic layer, an oral-linguistic layer, and an external-symbolic layer. The minds of individuals reflect these 
three ways of representing reality. 
Source: Excerpted from Donald (2001, 201, 260–62). 
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Table C.6 Integrative levels of understanding (Kieran Egan). 
Level Characteristics Representatives 
1. Somatic Pre-language-using human experience. Embodied kind of understanding. Distinctive human “take” on the world beyond 
mere animal perception. Understanding of social structure through mimetic acts like plays and rituals. Correspondence 
to Merlin Donald’s level of mimetic culture. 
Prelinguist human beings 
2. Mythic Development of spoken and grammatical language. Use of binary structuring and metaphor. Deployment of rhythm and 
rhyme. Narratives as access to knowledge of all kinds. Imaginative incorporation of the world rather than simply 
learning of facts. Images and fantasies closely tied to affects and emotions. Story-shaping of experiences and events. 
Oral cultures, Homer 
3. Romantic Development of written language and literacy. Second symbol system of written numbers and the alphabet referring to 
first symbol system of oral words. Extended discursive writing and discrete kind of literate thinking. Development of 
systematic investigation, early rational form of inquiry, and reflexivity. Narratives organized into large and coherent 
accounts. Simple binary structures complexified. Exploration of reality by trying to grasp its limits and extremes. 
Rational drive to represent the world accurately but still in a nonscientific and untheoretic way. 
Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, 
Herodotus, Hecataeus, the “Greek 
miracle,” European romanticism 
4. Philosophic Sophisticated language and literacy. Systematic, abstract, and generalized thinking with universal ambition. Rational 
reassessment of traditional authorities. Theoretical discourse. Appeal to empirical principles and general laws. 
Openness to “possibility.” Correspondence to Jean Piaget’s level of formal operations. 
Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, 
Hippocrates, Descartes, Bacon, 
European renaissance, Western 
enlightenment and nineteenth-century 
positivism 
5. Ironic High degree of reflexiveness on language and consciousness. Epistemic skepticism. Ironic stance about self-refuting claims 
such as “All knowledge is socially constructed.” Acknowledgment of multiple perspectives. Criticism on metanarratives. 
Socrates, Jakob Burkhardt, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Richard Rorty, Western 
postmodernism 
Source: Excerpted from Egan (1997, 33–171). 
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Table C.7 Integrative levels of cultural consciousness (James W. Fowler). 
Level Period Characteristics 
1. Orthodox  
(synthetic-conventional) 
 
Pre-Enlightenment The orthodox temper exhibits many of the structural features of the Synthetic-Conventional stage of faith. It preserves many 
dimensions of consciousness that resemble pre-Enlightenment modes of thinking and experiencing. In terms of faith 
consciousness the orthodox temper adheres to an implicit, tacitly held ideology. To be sure, there are explicit formulas and 
slogans that express deep going value options. Orthodox adherents, however, likely do not have a critically reflective, conceptual 
grasp on the worldview they espouse taken as a whole. Emotion-laden images and symbols provide cue for reactions and 
judgments that have the power of instincts or the voice of conscience within. Authority for the formulation and defense of this 
largely tacit value system is left, for the orthodox, to the recognized leaders of religious or political groups, interpreters of sacred 
scriptures or traditions, or political leaders certified as being congruent with the canons of their orthodox group or tradition. 
Authority, therefore, is located external to the person, and is located in sacred texts, in the group, in the tradition, or in the 
group’s authorized representatives. Reliance upon such authorities tends to be justified in personal terms: trust is grounded in 
personal qualities of authoritative persons. Relations with persons of other religious traditions, ethnic groups, or races tend to be 
personalized. Persons of the orthodox temper are likely to say: “Some of my best friends are …” (naming the particular out-group 
to which they are referring). The unexamined assumption seems to be that “because I enjoy personal and friendly relations with 
one or a few representatives of that group, I understand, accept, and could get along with all such persons.” Such a position 
makes examining the questions of whether one holds personal or group prejudices unnecessary. It allows one to ignore issues of 
deep going differences regarding symbols, beliefs, worldview, and institutional culture between religious traditions. It also allows 
the generalization of negative stereotypes for entire groups, based upon difficult relationships with one or a few representatives 
of those groups. Because orthodox adherents base their emotive loyalties on unquestioned external sources of authority, they 
allow themselves to live and act out of a largely unexamined sense of the superiority of their religious tradition over those of 
others.  
(continued) 
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Table C.7 Integrative levels of cultural consciousness (James W. Fowler). 
Level Period Characteristics 
2. Progressive  
(individual-reflexive) 
 
Enlightenment The progressive temper honors and preserves many of the procedural ideals introduced into Western societies through the 
impact of the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. They keep alive the Enlightenment’s suspicion of received traditions and 
its spirit of knowing by analytically breaking down the subject matter to be known into its constituent parts. Correlatively, the 
persons and groups best described as progressive exhibit many of the structural features of the Individuative-Reflexive stage of 
faith. They tend to place authority for making choices on matters of personal and political concern upon the experience, reflective 
judgment, and personal conscience of presumably rational individuals. Prizing the powers of objectivity made possible by the 
disciplined use of reason, they tend to give a kind of sovereign privilege to the critical and reflective deliberations of the 
individual. In terms of faith consciousness, progressive employ critical and reflective procedures for analyzing and making explicit 
the contents of ideological perspective of particular theological positions. In faith consciousness, progressives tend to be resistant 
to appeals to authority based upon unexamined traditional doctrine or to claims dependent primarily upon ecclesial authority for 
their validity. Progressives locate authority within the self. In their approaches to religion, progressives favor approaches to 
scripture and tradition that employ strategies such as demythologization. In such approaches, myths, parables, symbols, and 
allegories in scriptures or tradition are analyzed from the standpoint of the assumptions, experiences, and knowledge of educated 
moderns for the meanings they conserve and express. These meanings may be restated in conceptual formulations, thus yielding 
their existential wisdom in terms that are acceptable to modern consciousness, while stripping off the “husks” of premodern 
worldviews and prescientific superstitions. Progressives demand explicit formulations of truth claims and their justification. 
(continued) 
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Table C.7 Integrative levels of cultural consciousness (James W. Fowler). 






Postmodern consciousness, explicitly and implicitly, is a consciousness populated with systems and system awareness. I am 
suggesting that structurally postmodern consciousness parallels the Conjunctive pattern of faith consciousness. The term 
conjunctive derives from Carl Jung’s appropriation of Nicholas of Cusa’s concept of the coincidentia oppositorum, the conjunction, 
the holding together in one frame, of opposites. In the case of postmodern consciousness there is the juxtaposition—the holding 
in one complex range of models—of multiple systems. My claim is that the construction of these postmodern multiple systemic 
forms of consciousness represents a practical necessity for reflective persons in our era and is happing, willy-nilly, whether we 
have adequate theories or awareness to account for these constructs or not. In postmodern faith consciousness there is a 
recognition that there are no “naked” facts, truths, or events. All knowing involves interpretation; interpretations contrast and 
overlap due to the differing perspectives of those who construct meanings from different vantage points in a system or systems. 
Multiple perspectives must be taken into account and coordinated—including paradoxical or opposing perspectives—if anything 
deserving the complex name “truth” is to be modeled and understood. Recognizing that myths and symbols from classic 
traditions often “hold” and bring into view this sort of truthful richness, postmodern consciousness in faith manifests a second or 
willed naivité (Ricoeur). Persons and groups in the postmodern pattern may well hold allegiances to particular religious traditions. 
They recognize that we have no alternative to embracing interpretations and traditions of interpretation and that the complexity 
of our situations and demands for knowing commend stances of epistemological humility toward the richness of classic traditions 
that have perennially been accorded revealed status. From this practical postmodern standpoint it makes sense to eschew 
relativism, while acknowledging relativity, and with it the necessity of commitment in the midst of an embraced pluralism of such 
perspectives. 
Source: Excerpted from Fowler (1996, 165–66, 168–69, 174–75). 
  
Appendix C  Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in Collective Development 513 
Table C.8 Integrative levels of spatial representation in pictorial arts (Suzi Gablik). 
Level Cognitive development Spatial characteristics Megaperiods of art history 
1. Enactive mode Preoperational 
The stage at which representations are characterized by 
static imagery and space is subjectively organized. Psychical 
and physical ideas are not yet dissociated. 
Topological relations 
Distance between objects is based on their proximity to 
one another on a two-dimensional plane which only 
takes height and breadth into account. Absence of depth, 
no unified global space which conserves size and 
distance. 
Ancient and medieval 
including Graeco-Byzantine, 
ancient Oriental, Egyptian, archaic 
Greek and early medieval. 
2. Iconic mode Concrete-operational 
The stage at which representation can arrange all spatial 
figures in coordinate systems. Representation is still 
attached to its perceptual content, however. The emergence 
of perspective as a formal logic, applicable to any content 
whatsoever, but still confined to empirical reality and to the 
concrete features of the perceptual world. 
Projective and Euclidean relations 
based on the static viewpoint of a single observer. 
Separation of observer and world. 
The Renaissance 
 
3. Symbolic mode Formal-operational 
The stage at which hypothetical-deductive, logico-
mathematical and propositional systems emerge, 
constructed and manipulated as independent relational 
entities without reference to empirical reality. 
Indeterminate, atmospheric space 
(late Monet, cubism, Rothko). Space as an all-over 
extension in which all points are equal status and are 
relative to each other. No dominance of volume over void 
(Pollock). 
The modern period 
including late impressionism, 
cubism, formalism, serial art, art 
governed by logical systems and 
by propositional thinking. 
Source: Gablik (1979, 43). 
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Table C.9 Integrative levels of education (Jennifer M. Gidley). 
Level Characteristics Historical appearance Examples 
1. Preformal Symbolic, image-based forms of 
expression; myths and stories 
A pre-formal phase must be taken from the beginnings of early human culture. During 
this period, children were enculturated by their extended families, tribes and 
communities. This has been the case for the vast majority of the world’s population until 
around two hundred years ago. 
Community and family 
enculturation 
2. Formal Formal reasoning; modernist worldview A formal phase of school education. Within this sketch of formal education are two sub-
streams: elite schooling from at least 2,000 years ago and mass public schooling which 
began only two hundred years ago in Europe as a holistic initiative, but since the 
Industrial Revolution saw schools being modelled on factories. 
Mass schooling  
(schools and universities) 
3. Postformal Multiple epistemologies; multiple 
perspectives 
A postformal phase beginning in the 20th century. In parallel with the global spread of 
formal education, the third macro-phase—postformal—is emerging in which postformal 




Source: Excerpted from Gidley (2016, 73–95). 
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Table C.10 Integrative levels of worldview (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Characteristics Type of explanation and justification 
1. Magical-animistic Apparently the magical-animistic representational world of paleolithic societies was very particularistic 
and not very coherent. 
 
2. Mythological-naive Sociomorphic (preoperational) 
The ordering representations of mythology first made possible the construction of a complex of analogies 
in which all natural and social phenomena were interwoven and could be transformed into one another. 
This does not mean that the members of the group have formed a distinct consciousness of the 
normative reality of a society standing apart from objectivated nature—these two regions have not yet 
been clearly separated. 
Narrative 
Mythology permits narrative explanations  
with the help of exemplary stories. 
3. Mythological-developed Sociocentric-objectivistic (concrete-operational) 
Only with the transition to societies organized around a state do mythological world views also take on 
the legitimation of structures of domination (which already presuppose the conventional stage of 
moralized law). Thus the naive attitude to myth must have changed that time. Within a more strongly 
differentiated temporal horizon, myth is distantiated to a tradition that stands out from the normative 
reality of society and from a partially objectivated nature. With persisting sociomorphic traits, these 
developed myths establish a unity in the manifold of appearances. 
 
Developed myths establish a unity in the 
manifold of appearances. 
(continued) 
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Table C.10 Integrative levels of worldview (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Characteristics Type of explanation and justification 
4. Rationalized 
 
Universalistic (early formal-operational) 
The further transition from archaic to developed civilizations is marked by a break with mythological 
thought. There arise cosmological world views, philosophies, and the higher religions, which replace the 
narrative explanations of mythological accounts with argumentative foundations. The traditions going 
back to the great founders are explicitly teachable knowledge that can be dogmatized, that is, 
professionally rationalized. Of course, the universalistic structures of world views have to be made 
compatible with the traditionalistic attitude toward the political order that predominates in the ancient 
empires. This is possible above all because the highest principles, to which all argumentation recurs, are 
themselves removed from argumentation and immunized against objection. In the ontological tradition of 
thought, this finality is guaranteed through the concept of the absolute (or of complete self-sufficiency). 
Deductive 
Cosmological world views, philosophies, 
and higher religions already permit 
deductive explanations from first 
principles (the originary actions of myth 
having been transformed into 
“beginnings” of argumentation, beyond 
which one cannot go). 
5. Reflexive (late formal-operational) 
In the course of the establishment of universalistic forms of intercourse in the capitalist economy and in 
the modern state the attitude towards the Judaeo-Christian and Greek-ontological heritage was refracted 
in a subjectivistic direction (the Reformation and modern philosophy). The highest principles lost their 
unquestionable character; religious faith and the theoretical attitude became reflexive. The advance of 
the modern sciences and the development of moral-practical will-formation were no longer prejudiced by 
an order that—although grounded—was posited absolutely. For the first time, the universalistic potential 
already contained in the rationalized world views could be set free. The unity of the world could no longer 
be secured objectively, through hypostasizing unifying principles (God, Being, or Nature); henceforth it 
could be asserted only reflectively, through the unity of reason (or through a rational organization of the 
world, the actualization of reason). The unity of theoretical and practical reason then became the key 
problem for modern world interpretations, which lost their character as world views. 
Nomological 
Modern science, finally, permits 
nomological explanations and practical 
justifications, with the help of revisable 
theories and constructions that are 
monitored against experience. 
Source: Excerpted from Habermas (1979, 103–5). 
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Table C.11 Integrative levels of collective identity (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Representatives Characteristics 
1. Tribal societies Common ancestors (kinship) 
In neolithic societies collective identity was secured through the fact that individuals traced their descent to the figure of a common ancestor and thus, 
in the framework of their mythological world-view, assured themselves of a common cosmogonic origin. On the other hand, the personal identity of 
the individual developed through identification with a tribal group, which was in turn perceived as part of a nature interpreted in interaction 
categories. As social reality was not yet clearly distinguished from natural identity, the boundaries of the social world merged into those of the world in 
general. Without clearly defined boundaries of the social system there was no natural or social environment in the strict sense; contracts with alien 
tribes were interpreted in accord with the familiar kinship connections. On the other hand, encounters with civilizations that (unlike alien tribes) could 
no longer be assimilated to their own world represented a danger for the collective identity of societies organized along kinship lines (independently of 
the real danger of colonial conquest). 
2. State societies Common territorial organization (empire, state) 
The transition to societies organized through a state required the relativization of tribal identities and the construction of a more abstract identity that 
no longer based the membership of individuals on common descent but on belonging in common to a territorial organization. This took place first 
through identification with the figure of a ruler who could claim a close connection and privileged access to the mythological world views the 
integration of different tribal traditions was accomplished through a large-scale, syncretistic expansion of the world of the gods—a solution that 
proved to be rather unstable. For this reason, imperially developed civilizations had to secure their collective identity in a way that presupposed a 
break with mythological thought. The universalistic world interpretation of the great founders of religions and of the great philosophers grounded a 
commonality of conviction mediated through a teaching tradition and permitting only abstract objects of identification. Collective identity could now 
be secured only by way of doctrines with a universal claim. In highly stratified civilizations, the integrating power of the identity of the empire had to 
confirm itself precisely in unifying the evolutionarily nonsynchronous structures of consciousness of the country, the aristocracy, city tradesmen, 
priests, and officials, and in binding them to the same political order. A broad spectrum of belief attitudes toward the same tradition was permitted; 
what was for one something like a myth that could still be connected with magical practices was for others a tradition of faith, however supported by 
ritual. The dogmatic organization of doctrinal knowledge often displaced even the weight of tradition with the weight of arguments and replaced an 
attitude of faith based on the authority of a doctrine with a theoretical attitude. But this universalistic potential could not be released on a large scale 
if the particularity of domination and of the citizen’s status, which was merely concealed by the empire’s claim to universality, was to remain 
imperceptible and not lead to significant discrepancies. 
(continued) 
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Table C.11 Integrative levels of collective identity (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Representatives Characteristics 
3. Modern societies World citizens (legality, morality, sovereignty) 
Such discrepancies turned up again and again in the ancient empires; but only with the transition to the modern world did they become unavoidable. 
The capitalist principle of organization meant the differentiation of a depoliticized and market-regulated economic system. This domain of 
decentralized individual decisions was organized on universalistic principles in the framework of bourgois civil law. It was thereby supposed that the 
private, autonomous, legal subjects pursued their interests in this morally neutralized domain of intercourse in a purposive-rational manner, in accord 
with general maxims. From this conversion of the productive sphere to universalistic orientations there proceeded a strong structural compulsion for 
the development of personality structures that replaced conventional role identity with ego identity. In fact, emancipated members of bourgois 
society, whose conventional identity had been shattered, could know themselves as one with their fellow citizens in their character as (a) free and 
equal subjects of civil law (the citizen as private commodity owner), (b) morally free subjects (the citizen as private person), and (c) politically free 
subjects (the citizen as democratic citizen of the state). 
Source: Excerpted from Habermas (1979, 111–14). 
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Table C.12 Integrative levels of moral and legal representations (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Moral consciousness Basic socio-cognitive concepts Ethics Law 
1. Preconventional Particular expectations of behavior Magical ethics Revealed law 
2. Conventional Norm Ethics of the law Traditional law 
3. Postconventional Principle Ethics of conviction and responsibility Formal law 
Source: Based on Habermas (1987, 175: Figure 26) 
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Table C.13 Integrative levels of understanding of validity spheres (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Differentiation of validity spheres Sacred domains of action Profane domains of actions 
Cultic practice Worldviews that steer practice Communication Purposive activity 










2. Differentiation between relations 
of validity and effectiveness: 





paths to salvation and 
knowledge) 
Civilizations 




bound to particular contexts 
and with a holistic 
orientation to validity 
Archaic societies 
Purposive activity as a task-oriented 
element of roles  
(utilization of technical innovations) 
3. Differentiation of specific validity 
claims at the level of action: 
objectivating vs. norm-
conformative vs. expressive 
attitudes 
Early modern societies 
Contemplative 
presentation of auratic 
art  
(institutionalization of 
the enjoyment of art) 
Early modern societies 
Religious ethics of conviction, 




communicative action with 
an argumentative handling 
of truth claims 
Civilizations 
Purposive activity organized through 
legitimate power  
(utilization of specialized practical- 
professional knowledge 
4. Differentiation of specific validity 
claims at the level of discourse: 
communicative action vs. 
discourse 
  Early modern societies 
Normatively unbound 
communicative action with 
institutionalized criticism 
Early modern societies 
Purposive activity as ethically neutral 
purposive-rational action (utilization of 
scientific technologies and strategies) 
Source: Based on Habermas (1987, 192: Figure 28). 
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Table C.14 Integrative levels of organization (Frederic Laloux). 
Level* Characteristics Key breakthroughs Guiding 
metaphor 
Current example 
1. Red Constant exercise of power by chief to keep troops in line. Fear is the glue of the 
organization. Highly reactive, short-term focus. Thrives in chaotic environments. 
Division of labor 
Command authority 
Wolf pack Mafia 
Street gangs 
Tribal militias 
2. Amber  Highly formal roles within a hierarchical pyramid. Top-down command and control (what 





Army Catholic church 
Military 
Public school systems 
3. Orange  Goal is to beat competition; achieve profit and growth. Innovation is the key to staying 




Machine Multinational companies 
Charter schools 
4. Green  Within the classic pyramid structure, focus on culture and empowerment to achieve 




Family Culture-driven organizations 
(e.g., Southwest Airlines, 
Ben & Jerry’s) 
5. Teal  Organization seen as a living entity with its own evolutionary purpose. Strategy emerges 




Living systems (e.g., AES, BSO/Origin, 
Buurtzorg, ESZB, FAVI, 
Heiligenfeld, Holacracy) 
Source: Based on Laloux (2014, 36, 56–58, 223). 
 
* Color code adopted from Wilber (2006), M.K.  
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1. Sensorimotor Early + + + + + + + 
Late + + + + + + 
2. Preoperations Early + + + + + 
Late + + + + 
3. Concrete operations Early + + + 
Late + + 
4. Formal operations + 
Source: Based on Parker and McKinney (1999, 270: Table 9-1). 
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Table C.16 Integrative levels of cognition and culture modified after Merlin Donald (Sue T. Parker and Michael L. McKinney). 
Donald Revision of Donald’s level model Representative 
1. Episodic culture 1. Episodic culture Monkeys 
2. Rudimentary symbolic capacities Great apes 
2. Mimetic culture 3. Mimetic culture Homo erectus 
3. Mythic culture 4. Mythic culture Homo sapiens 
4. Theoretic culture 5. Theoretic culture Literate humans 
Source: Excerpted from Parker and McKinney (1999, 275–76). 
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Table C.17 Integrative levels of consciousness (Wojciech Pisula). 
Level Short description Quality/mechanism  
(added to the lower level) 
Purpose/function  
(performed for the higher level) 




I sense, but I do not 
know that I sense. 
Ability to experience sensory stimuli and 
respond to them 
Adaptive automatisms (taxes, tropisms) All animals equipped with nervous 
system and sensory organs 





Ability to experience sensory stimuli 
perception 
Basic mechanism for regulating 
organism’s behavior with respect to 
external events and objects through 
locating source of stimulus 
All vertebrates with mesencephalon 
(midbrain), which is the centre for 




I know that I can 




Ability to experience pain and emotions. 
Memorizing emotions (generation of 
acquired drives) 
Basic mechanism for regulating 
organism’s behaviour towards external 
events and objects by assigning them 
affective meaning (sign); avoidance of 
aversive events and desiring events 
arousing pleasant sensations 
All vertebrates that have evolved 
structures responsible for emotional 
responses (e.g. amygdala), starting from 
fish 
4. Self-awareness I know that I exist 
and that there is a 
boundary between 
me (my body, mind) 
and the 
environment. 
Ability to read one’s own feelings and 
thoughts; experiencing oneself, one’s body 
and mind as separate from the rest of the 
reality; establishing a representation of 
“Self” fairly stable temporally and 
situationally 
Basic aspects of regulating behavior 
towards others within a community and 
in interspecies relations 
Majority of human population, 
including children under 3 years of age; 
significant proportion of primates, 
cateceans, carnivorans, corvids and 
parrots; possibly a large number of 
animals so far not assessed in this 
respect 
(continued) 
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Table C.17 Integrative levels of consciousness (Wojciech Pisula). 
Level Short description Quality/mechanism  
(added to the lower level) 
Purpose/function  
(performed for the higher level) 
Description of subjects 
5. Meta-consciousness I  
 
I know that others 
feel, want, (dis)like, 
stick “with” or fight 
other members of 
the group. 
Ability to read emotions, what another 
individual knows (sees), others’ attitudes 
towards the subject and other interaction 
partners; ability to personally recognize 
individual interaction partners 
Relations within a small social group; 
building alliances within the group; 
coherent in-group relations, maintaining 
group identity with regard to other 
groups 
The majority of human population, 
including schoolchildren; some 
primates and cetaceans, elephants, 
some corvids and parrots 
6. Meta-consciousness II  
 
I know that others 
also know and 
judge. 
Ability to construct mental representations 
of other actors’ mental states (thoughts, 
judgments) and to assume their 
perspective (understand their intentions, 
state of knowledge, feelings) 
Widely understood social relations; an 
individual capable of perspective taking, 
successfully regulates his social 
relations, fit to enter social contracts, 
predict how others will behave in 
changeable conditions 
Those healthy adults who achieve 
fullness of mental development. It 
seems that attaining this level requires 
strong cultural training, rich vocabulary, 
fluency in verbalizing feelings and 
psychological states 
Source: Based on Pisula (2016, 58: Table A1). 
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Table C.18 Integrative levels of cognition and culture modified after Merlin Donald (Colin Renfrew). 
Donald Revision of Donald’s level model Characteristics 
1. Episodic 1. Episodic culture Primate cognition 
2. Mimetic 2. Mimetic culture Homo erectus cognition 
3. Mythic 3. Linguistic or mythic culture Homo sapiens cognition 
4. Theoretic 4. External symbolic storage Employing symbolic material culture  
(characteristic of early agrarian societies with permanent settlements, monuments and valuables) 
5. Theoretic culture Using sophisticated information retrieval systems for external symbolic storage, usually in the form of writing  
(frequently in urban societies) 
Source: Excerpted from Renfrew (1998, 4). 
  
Appendix C  Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in Collective Development 527 
Table C.19 Integrative levels of spatial thinking (Jürgen Renn). 
Level Characteristics 
1. Naturally conditioned space Naturally conditioned space in the sense of schemata of action based on the similar biological constitution of all humans and the 
fundamental similarities in their physical environments. These schemata of action are rooted in sensorimotor intelligence that allows for 
spatial inferences to be drawn in the context of practice and perception but are otherwise inaccessible to the actors. 
2. Culturally shared space Culturally shared space, which is still shaped by elementary mental models controlling the action and perception of “naturally conditioned 
space,” such as the so-called permanent object and landmark models familiar from studies in developmental psychology. The first allows for 
the handling of bodies in our vicinity, while the second underlies cognitive skills, allowing for navigation through various environments. But 
now these mental structures are endowed with cultural meaning. Thus, culturally shared large-scale space is spanned not only by landmarks, 
places, regions, and their relations, but also by the meanings attached to these entities. Aspects of the natural and cultural environments, 
culturally conditioned practices, and language serve as external representation. Knowledge about the environment is explored and 
accumulated by societies over the course of many generations. The resulting immense cultural diversity is due to the fact that different 
knowledge systems and institutions may represent responses to the challenges of very different ecologies, but it is also due to the different 
evolutionary trajectories along which this exploration takes place. 
3. Administratively controlled space Administratively controlled space as it was conceived and practiced, for instance, in the ancient civilizations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, China, or 
India. The social control of space involved mental models of practical knowledge related to building activities, urban planning, surveying, and 
field measurement. They might be externally represented by buildings, models, instruments, measuring tools, graphical representations, or 
symbol systems, for example. In ancient societies, new forms of spatial knowledge emerged from exploring these tools, as well as by 
exploring the external representations employed in administrative practices. In this way, for the first time, units of length, area, and volume 
were integrated into metric systems spanning spaces of different scales, whereas no previous relation had existed, for example, between 
spatial dimensions in the bodily realm and the spatial dimensions of a journey. However, such integrations of different domains of spatial 
knowledge may have taken different forms in different cultures. They took place, in any case, within a niche shaped by the preexistence of 
first-order representations supporting historically specific regulatory structures of spatial thinking and allowing for their extension by 
exploring the potential inherent in these representations. 
(continued) 
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Table C.19 Integrative levels of spatial thinking (Jürgen Renn). 
Level Characteristics 
4. Higher-order concepts of space Higher-order concepts of space as they are externally represented by written texts, possibly comprising diagrams, formalized language, and 
other symbol systems. Beginning in Mesopotamia and Egypt, and then more markedly in Greece and China, the division of societal labor 
generated a knowledge economy with new groups of actors and structures of social interaction such as schooling and disputation. Here, 
existing concepts of space and their representations could be further explored. Thinking about space was regulated, to begin with, by the 
first-order concepts of space emerging at the preceding stage and by their external representations. Reflecting on practices involving these 
external representations in turn gave rise to higher-order concepts of space as they are represented, for instance, in Euclid’s Elements. Owing 
to the representation of this higher-order knowledge of space by written texts, a tradition could be picked up even centuries after it had last 
been actively pursued. Different evolutionary lines may be distinguished: Mathematical higher-order knowledge, in particular, resulted from 
reflection on practical spatial knowledge and the use of instruments. Philosophical higher-order knowledge resulted from reflection on the 
linguistic representations of intuitive spatial knowledge. Further explorations of second-order concepts of space and reflections on their 
results led to a proliferation of theories of space both in philosophy and geometry. 
5. Empirically controlled spatial 
concepts and practices 
And finally, empirically controlled spatial concepts and practices as they emerged in the multiplication of spaces of experience by political 
expansion, trade, exploration, and engineering. This expansion changed (as an “externalization”) both the natural and social environments, as 
well as the world of symbolic and instrumental representations—a transformation that, in turn, triggered an “internalization” in the form of 
new regulative structures, both in the social and the cognitive realms. In early modern Europe, for instance, the accumulation of experiential 
knowledge took place in part within institutions specifically designed for the purpose of knowledge acquisition, such as academies or 
universities. Intellectually, the accumulating empirical knowledge was organized in integrative structures based on symbolic and formalistic 
languages: numerical coordinates, analytic geometry, calculus, and differential equations. These structures stabilized or brought about 
empirically controlled spatial concepts and practices that are highly counterintuitive, for instance, the knowledge that Earth has a spherical 
shape and land masses and water distributed all over it. The theoretical knowledge resulting from the expansion of experiential spaces also 
had repercussions on other layers of knowledge, as well as on regulatory structures of societal practice. An example is the impact of global, 
geographical coordinates on navigation techniques, in particular on deep-sea navigation. This last stage also comprises the emergence of new 
space and time concepts in the context of Einstein’s theories of relativity. 
Source: Based on Renn (2020, 335–37). 
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Table C.20 Integrative levels of organizational action-logics (William R. Torbert). 
Level Characteristics Correlation to personal action-logics 
1. Conception Dreams about creating a new organization 
Dreams, visions, informal conversations about creating something new to fill need not now adequately 
addressed; interplay among multiple founders; working models, prototypes, related projects, or business 
plans developed. Critical issues: timeliness and mythic proportion of vision 
Impulsive 
Multiple, distinctive impulses gradually resolve 
into characteristic approach (e.g., many fantasies 
into a particular dream for a new organization 
2. Investment Spiritual, social network, and financial investments 
Champions commit to creating organization; early relationship-building among future stakeholders; peer 
networks and parent institutions make spiritual, structural, financial commitments to nurture. Critical 
issues: authenticity and reliability of commitments; financial investment appropriately subordinated to 
structural and spiritual investments 
Opportunist 
Dominant task: gain power (e.g., bike riding skill, 
capital) to have desired effects on outside world 
 
3. Incorporation Products or services actually rendered 
Products and services produced; recognizable physical setting, tasks, and roles delineated; goals and 
operating staff chosen. Critical issues: display of persistence in the face of threat; maintaining or recreating 
consistency between original dream and actual organizational arrangements 
Diplomat 
Looking-glass self: understanding others‘ 
culture/expectations and molding own actions to 
succeed in their terms (e.g., a marketable 
product) 
4. Experiments Alternative strategies and structures tested 
Alternative administrative, production, selection, reward, financial, marketing, and political strategies 
practiced, tested in operation, and reformed in rapid succession. Critical issues: truly experimenting—taking 
disciplined stabs in the dark—rather than merely trying one or two preconceived alternatives; finding a 
viable, longer-lasting combination of strategy and structure for the following stage 
Expert 
Intellectual mastery of outside-self systems such 
that actions equal experiments that generate 
new ways of doing business 
(continued) 
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Table C.20 Integrative levels of organizational action-logics (William R. Torbert). 
Level Characteristics Correlation to personal action-logics 
5. Systematic 
productivity 
Single structure/strategy institutionalized 
Attention legitimately focused only on systematic procedures for accomplishing the predefined task; 
standards, structures, roles taken for granted as given; marketability or political viability of product or 
service, as measured in quantifiable terms, the overriding criterion of success. Critical issue: whether 
organization remembers analogical concerns about congruity from mission through outcomes during this 
emphasis on deductive, pyramidal systems 
Achiever 
Pragmatic triangulation among plan/theory, 
operation/implementation, and 
outcome/evaluation—single loop feedback acted 
on unsystematically but regularly 
6. Social network Portfolio of distinctive organizational structures 
Strategic or mission-focused alliances among portfolio of organizations, with strong value on maintaining 
distinctive traditions, craft-orientations, and relative financial autonomy. Critical issue: will organization 
regress or progress in economically adverse conditions 
Individualist 
Experimental awareness that diverse 
assumptions may complement one another both 
for inquiry and for productivity 
7. Collaborative 
inquiry 
Self-amending structure matches dream/mission 
Explicit, shared reflection about corporate mission; open interpersonal relations with disclosure, support, 
and confrontation of apparent value differences; systematic personal and corporate performance appraisal 
on multiple indexes; creative resolution of paradoxes-inquiry/productivity, freedom/control, 
quality/quantity; interactive development of unique, self-amending structures appropriate for this 
particular organization at this particular historical moment; critical issues: will organization sustain 
collaborative inquiry as it grows through hiring, merger, or strategic alliances, or will it revert to 
conventional Systematic Productivity 
Strategist 
Self-conscious mission/philosophy, sense of 
time/place, invites conversation among multiple 
voices and reframing of boundaries—double-
loop feedback occasionally acted on 
(continued) 
Appendix C  Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in Collective Development 531 
Table C.20 Integrative levels of organizational action-logics (William R. Torbert). 
Level Characteristics Correlation to personal action-logics 
8. Community of 
inquiry 
Structure fails, spirit sustains wider community 
Appreciation of continuing interplay of opposites: action/research, sex/politics, past/future, 
symbolic/diabolic, etc.; ongoing experimental and empirical research on relations among spiritual/intuitive 
visioning, theoretical/practical strategizing, timely performing, and assessing outcomes in the visible, 
external world; all fundamentalist, universal ideologies are challenged by the community’s emphasis on 
peer-like mutuality among people of diverse backgrounds and on the humble, vulnerable practice of timely 
action inquiry; political friction among different paradigms/frames/action-logics within the organization and 
between the organization and the wider environment; Collaborative Inquiry structure fails because it does 
not meet the alchemical challenge of timely transformational, emancipatory, collective action; if timely 
transformational collective action is taken, shared purpose is revealed as sustaining and as generating 
multiple choices for action (and feedback on the consequences of such choices) from all participants; new 
experiences of time; his-story becomes my-story; interplay of time-bound needs, timeless archetypes, and 
timely creative inquiry 
Alchemist 
Life/science equals a mind/matter, 
love/death/transformation praxis among others, 
cultivating interplay, re-attunement and continual 
triple-loop feedback 
Source: Excerpted from Torbert (2003, 126–29, 195). 
  
Appendix C  Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing in Collective Development 532 
Table C.21 Integrative levels of spatial cognition in stone-tool technology (Thomas Wynn). 












Chopper, scraper, knapper  
The spatial concepts necessary to manufacture the Oldowan tools are really rather simple. No Euclidean concepts are 
necessary, only topological relations. Topology is the geometry of simple spatial relations such as proximity and 
surrounding. Although some topological concepts do require operational thinking, the concepts necessary for Oldowan 
tools do not. A chopper, for example, results from striking a flake from a platform supplied by a previous flake removal. In 
topological terms, this requires a concept of pair; one element placed immediately next to one preceding element. The 
position of only one preceding element, in this case a flake removal, needs to be taken into account. This is true even if 
many flakes are eventually removed. The paired nature of chopper knapping yields an irregular edge with no intentional 
overall morphology, a characteristic of many Oldowan artefacts. The geometry of a scraper is a bit more complex. Several 
flake removals must be placed in such a way that the result is a continuous sequence. To do this it is necessary to 
consider the position of not just the preceding flake removal but also ones that have gone before. The relevant 
topological concept is that of order. Both the pair and sequential order can be achieved by a process of trial and error, 
that is, one flake is struck off, the result checked and then another struck off until an acceptable tool has been made. The 


















The Acheulean artefacts were clearly manufactured according to operational concepts. The most revealing of the 
artefacts is the handaxe, a tool whose shape requires some rather sophisticated Euclidean and projective relationships. 
Most obvious is the symmetry. Piaget has argued that symmetry is never passively perceived (true symmetry is extremely 
rare in nature) but must be actively constructed by means of the operational relation of reversibility. Put simply, bilateral 
symmetry results from the reversal of a shape across an imaginary midline. The ability to perform such a task is not 
achieved until the operational stage because it requires the simultaneous conception of the shape and its inverse. Since 
the stone cannot be folded to provide a model for trial and error flaking, the inverse must be constructed in thought, and 





(propositional)  No archaeological evidence (at least until the introduction of writing). Modern humans 
Source: Excerpted from Wynn (1985, 36–41). 
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 Mode of expression 
 








1. Primitive Simple folktale 
Various origin stories and 
other lore interpret 
reality and life for 
people, along with a 
good collection of 
commonsense 
information about the 
world. 
Animism (tribal) 
Belief in spirit beings 
of relatively human 
size and power 
Folktale-magical 
Analogies with preoperational 
thought, though it includes 
concrete operational thinking 
Preoperational 
Collects bits and pieces 
of information without 
organizing them into 
large or complex 
categories 
  
2. Archaic Literacy 
Some religious stories 
become much more 
complex, in the form of 
long mythic narratives, 
and religious beliefs are 
often more clearly 
distinct from everyday 
information. 
Polytheism (national) 
Belief in spirit beings 
of such great power 
that they require 
worship 
Literate-mythical 
Retains primitive style of 
thought, but literacy creates an 
overlay, makes people more 
adept at concrete operational 
skills of categorizing and 
comparing ideas, more apt to 
construct long, coherently 
organized narratives 
Concrete operational 
Organizes ideas into 
larger and more complex 
categories, showing an 
ability to cross-index 








practical facts of 
life; a person’s 
social context as 
authority 
(continued) 
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 Mode of expression 
 











Folktales and mythic 
narratives remain 
popular but are now in 
competition or 
cooperation with a more 
abstract and 
universalizing form of 
thought. 
Universalizing 
Belief in some single 
Ultimate Being or 
Condition or Power 
Systemic-theoretical 
Reliance on systematically logical 
explanatory theories of universal 
scope 
Early formal- operational  
Is able to devise 
hypothetical alternative 
ways of explaining the 
categories, and of testing 
those explanations for 
logical coherence with 





own ideas for their 
coherence and 
validity; ability to 
reflect on 













symbolic awareness that 
has resulted from self-
critical awareness of 
modern philosophy and 
science 
Reflexive 
Self-aware form of 
belief that treats all 
beliefs as human 
symbolic 
representations of 
whatever is taken to 
be the ultimate or 
basic Reality. 
Empirical-critical 
Symbolic or existentialist 
approaches to theology 
Late formal- operational  
Treats any systematically 
or logically derived 
conclusion with greater 












Source: Excerpted from Barnes (2000, 20–30, 48–58, 95, 224). 
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Table D.2 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Robert N. Bellah). 
Level Bellah  
Religious representation  
Donald 
Human culture 
1. Unitive Episodic 
Earliest is episodic culture, in which humans, along with all higher mammals, learn to understand and respond to the immediate situation they 
are in. 
2. Enactive Mimetic 
Then, perhaps beginning as early as 2 million years ago, came mimetic culture, the prelinguistic, but not necessarily prevocal, use of the body 




Then, some 100,000 or more years ago, with the development of language as we know it, came mythic culture, which Donald describes as “a 
unified, collectively held system of explanatory and regulatory metaphors. The mind has expanded its reach beyond the episodic perceptions 
of events, beyond the mimetic reconstruction of episodes, to a comprehensive modeling of the entire human universe.” Every aspect of life, 
he says, “is permeated by myth.” Although myth gives a comprehensive understanding of life, it does so exclusively by the use of metaphor 




Donald begins his description of theoretic culture negatively, telling us that it involved “a break with the dominance of spoken language and 
narrative styles of thought,” but a break with dominance does not mean the abandonment of earlier forms of cognitive adaptation. Humans 
are still episodic, mimetic, and mythic creatures, although, as in earlier transitions, the emergence of a new form of cultural cognition 
eventually involves reorganization of the earlier forms. The key elements of theoretic culture developed gradually; they consisted in graphic 
invention, external memory, and theory construction. 
Source: Excerpted from Bellah (2011, 118, 272–73). 
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Table D.3 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Fredda Blanchard-Fields). 
Level Blanchard-Fields Perry Labouvie-Vief Loevinger King/Kitchener Commons/Richards Armon 
1. Dualistic absolutism. 
Interpretation of events 
not differentiated from 
event itself. Subjectivity 













thought. Logic is not 
differentiated from 
interpretation and is 





of right vs. wrong. 
Conformity to social 
norms without 
question. 
Belief in absolute and true 
reality not known to 
everyone, i.e., right versus 
wrong beliefs. 
Formal operations 
Ordered relations of 
classes and relations. 
Affective mutuality 






and others, but 
not self vs. society. 
2. Perceived discrepancies 
denied or deemed 
inconsequential; 
therefore subjectivity 






 Information is divided into 
certain and uncertain 
knowledge. Uncertain 
knowledge is to be known 
at a future date. 
3. Multiple outcomes 
recognized with strong 
reliance on “objective” 
facts. Interpretive 
discrepancies 
recognized, yet resolved 
in the search for 
objective facts.  
Multiplicity is 
accepted, yet 










Sees world globally. 
The uncertainty of reality 
is acknowledged. 
Therefore truth is 
relegated to the 
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Table D.3 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Fredda Blanchard-Fields). 
Level Blanchard-Fields Perry Labouvie-Vief Loevinger King/Kitchener Commons/Richards Armon 
4. Clearly recognized 
interpretive 
discrepancies of events 
in terms of underlying 
“neutral” event 
structure. Subjectivity 







  The belief that objective 
knowledge does not exist. 
Reality is simply a 




across systems relating 
systems to systems, 






of self and society, 
yet unable to 
coordinate them. 
5. Each discrepant 
perspective seen as 
valid in its own right due 
to interpersonal and 
subjective factors. 




has no fixed 
answer; 
therefore one 











etc. Self and other 
are differentiated. 
Conscientious 
Aware of mutuality 
and communicative 
responsibilities. 
Differentiates self and 
others. 
Given that reality is a 
matter of subjective 
interpretation, rational 
justification procedures 




operations that relate 
families, systems, or 
systems of systems. 
Autonomy 
Recognizes need 
for coordination of 
self and society. 





Appendix D  Correlation of Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing  539 
Table D.3 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Fredda Blanchard-Fields). 
Level Blanchard-Fields Perry Labouvie-Vief Loevinger King/Kitchener Commons/Richards Armon 
6. Self as interpreter is 
explicitly stated. Self 




by relating both to self 
and to other. 
Commitment 
within relativism 
where a choice is 

















process from product 
and attempts to 
integrate polarities in 
life. 
Given subjective 
interpretations of reality, 
a synthesis can be 
reached that is 
epistemically justifiable. 
 Universal holism 
External social self 
system and 
internal self 
system are fully 
coordinated as 
subsystems of a 
greater system. 
Source: Based on Blanchard-Fields (1989, 76–78: Table 4.1). 
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Table D.4. Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Susanne R. Cook-Greuter). 
Cook-Greuter Loevinger Torbert Commons/Richards Beck/Cowan Wilber 
1st person perspective Impulsive Impulsive Impulsive Nominal actions Beige Magenta 
Self-protective/ opportunist Self-protective Opportunist Preoperational actions Purple Red 
2nd person perspective Rule-oriented Primary actions Red 
Conformist Conformist Diplomat Concrete operations Blue Amber 
3rd person perspective Self-aware Self-aware Expert Abstract operations 
Conscientious Conscientious Achiever Formal operations Orange Orange 
4th person perspective Pluralist/ individualist Individualistic Individualist Systematic operations Green Green 
Autonomous Autonomous Strategist Metasystematic operations Yellow Teal 
5th person perspective Construct-aware Integrated Alchemist Paradigmatic operations Turquoise Turquoise 
Ego aware Magician 
Unitive Ironist Indigo 
Source: Based on Cook-Greuter (1990, 104; 2010, 230–31). 
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1. Sensori-motor Impulsive  Pre-conventional Preformal Somatic Archaic Arachaic-uroboic 
2. Pre-operational Instrumental Mythic Magical Magic-typhonic 
3. Concrete operations Socialized Romantic Mythic Myth-membership 
4. Formal operations Self-authoring Conventional Formal Philosophic Mental Ego-rational 
5. Postformal reasoning Self-transforming Post-conventional Postformal Ironic Integral Vision-logic 
Source: Excerpted from Gidley (2016, 26, 104, 162, 214: Tables 2.1, 5.2, 7.1, 9.3). 
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Table D.6 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Loevinger Kohlberg 
Ego stage Impulse control Interpersonal style Conscious preoccupation Moral stage Characteristics 
1. Presocial  Autistic    
2. Symbiotic Symbiotic Self vs. nonself 
3. Impulse ridden Impulse ridden, 
fear of retaliation 
Exploitive, 
dependent 
Bodily feelings, especially 




Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige, or 
trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility. 





Advantage, control Instrumental 
hedonism 
Right action is that instrumentally satisfying the self’s 
needs and occasionally those of others. Naive 
egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity. 










Orientation to approval and to pleasing and helping others. 
Conformity to stereotypical images of majority or natural 
role behavior, and judgment by intentions. 
6. Law-and-order 
orientation 
Orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the 
maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of 
doing one’s duty, showing respect for authority, and 
maintaining the given social order for its own sake. 
(continued) 
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Table D.6 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Jürgen Habermas). 
Level Loevinger Kohlberg 
Ego stage Impulse control Interpersonal style Conscious preoccupation Moral stage Characteristics 











Right action is defined in terms of individual rights and of 
standards which have been initially examined and agreed 
upon by the whole society. Concern with establishing and 
maintaining individual rights, equality, and liberty. 
Distinctions are made between values having universal, 
prescriptive applicability and values specific to a given 
society. 
















Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord 
with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical 
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These 
principles are abstract; they are not concrete moral rules. 
These are universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity 
and equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity 
of human beings as individual persons. 




Ditto, cherishing of 
individuality 
Ditto, identity 
Source: Based on Habermas (1979, 76–77: Schemes 1, 1a). 
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Table D.7 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Sue T. Parker and Michael L. McKinney). 
Level Parker/McKinney Mithen Donald Representative 
1.  Apprenticeship  
(symbolic) 
General intelligence 
Powerful general intelligence plus several specialized mental modules, including one for social 
intelligence (which first evolved in monkeys) 
Episodic culture Great apes 
2.  Joint attention  
(early concrete 
operational) 
Multiple specialized intelligences 
Language module communicated with the social module, but remained isolated from the 
technological and natural history modules, which also remained isolated from each other 
Mimetic culture Homo erectines 
3.  Declarative planning  
(late concrete operational) 
Flexible flow of knowledge among the multiple intelligences 
Barriers among the modules break down, resulting in flexible, general purpose intelligence 
Mythic culture Homo sapiens 
4. (formal operational) Theoretic culture 
Source: Excerpted from Parker and McKinney (1999, 275–77, 286–87). 
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Table D.8 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Angela H. Pfaffenberger and Paul W. Marko). 
Level Hy/Loevinger Cook-Greuter Torbert Joiner 
1. Impulsive Impulsive Impulsive Enthusiast 
2. Self-protective Self-protective Opportunist Operator 
3. Conformist Conformist Diplomat Conformer 
4. Self-aware Self-aware Expert Expert 
5. Conscientious Conscientious Achiever Achiever 
6. Individualist Individualist Individualist Catalyst 
7. Autonomous Autonomous Strategist Co-Creator 
8. Integrated Construct Aware Alchemist Synergist 
9. Unitive Ironist 
Source: Based on Pfaffenberger and Marko (2011, 3: Table I.1). 
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Table D.9 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Philip M. Powell). 
Level Piaget Selman Fischer Commons/Richards 
1. Sensori-motor  Ability to form sets of concrete actions on and perceptions of things Circular sensori-motor actions and 
sensori-motor actions 
2. Preoperations Egocentric 
perspective-taking 
Nominal actions and preoperations 




Developing ability to represent concrete attributes of an object Preoperations and primary operations 




Developing ability to relate one representational set to another Concrete operations 
5. Early formal operations Mutual  
perspective-taking 
Ability to relate two representational systems to solve simple formal 
operations tasks 
Abstract operations 
6. Formal operations Societal-symbolic 
perspective-taking 
Early ability to relate one abstract concept to another 
 
Formal operations 
7. Ability to integrate within and across two or more abstract systems Systematic or metasystematic 
operations 
8. Ability to integrate subject and object Metasystematic through cross-
paradigmatic operations 
Source: Based on Powell (1984, 337–38: Table 15.2). 
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Table D.10 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (John Snarey, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Gil Naom) – Part 1. 
Level Period Ego development Epistemological reasoning 
Erikson Loevinger Kegan Piaget Selman Perry 
1. Infancy Hope  Presocial, autistic Incorporative Sensorimotor   
Will 
2. Early childhood Purpose  Symbiotic Impulsive Preoperational Egocentric Simple dualism 
3. Middle childhood Competence  Impulsive Imperial Concrete operations  Subjective  
4. Late childhood Self-protective Self-reflective  Dualism 
5. Early adolescence Fidelity Conformist Interpersonal Formal operations Mutual  Subordinate multiplicity 
6. Later adolescence Conscientious Institutional  Systems  Multiplicity | Relativism 
7. Early adulthood Love Autonomous Interindividual Symbolic Commitment 
8. Middle adulthood Care Integrated [Postformal operations] 
9. Maturity Wisdom 
Source: Snarey, Kohlberg and Noam (1983, 331: Table 3). 
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Table D.11 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (John Snarey, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Gil Naom) – Part 2. 








Natural and social environment 
Fowler 
Ultimate environment 
1. Infancy Amoral protoplasmic Amoral egocentrism  Undifferentiated Primal 
2. Early childhood Animal attraction and 
avoidance 
Obedience-punishment Complete determinism Objective Intuitive-projective 
3. Middle childhood Individual Mythic-literal 








Voluntarism Divided Conventional 
6. Later adolescence The natural system, 
ecological perspective 
Social accord and system 
maintenance 
Divine plan Dualist Individuating and reflexive 




8. Middle adulthood Universal oneness 
with nature 
Universal ethical principles Universal communion Dialectical materialist Paradoxical-consolidative 
9. Maturity Universalizing 
Source: Snarey, Kohlberg and Noam (1983, 332: Table 3). 
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Table D.12 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Zachary Stein and Katie Heikkinen). 
Level Fischer Commons Kohlberg Armon King/Kitchener Kegan Beck Cook-Greuter 
0. Single reflexes Calculatory       
1. Reflexive mappings Sensory or motor 
2. Reflexive systems Circular sensory motor 
3. Single sensorimotor actions Sensory-motor 
4. Sensorimotor mappings Nominal 
5. Sensorimotor systems Sentential 
6. Single representations Pre-operational Stage 1 Stage 1 Impulsive 1st person 
7. Representational mappings Primary Stage 2 Magical-animistic 2nd person 
8. Representational systems Concrete Stage 2  Imperial Power gods 
9. Single abstractions Stage 3 Absolutist 3rd person 
10. Abstract mappings Formal Stage 3  Stage 3 Interpersonal Individualistic achiever 
11. Abstract systems Systemic Stage 4 Stage 4 Stage 4 Institutional Relativistic 4th person 
12. Single principles Metasystemic Stage 5 Stage 5 Stage 5 Interindividual Systemic-integrative 5th person 
(continued) 
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Table D.12 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Zachary Stein and Katie Heikkinen). 
Level Fischer Commons Kohlberg Armon King/Kitchener Kegan Beck Cook-Greuter 
13. Principled mappings Paradigmatic Stage 6  Stage 6 | Stage 7  Global holistic Global 
14. Principled systems Cross-paradigmatic Coral Cosmic 
Source: Based on Stein and Heikkinen (2008, 123: Table 2). 
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Table D.13 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Fred Travis and Sue Brown). 
Level Age 
(years) 
Brain maturation Piaget 
Cognitive stage 
Alexander 
Predominant process of knowing 
Loevinger (Cook-Greuter) 
Ego stage 
1. 0–2 Neural exuberance and myelination of 
sensory and motor areas 
Sensorimotor Behavior senses Presocial  Preconventional 
Symbiotic 
2. 2–7 Maximum number of connections Preoperations Desire Impulsive 
3. 7–11 Corpus callosum myelinates and pruning 
begins around age 10 
Concrete operations Mind Self-protective 
4. 11–18 Prefrontal connections begin to 
myelinate at age 12, and pruning 
finishes at age 18 
Formal operations Intellect Conformist  Conventional 
Self-aware 
Conscientious 
5. 18–25 Prefrontal myelination finishes Feeling and intuition Individualistic  Postconventional 
6. Experience continues to shape brain 
circuits throughout one’s life span 
Postformal 
operations 
Individual ego Integrative  
(Construct-aware | Unitive) 
7. 25+ Techniques such as meditation practices 
are needed to promote postsymbolic 
experiences 
 Universal ego Higher states of consciousness 
Source: Based on Travis and Brown (2011, 29: Table 2.1). 
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Table D.14 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Charu T. Tuladhar and Michael L. Commons). 
Level Commons et al. 







1.  Calculatory    
2.  Automatic 
3.  Sensory or motor 
4.  Circular sensory motor Single sensory-motor set Sensorimotor 
 
5.  Sensory motor Sensory-motor mapping 
6.  Nominal Sensory-motor system Preoperational Stage 1  Preconventional 
7.  Sentential 
8.  Preoperational Single representational set 
9.  Primary Representational mapping Stage 2 
10.  Concrete Representational system Concrete operational 
11.  Abstract Single abstract set Stage 3  Conventional 
12.  Formal Abstract mappings Formal operational 
13. Systematic Abstract systems Stage 4 
(continued) 
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Table D.14 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Charu T. Tuladhar and Michael L. Commons). 
Level Commons et al. 







14. Metasystematic Single principles [Postformal] Stage 5  Postconventional 
15. Paradigmatic Stage 6 
16.  Cross-paradigmatic 
17.  Meta-paradigmatic 
Source: Based on Tuladhar and Commons (2014, 26: Table 1). 
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Table D.15 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 1. 














1. Sensori-motor Matter Material self Pleromatic Distortion, delusional 
projection, hallucination, 
wish fulfillment 
Psychosis Intense regressive 
therapies, 
pacification 
F1 (physical self) 
2. Sensation Bodyego Uroboic 
3. Perception 
4. Exocept Axial-body 
5. Phantasmic-
emotional 
Impulse Pranic-body (typhonic) Selfobject fusion, 
projection, splitting 
Borderline Structure-building F2 (emotional self) 
6. Image Image-body (magical) 
7. Representational Symbol Persona Name-self Isolation, repression, 
reaction form 
Neurosis Uncovering F3 (self-concept) 
8. Endocept 
9. Concept Concept-self 
10. Concrete-
operational 
Rule/role Membership-self (mythic) Displacement, duplicitous 
transactions, covert 
intentions 




Formal Ego Mature ego Suppression, anticipation, 
sublimation 
Ego Introspection F5 (mature ego) 
13.  
(continued) 
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Table D.15 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 1. 














14. Postformal Vision-logic Centaur Centaur  




Existential Existential therapy F6 (centaur) 
15. 
16. 
17. Transpersonal Psychic  Soul Psychic self Psychic inflation, split-life 
goals, pranic disorder, yogic 
illness 
Psychic Path of yogis F7 (psychic) 
18. 




Subtle Path of saints F8 (subtle) 
20. 




Causal Path of sages F9 (causal) 
22. 
23. Nondual Nondual    Ground 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 627: Chart 1A). 
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Table D.16 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 2. 






1. Sensori-motor Matter Archaic Undifferentiated, pleromatic Egocentric 
2. Sensation 
3. Perception 




6. Image Magical Egocentric, word magic, narcissistic; locus of magic power = ego 
7. Representational Symbol 
8. Endocept Magic-mythic Omnipotence of ego challenged; security; ego omnipotence transferred to gods 
9. Concept Mythic (literal) Concrete-literal myths; locus of magic power = deified Other 
10. Concrete-
operational 




Formal Rational formalism Static universal formalism 
13. Static systems/contexts 
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Table D.16 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 2. 






14. Postformal Vision-logic Pluralistic relativism Pluralistic systems, dynamic-multiple contexts/histories Worldcentric 
15. Holistic integralism Integrates multiple contexts; paradigmatic 
16. Cross-paradigmatic; dialectical developmentalism as World Process 
17. Transpersonal Psychic  Psychic (shamanic, yogic) Union with World Process; nature mysticism; gross real unity Theocentric 
18. 
19. Subtle Subtle (archetypal, saintly) Union with creatrix of gross realm; deity mysticism; subtle realm unity 
20. 
21. Causal  Causal (formless, sage) Union with source of manifest realms; formless mysticism; causal unity 
22. 
23. Nondual Nondual (siddha) Union of form and formless; Spirit and World Process; nondual mysticism 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 628: Chart 1B). 
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Table D.17 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 3. 
Level  Wilber 
Basic structure 
Moral span  







1. Sensori-motor Matter “me” 






2. Sensation Sensations Sensorimotor  
(initial aesthetic impact) 















7. Representational Symbol Magical imagery 
(e.g., Paleolithic cave art, 







Rule/role 3rd degree emotions  
(love, joy, depression, 
hate) 
Gender conventionality Mythological-literal 
(e.g., concrete religious art, 
icons) 11. “us” 
(locus of mythic 








Formal 4th degree emotions 
(universal affect,  
global justice, care,  
Perspectival  
(e.g., naturalistic, empirical-
representational, impressionist,  13. 
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Appendix D  Correlation of Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing  559 
Table D.17 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 3. 
Level  Wilber 
Basic structure 
Moral span  







14. Postformal Vision-logic “all of us” 
(locus of rational universal 












(e.g., cubist, abstract) 
16. 
17. Transpersonal Psychic  “all earthly beings” 








(e.g., fantastic realist, psychic 
perceptual) 18. 
19. Subtle “all sentient beings” 
(locus of Brahma-lokas) 






(e.g., thangka, bhakti 
expressivist) 20. 





22. Non-dual  
(e.g., Zen landscape) 
23. Nondual “all manifest and 
unmanifest” 
(Buddhic) One taste 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 627–28, 643: Charts 1-B, 8). 
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Table D.18 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 4. 









Idea of the good life 
 
Ethics 






Impulse Archaic  
(familization of male) 
6. Image 
7. Representational Symbol Magical-animistic  
(tribal kinship, 
preconventional law) 
Natural identity Actions and 
consequences of 
action 
Hedonism under obedience 
8. Endocept 




(early state, conventional 
law) 
Role identity Roles Concrete morality/primary groups 
11. Systems of norms Concrete morality/secondary groups Specific order 
12. Formal-
operational 
Formal Mythic-rational (empire) Ego identity Principles Civil liberties, legal freedom Rational natural law 
13. Rational-reflective (nation Moral freedom Formalistic ethics 
(continued) 
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Table D.18 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 4. 









Idea of the good life 
 
Ethics 
14. Postformal Vision-logic state, postconventional law)     
15. World citizen 
(global) 
Political freedom Universal ethics of 
speech 
16. 




21. Causal  
22. 
23. Nondual 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 644, 646: Charts 9A, 10). 
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Table D.19 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 5. 










1. Sensori-motor Matter     
2. Sensation 
3. Perception Sensorimotor Sensorimotor actions Single sensorimotor set Sensorimotor 
4. Exocept Sentential actions Sensorimotor mapping 
5. Phantasmic-
emotional 
Impulse Sensorimotor system Prana-emotion-desire 
6. Image Preoperational  
(preconceptual) 
7. Representational Symbol Nominal actions Single representational set  
8. Endocept (conceptual, intuitive) Preoperational actions 





Substage 1 Primary actions Representational system 





Substages 1 | 2 Abstract | Formal operations Abstract mapping 
13. Substage 3 Systematic Systems Abstract mind 
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Table D.19 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 5. 










14. Postformal Vision-logic Polyvalent logic (systems of systems) Metasystematic Systems of systems  
15. Paradigmatic 
16. Cross-paradigmatic 
17. Transpersonal Psychic  
18. 
19. Subtle Transcendental intuition 
20. 
21. Causal  Root mind 
22. Pure Self 
23. Nondual Brahman-Atman 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 631: Chart 3A). 
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Table D.20 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 6. 










1. Sensori-motor Matter     
2. Sensation 




Impulse Symbiotic Symbiotic Confused, confounded 
6. Image 
7. Representational Symbol Impulsive Rudimentary self-labeling 1st person 
8. Endocept 
9. Concept Self-protective Self-protective Basic dichotomies, concepts 
10. Concrete-
operational 
Rule/role Rule-oriented Early roles 2nd person 
11. Conformist Conformist Simple roles 3rd person 
12. Formal-
operational 
Formal Conscientious-conformist Self-conscious Introspection 
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Table D.20 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 6. 










14. Postformal Vision-logic Autonomous Autonomous Self as system  
15. Integrated Ego-witnessing Self as construct 5th person 
16. Construct-witnessing Self transparent 6th person 




21. Causal  
22. 
23. Nondual 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 633, 635: Charts 4A, 4C). 
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Table D.21 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 7. 










1. Sensori-motor Matter  Physiological Pleroma Pleromatic, uroboic fusion 
2. Sensation Trust vs. mistrust Uroboros Alimentary uroboros 
3. Perception Uroboric Mother 
4. Exocept Wish-fulfillment, magic 
5. Phantasmic-
emotional 
Impulse Autonomy vs. shame and doubt Beginning of safety The Great Mother Material incest 
6. Image Bodyself, narcissism 
7. Representational Symbol Separation of the World Parents Oedipus, Elektra 
8. Endocept Safety 
9. Concept Initiative vs. guilt and anxiety Dragon fight, birth of the Hero Overcoming instincts 
10. Concrete-
operational 
Rule/role Slaying of Mother Emergence of ego 
11. Industry vs. inferiority Belongingness Differentiation of anima 
12. Formal-
operational 
Formal Self-esteem Slaying of Father Differentiation of animus 
13. Identity vs. role confusion Captive and Treasure Mature ego 
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Table D.21 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 7. 










14. Postformal Vision-logic Intimacy vs. isolation Self-actualization Transformation Ego/self integration 
15. Generativity vs. stagnation 
16. Integrity vs. despair 




21. Causal  
22. 
23. Nondual 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 633–34, 642: Charts 4A, 4B, 7). 
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Table D.22 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 8. 



















6. Image Anomy 
7. Representational Symbol Magic wish 
8. Endocept Selfish 
9. Concept Punishment and obedience Morality of authority Radical egoism 
10. Concrete-
operational 
Rule/role Heteronomy Naive hedonism Instrumental egoism 
11. Approval of others Care Morality of association Affective mutuality 
12. Formal-
operational 
Formal Law and order Individuality 
13. Autonomy 4 ½ transition Subjective relativism 
(continued) 
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Table D.22 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 8. 












14. Postformal Vision-logic  Prior rights, social contract Universal care  
(hierarchical-integrative) 
Morality of principles Autonomy 
15. Universal ethical Universal holism 
16. 




21. Causal  
22. 
23. Nondual 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 636–38: Charts 5A, 5B, 5C). 
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Table D.23 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 9. 


















7. Representational Symbol Concrete category 
8. Endocept Undifferentiation 
9. Concept Representational relations One perspective Dualistic 
10. Concrete-
operational 
Rule/role Personal impressions Preformism Dualist absolutist Early multiplicity 
11. Abstractions Formism, mechanism Multiple outcomes Multiplicity 
12. Formal-
operational 
Formal Relativism, contextualism Static relativism, pluralism Early multiple perspectives Relativism, pluralism 
13. Early synthesis Static systems 
(continued) 
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Table D.23 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 9. 










14. Postformal Vision-logic Synthesis Dynamic relativism, contextualism Multiple perspectives Commitment (early) 
15. Dynamic dialecticism 
(“integration of cultural and 
historical systems into evolving 
social structures”) 
Integrative multiple perspective (middle | late) 
16. 




21. Causal  
22. 
23. Nondual 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 636: Chart 5A). 
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Table D.24 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 10. 










1. Sensori-motor Matter    Reactive 
2. Sensation 






7. Representational Symbol Egocentric Impulsive Impulsive 
8. Endocept 
9. Concept Egocentric 
10. Concrete-
operational 
Rule/role Early role-taking Imperial Opportunist 
11. Reflective roles Diplomat Conformist 
12. Formal-
operational 
Formal Mutual role-taking, 
perspectivism 
Interpersonal Technician 
13. Individual role Formal-institutional Achiever Achiever or Affiliative 
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Table D.24 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 10. 










14. Postformal Vision-logic Symbolic interaction  Existential  
15. Postformal-interindividual Ironist Authentic 
16. 
17. Transpersonal Psychic  
18. 
19. Subtle Transcendent 
20. 
21. Causal  
22. 
23. Nondual Unitary 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 633, 635–36, 638: Charts 4A, 4C, 5A, 5C). 
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Table D.25 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 11. 












1. Sensori-motor Matter      
2. Sensation Preverbal, 
undifferentiated 
Instinctive 




Impulse Archaic Primitive Magical-animistic Magical-animistic 
6. Image 
7. Representational Symbol Magic Archaic Magical, projective 








Formal Mental Early modern Individual-reflexive Multiplistic Individualistic-achiever 




Appendix D  Correlation of Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing  575 
Table D.25 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 11. 












14. Postformal Vision-logic Integral-aperspectival   Systemic (integrated) Systematic-integrative 
15. Universalizing 
16. Global holistic 




21. Causal  
22. 
23. Nondual 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 634–35, 639, 645: Charts 4B, 4C, 6A, 9B). 
 
  
Appendix D  Correlation of Models of Integrative Levels of Knowing  576 
Table D.26 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 12. 
Level  Wilber 
Basic structure 






1. Sensori-motor Matter Matter Physical    
2. Sensation Sensation Sensation Archaic 
3. Perception Perception Perception 
4. Exocept Archaic-magical 
5. Phantasmic-
emotional 
Impulse Pleasure/pain Vital-emotional 
6. Image Images Magical 
7. Representational Symbol 
8. Endocept Magic-mythic 







Formal Logical faculty Logical mind (preliminary practices) 
13. Rational-universal 
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Table D.26 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 12. 
Level  Wilber 
Basic structure 










17. Transpersonal Psychic  World soul Illumined mind Nature mysticism 
(union with stream of life) 
Concentration with support Nature mysticism 
18. Transcending gross perception 




Subtle perception Deity mysticism 
20. Luminosity 
21. Causal  Nous Overmind Insight Formless mysticism 
22. Divine mysticism 
(dark night, union) 
Cessation | Advanced insight 
23. Nondual Absolute one Supermind Enlightment Nondual mysticism 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 629–30, 639–40: Charts 2A, 2B, 6A, 6B). 
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Table D.27 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 13. 





Great Chain of Being 
Islamic tradition 
Sufism (Hazrat Inayat Khan) 
 
Zikr (Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi) 
1. Sensori-motor Matter Malkhut Matter Matter (nasut) Mineral world 
2. Sensation Vegetable Vegetal world 




Impulse Yesod Body Mundane person (bodily desires) 
6. Image 
7. Representational Symbol 
8. Endocept 




11. Tiferet Surface sign 
12. Formal-
operational 
Formal Artistic person (beyond conventions) 
13. Universal order 
(continued) 
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Table D.27 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 13. 





Great Chain of Being 
Islamic tradition 
Sufism (Hazrat Inayat Khan) 
 
Zikr (Muhyiddin Ibn ‘Arabi) 
14. Postformal Vision-logic     
15. Idealistic (universal principles) Integral ideas 
16. 
17. Transpersonal Psychic  Chesed/Gevurah Soul Djinn (genius) Intellect in holy forms 
18. Vision mind (malkut) Vision-wholeness 
19. Subtle Chokhmah/Binah Soul (angelic) Ascending sights 
20. Akasha-archetypal | Arwah-divine luminosity Divine light, bliss 
21. Causal  Keter Ayn Spirit Wahdat-witness Witness-totality 
22. Djabrut-cessation (formless) Gnosis (a returned one) 
23. Nondual Ein Sof Zat (absolut consciousness, nondual) 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 630, 639–40: Charts 2B, 6A, 6B). 
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Table D.28 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 14. 


















Impulse Emotional-sexual Emotional-sexual 
(prana-mayakosha) 
6. Image 
7. Representational Symbol Concepts and beliefs of gross 
mind 
8. Endocept 









Formal Manovijnana  
(gross-reflecting mind) 
13. Verbal-rational mind Universal ethical practices 
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Table D.28 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – A Part 14. 










14. Postformal Vision-logic     
15. 
16. 





(gross union, subtle perception, 
luminosity) 18. 
19. Subtle Sahasrara, transcendental 
consciousness, light 
20. Tainted alayavijnana 
(archetypal) 





23. Nondual Brahman-Atman Nondual consicousness One taste | Non-meditation 
Source: Based on Wilber (1999, 629–30, 639: Charts 2A, 2B, 6A). 
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Table D.29 Correlation of models of Integrative Levels of Knowing (Ken Wilber) – B. 
Level Interior-individual (intentional) Exterior-individual (behavioral) Interior-collective (cultural) Exterior-collective (social) 
1. Prehension Atoms Physical-pleromatic Galaxies 
2. Molecules Planets 
3. Irritability Prokaryotes Protoplasmic Gaia system 
4. Eukaryotes Vegetative Heterotrophic ecosystems 
5. Sensation Neuronal organisms Locomotive Societies with division of labor 
6. Perception Neural cord organisms 
7. Impulse Reptilian brain-stem organisms Uroboic Groups/families 
8. Emotion Limbic system organisms Typhonic 
9. Symbols Neocortex (triune brain) organisms Archaic Tribes (foraging) 
10. Concepts Complex neocortex organisms Magic Tribal/village (horticultural) 
11. Concrete operations (structure function 1) Mythic Early state/empire (agrarian) 
12. Formal operations (structure function 2) Rational Nation/state (industrial) 
13. Vision-logic (structure function 3) Centauric Planetary (informational) 
Source: Based on Wilber (2000, 198: Figure 5-1). 
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1. Infrared  Sensorimotor    Symbiotic  Undifferentiated 
2. Magenta Symbolic Preoperational 1st Order Impulsive Magic-animistic Magical 
3. Red Conceptual 2nd Order Self-protective Egocentric Mythic-literal 
4. Amber Rule/role Concrete-operational 3rd Order Conformist Absolutistic Conventional 
5. Orange Rational Formal-operational 4th Order Conscientious Multiplistic Individual-reflexive 
6. Green Pluralistic Meta-systemic (4.5 Order) Individualistic Relativistic Conjunctive 
7. Teal Low vision-logic Paradigmatic Autonomous Systemic Universalizing-
Commonwealth 
8. Turquoise High vision-logic Cross-paradigmatic Higher mind 5th Order Construct-aware 
9. Indigo Psychic Illumined mind  (Ego-aware) 
10. Violet Subtle Intuitive mind 
11. Ultraviolet Causal Overmind Transpersonal 
12. Clear light Nondual Supermind 
Source: Based on Wilber (2006, 68–69: Figures 2.4, 2.5). 
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Table E.1 Examples of viewpoint analysis and indexing based on various models of Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
Document Significant features Integrative Level of Knowing Reference 
The Sorcerer, cave painting in 
the Cave of the Trois-Frères, 
Ariège, France 
(c. 13,000 BCE) 
Representation of mythical creature with human and animal 
characteristics. Artistic creation of something new from known elements. 
Artwork with symbolic function in a social, maybe ritualistic context. 
Archaic thinking based on images and symbols with magical and animistic 
elements. 
Level of preoperational cognition according to 
Piaget’s model of logico-mathematical 
development. 
Klix (1993, 191–93, 
206–8, 363, 387) 
Tales of Australian Aborigines 
(oral tradition) 
 
[e.g., Aboriginal Legends 
edited by David Unaipon 
(1927), M.K.] 
String of tales about certain ancestral heroes among many Australian 
Aborigines. Folktales rather then epic myths. Brief, often elliptical and 
unconnected stories with loose collection of facts, places, rules, powers, 
and beings. Without much concern for chronology or logical 
interrelations. Lack of large-scale organizing elements or a single 
narrative plot. 
Level of preoperational cognition according to 
Piaget’s model of logico-mathematical 
development. 
Level of primitive culture according to Barnes’s 
model of scientific and religious development.  
Barnes (2000, 59, 
89–90) 
Epic of Gilgamesh 
(c. 2,100–1,000 BCE) 
Long and complex epic myth. Interrelation of many parts of a longer story 
in a single plot. Older stories placed within a larger and new narrative 
framework. The adventures of Gilgamesh and his friend Enkidu had to 
take place in a sequence after the taming of the wild Enkidu and before 
his death. The search by Gilgamesh for immortality had to follow his 
bereavement over Enkidu’s death and be a result of it. Each complex part 
of the story builds logically upon another part. 
Level of concrete-operational cognition 
according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of archaic culture according to Barnes’s 
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Table E.1 Examples of viewpoint analysis and indexing based on various models of Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
Document Significant features Integrative Level of Knowing Reference 
Rig Veda 
(c. 1,500–800 BCE) 
Collection of sacred texts originating in hymns and other religious 
material. Mostly polytheistic and concerned with ritual appeasement of 
the gods and manipulation of various kinds of sacred or magical power. 
General tone is concrete and mythological. Unreflected thought. Major 
attribute of the gods is not moral rectitude but sheer power. In most 
recently written parts (e.g., book X) speculation about the origin of the 
universe, reflection upon the problem of establishing the single unity 
behind all diversity, the single source of all multiplicity. Monotheistic and 
monistic tendencies.  
Mainly level of concrete-operational, partly early 
forms of level of formal-operational cognition 
according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Mainly level of archaic culture, partly early 
forms of level of classical or axial culture 




Tutankhamun’s Painted Box, 
painting 
(c. 1,320 BCE) 
Aspective representation with a lack of spatial depth and a strict profile 
display. Persons are depicted in different sizes according to their 
importance. Size, form, and color of entities remain constant 
independently from distance and perspective. Landscape is indicated 
only by some plants and thus as a place, not as a space. 
Level of preoperational cognition according to 





Pan Geng chapter of Shujing 
(Book of Documents) 
(c. 1,100 BCE) 
Speech attributed to Shang dynasty king Pan Geng, around 1,400 BCE. 
Orientation towards role and upholding of the system instead of 
preference for kin. Establishment of a political state order. 
Announcement that Pan Geng will “punish by death all those who 
commit crimes and display the goodness of those who show virtuous 
behavior, regardless of how distant or near they stand (to me).” He 
demands that his subordinates “fear” him, the “one man,” and accept his 
authority, since otherwise the whole state would break into parts and 
“we will all together sink in ruin.” Hence, everybody is admonished to 
“fulfill his business and get his position in order.” 
Level of social system and conscience 
(conventional moral judgment) according to 
Kohlberg’s model of moral development. 
Roetz (1993, 35) 
(continued) 
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Table E.1 Examples of viewpoint analysis and indexing based on various models of Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
Document Significant features Integrative Level of Knowing Reference 
Mahabharata, including 
Bhagavat Gita 
(c. 900–400 BCE) 
Collection of stories and wisdom. The great battle that is its central event 
is prefaced and surrounded by multiple stories. The teachings of the 
Bhagavat Gita is similar to that of the Upanishads but in the form of a 
story about the warrior Arjuna and his charioteer Krishna as an 
incarnation of the god Vishnu. Typically mythical and history-like 
narrative of significant deeds by gods and demons. It gathers together in 
one place an enormous amount of traditional material about the origin 
of things, the nature of human life, the basic structure of the cosmos, 
and how everything led up to the major events of the narrative.  
Level of concrete-operational cognition 
according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of archaic culture according to Barnes’s 
model of scientific and religious development. 
Barnes (2000, 89–
90, 101) 
Mukhya Upanishads (Principal 
Upanishads) 
(c. 800–300 BCE)  
Commentaries on the Vedas, mostly on the few lines that show an 
incipient monotheism and monism. Shift from polytheism toward belief 
in a single Ultimate or a single supreme personal Being. A few lines that 
suggest belief in a Reality that transcends even personness. It is 
philosophical in that it offers rather orderly analyses of the structure of 
the universe and human life. 
Early forms of level of formal-operational 
cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of classical or axial culture according to 
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Table E.1 Examples of viewpoint analysis and indexing based on various models of Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
Document Significant features Integrative Level of Knowing Reference 
Illiad attributed to Homer 
(c. 750 BCE) 
Long and complex epic myth. Older stories placed within a larger and 
new narrative framework. Belief in gods. People do not have language for 
identifying own feelings and inner thoughts very well as their own but 
think of them as placed in the person by a god. External factors such as 
wealth and power, and especially heroism, count. Using guile to achieve 
success is an admirable skill. The highest goal in life is to earn esteem 
through heroic accomplishments, especially as a warrior. Individual 
human beings as such has no rights. There are no universal standards of 
justice or truth against which a person could measure self-worth. It is a 
shame culture rather than a guilt culture. 
Level of concrete-operational cognition 
according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of preconventional moral judgement 
according to Kohlberg’s model of moral 
development. 
Level of archaic culture according to Barnes’s 
model of scientific and religious development. 
Barnes (2000, 89–
90, 107–8) 
Lack of the concepts of consciousness, self, and will. Protagonists like the 
hero Achill do not consider the consequences of their actions, show a 
lack of subjectivity, are not able to take the perspective of others or to 
reflect complex situations. His decisions are guided externally by gods, 
for example, when Athena intervenes in order to stop Achill to kill 
Agamemnon in rage. 
Level of preoperational cognition and level of 
concrete-operational cognition according to 
Piaget’s model of logico-mathematical 
development. 
Bammé (2011, 
175, 179–82, 188, 
270–71) 
Odyssey attributed to Homer 
(c. 700 BCE) 
Early forms of ego identity. The hero Odysseus considers the 
consequences of his actions, is able to reflect on complex situations and 
to take the perspective of his opponents like those of the cyclops 
Polyphem. Significant use of abstract terms. Beginning of personal 
responsibility and moral consciousness. 
Mainly level of concrete-operational cognition, 
partly early forms of level of formal-operational 
cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Bammé (2011, 
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Theogony by Hesiod 
(c. 700 BCE) 
Cosmological and theogonic poem compiling views based on a rich 
religious heritage. Narrative account expressed in mythopoetic language 
of the origin and emergence of the present structure of the physical 
universe, and of the origin, genealogy, conflicts among, and present 
control over the universe of the gods. It contains a personified or 
anthropomorphic interpretation of the physical features of the universe, 
of social, artistic, and political functions, and of various human traits. 
Mythical-religious cognitive framework and primitive thought utilizing 
concrete descriptions and explanations as narrative stories more than it 
does abstract concepts and theoretical interpretations. 
Level of preoperational cognition and level of 
concrete-operational cognition according to 
Piaget’s model of logico-mathematical 
development. 
Schlagel (1995, 67, 
79, 84) 
Carmina Archilochi by 
Archilochos 
(c. 650 BCE) 
Poetry of an author who speaks of himself as individual person. 
Discovery of the self. Early forms of ego-identity and autonomy. 
Distinction between objectivity and subjectivity, as well as between 
human and divine spheres. World ruled by objective laws instead of gods. 
Mainly level of concrete-operational cognition, 
partly early forms of level of formal-operational 




Dao De Jing attributed to Laozi 
(c. 600–300 BCE) 
Search for a single Ultimate Reality and the Ultimate Way (Tao) of things. 
Universalizing approach. Emphasis on impersonal forces of nature. 
Early forms of level of formal-operational 
cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of classical or axial culture according to 
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Philosophical fragments of the 





(c. 600–370 BCE) 
 
[e.g., The Fragments of the 
Pre-Socratics edited by 
Hermann Diels (1903), M.K.] 
Philosophizing about the basic stuff of which all things are made and the 
basic processes by which all things take place. Prose reflection and 
analysis. Determination of how to distinguish truth from mere opinion, 
and how to make language clear for the sake of rational argument. 
Early forms of level of formal-operational 
cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of classical or axial culture according to 




Early form of scientific rationalism. Emancipation from religious heritage 
but still traces of mythical thought. Rational speculative cosmology with 
increasing rationality compared to earlier mythical theogonies and 
cosmogonies. Incorporation of new principles of interpretation, such as 
the principle of sufficient reason, and new abstractions derived from 
natural processes. Search for first principles and the reality behind 
phenomena. 
Level of concrete-operational cognition and 
early forms of level of formal-operational 




Recorded sayings of Buddha, 
Confucius, the Jewish 
prophets, Jesus and 
Muhammad 
(c. 550 BCE to 650 CE) 
Reflection on society as a whole, on individuals independently of social 
status. Distinction between general moral principles and duties or 
customs. Critical approach to the claims of custom and convention. 
Emphasis on the importance of conscience. Awareness of the significance 
of intention and motive. Integrated analysis of the components of the 
human personality.  
Level of social contract or utility and individual 
rights (postconventional moral judgement) 





Appendix E  Document Indexing Based on Integrative Levels of Knowing 591 
Table E.1 Examples of viewpoint analysis and indexing based on various models of Integrative Levels of Knowing. 
Document Significant features Integrative Level of Knowing Reference 
Commentary of Zuo attributed 
to Zuo Qiuming 
(c. 500–300 BCE) 
Commentaries on the Spring and Autumn Annals. Revision, expansion, 
and compilation of briefer narratives. Older stories placed within a larger 
and new narrative framework. Interrelation of many parts of a longer 
story in a single plot.  
Level of concrete-operational cognition 
according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of archaic culture according to Barnes’s 
model of scientific and religious development. 
Barnes (2000, 89, 
258) 
Ramayana 
(c. 500–200 BCE) 
Delineation of the basic truth of karma and dharma through the story of 
prince Rama as an incarnation of the god Vishnu. Typically mythical and 
history-like narrative of significant deeds by gods and demons. It gathers 
together in one place an enormous amount of traditional material about 
the origin of things, the nature of human life, the basic structure of the 
cosmos, and how everything led up to the major events of the narrative. 
Level of concrete-operational cognition 
according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of archaic culture according to Barnes’s 
model of scientific and religious development. 
Barnes (2000, 90, 
101) 
Analects attributed to 
Confucius 
(c. 480–220 BCE) 
Reflection on concepts from the ethical canon. Distinction between 
ethical life and morality, as well as between propriety (li) and 
humaneness (ren). Humaneness is not to be played off against 
conventional ethos, but is to safeguard it. Humaneness, however, is the 
necessary corrective which is to protect the conventional ethos against 
degenerating into a superficial and exploitable formalism. The principle 
of fairness represents a formal procedure rather than a virtue. This 
procedure does not depend on any tradition-impregnated casuistry nor 
on conventional values. It only depends on imaginatively putting oneself 
in the place of the other on the basis of the actor’s generalized wants, 
without specifying these beforehand. Individual’s inner self as basis of 
ethical life. 
Early forms of level of social contract or utility 
and individual rights (postconventional moral 
judgement) according to Kohlberg’s model of 
moral development. 
Roetz (1993, 46, 
52, 123, 135) 
(continued) 
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Mozi attributed to Mozi 
(c. 470–220 BCE) 
Form of orderly essay, not mythic narrative. Universalist moral standards 
superior to the social requirements of one’s time and place. Universal 
and egalitarian love of everyone, including strangers. Elaboration on 
universalist criteria of truth. 
Early forms of level of formal-operational 
cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of classical or axial culture according to 




Thematic treatises set up criteria of validity and try to convince the 
reader by long-winded and ponderous chains of arguments. 
Utilitarianism and ethics of absolute reciprocity. Rejection of the idea 
that one’s own family or state should take precedence over families and 
states of others. Concept of humaneness which means to benefit others 
as one benefits oneself. Abstraction of the “other” and ethical 
universalism. The entirety of mankind, including the “barbarian” tribes, 
equally falls within the subject range of moral responsibility.  
Level of social contract or utility and individual 
rights (postconventional moral judgement) 




Zhuangzi attributed to 
Zhuangzi 
(c. 400–100 BCE) 
The gesture of exposing moralism, the nonconformist symbolism is 
replete with, the rejection of conventional compulsion, and the emphasis 
on individual life—all this fits well into the phase of youthful protest. 
From here, the defiant applause for the robber, the glorification of the 
freedom of the childhood, and the defense of opportunism also explain 
themselves. They are linked together by one and the same deeper 
structure of a postconventional recourse to the preconventional past. 
Defying adjustments and normality, fueled by a deep feeling of alienation 
with sentimental overtones. 
Level of postconventional but not yet principled 
moral judgment (Stage 4 ½) according to 
Kohlberg’s model of moral development. 
Roetz (1993, 257) 
(continued) 
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Classics of Mountains and Seas 
(c. 400 BCE – 100 CE) 
Collection of brief stories and folktale myths. Throughout the stories the 
standard mythic events and heroes explain the origins of farming and 
fire, tell of metamorphoses and virgin birth, and dream of immortality. 
Lack of larger, coherent narrative or logical connection. 
Level of preoperational cognition according to 
Piaget’s model of logico-mathematical 
development. 
Level of primitive culture according to Barnes’s 
model of scientific and religious development. 
Barnes (2000, 
102–3) 
Meno by Plato 
(c. 385 BCE) 
Transcendence of merely local customs and laws. Elaboration of universal 
ethical norms that in theory could be applied impersonally to everyone. 
When asked to describe what true excellence or virtue (arete) is in a 
person, Meno at first praises a person who fits with the ordinary (and 
archaic) moral sensibility of his time, one who achieves success for self 
and friends, ideally also doing damage to their enemies. Socrates then 
begins to push Meno to acknowledge a more universal and objective 
sense of justice, which should be applied to any person equally. 
Level of classical or axial culture according to 
Barnes’s model of scientific and religious 
development. 
Barnes (2000, 110) 
Physics by Aristotle 
(c. 350 BCE) 
Things are viewed as acting under their own powers. Vocabulary of 
metaphysics (e.g., “substance,” “entity,” “reality,” “actor,” “creator,” or 
“cause”). 
Level of self-action according to Dewey’s and 





Arthasastra by Kautilya 
(c. 300 BCE) 
Samkhya philosophy (samkhya means “enumeration” or “calculation”) 
concerned with the enumeration of the basic principles of the universe 
and of knowledge. Development of formal logic and methods of 
knowing.  
Early forms of level of formal-operational 
cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of classical or axial culture according to 
Barnes’s model of scientific and religious 
development. 
Barnes (2000, 99, 
261) 
(continued) 
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Nyaya Sutra 
(c. 300–200 BCE) 
Reflection about the reality (or unreality) of the universe, about its most 
basic structural aspects, and about the problem of knowing. Formal logic. 
Early forms of level of formal-operational 
cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of classical or axial culture according to 
Barnes’s model of scientific and religious 
development. 
Barnes (2000, 100) 
Xunzi attributed to Xunzi 
(c. 250 BCE) 
Ethical reflections. Mere performance of roles, without considering the 
underlying inner attitude, can be morally indifferent or even wrong. 
Distinction of several stages of morally relevant action, the “minor 
conduct” (service to the family), the “medium conduct” (doing one’s duty 
in an office), and the “great conduct” (following neither the father nor 
the ruler, but justice and the Dao). The latter and normatively highest 
evaluated stage transcends the limits of convention. 
Early forms of level of social contract or utility 
and individual rights (postconventional moral 
judgement) according to Kohlberg’s model of 
moral development. 
Roetz (1993, 64–
65, 269, 274) 
New Testament  
(c. 50–140 CE) 
There are two alternative statements of the Golden Rule. The first can be 
seen in the fairness orientation as “Do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you.” The second version is phrased in terms of the 
orientation of care as “Love thy neighbour as thyself.” Considerations of 
care and justice presenting, as modern moral philosophy does, a view of 
justice which is beyond either strict contract, strict retribution, or strict 
obedience to rules. Rather it is a view of justice which focuses on ideal 
role-taking, a principle which can be called, alternatively, respect for 
persons (i.e., justice) or caring for persons as ideal ends in themselves 
(i.e., ethic of care). 
Early forms of level of universal ethical principles 
(postconventional moral judgement) according 
to Kohlberg’s model of moral development. 
Kohlberg, Levine 
and Hewer (1983, 
138) 
(continued) 
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Physiologus 
(c. 100–400 CE) 
Piecemeal allegorical interpretation of nature that lacks rational analysis 
and systematization. Animal lore attending to the habits of animals in 
order to learn moral lessons rather than understand nature. It begins, for 
example, with a description of the lion that masks its tracks from the 
hunter by whisking its tail over them as it walks, just as Jesus masked his 
divinity from unbelievers. The problem with this pious use of natural 
history is that it is wrong about the actual behavior of lions. 
Level of concrete-operational cognition 
according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of archaic culture according to Barnes’s 
model of scientific and religious development. 
Barnes (2000, 124, 
131) 
Outlines of Skepticism by 
Sextus Empiricus 
(c. 200 CE) 
Summary and analysis of skeptical arguments as to why no one can really 
know what is true or not, nor what is good or not, and therefore should 
employ a suspension of all judgement. Skeptical stance that foreshadows 
late twentieth-century arguments about the possibility of reliable 
knowledge, including scientific knowledge, about cultural relativism, 
about the theory of the social construction of knowledge, and about 
antifoundationalism. 
Late forms of level of formal-operational 





Samkhyakarika attributed to 
Isvarakrshna 
(c. 350 CE) 
Classic formulation of Samkhya philosophy (samkhya means 
“enumeration” or “calculation”) concerned with the enumeration of the 
basic principles of the universe and of knowledge. Development of 
formal logic and methods of knowing. Explicit abstract theory of 
causation: Every effect preexists in its cause; out of nothing comes 
nothing, so all that occurs is a change in preexisting reality. 
Early forms of level of formal-operational 
cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of classical or axial culture according to 
Barnes’s model of scientific and religious 
development. 
Barnes (2000, 99, 
261) 
(continued) 
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Tattvopaplavisimha by Jayarasi 
(c. 800 CE) 
Carvaka philosophy concerned with the analysis of the nature of all 
reality and of the means by which we know reality in order to arrive at a 
skepticism about the gods, about future life, and about inference. 
Rejection of the possibility of making valid inferences on the basis of 
sense experience. Concern for methods of knowing (Kitchener’s 
“metacognition”). 
Level of formal-operational cognition according 
to Piaget’s model of logico-mathematical 
development. 
Level of classical or axial culture according to 
Barnes’s model of scientific and religious 
development. 
Barnes (2000, 100) 
Leges Henrici Primi (Laws of 
Henry I) 
(c. 1114–1118) 
Confusion or interchangeability of intention and behavior. The compiler 
discusses homicide without differentiating among intentional slayings, 
deaths caused by negligence, and those resulting from unavoidable fault. 
Maxim: who unknowingly commits a wrong knowingly shall make 
amends. Lack of abstract principles. Conception of justice as exchange 
between autonomous individuals. 
Level of Individualism, instrumental purpose, 
and exchange (preconventional moral 




Song of the Nibelungs  
(c. 1250) 
Morality of loyalty. Conventions of tribal society. Level of mutual interpersonal expectations, 
relationships, and interpersonal conformity 
(conventional moral judgment) according to 
Kohlberg’s model of moral development. 
Apel (1988, 473) 




Representation based on central perspective in which vanishing lines are 
united in a uniform vanishing point. 
Level of formal-operational cognition according 




(1992, 9, 58–59) 
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View of an Ideal Town, 
painting by Pierro della 
Francesca 
(c. 1470) 
Representation as arrangement of spatial figures within coordinate 
system. Central perspective as a formal logic that is applicable to any 
content. Still confined to empirical reality and concrete features. 
Projective and Euclidean spatial relations. Static viewpoint of a single 
observer. Separation of observer and world. 
Level of concrete-operational cognition 
according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of iconic mode of representation according 
to Gablik’s model of artistic development. 
Gablik (1979, 43, 
69–70, 74) 
Novum Organum by Francis 
Bacon 
(1620) 
Compendium of how induction may be used to generate hypotheses as 
the “first vintage” or preliminary interpretation, and how those 
hypotheses may be subjected to a wide variety of types of tests. Any idea 
(fact, law, hypothesis, theory, paradigm) can be tested by reference to 
empirical evidence. Recognition of the open-ended character of 
empirical testing. 
Late forms of level of formal-operational 
cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of empirical-critical culture according to 
Barnes’s model of scientific and religious 
development. 
Barnes (2000, 150, 
183) 
Prince Balthasar Carlos on 
Horseback, painting by Diego 
Velázquez 
(c. 1635-36) 
Representation based on oblique projection and body perspective. All 
elements of the painting, the horse, the rider, and the landscape, are 
related to each other and build a unity that suggests spatial depth.  
Level of formal-operational cognition according 





Discourses and Mathematical 
Demonstrations Relating to 
Two New Sciences by Galileo 
Galilei 
(1638) 
Thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection. Concept of 
inertia: a mass once in motion continues in motion in a straight line, if 
not interfered with by other moving masses. 
Level of interaction according to Dewey’s and 
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Philosophiae Naturalis 
Principia Mathematica 
(Mathematical Principles of 
Natural Philosophy) by Isaac 
Newton 
(1687) 
Thing is balanced against thing in causal interconnection. Space and time 
as absolute and fixed, omitted from the process itself. Interactional 
systems (e.g., “particles,” “principle,” “law”). 
Level of interaction according to Dewey’s and 





The Social Contract by Jean-
Jacques Rousseau 
(1762) 
Theory of inalienable rights of liberty, rights of autonomy of the 
individuals, and principles of democracy based on a social contract. 
Level of social contract or utility and individual 
rights (postconventional moral judgement) 




United States Declaration of 
Independence 
(1776) 
Foundation of constitutional democracy that presumes attitudes of 
mutual respect among citizens. Such respect makes possible the 
recognition of rights existing prior to a social contract—the "inalienable 
rights" of the Declaration of Independence. Such rights are inalienable 
because they are inherent in the preexisting moral relationship of mutual 
respect. The democratic (or representative) form of government reflects 
the relationship of mutual respect. In addition, the procedures for 
creating, administering, and adjudicating public law reflect the 
relationship of rational debate. The right of free speech and press and 
the right to petition Congress stem from the necessity of gathering all 
relevant information before a decision. Rules of procedure are designed 
to allow all sides to be heard. Due process in both execution and 
adjudication of laws reflects a desire to ensure that all interests have an 
opportunity to be heard. 
Level of social contract or utility and individual 
rights (postconventional moral judgement) 
according to Kohlberg’s model of moral 
development. 
Rosenberg, Ward 
and Chilton (1988, 
152) 
(continued) 
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Constitution of the United 
States of America 
(1787) 
Individual’s moral orientation is not any longer based on conventional 
norms and laws of the society but on the reciprocity of human 
obligations, that is, concluded contracts and agreements legitimized by 
their utility.  
Level of social contract or utility and individual 
rights (postconventional moral judgement) 
according to Kohlberg’s model of moral 
development. 
Apel (1988, 191) 
Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals by 
Immanuel Kant  
(1785) 
Conception of the categorical imperative. Legitimization of an action 
maxim that should become a universal law is based on taking the 
perspectives of all participants and their assessment of the situation. 
Generalization and reflexive internalization of the reciprocity of role-
taking. 
Level of universal ethical principles 
(postconventional moral judgement) according 
to Kohlberg’s model of moral development. 
Apel (1988, 192) 
Birth of Bhéma, painting by 
Kangra school 
(c. 1810–25) 
Space is conceived on the basis of a linear order formed through the 
progressive combining of proximities: five distinct groups of figures exist 
as a set of neighbouring elements in five separate spaces. The eye 
revolves around each group individually, whereas in a fully developed 
projective system the eye of the observer is established as the central 
point around which revolve the form of object. In a topologically ordered 
spatial system, there is nothing outside the given configuration to act as a 
reference frame, and consequently there is no conservation of size or 
distance. 
Level of preoperational cognition according to 
Piaget’s model of logico-mathematical 
development. 
Level of enactive mode of representation 
according to Gablik’s model of artistic 
development. 
Gablik (1979, 43, 
51, 57) 
Beyond Good and Evil by 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
(1886) 
Naturalistic reductionism that seeks to expose genealogically the validity 
claims of morality as being based on irrational motives. Moral conscience 
is considered to be a pathological inversion of the “will to power.” Total 
denunciation of all universal claims of equality in the sense of human 
rights. 
Level of postconventional but not yet principled 
moral judgment (Stage 4 ½) according to 
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On the General Theory of 
Relativity, by Albert Einstein 
(1915) 
Systems of description and naming are employed to deal with aspects 
and phases of action, without final attribution to “elements” or other 
presumptively detachable or independent “entities,” “essences,” or 
“realities,” and without isolation of presumptively detachable “relations” 
from such detachable “elements.” Space and time brought into the 
investigation as among the events investigated. 
Level of transaction according to Dewey’s and 





Pronounced Rose, No. 573, 
painting by Wassily Kandinsky 
(1932) 
Non-objective picture with indeterminate, atmospheric space. 
Construction of independent relational entities without reference to 
empirical reality. There is an increase in the autonomy of forms to the 
point where even abstract forms devoid of content can be constructed 
and manipulated. Art becomes syntactic in character, operating on sets of 
pure relations. The square, circle, cube, rectangle, and triangle form a 
natural grammatical unit, a “kernel sentence” from which all 
combinations become possible. 
Level of formal-operational cognition according 
to Piaget’s model of logico-mathematical 
development. 
Level of symbolic mode of representation 
according to Gablik’s model of artistic 
development. 
Gablik (1979, 43, 
84, 91, 118) 
Dynamics of Faith by Paul 
Tillich 
(1967) 
Correlational theology that relates basic human experience of existential 
dismay to a rather liberalized Christianity. Critical awareness that images 
and doctrines of the Christian heritage are “broken myths” because we 
recognize that they are symbols and not literal truths. Affirmation of a 
reflexively critical approach to the religious truth-claims of the Christian 
tradition in harmony with the modern empirical-critical method in 
science. If the practice of modern science have made contemporary 
people more aware of themselves as limited knowers, at work in an 
evolutionary universe, then science may be directing people’s awareness 
to the real issue of God: Ultimacy of Infinite Mystery.  
Late forms of level of formal-operational 
cognition according to Piaget’s model of logico-
mathematical development. 
Level of empirical-critical culture according to 
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A Theory of Justice by John 
Rawls 
(1971) 
Striving for rational consensus on the content of the right in 
disagreement about justice. The claim of agreement represents a norm 
of moral rationality analogous to norms of scientific rationality in the 
discussion of the philosophy of science. Moral principles are designed to 
reach agreement in situations of potential moral conflict or disagreement 
among individuals. Justice as fairness and reversibility. Reversibility 
implies a conception of justice which requires each person to 
systematically take the position of everyone else in the situation until a 
fairly balanced solution emerges. 
Level of universal ethical principles 
(postconventional moral judgement) according 
to Kohlberg’s model of moral development. 
Kohlberg, Levine 
and Hewer (1983, 
61–62, 95) 
 
 
